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In the past decade and a half, most of my academic activity has been devoted to producing annotated editions of important medieval 
Jewish philosophic treatises written in Provence that had not been 
published till now. On occasion I would also write articles, many of 
them in response to invitations to deal with a general topic in medieval 
Jewish philosophy for one of the more popular series of collected 
essays. Thus when I was approached a number of years ago by Dr. Igor 
Nemirovsky at the suggestion of Professor Dov Schwartz to contribute 
a volume of my articles to the series “Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and 
Kabbalah,” published by the Academic Studies Press, I was at first 
reluctant to do so. I had no desire to present simply a compilation of 
articles. I preferred a book devoted to a central theme, in the model of 
my previous book of articles, Maimonides’ Political Thought, and I was 
not sure that I could put together another book of this nature. Upon 
further reflection, I realized that insofar as much of my research during 
this period focused on Maimonides and his reception in Provence, I 
could in fact dedicate a book to this topic. This undertaking would 
Acknowledgements
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entail, however, translating and editing an extensive amount of 
material that I had written in Hebrew, in addition to reediting a 
number of articles written in English. With this in mind, I accepted 
Dr. Nemirovsky’s proposal.
The process took far longer and it involved far more work than I 
originally envisioned. Seven of the eleven chapters in this volume are 
based on writings that appeared till now only in Hebrew. I myself 
translated these writings, while at the same time I revised them exten-
sively. I rearranged some of the discussions, added or modified many 
points, and also attempted to eliminate much of the redundant mate-
rial. Four other chapters appeared originally as English articles, to 
which I also introduced a fair number of revisions. In all the chapters 
I included cross references to other chapters in the volume. In short, I 
have tried to create more of a cohesive book than simply a collection 
of diverse articles. It is my sincere hope that for the non-Hebrew 
reader, this volume will help to illuminate the thought of some very 
interesting but lesser known Provençal Jewish thinkers with whom I 
have dealt previously mostly in my Hebrew writings. This volume is 
also intended as a contribution to the understanding of how the 
Provençal thinkers of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries 
read Maimonides and the scope of his influence on them, as well as to 
how I think the modern reader should read Maimonides.
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In a famous passage of the Kuzari, Judah Halevi contrasts the God of Aristotle, who is referred to as Elohim and known by reason, with 
the God of Abraham, whose name is the Tetragrammaton and who is 
known by prophetic illumination. The former is the God of nature, 
who governs the world by a fixed order. The latter is the God of 
history, who is aware of all that occurs in the world and exercises 
personal providence that is not limited to the workings of nature. The 
two views of God elicit two different responses in human beings, as 
the Khazar king notes:
One passionately yearns for Adonai with a passion that involves 
both “taste” and testament, while attachment to Elohim is by way 
of speculation. The passion involving “taste” compels one to 
devote oneself to the love of God and be prepared to die for 
God’s sake. Speculation, on the other hand, makes the honor of 
God a necessity only as long as it entails no harm or hardship for 
the sake of God. Hence one may excuse Aristotle if he was lax in 
Maimonides’ God: 
 The God of Abraham or the God of 
Aristotle? 
Chapter One4 
the observance of the law, since he doubted whether God is 
cognizant of it. (Kuzari 4.16)1
Who then is Maimonides’ God? The answer appears to be clear in light 
of Maimonides’ description of the commandment to sanctify God, 
which he presents in the Book of Commandments (positive command-
ment no. 9):
We are commanded to publicize the true religion, with no fear of the 
injury inflicted by an adversary. Even if an oppressor coerces us to 
deny God, we should not obey him but rather surrender ourselves to 
death. We should not even attempt to deceive him into thinking that 
we deny God, though in our hearts we continue to believe in God. 
This is the commandment to sanctify God, which is incumbent upon 
all Israel; that is to say, in our love of God and belief in God’s unity 
we surrender ourselves to be put to death by the oppressor.2
Maimonides’ description is reminiscent of that of Judah Halevi 
regarding the readiness on the part of one who knows the God of 
Abraham, the God of history, to surrender one’s life for the sake of 
one’s belief.3 This is not to deny that Maimonides’ God is also the God 
of Aristotle, for Abraham too knew God as Elohim,4 nor to ignore the 
fact that Maimonides, in many of his writings, encourages his readers 
1 All translations in this chapter are my own unless noted otherwise. For the Arabic 
see David Baneth (ed.), Al-Kitāb Al-Khazarī (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977), 
168-9. The notion of “taste” in reference to God is reminiscent of Sufi notions; see 
Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experi-
ence in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 95-100.
2 Joseph Kafiḥ (ed. and Hebrew trans.), Sefer Hamitzvot (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav 
Kook, 1971), 63.
3 For the relation between Maimonides and Halevi and the likelihood that Maimon-
ides was acquainted with the Kuzari see Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence 
on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 95-121.
4 See Maimonides’ description of Abraham’s discovery of the existence of God in 
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.3 and contrast this description with Laws of 
Principles of the Torah 1.5, 7. In both passages God is known as the Aristotelian 
First Mover and Prime Cause of the world. Halevi accepts the philosophers’ view 
of God as First Cause, and he accepts as well their conception of nature, as 
opposed to the belief in occasionalism characterizing most of the Moslem theolo-
gians (the mutakallimūn); see Kuzari 5.20. Yet in contrast to the philosophers he 
believes in a deity that acts outside the boundaries of the order of nature.
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to appreciate more this name of God, the aspect of divine activity that 
results in the order of nature.5 This point notwithstanding, Maimonides 
does not appear to abandon the conception of the personal God of 
Abraham that lies at the heart of Jewish tradition. In extending divine 
providence, God may not intervene as much in the order of nature as 
the masses would have it, but God is cognizant of all that occurs, 
rewards and punishes accordingly, and still plays an immediate role in 
determining at least some events of history, most notably the Giving 
of the Torah at Sinai—or so it appears to be the case for Maimonides.6 
Is it not then for the God of Abraham that Maimonides’ soul passion-
ately yearns, just as is the case for Halevi before him?
There is, however, another way of understanding Maimonides’ 
approach. Perhaps he is of the opinion that Abraham’s response remains 
the one that is most appropriate even for the God of Aristotle. That is 
to say, Maimonides thinks that one should passionately yearn for 
Elohim, the God of nature, as a matter of “taste” and testament and 
not simply view Elohim as an object of cold contemplation, as opposed 
to Halevi’s characterization of the philosophers’ approach. The appre-
hension of God by way of philosophic speculation is what leads to the 
desire and, moreover, the internal feeling of compulsion to publicize 
the truth of the unity of God to all of humanity, even if it endangers 
oneself.7 In his treatment of the commandment to love God, Maimon-
ides writes in a previous passage in the Book of the Commandments 
(positive commandment no. 3):
5 See, in particular, Guide of the Perplexed, 2.10. All English citations from this book 
in this volume are taken from Shlomo Pines (trans.), The Guide of the Perplexed 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
6 For a survey of these topics in Maimonides’ thought and the different possibilities 
for interpreting his approach, see Howard Kreisel, “Moses Maimonides,” in 
History of Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 245-280.
7 See Guide 2.37, where Maimonides compares the internal compulsion experienced 
by the prophets to call upon the nation to serve God to that experienced by the 
philosophers to communicate to others the truths they had learnt. In all likelihood, 
Maimonides was acquainted with the fact that Socrates in his passionate commit-
ment to truth was prepared to die rather than cease his teachings.
Chapter One6 
We have explained to you that by way of contemplation one attains 
knowledge [of God] and finds felicity; love [of God] necessarily 
follows. They [the sages] have stated that this commandment [to 
love God] includes calling upon all humanity to worship and believe 
in God. That is to say, by way of analogy, when one loves someone, 
one glorifies and praises that person and calls upon others to befriend 
that person. Similarly, if you truly love God in accordance with the 
knowledge of God that you attain, you will undoubtedly call upon 
the foolish and the ignorant to discern the truth that you have 
discerned. . . . Just as Abraham, who loved God—as Scripture attests 
by [God referring to him as] Abraham, my lover [Isaiah 41:8]—by 
virtue of the strength of his intellectual attainment, and called upon 
humanity to believe in God as a result of his love for God, so one 
must love God till one calls upon others to [believe in] God.8
According to Maimonides, Abraham’s belief in God resulted from his 
philosophic speculation. In other words, Abraham apprehended the 
God of Aristotle and this apprehension led to his passionate love of 
God, described by Maimonides in this passage as well as in Mishneh 
Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 4.12, where he writes:
When the human being contemplates these matters and knows all 
the existents—the angel [Separate Intellect], sphere, human being, 
and so on—and discerns the wisdom of God in all the existents and 
creatures, his love for God increases and his soul thirsts and flesh 
yearns to love God, blessed be He.9
Nevertheless, this alternative interpretation that one passionately loves 
the God of nature appears problematic. How can I yearn for a God who 
does not know me? Why should one be so devoted to a divine law 
8 Kafiḥ, Sefer Hamitzvot, 59.
9 See also Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 2.2; Laws of Repentance 
10.6. In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides ties the true love of God solely to the 
philosophic understanding of the order of existence. For a study of Maimonides’ 
approach to the love of God, see Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 225-266. It is interesting to note that in the Guide of 
the Perplexed, Abraham is no longer viewed as an Aristotelian philosopher but one 
who proves the existence of God on the basis of the creation of the world; see 
Guide 2.13. In this case Maimonides adopts a more exoteric philosophic stance in 
his legal work than in his theological one, as some scholars have already pointed 
out. For a discussion of this point see Kreisel, “Moses Maimonides,” 216-223.
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whose immediate author can not be God, for Aristotle’s God is inca-
pable of such action, and who is also ignorant of my observance of 
the commandments, let alone of my emotional state. How could 
Maimonides, who dedicated all his major works to the God of Abraham 
by opening them with the verse in the name of God the Lord of the world 
[Genesis 21:33],10 have thought that Abraham’s God and Aristotle’s 
God are in fact the same? Is it not strange, if not ludicrous, to think 
that Maimonides the great Jewish legal scholar is in fact committed 
solely to the God of nature?
This fundamental problem has confronted Maimonides’ commen-
tators from his own time to the present. Those who maintain that 
Maimonides’ true view essentially conforms to the world view of the 
medieval Aristotelian philosophers, and this is the esoteric position 
that he conceals in the Guide, have struggled and continue to struggle 
to show on the basis of his writings that he holds such a position.11 
Most, though not all, who argued this position in the medieval world 
10 God in the verse is referred to by the Tetragrammaton. In Maimonides’ interpreta-
tion, the verse refers to Abraham’s teaching others the monotheistic idea; see 
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.3; Guide 3.29. Maimonides opens the Commen-
tary on the Mishnah, Book of Commandments, each book of the Mishneh Torah, and 
each part of the Guide with this verse, not only conforming thereby with the 
accepted Arabic practice of dedicating religious works to the name of God but also 
indicating that in all these writings he is following in the footsteps of Abraham.
11 For a discussion of the esoteric interpretation of Maimonides through the ages, see 
in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed: Between 
the Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries,” in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore 
Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 159-207. It is not my 
contention that all those through the ages who interpreted Maimonides as holding 
an esoteric opinion on a given issue were of the view that he agreed completely 
with the Aristotelian world view. Rather, my claim is that those who adopted such 
an interpretation generally attempted to show Maimonides’ agreement with the 
philosophical approach on the issue in question. There are certainly differences of 
opinion among the commentators on what issues Maimonides concealed his true 
opinion, let alone whether he held esoteric opinions at all. I am also not claiming 
that the only reason for Maimonides’ esotericism was to hide his agreement with 
Aristotelian philosophy because of the dangers of the views advanced by Aristotle 
and his medieval Islamic followers to the naïve faith of the masses, though I am of 
the opinion that this was his primary motivation. Moreover, this was the reason 
advanced by those of Maimonides’ medieval followers who interpreted him as 
holding esoteric positions. For a different approach to the reasons for Maimonides’ 
esotericism see, for example, Yair Loberbaum, “On Contradictions, Rationality, 
Chapter One8 
did so not in order to criticize Maimonides, but because they them-
selves felt it as the true view of God and God’s relation to the world. 
The early interpreters of the Guide in Provence, beginning with Samuel 
Ibn Tibbon and his followers, developed the esoteric approach to 
Maimonides’ magnum opus and saw themselves not only as his inter-
preters but also his true disciples, even if they did not agree with him 
on all issues.12 The problem they faced was how to bridge between 
belief in the Torah and all that this entails and belief in a deity whose 
relation to the world is that which Aristotle posited.
Let us return for a moment to Judah Halevi, the Jewish thinker 
who has gone down in history as the great antagonist of Aristotelian 
philosophy, the Jewish counterpart to the great Islamic thinker 
Al-Ghazali.13 Halevi is well aware that if his criticism of the philoso-
phers is correct, one would expect them to practice all forms of moral 
and religious debauchery. If God is not aware of human actions, all 
moral restraints on human behavior are removed. Yet as the king of 
the Khazars points out:
I see you criticizing the philosophers by attributing to them that of 
which the contrary is known. Of a person who lives in seclusion and 
divorces himself from the pleasures of the world, we say he is engaged 
Dialectics and Esotericism in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Metaphysics 55 
(2002): 711-750. For a further discussion of this issue see below, chapters 2 and 7.
12 For Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s importance for the subsequent esoteric interpretation 
of Maimonides see, in particular, Aviezer Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and 
the Esoteric Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 6 (1981): 
87-123. See also Carlos Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel Ibn Tibbon: The 
Transformation of Dalālat al-Hā’irīm into the Moreh Nevukhim, ( Jerusalem: 
Magnes Press, 2007) (Heb.). 
13 This is not the place to deal with the question of the extent to which Halevi is 
influenced by the very philosophy which he purportedly rejects. In a number of 
articles I attempted to show the decisive influence exerted by Aristotelian 
philosophy on Halevi’s thought; see, for example, Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s 
Kuzari: Between the God of Abraham and the God of Aristotle,” in Joodse filo-
sofie tussen rede en traditie, ed. Reinier Munk and F. J. Hoogewould (Kampen: 
Kok, 1993), 24-34. On the relation between Halevi and Al-Ghazali see David 
Baneth, “R. Judah Halevi and Al-Gazali,” Keneset 7 (1942): 311-329 (Heb.). For the 
reception of Halevi through the ages see Adam Shear, The Kuzari and the Shaping 
of Jewish Identity: 1167-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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in philosophy and shares the views of the philosophers. You, on the 
other hand, deny them every good action. (Kuzari 4.18)
Halevi’s response to this criticism is worthy of note:
What I told you is the foundation of their belief, namely, that the 
highest human happiness lies in the knowledge of the speculative 
sciences. By grasping the forms of the existents by the hylic intellect 
and becoming an intellect in actu, and then an acquired intellect 
close to the rank of the Active Intellect, one no longer experiences 
death. This, however, can only be obtained by devoting one’s life to 
study and continuous contemplation, which is incompatible with 
worldly pursuits. For this reason, the philosophers divorced them-
selves from the pursuit of wealth, glory, corporeal pleasures, and 
children, in order not to be distracted in their studies. As soon as one 
has become learned in accordance with the final goal of the sought-
after knowledge, the individual is no longer scrupulous in his actions. 
The philosophers do not practice humility for the sake of reward, 
nor do they think that if they steal or murder they will be punished. 
They command the good and prohibit evil in the best and most 
excellent manner, in order to resemble the Creator who arranged 
everything perfectly. They have devised social laws without binding 
force, and which are conditional and may be overridden in times of 
need. The religious law, however, is not so except in its social parts, 
and the law itself sets down those which permit exceptions and 
those which do not. (Kuzari 4.19)
Halevi’s description of the philosophers’ approach is designed to 
impress upon the reader the view that they do not see in morality a 
binding obligation governing one’s behavior, but rather a useful sugges-
tion of how one is to behave.14 Yet this conclusion is problematic in 
light of Halevi’s own words. He is aware of the fact that the world view 
of the philosophers demands one to lead a completely moral life. 
Though they may regard it as a means to intellectual perfection, they 
view it as a necessary means. Moreover, for the medieval Aristotelian 
14 Leo Strauss devoted an important article to examining and defending Halevi’s phil-
osophical critique of the philosophers’ position on this issue; see Leo Strauss, “The 
Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” PAAJR 13 (1943): 47-96. See also Howard Kreisel, 
“Judah Halevi and the Problem of Philosophical Ethics, in Between Religion and 
Ethics, ed. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1993), 
171-183 (Heb.).
Chapter One10 
philosophers who were strongly influenced by Neoplatonic thought, 
the moral life is not solely a means to perfection but an aspect of 
perfection. It provides the foundation for a life of imitatio Dei15—
another point Halevi mentions in this context. At the beginning of 
his treatise, Halevi ascribes to the philosopher the view that one who 
attains intellectual perfection always performs the most noble actions, 
as if his soul is governed by the Active Intellect.16 In light of these 
positions, one may question how compelling is Halevi’s criticism of the 
philosophers that they do not fear God for the sake of reward or think 
that stealing or murdering will merit punishment. While they may not 
live moral lives for the sake of reward or punishment on the part of a 
personal deity who is watching everything they do, they do so because 
of the inherent worth of this mode of life. In short, even Halevi 
concedes that the morality preached and practiced by the philosophers 
is integrally related to their world view. The God of Aristotle provides 
the foundation not only for the physical order of the world but also for 
the moral one. In light of this point, we may well ask whether the 
intrinsic value of morality does not provide a more solid basis for its 
binding nature than any external rewards and punishments that result 
from its practice or non-practice. Moreover, Halevi indicates at the 
beginning of his treatise that the philosophers see their lifestyle, which 
combines strict morality with intensive contemplation, as inevitably 
resulting in the highest form of human happiness, one that is divine in 
nature as well as eternal.17
Halevi’s essentially laudatory characterization of the philosophers’ 
approach, even if unintended, is certainly justified in light of the medi-
eval Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle himself appears to hold a natural 
15 For different models of imitatio Dei in medieval philosophy, see Lawrence Berman, 
“The Political Interpretation of the Maxim: The Purpose of Philosophy is the 
Imitation of God,” Studia Islamica 15 (1961): 53-61.
16 Kuzari 1.1.
17 It should be added that Halevi is disingenuous when he indicates that the philoso-
phers after attaining their goal can permit themselves immoral actions when 
convenient. He himself notes when presenting their thought at the beginning of 
the treatise that after attaining perfection the person naturally performs only the 
noblest actions, as if he is guided completely by the supernal intellect. 
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law theory, though he does not regard even those moral propositions 
acknowledged by rational individuals as having the same level of 
certainty as those belonging to the theoretical sciences, which are 
known either intuitively by the intellect or by demonstrative proof.18 
Ideally, natural law, which does not vary in time or place, serves as the 
universal framework for all conventional laws.19 In general, Aristotle’s 
conception of morality is strongly related to his conception of nature. 
As is the case with all species, human beings too strive to survive and to 
continue to propagate their species. In addition, they desire to achieve 
happiness. They are by nature social animals, requiring society to satisfy 
their material needs as well as the psychological need for companion-
ship. This goal requires a government that organizes their dealings with 
each other and insures that they do not harm one another. In short, 
some level of morality is required of human beings by nature. This 
morality may be viewed as “utilitarian,” but the goal it serves is one 
embedded in the nature of humanity. The higher goal of humanity is to 
attain human perfection and the felicity attending this state, and for 
Aristotle this lies in the perfection of the theoretical intellect. This 
ultimate goal is not given to human choice, though one may choose to 
pursue it or not, and few are naturally equipped to do so; nonetheless, 
it is a goal embedded in the natural order of the world. Achieving moral 
character traits is a necessary condition for attaining this goal. This at 
least appears to be the implicit message emerging from his Nicomachean 
Ethics, which concludes with a discussion of the perfection of the 
intellect.20 This view was made explicit by the medieval Aristotelian 
philosophers, in particular Alfarabi.21 
18 See Aristotle, Topics 1, 10, 104a. Moral propositions are dialectical rather than 
demonstrative in character.
19 See Aristotle, Rhetoric 1, 13, 1373b.
20 While Aristotle himself draws no direct link between moral virtue and intellectual 
perfection, his choice to conclude a treatise on ethics by focusing on the latter 
suggests such a link in his thought. See Marvin Fox, “The Doctrine of the Mean in 
Aristotle and Maimonides: A Comparative Study,” Interpreting Maimonides: Studies 
in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 100-109. 
21 In many of his writings, Alfarabi sees the role of the ideal polity as advancing true 
happiness, which he equates with intellectual perfection, by instilling in its 
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While the dictates of morality are not known by theoretical reason 
but by practical reason—which is the faculty that explores how to best 
achieve a given end—these dictates are not viewed as a matter of purely 
subjective judgment. One simply cannot achieve final perfection while 
retaining character traits that reflect the victory of corporeal passions 
over reason. One prone to anger or constantly preoccupied with one’s 
physical appetites cannot achieve the equanimity of the soul that is 
demanded for the attainment of ultimate perfection, despite the fact 
that one may still be very smart and learn a great deal of science. For 
the Aristotelian philosopher, nature is not value-free, but values, if not 
also specific moral dictates, are an integral part of the order of the 
world. To live a truly human, that is to say divine, life, one must devote 
oneself to a life of intellect and the moral virtues that enable one to 
live such a life. Moreover, the ultimate reward, the felicity of the intel-
lect contemplating the eternal truths, is also built into the order of 
existence. The masses may not fully appreciate this fact and may need 
to be inculcated to believe in a personal God in order to prevent them 
from always capitulating to their corporeal desires and from living as 
animals. Myths that support the law and are a mode for communicating 
fundamental truths in a figurative manner must be devised for their 
benefit, a point made by Plato in his Republic, and greatly appreciated 
by the medieval philosophers, as Halevi’s “philosopher” indicates at 
the beginning of the Kuzari. The true philosopher, however, under-
stands that virtue, intellectual and moral, is in fact its own reward.
Thus the medieval Jewish philosopher who favors the God of Aris-
totle does not in the process undermine morality or reject the notion of 
eternal felicity that is inherently connected with the type of life one 
lives. This philosopher does not cease to yearn for God and to live a life 
that can be considered truly divine—not simply as a matter of existen-
tial choice but also philosophic necessity. The problem with which 
the Jewish Aristotelian philosopher must grapple is why Judaism? How 
does Judaism fit into this picture? If God is not the immediate author 
of Jewish law, then what advantage does Judaism hold over the other 
members moral virtue and inculcating true opinions. This view was to exercise a 
decisive influence on Maimonides’ approach.
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religions or over other legislations, and why should one continue to 
observe its dictates?
Maimonides’ answer according to the esotericist interpretation is 
that Moses attained the highest level of intellectual illumination 
possible for human beings, thereby enabling him to formulate the 
optimal law for a political polity, one that best directs society to the 
pursuit of perfection. Only such a law deserves to be labeled “divine.” 
This interpretation, I would like to stress, is not found only among 
Maimonides’ modern interpreters but is alluded to previously by some 
medieval ones. Nissim of Marseille comes close to making this view 
explicit, as we shall see.22 The ceremonial commandments, according to 
this view, are crucial for the Law’s pedagogical role, particularly in 
constantly reinforcing belief in one God and reminding the community 
of other speculative truths, a point that Maimonides himself repeatedly 
states in his discussion of the reasons for the commandments.23 The 
wedding of Aristotle and Judaism is not without many difficult prob-
lems, some of them seemingly insurmountable, even when viewed in its 
medieval context. The crucial point is that medieval Aristotelianism 
shared enough in common with revelatory religion to make such a 
reinterpretation of Judaism conceivable. The medieval Aristotelian 
view that there is only one God who remains unceasingly both the First 
Mover of all that changes and the First Cause of all that exists and is 
also the Supreme Intellect, the notion of a completely ordered world in 
which nothing in vain occurs in nature, Plato’s philosopher-king turned 
into Alfarabi’s prophet-legislator, with revelation being treated as a 
natural phenomenon involving the illumination of the perfect intellect, 
the notion of virtuous existence, both morally and intellectually, that 
brings with it the greatest felicity and is the goal of life, the notion of 
imitatio Dei, and the philosophic view of religion as presenting these 
truths in imaginative form as suited for society at large were seen as 
providing the philosophic foundation for a true understanding of the 
sacred texts of Judaism—both the speculative teachings these texts 
contain and the purpose of the commandments they enjoin. Jewish 
22 See below, chapter 6, 171-173. This issue will be explored further in chapter 9. 
23 See, for example, Guide 3.28.
Chapter One14 
virtue, in the fields of speculation and morality, could be viewed as the 
best expression of philosophic virtue; Moses the lawgiver could be seen 
as representing the epitome of human perfection.
The subsequent undermining of Aristotle’s physical and 
metaphysical view of the world also undermined the philosophic 
foundations for moral virtue that characterize medieval Aristotelian 
philosophy. Baruch Spinoza thought that he could build a firmer 
philosophical foundation for morality on the basis of his philosophic 
system as developed in the Ethics. His view of morality in a crucial 
sense suggests a desire to hold onto this area of medieval Aristote-
lianism, while throwing out the rest of the system. He certainly 
shares with the medieval Aristotelians the notion that human perfection 
and the road to it is built into the order of the world. Spinoza’s God 
of nature, no less that Aristotle’s God of nature, despite their 
fundamental differences, mandates moral virtue, and one may say 
also rewards it, even if in both these conceptions God is certainly 
not the personal deity of revelatory religion and has no intimate 
knowledge of virtuous individuals except in the most metaphorical 
of senses.
With Spinoza, the medieval esoteric interpretation of Maimon-
ides, the interpretation that I consider the true interpretation of his 
thought, would appear to become basically obsolete from a philosophic 
perspective. Once Aristotelianism is no longer regarded as true, any 
interpretation of Judaism along these lines must also be regarded as 
false. With Maimonides’ explicit agreement with Aristotle on so many 
fundamental points of his philosophy, and his interpretation of the 
Bible accordingly, the letter of his doctrine could no longer be accepted 
except by those who refused to recognize that the world has moved on. 
One may still try to keep the spirit of Maimonides alive by reinter-
preting Judaism, if not also Maimonides himself, along new philosophic 
lines that are regarded as true. Spinoza tried to forestall any attempt 
to turn Maimonides into a Spinozist by adamantly rejecting the inter-
pretation of Judaism along any philosophic lines. In other words, 
Spinoza sets out to destroy not only Aristotelianism but also any part-
nership between philosophy and revelatory religion that is the basis 
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for even the less radical interpretations of Maimonides’ philosophy.24 
While in the medieval world one could be an Aristotelian philosopher 
while remaining committed to Jewish law and lore, in a manner that 
goes a long way in solving the conceptual contradiction that at first 
glance characterizes these two stances, one could certainly not be a 
dedicated Spinozist and remain committed to Jewish law and to the 
truth of Jewish lore. One could choose one or the other (or neither), 
but not both.
There were a good number of attempts after Spinoza to see Judaism 
as the highest expression of philosophic religion, attempts that were in 
tune with the contemporary philosophic climate. In many cases, these 
thinkers viewed Maimonides at least as a role model, if not also as 
providing specific ideas they regarded as still relevant.25 Yet it is clear 
that the modern day academic interpreters of Maimonides’ thought, 
who treat him as a closet Aristotelian (or even as a thinker who seeks to 
develop a philosophy that completely rejects Aristotle on certain funda-
mental issues while accepting him on others), can themselves no longer 
return to the world view of their medieval counterparts. One can no 
longer root one’s own understanding of Judaism in Aristotle’s teachings 
in light of the dramatic changes in science and philosophy that have 
taken place since medieval times. Today’s God of nature may be inca-
pable of demonstratively refuting the God of revelation, but neither 
can such a deity provide any foundation for revelatory religion. We are 
witness to endless present-day attempts to show the harmony between 
science and religion on some of the big questions, particularly creation, 
but mostly as part of an apologetic program to make room for the 
24 See in particular Leo Strauss’s characterization of Spinoza’s approach to religion 
and his scathing critique of Spinoza on this cardinal issue in his Spinoza’s Critique 
of Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965).
25 For example, thinkers as diverse as Moses Mendelssohn, Hermann Cohen, Leo 
Strauss, Joseph Soloveitchik, and Yeshayahu Leibowitz. Interestingly, some other 
philosophers found in Judah Halevi an even more profound source of inspira-
tion, Franz Rosenzweig being one example. Maimonides proved to exert a 
particularly strong impact upon the early German Reform movement, which 
tended to reinterpret both him and Judaism along Kantian lines. See George Y. 
Kohler, Reading Maimonides’ Philosophy in 19th Century Germany: The Guide to 
Religious Reform (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 
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personal God of religion. Can one still move from science to morality 
or to Jewish law if one is committed to the impersonal God of nature, as 
the medieval Aristotelians were capable of doing? Can such a deity still 
invoke in us a passionate yearning, as it still was capable of doing even 
for Spinoza? Moreover, most of great modern existential philosophers, 
from Nietzsche onwards, premise their philosophies on the absence of 
God and the human being’s complete autonomy in creating values (and 
not just discovering them), as opposed to the teachings of their great 
philosophical predecessors. Given this situation, how can we preserve 
the legacy of Maimonides even in spirit in today’s world? What does it 
mean to preserve the spirit of Maimonides’ philosophy?
As a scholar who has engaged many years in trying to understand 
Maimonides in his historical context, to capture the letter of his thought, 
to hear him as a medieval Jew might have, and, dare I say, should have 
heard him, I have trouble answering this question. I am looking for a 
Maimonides who has little if anything to teach contemporary Jews, 
certainly those who wish to live both in the world of traditional Judaism 
and remain intellectually honest in the face of scientific and philosophic 
developments. In many ways I feel more comfortable in the world of 
medieval Jewish Aristotelianism, to follow in the footsteps of Samuel 
Ibn Tibbon and Nissim of Marseille in how they understood the “Great 
Eagle” and developed their own thought accordingly, than in the world 
of modern thought. It is ironic, an irony that has existed with us from 
time immemorial, that those who have tried to keep Maimonides’ 
legacy alive are those who have not interpreted him in the most accu-
rate manner from a historical perspective, but have tried to translate 
the goals of his thought, as they understood them, for their contempo-
raries along the lines of the philosophy of their own time, even if their 
own philosophies would have left Maimonides himself greatly perplexed. 
These are the thinkers who have developed philosophical foundations 
for traditional Judaism that are in tune with their age and are not 
fundamentally apologetic in nature.
Yet perhaps I am being overly critical of the relevance of the 
academic study of Maimonides in today’s world. The focal problem in 
the interpretation of Maimonides’ philosophy remains for us today the 
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same one that confronted the medieval scholars: can one remain 
committed to Jewish law and lore and still accept a world view that 
denies the personal willful activity of the Deity? Can one be a loyal 
member of the religious community, yet see in the stories of the Torah 
the reflection of philosophical and scientific truths in imaginative 
form? Because of the continuous importance of this topic, we do not 
tire in returning again and again to the arguments that were offered in 
the Middle Ages regarding the true views of Maimonides—one of 
Judaism’s foremost legal authorities of all time—on the profound 
theological problems with which he deals. We continue to debate the 
issue of his esotericism, for at the heart of this issue lie the limits of 
the reformulation of Judaism as philosophy. If we can show that 
Maimonides went much further in his understanding of Judaism than 
simply locating it between Athens (Greek Philosophy) and Jerusalem 
(traditional Jewish beliefs), as emerges from an exoteric reading of his 
philosophy and which in itself is a radical approach, but he saw the 
way to the heavenly Jerusalem—the proper way to understand Jewish 
teachings and attain knowledge of the ultimate truths and perfec-
tion—as necessarily passing through Athens, with Jewish law serving 
as the ultimate practical expression of philosophical ideas, then the 
modern reader can gain an important perspective in appreciating 
today’s philosophic reformulations of Jewish belief, no matter how 
radical they appear to “orthodox” thinking Jews. Furthermore, the 
scholar can show that this issue and the controversy it raises is hardly 
new; rather it is characteristic of much of medieval Jewish thought, 
particularly in Provence, which gave birth to the most incisive esoter-
icist readers of Maimonides’ philosophy as well as to the controversies 
their readings incurred. In short, it is a traditional conflict for how to 
view Judaism, even if on one side of the divide stands only a very small 
group, as Maimonides himself characterizes the Jewish philosophically 
minded elite. While it is not my purpose in this volume to build upon 
the legacy of Maimonides and his disciples in Provence, but to try to 
understand their legacy better, this understanding is of more than just 
“historical” interest in today’s efforts to develop Jewish thought within 
the traditional world.
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So what is Maimonides’ legacy? Certainly his fundamental teaching 
to his coreligionists is that the study of philosophy is both a religious 
obligation and the most noble of human activities, but one that must be 
rooted in Jewish law and lore and should be accompanied by a strong 
social component—guiding others to pursue the truth to the degree 
they are capable and to live just lives. This teaching remains as relevant 
today as in Maimonides’ time. The philosophy most in keeping with his 
legacy is one that weds an unwavering commitment to Jewish tradition 
with an unwavering commitment to intellectual integrity in its inter-
pretation of Judaism, one that carefully considers, builds upon, and 
challenges that which contemporary science and philosophy teach, and 
at the same time reflects a deep sense of social responsibility. This may 
no longer lead us to the God of Abraham or to the God of Aristotle, but 
it does lead us to the God of Maimonides.
Let us posit the following hypothetical situation: a Jew approaches Maimonides toward the end of the latter’s life and addresses him as 
follows:
Teach us our master. In your conclusion to the Mishneh Torah (Laws 
of Kings and their Wars 12.1) you write that in the days of the 
messiah all humanity will return to the true religion (yaḥzeru qulam 
la-dat ha-emet), and in your treatise the term “true religion” refers 
specifically to Judaism.1 Does this mean that the entire world will 
eventually convert to Judaism?
In this situation as I imagine it, Maimonides hesitates for a brief 
of moment before answering affirmatively. In the messianic age, he 
proclaims, the entire world will convert to the one true divine religion, 
Judaism. In this chapter I will show why I am convinced that this is 
what Maimonides would answer, and why in the situation I envision he 
hesitates before responding. In this hesitation, he considers the issue 
1 See, for example, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Leavened and Unleavened Bread 7.4; 
Laws of Gifts for the Poor 10.1; Laws of Ḥagigah 3.1; Laws of Kings 4.10. See also 
Book of Commandments, positive commandment no. 9 (in Arabic: al-din al-ḥaqīqī).
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from a number of perspectives that are discernible in his various 
writings. What these perspectives are will be the main subject of 
this chapter.
The issue that I raise is not a new one but has already been debated 
by scholars. The evidence for and against the conclusion that the whole 
world will convert to Judaism in the messianic times according to 
Maimonides is presented by Gerald Blidstein, who interprets Maimon-
ides as avoiding the conclusion to which many of his express statements 
on the subject appear to lead. He feels that Maimonides views the 
gentiles in the messianic age as fellow travelers of the Jewish people, 
voluntarily engaging in many Jewish practices, without, however, 
becoming formal converts who observe the entire Torah.2 Menachem 
Kellner, on the other hand, sees Maimonides as positing a world in 
which all gentiles formally embrace Judaism.3 Other scholars have 
examined issues that have an important bearing on this problem. Joel 
Kraemer, for example, has studied Maimonides’ use of the Arabic 
terms for law—namely, sharī‘a, which generally denotes religious or 
divine law, and namus, which generally denotes civil or human law. 
Kraemer shows that this distinction does not characterize all of 
Maimonides’ usages of these terms.4 Avraham Nuriel’s subsequent 
study of the term sharī‘a in Maimonides’ writings adds some important 
points to Kraemer’s analysis. Nuriel concludes that Maimonides may 
have regarded the seven Noahite laws as a divine law, though an 
2 See Gerald Blidstein, Political Concepts in Maimonidean Halakha (Ramat-Gan: 
Bar-Ilan University Press, 2001), 245-248 (Heb.).
3 See Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1991), 39-58. Kellner subsequently returned to this issue in an attempt 
to bolster his original conclusion; see his article, “Maimonides’ True Religion—for 
Jews, or All Humanity,” Me’orot 7 (2008) [reprinted in his Science in the Bet Midrash: 
Studies in Maimonides (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2009), 291-319.
4 See Joel L. Kraemer, “Namus and Sharī‘a in the Philosophy of Maimonides,” Teudah 
4 (1986): 185-202 (Heb.). See also idem, “Naturalism and Universalism in Maimon-
ides’ Political and Religious Thought,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish 
Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: 
Magnes Press, 2001), 47-81.
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imperfect or incomplete one.5 This leaves open the possibility that 
“true religion” (dat emet) in Maimonides’ depiction of the messianic 
future in fact refers to the Noahite laws, which will then be adopted 
by all gentiles. This interpretation finds further support from the use of 
the term “return to the true religion,” more appropriately referring to 
the Noahite commandments, which according to rabbinic tradition 
were practiced by the entire world when they were first promulgated, 
than to Mosaic Law.6 As we shall also see, Maimonides at times uses 
the term “true religion” in contexts that could not possibly refer to 
Judaism. David Sklare has delved into the historical background of this 
issue in the Islamic world, dealing with Islamic and Jewish theologians 
who addressed the issue of whether the entire world will or should be 
converted to one religion.7 While many theologians were of the opinion 
that ideally everyone should practice the same ultimate divine religion, 
and some were of the opinion that this goal should be attained even by 
coercion, Maimonides appears to adopt a middle position on this issue. 
He demands of all gentiles in pre-messianic times to practice only the 
seven Noahite laws, and states that they should even be coerced to do 
so in all places where Jewish sovereignty extends.8 Moreover, they must 
also acknowledge the Law of Moses as the source for the obligation of 
observing the Noahite laws.9
In his vision of the future, it is clear that Maimonides certainly 
does not posit a situation of forcible conversion of the gentiles to 
5 See Avraham Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Jeru-
salem: Magnes Press, 2000), 165-171 (Heb.).
6 This argument, however, is not decisive. “Return” in this context does not neces-
sarily refer to a situation in which one has already been; it may refer also to a 
situation that one should attain. This is evident in the phrase “to return in repen-
tance” (laḥzor beteshuvah), which does not connote that the individual has started 
out completely righteous observing all the commandments.
7 See David Sklare, “Are the Gentiles Obligated to Observe the Torah? The Discus-
sion Concerning the Universality of the Torah in the East in the Tenth and 
Eleventh Centuries,” in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. 
Jay Harris (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 311-346.
8 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and their Wars 6.4; 8.10
9 Ibid., 8.11.
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Judaism. Just as Moses did not command the conversion of gentiles,10 
so will the king-messiah refrain from such an act. If they all convert, it 
is because they have grasped the eternal truth and validity of Judaism. 
Given Maimonides’ conception of the nature of Judaism and the intel-
lectual and spiritual enlightenment characterizing all nations in the 
messianic age, the logic of the argument that the whole world will 
become Jewish in his view is compelling. Gentiles would not settle for 
anything less than the one true divine legislation if they have come to 
realize the true purpose of life and the role played by Mosaic Law in 
attaining that purpose, have come to recognize the lies that their fore-
fathers have taught them in promulgating Christianity and Islam, as 
Maimonides points out in Laws of Kings 11.8,11 and finally, have no 
other religious option, at least no other complete religious law that 
can be considered divine. Maimonides is certainly adamant on the point 
that there was and always will be only one complete divine law—
namely, the Law of Moses.12 Why then would I envision that Maimonides 
hesitates before proclaiming that the whole world will voluntarily 
convert to Judaism?
First, let me bring some textual support for the view that Maimon-
ides does not think that the whole world will become Jewish. As 
Blidstein argues, if Maimonides felt that the whole world would in fact 
convert to Judaism, one would have expected a more explicit statement 
on the subject, some stress on this point. Moreover, Maimonides appears 
to see the world in the messianic times as maintaining its multi-national 
character. This would not be the case if everyone converted. Then 
everyone’s nationality would be Jewish, at least according to what 
appears to be Maimonides’ conception of nationality.13 There is then an 
10 Ibid., 8.10.
11 This passage was censored from the early printed editions of the Mishneh Torah and 
still does not appear in many editions. Cf. Judah Halevi, Kuzari 4.23.
12 See Guide 2.39; cf. 1.63, 3.27.
13 See Blidstein, Maimonides’ Political Halakha, 247. Maimonides’ position is based 
on the view that the proselyte becomes a full-fledged Israelite who has completely 
abandoned his previous identity, in accordance with the rabbinic dictum: “The 
proselyte is like a newborn,” and hence we pay no consideration to his past. See, 
for example, his commentary to Mishnah Zavim 2.3. In his letter to Obadiah the 
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ambiguity, if not an inconsistency, in Maimonides’ view of the future.14 
He must hesitate for a brief moment before unequivocally deciding the 
issue. I interpret him as secretly agreeing with the view that it would be 
sufficient for gentiles to become fellow travelers of the Jews by striving 
to perfect their intellects, each in accordance with one’s ability, and 
pursuing ethical perfection, while at the same time giving his vocal 
assent to the view positing their formal conversion. This is intrinsically 
tied to his political thought.
It is well known that Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed 
makes an unusual move in proving the divinity of Judaism. Whereas in 
his earlier works he points to empirical proofs of its supernatural origin, 
namely the divine voice heard at Sinai proclaiming before all Israel the 
truth of Moses’ prophecy,15 in the Guide he points to three different 
criteria as proof of its divinity: 1) the “equibalance” of its laws, partic-
ularly in its demands on limiting one’s corporeal appetites (2.39);16 2) 
Proselyte, Maimonides reinforces the view of the complete integration of the pros-
elyte into the Jewish people; see Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot 
HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot, 1987), 233-235. In the introduction to the 
Mishneh Torah, he underlines the fact that two of the leading rabbinic sages, R. 
Akiva and R. Meir, were children of converts, in order to show that the level one 
achieves within the Jewish community is dependent upon one’s learning and not 
one’s origin.
14 Maimonides’ view of the messianic future has been the subject of a good number 
of studies. For two different interpretations of his conception see in particular 
Amos Funkenstein, “Maimonides: Political Theory and Realistic Messianism,” 
Miscellanea Medieavalia 9 (1977): 81-103; Aviezer Ravitzky, “‘To the Utmost of 
Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah,” in Perspectives on 
Maimonides, ed. Joel Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 221-256 
[reprinted in Ravitzky, History and Faith: Studies in Jewish Philosophy (Amsterdam: 
J. C. Gieben, 1996), 73-112]. An extensive bibliography dealing with this topic was 
compiled by Jacob Dienstag and can be found in Eschatology in Maimonidean 
Thought: Messianism, Resurrection, and the World to Come, ed. Jacob I. Dienstag 
(New York: Ktav, 1983), 242-271.
15 See, for example. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 8.1.
16 “For when a thing is as perfect as it is possible in a species, it is impossible that 
within that species there should be found another thing that does not fall short of 
that perfection, either because of excess or deficiency. Thus in comparison with a 
temperament whose composition is of the greatest equibalance possible in the 
species in question, all other temperaments are not composed in accordance with 
this equibalance because of either deficiency or excess. Things are similar with 
regard to this Law (sharī‘a), as is clear from its equibalance . . . for these are manners 
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the purpose of the Law, namely that it pays attention to the well-being 
of one’s beliefs (2.40), ultimate perfection lying in one’s knowledge 
rather than in one’s deeds.17 Since legislations that imitate the divine 
law may also appear to share these two traits, Maimonides adds another 
criterion: 3) the intellectual-moral perfection of the prophet who 
brings the law (2.40). Only a perfect individual can receive prophecy 
in his view of this phenomenon.18 Maimonides is also adamant on the 
point that God does not miraculously bestow prophecy upon one who 
does not possess all the necessary natural qualifications (2.32). The 
Guide substitutes a rational—and, one is tempted to add, natural-
istic—basis for recognizing the divinity of the divine law for the 
supernatural basis found in his earlier writings. There is no inherent 
of which there is no burden or excess—such as monastic life and pilgrimage and 
similar things—nor a deficiency necessarily leading to greed and being engrossed in 
the indulgence of appetites, so that in consequence the perfection of man is dimin-
ished with respect to his moral habits and to his speculation—this being the case 
with regard to all the other nomoi of the religious communities of the past. . . . 
Accordingly the facility or difficulty of the Law (sharī‘a) should not be estimated 
with reference to the passions of all the wicked, vile, morally corrupt men, but 
should be considered with reference to the man who is perfect among the people. 
For it is the aim of this Law that everyone should be such a man. Only that Law is 
called by us divine Law (sharī‘a ilāhīyā), whereas the other political regimens 
(al-tadbīrāt al-madanīyāt)—such as the nomoi of the Greeks and the ravings of the 
Sabians and of others—are due, as I have explained several times to the action of 
groups of rulers who were not prophets” (380-381).
17 “Accordingly if you find a Law (sharī‘a) the whole end of which and the whole 
purpose of the chief thereof, who determined the actions required by it, are 
directed exclusively toward the ordering of the city and its circumstances and the 
abolition in it of injustice and oppression; and if in that Law attention is not at all 
directed toward speculative matters . . . you must know that that Law is a 
nomos. . . . If, on the other hand, you find a Law all of whose ordinances are due 
to attention being paid, as we stated before, to the soundness of the circumstances 
pertaining to the body and also to the soundness of belief—a Law that takes pains 
to inculcate correct opinions with regard to God, may He be exalted in the first 
place, and with regard to the angles, and that desires to make man wise, to give him 
understanding, and to awaken his attention, so that he should know the whole of 
that which exists in its true form—you must know that this guidance comes from 
Him, may He be exalted, and that this Law is divine (al-sharī‘a ilāhīyā)” (383-384). 
See also Guide of the Perplexed 3.27; 3.54.
18 I analyze these chapters of the Guide in Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of 
an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2001), 257-263.
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contradiction between these two approaches. Speaking philosophi-
cally, one may say that in his early writings Maimonides underlines the 
efficient cause of the divine law, while in his theological treatise he is 
more interested in stressing its final and formal causes.19 A number of 
interpreters, myself among them, have viewed this shift in approach 
not only as a tactical one, that is to say presenting the notion of divine 
law in a manner that will be more acceptable to rationalists, but rather 
as indicative of his esoteric position on the origin of divine law. The 
Torah does not result from God directly creating audible words to 
convey specific commandments to Moses’ hearing, as R. Saadiah Gaon 
maintains,20 nor does it result from the impressing of specific laws on 
the mind of Moses, an internal “voice” conveying the laws.21 Rather it 
is the immediate product of Moses’ intellectual perfection, a perfec-
tion that involves a purely intellectual and perfect understanding of 
the order of existence, and Moses’ ability to frame a perfect Law on 
the basis of his theoretical understanding.22
Maimonides takes for his model Alfarabi’s depiction in the Polit-
ical Regime of the ideal lawgiver:
The supreme ruler without qualification is he who does not need 
anyone to rule him in anything whatever, but has actually acquired 
the sciences and every kind of knowledge, and has no need of a man 
to guide him in anything. He is able to comprehend well each one of 
the particular things that he ought to do. He is able to guide well all 
others to everything in which he instructs them, to employ all those 
who do any of the acts for which they are equipped, and to deter-
mine, define, and direct these acts toward happiness. This is found 
only in the one who possesses great and superior natural disposi-
tions, when his soul is in union with the Active Intellect. . . . This 
19 In both his legal treatises and in the Guide he stresses unique perfection of the 
agent of transmission, Moses.
20 For the notion of created speech see Book of Beliefs and Opinions 2.12. For a discus-
sion of this phenomenon see Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea, 56-68.
21 I will discuss this point in more detail below in chapter 9.
22 See Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 
12-13, 79-81. See also Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concept of Mosaic Prophecy,” 
HUCA 40 (1969): 325-362; and Kalman Bland, “Moses and the Law According to 
Maimonides,” in Mystics, Philosophers and Politicians, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and 
Daniel Swetschinski (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), 49-66.
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man is the true prince according to the ancients; he is the one of 
whom it ought to be said that he receives revelation (waḥy).23
If Maimonides finds his inspiration from Alfarabi’s model, he also 
finds in it a challenge to the permanent validity of Judaism. Certainly 
the vast majority of individuals would consider such a law to be a 
human product. For Alfarabi, followed by Maimonides, the legislator 
solves this problem by creating myths indicating the Deity’s personal 
involvement in the transmission of each of the laws. This should 
satisfy the masses as to the divine origin of the Law and insure their 
commitment.24
Yet there remains another problem that is more substantive from a 
philosophic perspective. Alfarabi depicts ideal legislators and polities 
only in theoretical terms, without dealing explicitly with Islam. His 
theoretical model enables him to posit successive ideal legislations 
stemming from more than a single ideal lawgiver. Each lawgiver frames 
a legislation fitting to one’s own time and place. In the periods between 
the emerging of ideal lawgivers, subordinate lawgivers assume the task 
of adapting the existing legislation to changing circumstances.25 There 
is nothing in the model itself that suggests that one lawgiver will be the 
23 The passage was translated by F. M. Najjar and appears in Medieval Political Philos-
ophy, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 
36. It should be noted that Alfarabi in his various writings does not use the term 
“divine religion” but “virtuous (faḍīla) religion.” See in particular his Book of Reli-
gion, in Alfarabi: The Political Writings, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), 93-98.
24 For a study of Alfarabi’s political thought, see Miriam Galston, Politics and Excel-
lence: The Political Philosophy of Alfarabi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990). The importance of the prophet teaching by means of images of the truth and 
laying down activities that are designed to preserve the people’s commitment to the 
law is elaborated by Avicenna; see the selection from Al-Shifā: Al-Ilāhiyyāt trans-
lated by Michael Marmura that appears in Medieval Political Philosophy, 100-101. 
Maimonides’ indebtedness to Alfarabi’s political philosophy has been much 
discussed in scholarly literature, following the classic studies of Leo Strauss on this 
issue, such as his “Farabi’s Plato,” in Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, ed. Alexander 
Marx et al. (New York: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1945), 357-393. 
See, for example, Lawrence Berman, “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi,” 
Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 154-178.
25 See Political Regime, 37.
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seal of all prophets and lawgivers, as Moslems regard Mohammed. 
Quite the contrary, the model suggests that as long as there are histor-
ical changes there is room for new divine legislations. Maimonides 
leaves little doubt that he sees some of the laws outmoded, namely 
those involving sacrifices that are laid down in accordance with the 
“second intention” of the law as he terms it—that is, they do not lead 
to perfection directly but are promulgated as a compromise measure 
out of consideration to historical circumstances.26 He nevertheless is 
adamant on the issue that there never was or will be another divine 
legislation.27 Given the historical context in which all laws are framed, 
it will do little good to argue that theoretically speaking, even if any 
prophet attained Moses’ perfection he would not lay down a new law, 
insofar as the law, like nature, is completely perfect, and any change, 
either addition or deletion, would detract from its perfection.28 This 
argument ignores the fact recognized by Alfarabi that changes in histor-
ical circumstances would call for framing a different divine law. Once 
Sabian practices are largely obliterated, it appears to be pointless to 
continue to uphold a divine law that is devoted in such large measure to 
countering them. New threats to ethical monotheism should be given 
more consideration. Maimonides himself appears to recognize that a 
superior divine law is possible. While explaining why God commanded 
sacrifices despite the fact that they do not belong to the primary inten-
tion of the law—that is, they do not contribute to perfection in a direct 
manner—he states:
His wisdom, may He be exalted, and His gracious ruse, which is 
manifest in regard to all His creatures, did not require that He give 
us a Law prescribing the rejection, abandonment, and abolition of all 
these kinds of worship. For one could not then conceive the accep-
tance of [such a Law], considering the nature of man, which always 
likes that to which it is accustomed. At that time this would have 
26 Guide 3.32.
27 Ibid. 2.39; 3.27. See also the ninth principle of Judaism that Maimonides presents 
at the end of his introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq in his Commentary on the Mishnah; and 
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 9.1.
28 See above, note 16. Maimonides makes a similar point when discussing miracles 
and permanent changes in nature in Guide 2.28.
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been similar to the appearance of a prophet in these times who, 
calling upon the people to worship God, would say: “God has given 
you a Law forbidding you to pray to Him, to fast, to call upon Him 
for help in misfortune. Your worship should consist solely in medita-
tion without any works at all.” (Guide 3.32: 526)
How then are we to understand the paradox that Maimonides, one of 
the more historically inclined thinkers regarding the reason for many of 
the commandments of Mosaic Law, adopts what appears to be a 
completely ahistorical position when it comes to its eternal validity?
The answer lies in Maimonides’ commitment to Judaism. Maimonides 
never looks at Judaism as an outsider. The way he approaches this issue 
is how can one best understand, defend, and promote the Torah as a 
divine legislation in his own period in a manner that at the same time 
conforms to his understanding of the nature of divine activity. While 
Maimonides may actually have thought that he could dismiss the divine 
character of Christianity and Islam on philosophical grounds by 
pointing to the defects in the content of the religions and in those who 
were responsible for laying them down,29 he certainly had no strong 
rational argument to eliminate the possibility that there will emerge a 
prophet equaling Moses’ perfection, who would lay down a new divine 
law. Such argument can only be based on traditional grounds or polit-
ical ones. It certainly is not a demonstrative claim from a philosophic 
perspective. There are traditional statements that Maimonides employs 
in support of this position,30 but I regard the political considerations as 
29 Maimonides devotes much of his Epistle to the Jews of Yemen to this objective. He 
also hints to Mohammed’s unfitness as a prophet in Guide 2.40. As for Christianity, 
belief in the Trinity and of God assuming a human form made it an easy target for 
the polemics of Moslems and Jews alike who accepted the philosophic doctrine of a 
single incorporeal deity. For a study of anti-Christian philosophical polemics, see 
Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle 
Ages (New York: Ktav, 1977).
30 In addition to attempting to prove this point on the basis of biblical verses, 
Maimonides also cites rabbinic statements—for example, prophets are not allowed 
to introduce any innovation in the Law after its reception; see BT Shabbat 104a. 
Prior to Maimonides, R. Saadiah Gaon already argued at length against the abro-
gation of the Torah, employing both rational considerations and biblical textual 
ones; see Book of Beliefs and Opinions 3.7-10.
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more important. He is writing in a period during which three revela-
tory religions are vying for supremacy (leaving aside Eastern religions), 
and from a historical perspective Judaism is in last place.31 To concede 
even the possibility of changes in Judaism in the future is to weaken 
one’s defense against the view that these changes have already occurred 
in the past, namely by the founders of the other religions. This would 
make it easier to undermine the commitment of Jews in the present to 
their ancestral religion.32
Maimonides at times was faced with the necessity of addressing 
the contemporary situation directly in an effort to prevent Jews from 
converting. The arguments he makes in the Guide for identifying the 
characteristics of the divine religion previously appeared in his Epistle 
to the Jews of Yemen, in which he deals with Christianity and Islam 
explicitly. Taking a page from Halevi, Maimonides views these reli-
gions as poor, lifeless imitations of the “divine religion” (din āllāh) and 
31 This problem is the starting point for Halevi’s Kuzari. If might does not make 
right, it at least is reflective of right, or of God’s favor, in the minds of the 
populace.
32 Maimonides writes in Guide 3.34: 534-535: “In view of this consideration, it also 
will not be possible that the laws be dependent on changes in the circumstances of 
the individuals and of the times, as is the case with regard to medical treatment, 
which is particularized for every individual in conformity with his present temper-
ament. On the contrary, governance of the Law ought to be absolute and universal, 
including everyone, even if it is suitable only for certain individuals and not suit-
able for others; for if it were made to fit individuals, the whole would be corrupted.” 
While the problem of abrogation is not discussed in this passage, Maimonides’ 
view suggests that allowing for even the slightest change in the Torah would lead to 
undermining the entire legislation. He is adamant in his insistence that one should 
view the Law of Moses as an immutable whole, a point that is underscored by his 
codification of all the Mosaic commandments in his Mishneh Torah, including those 
concerning the service of the Temple that were not relevant to his own period. This 
point is also reflected in the extreme stance he adopts in distancing prophecy from 
any legislative/judicial role. I discuss this issue in greater detail in “Maimonides’ 
Political Philosophy,” in Cambridge Companion to Moses Maimonides, ed. Kenneth 
Seeskin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 204-206. See also Kreisel, 
Prophecy: The History of an Idea, 159-167, 198-200; Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political 
Thought, 23-29; Gerald Blidstein, “On the Institutionalization of Prophecy in 
Maimonidean Halakha,” Daat 43 (1999): 25-42 (Heb.).
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the “true religion” (al-din al-ḥaqīqī).33 The constant repetition of these 
terms in this context serves to counter the claims of the competing 
religions and stress Judaism’s exclusivity.
If Maimonides posits Mosaic Law as the one eternal divine reli-
gion, he is not being insensitive to the relation between divine law and 
historical realities, but he is rather being very sensitive to his current 
reality that requires a vigorous defense of Judaism. On a practical level, 
changes in historical realities are to be met by the various powers 
bestowed by Mosaic Law upon the rabbinic authorities in every gener-
ation, who assume the task Alfarabi ascribes to the subordinate 
lawgivers who adapt the divine Law to their own period. For Maimonides, 
the only way to preserve the whole is to deny any formal change in any 
of its parts. Mosaic Law in fact continuously evolves due to the activity 
of the legal institutions responsible for its interpretation and the 
various powers accorded them, while no commandment is ever formally 
abrogated. Maimonides essentially adopts the model of the virtuous 
religion that he found in the writings of Alfarabi in order to under-
stand, defend, and adapt Jewish law to his own time in accordance with 
his view of the factors that make a law divine—namely, its purpose 
and the way it goes about attaining it.34 In an exceptionally innova-
tive and highly significant move, Maimonides opens his great legal 
code, Mishneh Torah, with two sections that are devoted to bringing 
about the “welfare of the soul,” that is, correct opinions concerning 
God and the world, and the “welfare of the body,” that is, ethical 
traits. These are the two purposes of the divine law presented by 
Maimonides in Guide 3.27.
Maimonides’ response to historical circumstances finds expression 
in yet another interesting way in a context in which he deals with the 
divine law. In the “Laws of Kings,” Maimonides essentially transforms 
33 See Shailat, Iggerot HaRambam, 86-87 (Heb., 121-123). Maimonides also employs 
there (87) the term “the true divine religion” (al-sharīca al-ilāhīyā al-ḥaqīqī). See 
Halevi, Kuzari 3.9; see also Daniel J. Lasker, “Proselyte Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam in the Thought of Judah Halevi,” JQR 81 (1990): 75-91.
34 See Warren Z. Harvey, “Political Philosophy and Halakhah in Maimonides,” Iyyun 
29 (1980): 198-212 (Heb.); see also Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought, 21ff.
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optional wars waged by a Jewish sovereign into holy wars by making it 
the duty of the sovereign to insure that all the vanquished adopt the 
seven Noahite laws.35 This transformation can be seen also in the termi-
nology he employs in “Laws of Kings” 7.15 when dealing with the 
desired mindset of the soldiers marching off to an optional war: “He 
should know that he is waging war in order to unify God.” As early as 
the Book of Commandments (positive commandment no. 191), where 
Maimonides deals with the anointed priest who addresses the troops 
before marching off to battle, this point clearly emerges: “He should 
add to this words that stir up the nation for war and bring them to 
sacrifice their lives for the victory of the divine religion (din āllāh) and 
revenge upon those ignorant of it who corrupt the order of society.” 
“Divine religion” in this context does not appear to refer to the Noahite 
laws but to the Mosaic Law that commands their enforcement. This 
also is the purport of his statement in “Laws of Kings” 4.10: “In every 
matter, his [the king’s] acts should be for the sake of heaven, and his 
thought and intention to elevate the true religion (dat ha-emet) and to 
fill the world with justice.” One need not go far to find the primary 
sources for Maimonides’ position and terminology when dealing with 
war—namely, the same Islam against which Maimonides polemicizes.36 
While Judaism may be powerless at the current stage of history to 
engage in jihād or Crusades, Maimonides develops a model based on 
traditional sources that is designed to address the aspirations of his 
coreligionists at the same time that he attempts to mold their aspira-
tions (and their historical memory) in response to the views and 
practices of the other religions.
35 See Ralph Lerner, “Moses Maimonides,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo 
Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 181-200; 
Blidstein, Political Concepts in Maimonidean Halakha, 230-245.
36 This point is also true of Maimonides’ decision to formulate principles of faith, his 
role model being the fanatical Almohades, who were the cause of so much suffering 
experienced by Andalusian Jewry including Maimonides and his family. See 
Shlomo Pines, “Lecture on Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Iyyun 47 (1998): 
115-128 (Heb.). The article was prepared from Pines’s manuscript by Sarah 
Stroumsa and Warren Z. Harvey.
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In his treatment of the Noahite laws in Mishneh Torah, Laws of 
Kings 8.11, Maimonides introduces a very controversial point that has 
important bearing on our topic as well as on his philosophy in general. 
He insists that gentiles observe these laws based on an acceptance of 
the revelation of the Torah and not because of an “inclination of the 
intellect” (hekhre‘a ha-da‘at). Without this acceptance, one is not 
considered to be a righteous gentile (who merits a portion in the 
World to Come) and one who wishes to live in Israel would be denied 
the status of a resident alien. One who observes these laws due to an 
inclination of the intellect is labeled by Maimonides a sage, at least in 
accordance with the preferred reading (from a textual and philosophic 
standpoint) of the passage in question.37 Maimonides deliberately 
leaves ambiguous the status of this individual and whether he attains 
a share in the World to Come.38 By adding the clause that Noahites 
must follow the laws based on an acceptance of the revelation to 
Moses, Maimonides achieves two objectives: 1) belief in one God, 
who is a God of revelation (note that without this clause an atheist 
might have no problem in fulfilling the demands of the Noahite laws); 
2) a more solid foundation for morality than the popular conceptions 
of the masses and perhaps even the conceptions of the philosophers—a 
point on which Leo Strauss devoted so much of his thought.39 
37 Instead of reading “is not a resident alien and not a philosopher,” one should read 
“. . . but a philosopher,” substituting the letter aleph for the letter vav, followed by 
the letters lamed aleph (ela instead of ve-lo). While the older standard printed 
editions read the word with vav, the better manuscripts and most of the newer 
editions read it with aleph. The subsequent furor this position stirred up, particu-
larly after Spinoza’s famous critique of Maimonides at the end of the fifth chapter 
of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, is well known. Scholars continue to argue the 
basis for Maimonides’ ruling and even its very meaning, particularly given the 
controversy over the correct textual reading. For a study of this issue see Steven S. 
Schwarzschild, “Do Noachites Have to Believe in Revelation?” JQR 52 (1962): 
297-365 [reprinted in Schwarzschild, The Pursuit of the Ideal, ed. M. Kellner 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 29-60].
38 See Michael Nehorai, “How a Righteous Gentile can Merit the World to Come,” 
Tarbiz 61 (1992): 31-82 (Heb.); Hannah Kasher, “The Torah as a Means of Achieving 
the World to Come,” Tarbiz 64 (1995): 301-306 (Heb.). See also Kreisel, Maimon-
ides’ Political Thought, 65-71. For a possible reason for this ambiguity, see below.
39 See in particular Leo Strauss, “The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” PAAJR 13 (1943): 
47-96 [reprinted in his Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1988): 95-141].
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Presumably, in messianic times the gentiles, having already becoming 
righteous because of their acceptance of the belief in the revelation 
to Moses, and not solely because of their understanding of the 
wisdom of the Noahite laws, will take the final step and become full 
converts.
Yet my interpretation of Maimonides’ view of messianic times is 
not without its problems when considered in light of other statements 
of his on the subject. Maimonides’ depiction of the ideal future in 
Guide 3.11 appears to suggest a different conclusion:
These great evils that come about between the human individuals 
who inflict them upon one another because of purposes, desires, 
opinion, and beliefs, are all of them likewise consequent upon priva-
tion. For all of them derive from ignorance, I mean from a privation 
of knowledge. . . . If there were knowledge, whose relation to the 
human form is like that of the faculty of sight to the eye, they would 
refrain from doing any harm to themselves and to others. For through 
the cognizance of the truth, enmity and hatred are removed and the 
inflicting of harm by people on one another is abolished. . . . Then it 
gives the reason for this, saying that the cause of the abolition of 
these enmities, these discords, and these tyrannies, will be the 
knowledge that men will then have concerning the true reality of the 
deity, for it says: They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy moun-
tain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters 
cover the sea [Isaiah 11:9]. Know this. (440-441)
The knowledge to which Maimonides refers is not necessarily attained 
only by way of the divine Law. There is nothing in the context of the 
discussion to suggest this conclusion. The reference here is to the 
knowledge of God, of the purpose of human existence and of morality 
that is possessed also by the philosophers. The Law is not an end in 
itself but ultimately serves as a means to the end of true knowledge—a 
point that Maimonides makes explicit in Guide 3.27. The role 
Maimonides ascribes to the true religion in promoting true knowledge 
explains some of his more radical moves as a legal authority, particu-
larly in dogmatizing belief in an incorporeal deity. He repeatedly 
alludes to the view that intellectual perfection, and not Jewish 
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observance per se, is the basis for attaining immortality.40 Because of 
the connection between religion and knowledge, While Maimonides 
normally uses “true religion” to designate Mosaic Law, in his response 
to Obadiah the Proselyte the term is used to indicate true beliefs: 
“Abraham our father taught all the people, educated them, and 
informed them the true religion (dat ha-emet) and the unity of God.”41 
For this reason too, the most important distinguishing feature of 
Maimonides’ messianic future is the pursuit of knowledge of God, 
with all other features serving as a means to this activity. In short, the 
ideal social and material conditions in messianic times will enable one 
to engage more fully in the fulfillment of the Torah, which in turn 
leads to striving to attain knowledge of God to the utmost of one’s 
capacity.42 Yet given the superiority of knowledge over deed, the role 
of Mosaic Law in attaining perfection is at the same time an ambig-
uous one. It is concerned primarily with deeds on one hand, and it 
provides little of the philosophic-scientific knowledge, at least in an 
explicit manner, that constitutes intellectual perfection, on the other.43 
For this reason there is a significant gap between divine law and ulti-
mate knowledge, which Maimonides’ depiction of the messianic 
future in the “Laws of Kings” does not entirely bridge.
In the final analysis, Maimonides’ stress on belief in the revelation 
to Moses in “Laws of Kings” is due to the consideration that this belief 
is necessary for all of the world’s masses, for they, due to their limited 
40 See, for example, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 4.9; Guide 3.8; 
3.51. For a study of this issue see Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intel-
lect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” in Von der Mittelalterlichen zur modernen 
Aufklaerung (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987), 85-91. See also Kreisel, Maimonides’ 
Political Thought, 141-149.
41 Yehoshua Blau (ed. and Heb. trans.), R. Moses b. Maimon: Responsa (Jerusalem: 
Mekize Nirdamim, 1960), 549. Cf. Shailat, Iggerot HaRambam, 233, where the 
alternate reading “way of truth (derekh ha-emet)” is brought. Derekh ha-emet occurs 
in other passages in Maimonides’ writings to indicate the holding of true beliefs. 
See, for example, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.3. Maimonides’ usage of dat 
ha-emet in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Leavened and Unleavened Bread 7.4, is ambig-
uous; while it may refer to Mosaic Law it may also refer to the attainment of true 
beliefs. 
42 See Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 9.1-2.
43 I deal with this issue in more detail in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 189-223.
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intellect, will always require belief in the divine Law to insure their 
acceptance of the monotheistic idea and the practice of morality, even 
in messianic times. Maimonides is not so utopian as to believe that 
everyone will become philosophers. Thus in messianic times there will 
be no more crime, because everyone will possess the knowledge neces-
sary for its prevention by one means or another—the masses by way of 
belief in revelation and the philosophers by way of intellectual under-
standing. At the same time, the philosophers will realize that the divine 
Law presents these same truths in a manner appropriate to the masses. 
Those who achieve true knowledge of philosophy understand God and 
strive for human perfection independent of the mandates of the Law. 
In their case, the belief in the revelation of the Law or even a formal 
conversion to Judaism would not appear to add to their perfection. 
However, they will always remain few, even in messianic times, and the 
Law is aimed at the majority.44
This brings us to the problem of where the gentile sage stands in 
relation to perfection in comparison to an observant Jew in Maimonides’ 
thought. We have seen above that Maimonides is ambiguous in his 
definition of the status of this individual. There is little doubt that 
Maimonides as a philosopher must answer that such an individual 
stands on a much higher plane than the observant Jew who is ignorant 
of all philosophy and science. Moreover, if immortality of the intellect, 
which is how Maimonides defines the World to Come, is consequent 
on intellectual perfection, it is the philosophical elite, irrespective of 
their religion, who attain this state, and not the masses of Jews. Yet 
Maimonides as a rabbinic scholar cannot indicate the superiority of the 
former, at least not explicitly, for to do so would undermine much of 
his activity in bolstering the edifice of Jewish law.
44 Guide 3.34. It may further be argued that even if Maimonides accepted the theo-
retical possibility of framing a better divine Law in the future, there will be no real 
need to do so, just as there is no need in Maimonides’ own time. The need then as 
now is to interpret Mosaic Law in a manner that is most conducive to the pursuit 
of true knowledge of God and best insures social morality, including the curbing of 
one’s physical passions.
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The superiority of knowledge over deed in Maimonides’ thought, 
and the deliberate ambiguity in his approach to the gentile philosopher, 
finds expression also in the most famous parable in Guide 3.51—that of 
the king in his palace.45 The reader is struck by how far the observant 
masses are from reaching the king in Maimonides’ view; they do not 
even see the walls of the palace. Even more striking is the fact that he 
depicts the great Torah scholars who lack philosophic knowledge as still 
looking for the entrance to the palace. The importance of philosophic- 
scientific knowledge in attaining perfection receives a vivid expression in 
Maimonides’ explanation of the parable. This is particularly true in the 
second explanation Maimonides provides for the parable, in which 
proximity to the king is depicted in terms of mastering the various 
sciences in their proper order.46 A closer examination of Maimonides’ 
explanation of the parable reveals that his omission is no less striking. 
For all of his stress on philosophic knowledge in his explanation of how 
to reach the king, and the not so subtle downplaying of the role of all 
the commandments in this matter, at least those involving physical 
actions, one person or group is conspicuous by their absence—namely, 
Aristotle and his followers. Where does the “head of the philosophers,” 
as Maimonides calls Aristotle,47 stand in relation to the king?
45 For a detailed study of this parable, see Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Human 
Perfection (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990); and Hannah Kasher, “The Parable of the 
King’s Palace in The Guide of the Perplexed as a Directive to the Student,” AJS 
Review 14 (1989): 1-19 [Hebrew Section]. I discuss this parable also below in the 
introduction to chapter 4, 73-77.
46 In the first explanation of the parable, the ones who are near the walls of the palace 
but are looking for the gate are “the jurists who believe true opinions on the basis 
of traditional authority and study the law concerning the practices of divine 
service, but do not engage in speculation concerning the fundamental principles of 
religion and make no inquiry whatever regarding the rectification of belief” (619). 
Those who have plunged into speculation have entered the antechambers. In the 
second explanation of the parable, Maimonides indicates that those who have not 
progressed beyond the study of logic and the mathematical sciences are still 
searching for the gate, while those who understand the natural sciences have 
entered the antechambers. Maimonides suggests that the second explanation 
complements the first. The question arises whether he sees it as an alternative to 
the first.
47 Guide 1.5; 2.23.
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It is an untenable interpretation, in my view, to hold that Maimonides 
sees Aristotle as belonging to the group that “have turned their 
backs upon the ruler’s habitation,” whom he defines as “people who 
have opinions and engaged in speculation, but who have adopted incor-
rect opinions either because of some great error that befell them in the 
course of their speculation. . . . Accordingly, because of this opinion, 
the more these people walk, the greater is their distance from the ruler’s 
habitation. And they are far worse than the first. They are those 
concerning whom necessity at certain times impels killing them and 
blotting out the traces of their opinions lest they should lead astray the 
ways of others” (619). Maimonides is referring to polytheists and athe-
ists in his description of this group, for they have committed the 
greatest error of all in the opinions they hold.48 For Maimonides, Aris-
totle is the great monotheistic philosopher, the one who provides 
philosophical proofs against Epicurus and shows the general providence 
God exercises toward the world.49 He certainly should not be classed 
together with that ignoble philosopher. Nowhere does Maimonides 
speak of Aristotle with less than complete respect, even in those places 
where he apparently disagrees with him. It is Aristotle’s writings, 
together with those of his most important commentators, that Maimon-
ides indicates to the translator of the Guide, R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, 
that he must read in order to understand the treatise.50 Aristotle, whose 
work on metaphysics, let alone other sciences, remained for Maimon-
ides the most important treatise ever written on the subject and 
indispensable to the pursuit of intellectual perfection, clearly deserves 
a place close to the prophets in his thought, and hardly should be seen 
as belonging to the group that he condemns more than all others. The 
reason for Maimonides’ striking omission is clear. To indicate explicitly 
how close Aristotle stands in relation to the king would undermine 
48 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars 6.4, in which Maimonides rules that 
the Canaanites and Amaleqites are killed only if they do not accept the Noahite 
laws. For Maimonides, it is people’s beliefs that are the most important consider-
ation in determining their status.
49 Guide 3.17.
50 Shailat, Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides, 552.
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Judaism, for it would lead many to conclude that Judaism is not indis-
pensable, and perhaps not even the superior path to perfection. Silence 
in this case is the better part of valor. Here, as in the case of his depic-
tion of the messianic future, Maimonides walks a thin line between 
teaching the central role of philosophic knowledge in Judaism while 
trying to keep his readers from concluding that Judaism is not necessary 
for reaching ultimate perfection. Maimonides, like nature and the Law, 
cannot pay attention to the isolated in addressing his coreligionists. He 
is not writing for the exceptional philosopher who has attained perfec-
tion, but for the masses of Jews and the few potentially perfect, and he 
is interested in guiding them to perfection by way of Judaism.
One’s vision of the future, just as one’s reconstruction of the past, 
at least when you are talking about leaders and public educators, is 
always about the present. It is about how one sees the current situation 
and to what destination one seeks to guide the audience in their present 
circumstances. Maimonides’ depiction of messianic times is not an 
exercise in divination, is not based on what he sees as an inevitable 
natural process operating in history,51 nor on a simple reconstruction of 
traditional statements on the subject. One may even question to what 
extent he is concerned with what will actually happen sometime in the 
indefinite future. His code of Jewish law is for his time and not neces-
sarily for all time.52 He is concerned with what is happening to the 
Jewish people in the present, and how the situation is to be improved: 
how Jews in their current circumstances can best be guided to realize 
the true goal in life as human beings, how Jewish law can best be inter-
preted and implemented to achieve this goal, and how the past and the 
51 Interestingly, R. Nissim of Marseille, in his discussion of Maimonides’ principles, 
does view the coming of the messiah as an inevitable event from a philosophic 
standpoint. He bases this position on the Aristotelian principle that what in 
possible must inevitably occur in the course of eternity. See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 156.
52 That is to say, according to my view of Maimonides’ historical consciousness and 
his playing the role that Alfarabi ascribes to subordinate lawgivers, he accepts the 
fact that others like him will arise in the future who will play a similar role and 
write codes based on their interpretations and in accordance with the circum-
stances of their period, while maintaining the inviolability of the Mosaic 
commandments.
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future can be reconstructed to best teach this goal. He includes all the 
commandments in his code, and not only those practiced in his period, 
not because he sees his code as the one that will govern the future 
Sanhedrin, but because it is crucial that Jews in his own time view the 
Torah as a complete and single body of law that is inviolate, in order to 
meet the contemporary challenges.
Therefore, I think Maimonides would hesitate for a brief moment 
while considering all these points before answering what he must answer 
when confronted with the issue of whether all gentiles would become 
Jews in the messianic future. His uppermost consideration would be a 
political-pedagogical one: what will be the repercussions of his answer 
for Jews in his own time? What conclusions will they draw if he paints 
a picture of an ideal future in which all pursue the same goal but in 
different ways, not bound by uniform obligations? While the distinc-
tion between Jews and other nations in the messianic future may be 
important for reinforcing a sense of Jewish peoplehood, does it add to 
an appreciation of the role of Mosaic Law in attaining perfection or 
detract from it? In the final analysis, all answers about the future must 
serve to bolster the commitment of the Jewish people to Judaism in the 
present, at the same time that they contribute to appreciating the true 
nature of Judaism as a divine religion.
Introduction1
Maimonides’ stance on the creation of the world has attracted consid-
erable debate over the centuries. Those who arrived at the conclusion 
that Maimonides maintains an essentially Aristotelian picture of divine 
governance of the world, and presents an esoteric position on all the 
theological issues in which God is regarded as playing a personal role in 
human affairs, could hardly take Maimonides’ defense of creation at 
1 This article has its origins in a symposium that took place at the 2008 conference of 
the Association of Jewish Studies, and first appeared in Jewish Philosophy: 
Perspectives and Retrospectives, ed. Raphael Jospe and Dov Schwartz (Brighton, 
MA: Academic Studies Press, 2012), 157-184. In this volume appear also an article 
by Kenneth Seeskin, seeking to strengthen his interpretation of Maimonides as 
believing in creation, together with responses to both articles on the part of Roslyn 
Weiss and Charles H. Manekin. In spite of the points of critique against my article 
on the part of both respondents (from two entirely different directions, though 
Roslyn Weiss shares my basic conclusion), I decided to retain the original form, 
aside for some minor additions and changes, without responding to the critiques. 
One is strongly urged to read all the articles in the volume cited above.
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face value.2 Though I belong to the camp of those who adopt an esoteric 
reading of Maimonides and maintain that he attempted to understand 
Judaism in light of Aristotelian thought—and did not seek to develop a 
position that took a middle course between the personal God of tradi-
tion and the impersonal God of philosophy—I confess that it is hard to 
read Maimonides’ account of creation without feeling that he really 
means it. Why else would he go to such pains to defend this doctrine 
philosophically as well as on religious grounds? Moreover, Maimonides 
does not simply go through the motions of proving creation, but 
displays a great deal of philosophic ingenuity, and develops some solid 
philosophic arguments that improve upon those found in his sources, 
while still not abandoning the principles of Aristotelian physics to 
which he is committed. This is hardly the move we would expect of 
someone hinting at an esoteric position. The presentation of standard 
2 The most important modern exponent of the esoteric reading of Maimonides is Leo 
Strauss; see his classic study “The Literary Character of The Guide of the Perplexed,” 
in Essays on Maimonides, ed. Salo Baron (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1941), 37-91 [reprinted in Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe: Free 
Press, 1952), 38-94]. For a survey of esoteric vs. exoteric readings of Maimonides’ 
thought, see in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of the Guide of the 
Perplexed: Between the Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries,” in Studies in 
Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990), 159-207. See also Howard Kreisel, “Moses Maimonides,” in History of Jewish 
Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1997), 
245-280. For some recent studies of Maimonides’ esotericism, see Sara Klein-
Braslavy, King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in the Thought of Maimonides 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996) (Heb.); Yair Loberbaum, “On Contradictions, 
Rationality, Dialectics and Esotericism in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” 
Metaphysics 55 (2002): 711-750; Aviezer Ravitzky, “Maimonides: Esotericism and 
Philosophical Education,” Daat 53 (2004): 43-62 (Heb.). For a study of this issue in 
medieval Jewish philosophy in general, see Moshe Halbertal, Concealment and 
Revelation: Esotericism in Jewish Thought and its Philosophical Implications (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2007); Dov Schwartz, Contradiction and Concealment in 
Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002) (Heb.). It 
should be noted that even among those scholars who favor an esoteric reading of 
Maimonides, not all of them agree that his motive was essentially political—that is 
to say, to hide certain truths from the masses. See also Warren Z. Harvey, “How 
Leo Strauss Paralyzed the Study of the Guide of the Perplexed in the 20th Century,” 
Iyyun 50 (2001): 387-396 (Heb.). For a strident attack against the esoteric reading 
of Maimonides in general, see Herbert Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and 
His Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 387-402.
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but weak philosophic arguments to rebut the stronger arguments of 
your opponent is indeed a possible way of subtly alluding to an esoteric 
position.3 However, that a strong philosophic argument should be 
interpreted as not seriously held by its author—such an interpretation 
appears to be the product of perverse thinking.
It is easy to see the motivation of some of the medieval interpreters 
in making such a move, such as Joseph Ibn Kaspi and Moses Narboni, 
who suggest that Maimonides in fact believed in the eternity of the 
world and develop an esoteric reading of his statements on this issue.4 
The doctrine of eternity was philosophically more respectable, and in 
this manner they tried to show how Maimonides was in basic agree-
ment with the Aristotelian position, as they themselves apparently 
were. The modern interpreter is no longer burdened with this consid-
eration; the opposite is the case. Maimonides’ belief in creation, even 
creation ex nihilo, is more in keeping with contemporary science. Thus 
his stated position on this issue is the one that those interested in inter-
preting tradition in light of science should take pains to defend.
Nevertheless, I would like to advance the claim that despite all the 
considerable evidence to the contrary—much of it brought in pains-
taking detail by Kenneth Seeskin in his recent book, Maimonides on the 
Origin of the World5—Maimonides in fact secretly favored the belief in 
the eternity a parte ante of the world.6 The primary path I will adopt 
in arguing that Maimonides in essence accepts the position that he 
vociferously argues against is the textual one—a path long favored by 
3 See Leo Strauss’s masterful discussion of methods for conveying secret teachings 
that oppose the prevailing orthodoxy in his Persecution and the Art of Writing, 
22-37.
4 See Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Maskiyot Kesef, ed. Solomon Werblunger (Frankfurt A.M., 
1848), 99-101; Moses Narboni, Be’ur le-Sefer Moreh Nevukhim, ed. Jacob Golden-
thal (Vienna, 1852), 23b, 34a-b, 52a [both commentaries are reprinted in Sheloshah 
Qadmonei Mefarshei Ha-Moreh (Jerusalem, 1961)].
5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
6 I am not claiming that Maimonides was absolutely convinced of this position and 
that he thought that the philosophers had in fact presented a demonstrative argu-
ment proving eternity. I am prepared to grant that Maimonides continued to 
entertain doubts on this issue. My claim is that he felt that the eternity of the 
world was the preferable position from a philosophic standpoint and was in all 
likelihood the esoteric position of Jewish tradition.
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the esotericists and most in keeping with Maimonides’ remarks in the 
introduction to his treatise.7 Comments Maimonides makes in passing 
often do not belong to the thrust of his argument in the context in 
which they appear and in fact clarify his opinion on issues he discusses 
elsewhere. Moreover, a close look at some of his comments reveals that 
they in fact undermine the gist of his argument and support the posi-
tion he purportedly rejects. There is a midrashic quality to such 
reading—looking for the textual irregularities in the Maimonidean text 
and then offering an interpretation that seems to fly in the face of what 
the text literally states, or that reads much between the lines.8 While 
each of these readings taken individually are open to refutation, 
together they seem to support the view that there is an esoteric subtext 
to Maimonides’ treatise, which extends also to the issue of creation.
The Esotericist Reading of Maimonides’ Philosophy
Let us for a moment review the gist of Maimonides’ position in the 
Guide in regard to creation. According to Maimonides, the monothe-
istic idea is proven if one accepts either creation or the eternity of the 
world (Guide 1.71).9 God’s unique existence is not the issue here. Nor 
7 Maimonides writes: “If you wish to grasp the totality of what this Treatise contains, 
so that nothing of it will escape you, then you must connect its chapters one with 
another; and when reading a given chapter, your intention must be not only to 
understand the totality of the subject of that chapter, but also to grasp each word 
that occurs in it in the course of the speech, even if that word does not belong to 
the intention of the chapter. For the diction of this Treatise has not been chosen at 
haphazard, but with great exactness and exceeding precision, and with care to 
avoid failing to explain any obscure point. And nothing has been mentioned out of 
its place, save with a view of explaining some matter in its proper place” (15). All 
English translations are taken from the translation of Shlomo Pines (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1963).
8 In other words, just as the midrash often focuses on the verbal “irregularities” in 
the biblical text, isolates them, and develops their meaning, frequently appealing 
to verses that deal with entirely different matters, so one must use this method in 
reading Maimonides. As shown in the previous note, Maimonides himself appears 
to counsel employing this method in reading his treatise. 
9 Cf. Guide 2.1 (third proof of God’s existence). One should add that for the masses, 
belief in creation better supports the belief in one God than does belief in eternity. 
The belief that the spheres existed from eternity easily leads to the belief that they 
are deities, the belief that according to Maimonides characterizes the ancient reli-
gion of the Sabians (Guide 3.29). This may have also served for Maimonides as an 
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is the order of nature the issue, for Maimonides accepts the order of 
nature in its Aristotelian form even if the world is created, while 
rejecting the Kalām’s view on this matter (Guide 1.71-72; 2.3-12). One 
may further argue that Maimonides regards creation as providing a 
better foundation for accepting the order of nature as posited by Aris-
totle than does the doctrine of eternity. Maimonides equates the 
doctrine of eternity with the doctrine of necessity, and necessity cannot 
adequately explain the purposive functioning of the order of nature 
(Guide 2.19-22). Yet it is not that creation provides a better philosoph-
ical explanation for the existence of the order of nature that is the main 
point Maimonides argues; rather, he asserts that creation proves that 
God possesses volition that is not limited to the order of nature. Only 
by accepting the notion of divine volition can we have revelatory reli-
gion and all the theological doctrines associated with it (Guide 2.25). 
The God of Aristotle has no role to play in history, is not a lawgiver, 
does not choose prophets to send on missions, and cannot perform 
miracles. Nor does Aristotle’s deity reward and punish individuals in 
accordance with their actions. The God of Aristotle is the deity of an 
eternally unchanging natural order. Even if creation provides a better 
explanation for the existence of this order than does eternity, one 
hardly needs creation to posit such an order; one needs creation to posit 
the exceptions to the order. As Julius Guttmann succinctly notes 
regarding Maimonides’ doctrine of creation: “It relieves Maimonides 
of the necessity of interpreting the religious ideas of God’s activity and 
his relationship to the world in terms of an immanent, teleological, and 
largely impersonal dynamism. He can now reinvest these ideas with 
their original meaning, though he makes only sparing and very cautious 
use of this possibility.”10 As Maimonides himself phrases it in Guide 
2.25: “Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all 
the miracles become possible and the Law becomes possible” (329).
important factor in upholding the doctrine of creation, even if he did privately 
accept it as true.
10 Philosophies of Judaism, trans. David Silverman (New York: Schocken Books, 
1973), 192.
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Yet a close reading of the issues involved has led a number of inter-
preters of Maimonides’ philosophy to conclude that he in fact interprets 
God’s activity and His relationship to the world in terms of “an imma-
nent, teleological, and largely impersonal dynamism.” Maimonides treats 
prophecy as a natural phenomenon, with the caveat that God can 
miraculously withhold prophecy from one who is worthy to attain it. At 
the same time, he invalidates his own examples for the miraculous 
withholding of prophecy, viewing such a miracle as only a theoretical 
possibility that never materialized and apparently never will. In this 
manner he signals his essential agreement with the Aristotelian position 
(Guide 2.32).11 Only Mosaic prophecy and the Revelation at Sinai 
continue to be treated by him as supernatural phenomena, as in his 
earlier writings. However, in this case too there are passages in the 
Guide that can be interpreted as alluding to an esoteric position, which 
views Moses as the immediate author of the Law on the basis of the 
prophetic illumination he attained, and understands the Revelation at 
Sinai in a naturalistic manner.12 Maimonides scatters certain hints in 
his writings that God did not in fact personally inform Moses of each 
11 For a discussion of Maimonides’ three opinions concerning prophecy and the rami-
fications of his view of prophecy regarding the problem of creation, see Lawrence 
Kaplan, “Maimonides on the Miraculous Element in Prophecy,” HTR 70 (1977): 
233-256; Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation,” in Studies 
in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), 16-40. Warren Z. Harvey, “A Third Approach to 
Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle,” HTR 74 (1981): 287-301; Howard 
Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2001), 222-230; Roslyn Weiss, “Natural Order or Divine Will: Maimon-
ides on Cosmogony and Prophecy,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 15 
(2007): 1-26.
12 See Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concept of Mosaic Prophecy,” HUCA 40 (1969): 
325-362; Kalman Bland, “Moses and the Law According to Maimonides,” in Mystics, 
Philosophers and Politicians, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Daniel Swetschinski (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1982), 49-66. See also Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an 
Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 230-239, 260-262. Even some of the medieval 
philosophers, such as Nissim of Marseille, understood these phenomena in a natu-
ralistic manner and maintained that Moses was the immediate author of the Law. 
For a discussion of this issue see chapter 6, 171-173; see also chapter 9.
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commandment word for word by means of an audible voice, nor was 
such a voice miraculously created by God for Israel’s benefit at Sinai.13
When one turns to Maimonides’ discussion of providence, an 
esoteric position, in essential agreement with Aristotle, is presented in 
a manner that borders upon the exoteric. Maimonides begins his discus-
sion by indicating that according to the opinion of the Law, human 
beings possess free will and everything that befalls them, good and 
bad—whether a person is hurt by a thorn or receives even the slightest 
pleasure—is determined according to their just deserts (Guide 3.17). 
After presenting the view that posits personal divine intervention in all 
matters that befall human beings, he immediately modifies his view to 
indicate that individual providence, now treated as only the protection 
humans experience and not the calamities that befall them, is in propor-
tion to the perfection of the intellect, while everything else that happens 
to them is by chance, as is the case with the other species (Guide 3.18). 
Maimonides leads us step by step to the conclusion that the intellect 
itself is the mode of providence given to human beings, since it allows 
the individual to anticipate most evils and to take action to avoid them. 
It also directs the individual to lead a lifestyle that minimizes the phys-
ical evils normally befalling human beings. Finally, the perfect individual 
has attained an identity of pure intellect, in whose case all physical evils 
that befall the corporeal aspect of his being no longer affect him.14 The 
fact that Maimonides in his commentary on Job distinguishes Elihu’s 
opinion, ostensibly representing Maimonides’ own, and the opinion of 
13 See Howard Kreisel, “The Voice of God in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Exegesis,” 
Daat 16 (1986): 29-38 (Heb.). See also Jacob Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher 
and Codifier (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1989), 39-48 (Heb.). I discuss this issue in 
more detail below, chapter 9, 342-348. 
14 A number of scholars have convincingly argued this reading of Maimonides. See, 
for example, Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concepts of Providence and Theodicy,” 
HUCA 43 (1972): 169-206; Charles Touati, “Les deux théories de Maïmonide sur la 
providence,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History, ed. Siegfried 
Stein and Raphael Loewe (Alabama: Alabama University Press, 1979), 331-344. 
This position was advanced by Maimonides’ earliest commentators. See the inter-
pretations of Maimonides’ remarks on providence presented by Samuel and Moses 
Ibn Tibbon published by Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on 
Maimonides’ Theory of Providence,” HUCA 11 (1936): 341-366. See also below, 
chapter 4, 96; chapter 11, 415.
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Eliphaz, which he treats as false and equates with the opinion of the 
Law (Guide 3.23), hardly leaves any doubt that Maimonides eschews 
the view of God’s immediate role in extending providence to individ-
uals. The intellect is the human being’s guardian angel, while Satan, 
representing the privations associated with matter, is powerless to 
affect the perfect immortal intellect.15
As for miracles, Maimonides’ position on how to understand them 
is far from clear. In the case of the most important miracle associated 
with the faith, namely, the resurrection of the dead—leaving aside the 
Revelation at Sinai, which Maimonides treats as a unique event 
belonging to a different category altogether16—he apparently did not 
accept a literal understanding of resurrection, his disclaimers to the 
opposite in his Treatise on Resurrection notwithstanding. The immor-
tality of the perfect intellect is the only form of “resurrection” that 
Maimonides recognizes. This is at least the conclusion that appears 
upon a close reading of all his pronouncements on the subject.17 Other 
miracles he seems to regard as anomalies in nature. I have argued else-
where that he may even have accepted the view that the prophet 
himself is the author of some of the miracles,18 though the evidence for 
this view is admittedly sketchy at best.
Overall, there is a good deal of scholarly literature on each of the 
topics mentioned above providing a strong basis for arguing that 
15 For an in-depth study of Maimonides’ commentary on Job, see Robert Eisen, The 
Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
43-77. See also Hannah Kasher, “The Image and Views of Job in the Guide of the 
Perplexed,” Daat 15 (1985): 81-89 (Heb.).
16 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 8.1. Maimonides agrees that 
miracles occurred at Sinai, but the voice heard at Sinai is not to be placed in the 
category of miracles; see Guide 2.33. See also Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an 
Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 191-195, 230-232.
17 For an esotericist reading of Maimonides’ treatise see, for example, Robert 
Krischner, “Maimonides’ Fiction of Resurrection,” HUCA 52 (1982): 163-193.
18 Avicenna advances this theory, which in all likelihood was known to Maimonides. 
See my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Jewish Quarterly Review 75 
(1984): 106-114. See also below, chapter 9, 354-360. For a discussion of Maimon-
ides’ approach to miracles, see also Hannah Kasher, “Biblical Miracles and the 
Universality of Natural Laws: Maimonides’ Three Methods of Harmonization,” 
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (1999): 25-52.
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Maimonides held an esoteric position.19 Hence, when one looks at the 
issues Maimonides discusses after he lays down the doctrine of creation, 
one sees not only that on the exoteric level, after showing God’s voli-
tion to act freely and in a direct manner, he “makes only sparing and 
very cautious use of this possibility,” in the words of Guttmann; one 
also sees reasons for questioning whether he made any use of this possi-
bility at all. If one accepts the evidence for an esotericist reading of 
Maimonides on these issues—certainly a big “if” for those who have 
not closely examined the issues, or have done so and remain uncon-
vinced—one arrives at a strange conclusion: Maimonides believes in 
creation on religious as well as philosophic grounds, but treats the 
divine governance of the world, including the phenomena associated 
with revelatory religion, in a manner that is in complete harmony with 
the philosophic world view. Let us keep in mind that Maimonides had 
before him the model presented by Alfarabi, a philosopher he greatly 
admired, who explained revelation and the fundamental doctrines of 
revelatory religion in a naturalistic manner.20
It is true that Maimonides labels creation the most important prin-
ciple of the Law after the unity of God (Guide 2.13). It is not difficult 
to discern why: his appreciation of the fact that the vast majority of 
believers could not accept the divine origin of the Torah without belief 
in creation.21 It is no wonder that Maimonides works hard to defend 
this belief, given the stakes involved. After writing the Guide, he 
goes so far as to reformulate the fourth principle—God’s eternal 
19 It should be noted that Herbert Davidson in his book, Moses Maimonides (above, 
n. 2) chose to ignore many of the stronger arguments for an esotericist reading of 
Maimonides while dismissing this reading out of hand.
20 See, for example, Alfarabi’s description of the laying down of perfect law in The 
Political Regime, translated by Fauzi Najjar in Medieval Political Philosophy, ed. 
Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 36-37. 
The theological doctrines of revelatory religion are treated by Alfarabi as philo-
sophic truths presented in a figurative manner. For the influence of Alfarabi on 
Maimonides’ views on the origins and function of revelatory religion and its rela-
tion to philosophy, see in particular Lawrence Berman, “Maimonides, the Disciple 
of Alfarabi,” Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 154-178.
21 One may further argue that many would even question the very existence of God 
without belief in creation, as Maimonides’ comments in Guide 2.31 imply; see 
above, n. 9.
Maimonides on the Eternity of the World  49
existence—of the thirteen principles of the faith that he had laid down 
in his Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq to 
include creation. According to the original formulation, which stresses 
the unique nature of the eternity of God, one could accept this prin-
ciple while still believing in the eternity of the world, as he himself 
indicates in his reformulation.22
Up to this point in the argument I have not made any direct case 
for interpreting Maimonides as believing in eternity. My argument has 
simply been that if Maimonides holds an esoteric position regarding a 
number of major theological issues—a position that is far easier to 
prove—then at least one has grounds to wonder if the same is not the 
case for creation. This is not simply to claim that an esoteric stance on 
one issue inevitably implies esoteric positions on other issues as well. In 
this case, the issue of creation is the fundamental one underlying the 
other issues. Hence if Maimonides maintained an esoteric position on 
the major “derivative” issues, one has good reason to suppose that this 
is the case with the core issue. Moreover, Maimonides had every reason 
to present his true position on this issue in an even more veiled manner 
than he did on the others. By proving creation, Maimonides has 
removed the philosophic obstacles to a literal reading of Scripture on 
these issues, though he nevertheless rejects such a reading on many 
points quite explicitly. He could have utilized the doctrine of divine 
volition, which he has purportedly proven to advance a completely 
miraculous understanding of prophecy, more in keeping with a literal 
reading of Scripture, as well as a supernatural approach to divine prov-
idence, rather than treat them as esoteric doctrines belonging to the 
secrets of the Torah that are not to be understood in accordance with a 
literal reading of Scripture (Guide 1.35). Given this fact, one at least 
has a basis for wondering whether Maimonides’ adoption of an esoteric 
22 For a discussion of this point, see Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 217-221. The original formulation, God’s absolute 
eternity, appears to be predicated on Avicenna’s notion of God’s necessary exis-
tence—namely, God’s essence is the cause of His existence. Hence even if other 
entities are eternal, their eternity is not of the same nature as that of God, since 
they possess only possible existence. They require an external agent, namely God, 
to actualize this possibility.
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position is not also the case with the doctrine of creation. As we have 
seen, one can easily understand why, from a political-pedagogical 
perspective, Maimonides would publicly uphold the doctrine of creation 
even if privately he did not agree with it.
The Esotericist Reading of Maimonides’ Position on 
Creation
The textual evidence in support of the interpretation that Maimonides 
believed in a world without beginning is certainly of a subtle nature, 
as the studies on this issue show. Maimonides’ stated position in Guide 
2.25 that if the eternity of the world would be proven demonstrably he 
could certainly interpret Scripture accordingly, just as he did in the 
case of the corporeal descriptions of God, which is a more difficult 
move from a textual standpoint, was picked up as early as the Middle 
Ages as a possible hint to an esoteric position, insofar as it makes the 
interpretation of Scripture subservient to human reason. Moreover, it 
is strange that Maimonides favors a literal reading of Scripture on a 
topic he characterizes as belonging to the secrets of the Law while on 
all other issues belonging to this category Maimonides chooses a figu-
rative interpretation.23
The favorite piece of evidence for esotericists on the issue of 
creation relates to Maimonides’ presentation of three opinions on 
prophecy in Guide 2.32 (God gives prophecy to whomever He chooses; 
prophecy is received by all those possessing the necessary preconditions 
and only by them; certain fixed conditions are necessary for attaining 
prophecy, but God can miraculously withhold prophecy from one who 
possesses all the necessary qualifications), explicitly comparing them to 
the three opinions he presents on the question of the creation of the 
world in Guide 2.13 (creation ex nihilo; creation from eternal matter; 
the eternity of the world). The mental gymnastics practiced by the 
exotericists, who tried to show that creation ex nihilo most closely 
corresponds to the opinion brought by Maimonides in the name of the 
23 A similar point is made by Roslyn Weiss in her review of Seeskin, Maimonides on 
the Origin of the World (above, n. 5), Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
75 (2007): 739.
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Law that prophecy is a natural phenomenon, which God at times mirac-
ulously withholds from the worthy, and that creation ex nihilo does not 
correspond to the opinion of the masses that God grants prophecy to 
whom He wills without the person possessing any fixed qualifica-
tions—a position Maimonides completely dismisses—simply is not 
convincing, particularly in light of the problematic nature of the other 
match ups between the opinions on creation and those of prophecy that 
result if one adopts this view. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which 
imposes no limits on God’s volitional activity except for what is concep-
tually impossible, most clearly corresponds to God’s ability to bestow 
prophecy upon whomever He wishes.24 Seeskin’s suggestion that one 
should not look for a one-to-one match up is also problematic, since it 
does not account for why Maimonides would then point out the rela-
tion between the two subjects.25
One other frequently adduced bit of evidence for an esoteric posi-
tion is Maimonides’ apparent contradiction involving emanation. In 
2.11 of the Guide he agrees with this doctrine (cf. 1.58 and 1.69), while 
in 2.22 he criticizes it in detail. Arthur Hyman and Herbert Davidson 
argue that there is no contradiction, since Maimonides could hold the 
view that the world begins emanating from God with the volitional act 
of creation, a doctrine that Alexander Altmann had shown is in fact the 
view of Isaac Israeli.26 Seeskin criticizes this view,27 correctly in my 
opinion, but I find his own view that Maimonides never really embraces 
the doctrine of emanation equally problematic.28 Maimonides alludes to 
his acceptance of the doctrine of emanation in the Mishneh Torah, Laws 
24 For the bibliography dealing with this issue see above, n. 11.
25 See Seeskin, Maimonides on the Origin of the World, 178-179.
26 See Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides on Creation and Emanation,” in Studies in Medi-
eval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1987), 45-61; Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the 
Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1987), 208-209; Alexander Altmann, “Creation and Emanation in Isaac 
Israeli: A Reappraisal,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (above, 
n. 11), 1-15.
27 Seeskin, Maimonides on the Origin of the World, 145-146.
28 Ibid., 119-120.
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of Principles of the Torah29—where he also bases his abridged proof of 
God’s existence and unity on the doctrine of the eternity of the 
world30—as well as other chapters of the Guide.31 The main criticism 
Maimonides presents against the doctrine of emanation in 2.22 focuses 
on the issue of how each Separate Intellect can be the source of emana-
tion of a corporeal sphere. In other words, how can matter emanate 
from pure form? On this point, Maimonides’ position in 2.11, where he 
embraces the doctrine of emanation, is less than clear and is worthy of 
a separate study.32
29 In Laws of Principles of the Torah 2.5, Maimonides writes: “In what manner are 
the Forms [Separate Intellects] separate from each other though they are not 
bodies? They are not equal in their existence but each one is below the level of the 
other and exists by virtue of his power [ve-hu maẓui me-koḥo], one above the other. 
All of them exist by virtue of the power of God and His goodness.” This is a clear 
allusion to the doctrine of emanation, at least in regard to the Separate Intellects. 
Maimonides, however, does not allude to the immediate origin of the spheres in 
this context. See below, note 32.
30 Maimonides bases his proof of the existence and unity of God on the Aristotelian 
notion of the eternal motion of the sphere; see Laws of Principles of the Torah 1.5, 
7. In Guide 1.71, however, he explains this move as follows: “For this reason you 
will always find that whenever, in what I have written in the books of jurispru-
dence, I happen to mention the foundations and start upon establishing the 
existence of the deity, I establish it by discourses that adopt the way of the doctrine 
of the eternity of the world. The reason is not that I believe in the eternity of 
the world, but that I wish to establish our belief in the existence of God, may He 
be exalted, through a demonstrative method as to which there is no disagreement 
in any respect” (182). It is not clear that Maimonides’ explanation in the Guide in 
fact represents his original intent in formulating his position in his legal works. For 
a discussion of this point, see Warren Z. Harvey, “The Mishneh Torah as a Key to 
the Secrets of the Guide,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual 
Life, ed. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001), 15-17.
31 In several passages in the Guide, Maimonides treats God as the source of emana-
tion of the world; see 1.58, 69; 2.6.
32 In his brief presentation of the philosophic doctrine of emanation in 2.4, he does 
not explicitly attribute to the philosophers the doctrine that the spheres themselves 
emanate from the Separate Intellects—a doctrine that we find in Alfarabi and 
Avicenna, summarized by Halevi in the opening of the Kuzari, and subsequently 
brought by Maimonides in his critique of the philosophic position in 2.22. Rather 
Maimonides treats each Separate Intellect as the immediate agent of the intellect of 
each sphere. When he presents the doctrine of emanation in his own name in 2.11, 
however, he appears to allude to the position that the Separate Intellects are also 
the source of the body of the spheres and not only the sphere’s form or intellect. 
He writes: “For the overflow coming from Him, may he be exalted, for the bringing 
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An examination of the terminology used by Maimonides regarding 
creation shows that the terms he employs are equivocal, or that he treats 
the biblical terms he explains as being equivocal. Nuriel has analyzed 
the term “creator” (al-bari) in the Guide, showing that Maimonides does 
not employ this term when dealing with the creation of the world but in 
contexts more in harmony with the notion of an eternal world, thereby 
alluding to an esoteric view in this matter.33 Sara Klein-Braslavy has 
shown that Maimonides interprets the Hebrew term for “create,” bara’, 
in an equivocal manner; it need not refer to creation ex nihilo but can 
refer to the emanation of form on matter, a doctrine that is in harmony 
with the notion of an eternal world.34 Given Maimonides’ view on the 
into being of separate intellects overflows likewise from these intellects, so that one 
of them brings another one into being and this continues up to the Active Intellect. 
With the latter, the bringing in being of separate intellects comes to an end. More-
over a certain other act of bringing into being overflows from every separate intellect 
until the spheres come to an end with the sphere of the moon. After it there is the 
body subject to generation and corruption, I mean the first matter and what is 
composed of it” (275). In the latter passage it appears that only the question of the 
origin of sublunar matter is left open. Yet in a previous passage in the same chapter, 
he writes: “. . . that from the benefits received by the intellect, good things and 
lights overflow to the bodies of the spheres” (275). From this passage it appears that 
the bodies themselves do not have their origin in the Separate Intellects, only their 
form, and perhaps this is what Maimonides had in mind when he speaks of the 
emanation of the Separate Intellects that involves the bringing about of the 
spheres. This leaves open the problem of how Maimonides understood the origin of 
the bodies of the spheres, or of matter in general, if he did not in fact believe in the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo. It appears that Maimonides at least entertained 
doubts regarding the emanation of matter from what is incorporeal, even if he 
favored the doctrine of the eternity of the world. One should add that the problem 
of whether the bodies of the spheres emanate from the Separate Intellects is 
discussed briefly in Averroes’ Epitome to the Metaphysics. In this treatise, Averroes 
accepts the doctrine of emanation and sees in each of the Movers of the spheres the 
cause of the form (soul) of the sphere and the cause of a different Mover. As for the 
body of the sphere, he argues: “. . . the cause of the existence of the matters of the 
celestial bodies is nothing but their forms.” See Rudiger Arnzen (trans.), Averroes 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 169-175.
33 Avraham Nuriel, “The Question of a Primordial or Created World in the Philos-
ophy of Maimonides,” Tarbiz 33 (1964): 372-387 (Heb.) [reprinted in Nuriel, 
Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
2000), 25-40 (Heb.)].
34 Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation (Jerusalem: 
Reuben Mass, 1987), 81-90 (Heb.).
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equivocal nature of biblical terms, it is more than plausible that he 
should hint to his esoteric views by means of the equivocal meanings of 
the terms he employs. He alludes to this technique in his admonition to 
the reader to “grasp each word that occurs in it in the course of the 
speech” of his treatise (Guide 1.introduction 15).
When one starts looking at the Guide with at least a suspicion that 
he holds an esoteric position, one finds more and more signs in support 
of this interpretation. Perhaps in some cases these readings can be 
attributed to the overly creative imagination of the interpreter, but I 
certainly do not think all of them can be so easily dismissed. It appears 
to me that Maimonides adopted a gamut of esoteric techniques to hint 
at his true view on this matter.35 Let me present a few examples.36
One of the techniques for conveying an esoteric position is to 
attack a doctrine held by an opponent who does not belong to your 
“camp,” though this doctrine essentially characterizes your own tradi-
tion’s position. The average reader, even if he senses that there is a 
problem, will not pay too much attention to it since he is accustomed to 
35 Herbert Davidson dismisses the strongest argument for Maimonides’ esoteri-
cism—namely, that Maimonides explicitly indicates that he has incorporated 
contradictions in the Guide on purpose in order to veil his views—by arguing that 
Maimonides wrote the introduction before writing the bulk of his treatise; he 
subsequently changed his mind about using this technique, or any other, for 
masking his true views, which he proceeds to present quite openly. See Moses 
Maimonides (above, n. 2), 330, 391. Even if one accepts Davidson’s view about the 
writing of the introduction, one need not accept his conclusion. Rather that retract 
his intention to write a treatise containing an esoteric level, Maimonides may have 
in fact developed additional strategies for alluding to his esoteric views.
36 See my “The Guide of the Perplexed and the Art of Concealment,” in By the Well: 
Studies in Jewish Philosophy and Halakhic Thought Presented to Gerald J. Blidstein, 
ed. Uri Ehrlich, Howard Kreisel, and Daniel Lasker (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev Press, 2008), 487-507 (Heb.). In this article I also deal with 
a number of additional techniques not described below. On the issue of esoteric 
writing I am very much indebted to Leo Strauss’s masterful essay cited above, n. 3. 
There are no set rules for esoteric writing, for the premise of esoteric writing is that 
the reader will pick up on certain “irregularities” in the text, treat these irregular-
ities as deliberate in character, and draw deductions regarding their purpose. Much 
then depends on the mind of the reader. Maimonides explicitly brings one such 
type of irregularity—arguments based on contradictory premises. As argued in the 
previous note, this technique hardly exhausts the possibilities for esoteric writing 
and the other techniques Maimonides may have chosen to employ.
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dismiss out of hand the truth of the doctrines of those who belong to 
different traditions. The careful reader, on the other hand, discerns 
that this attack hints at the fact that the author does not accept his own 
tradition’s view on the matter. Maimonides appears to adopt this tech-
nique when he discusses one of the Kalām’s positions, a theology of 
which he is exceptional critical. According to Maimonides, instead of 
exploring the major questions of speculation based on a profound 
understanding of the principles of reality, the Moslem theologians 
invent their principles in accordance with the criterion of how best to 
defend religious doctrines.37 In the course of presenting the Aristotelian 
proofs for the eternity of the world, in Guide 2.14 Maimonides presents 
the following argument:
He [Aristotle] asserts that with respect to everything that is produced 
in time, the possibility of its being produced precedes in time the 
production of the thing itself. And similarly with respect to every-
thing that changes, the possibility of its changing precedes in time 
the change itself. From this premise he made a necessary inference 
as to the perpetuity of circular motion, its having no end and no 
beginning. His later followers in their turn made it clear by means 
of this premise that the world was eternal. They said: Before the 
world came into being, its production in time must have been either 
possible or necessary or impossible. Now if it was necessary, the 
world could not have been nonexistent. If its production in time 
was impossible, it could not be true that it ever would exist. And if 
it was possible, what was the substratum of this possibility? For 
there indubitably must be an existent thing that is the substratum 
of this possibility and in virtue of which it is said of the thing that 
it is possible. This is a very powerful method for establishing the 
eternity of the world. However, an intelligent man from among 
the later Mutalallimūn thought that he had solved this difficulty. He 
said: Possibility resides in the agent and not in the thing that is the 
object of action. This, however, is no reply, for there are two possi-
bilities. For with respect to everything produced in time, the 
possibility of its being produced precedes in time the thing itself. 
And similarly in the agent that produced it, there is the possibility 
to produce that which it has produced before it has done so. There 
are indubitably two possibilities: a possibility in the matter to 
37 Guide 1.71.
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become that particular thing, and a possibility in the agent to 
produce that particular thing. (287)
In the passage above, Maimonides presents an Aristotelian argument, 
brings the objection of the Kalām, and then brings the rebuttal of the 
philosophers to this objection, which he treats as successfully dismissing 
the objection. In order for something to be generated, there must exist 
two types of possibility. Maimonides himself in the previous chapter 
championed the opinion that the world was created ex nihilo, hence 
there existed no matter in which the possibility of the world resided. In 
a subsequent chapter, he dismisses the Aristotelian argument based on 
possibility as follows:
We shall make a similar assertion with regard to the possibility that 
must of necessity precede everything that is generated. For this is 
only necessary in regard to this being that is stabilized—in this being 
everything that is generated, is generated from some being. But in 
the case of a thing created from nothing, neither the senses nor the 
intellect point to something that must be preceded by its possibility. 
(2.17: 297)
According to Maimonides, the law that nothing is generated unless it is 
preceded by possibility found in matter only holds true after creation 
ex nihilo and is not an absolute law covering all conceivable existence. 
Thus God can create a world without there existing any substratum. 
The fact that Maimonides holds the view that there is an argument that 
rebuts the philosophic position on this issue raises the question of why 
he bothers to bring the argument of the Kalām against the philosophers 
only to then reject their argument. Ostensibly Maimonides’ position is 
similar to the one they bring—namely, that there need not exist any 
matter supporting the possibility for creation and it is sufficient that 
God as agent possesses the capacity to create.
One may answer that Maimonides is critical of the Kalām because 
they were of the opinion that they were able to rebut the view of the 
philosophers based on the philosophers’ own principles. Maimonides 
shows that they failed in this regard. Maimonides’ own argument is not 
based on the principles of the philosophers, which he accepts, but upon 
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a different principle—the difference between the laws of nature governing 
the world after it was formed and conceptual laws that necessarily char-
acterize every activity, including divine activity. That everything 
generated must be preceded by a substratum that supports the possi-
bility of generation is a physical law and not a logical one in his view.38 
Thus Maimonides’ argument against the philosophers is far different 
than the objection raised by the Kalām, despite a certain similarity 
between them.
There is, however, the alternative of interpreting Maimonides as 
alluding to an esoteric doctrine. By bringing the Kalām’s argument in 
Guide 2.14, which appears to be extraneous to the discussion, since it 
belongs to his subsequent discussion and rejection of the philosophic 
arguments in chapter 17, Maimonides hints that he does not in fact 
accept the doctrine that he brings in chapter 13 and defends in chapter 
17—God’s ability to create the world ex nihilo. His rebuttal of the 
Kalām’s argument, which arouses no problem in the average reader, 
while subsequently presenting an argument that essentially supports a 
similar position as the one advanced by the Kalām when defending the 
traditional position, is the way he signals to his more astute readers that 
he is not committed to the traditional view.
My second example is one in which a certain philosophic position 
is rebutted by the author, but then the rebuttal itself is answered by the 
author, essentially allowing the philosophic position to stand. In 2.22, 
in the midst of his critique of the doctrine of emanation, Maimonides 
ridicules this doctrine by claiming that it leads to the disgraceful conclu-
sion: “it would follow that the deity, whom everyone who is intelligent 
recognizes to be perfect in every kind of perfection, could, as far as all 
38 One should also note that in Maimonides’ presentation of the philosophic position 
in Guide 2.14, he talks of the possibility in the agent if one posits creation, a point 
that he knows is conceptually impossible since no possibility can exist in God. This 
too is one of the arguments of the philosophers against creation. God’s activity 
must remain constant through eternity. Maimonides acknowledges that this indeed 
is a great difficulty that he proceeds to address in Guide 2.18, though in a manner 
that is not completely convincing. The distinction between natural impossibilities 
(which are conceptually possible) and conceptual impossibilities underlies Maimon-
ides’ discussion of the impossible in Guide 3.15.
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the beings are concerned, produce nothing new in any of them; if He 
wished to lengthen a fly’s wing or to shorten a worm’s foot, He would 
not be able to do it” (319). In short, the deity of the Aristotelian philoso-
phers is completely impotent—certainly a conclusion that no one is 
prepared to accept. What is significant in this case is Maimonides’ next 
sentence, one in which he essentially undermines his own argument. 
“But Aristotle will say that He would not wish it and that it is impos-
sible for Him to will something different from what is; that it would not 
add to His perfection but would perhaps from a certain point of view 
be a deficiency.” Maimonides does not proceed to rebut Aristotle’s 
counter-argument, as we would expect him to do, but allows Aristotle 
to have the last word on this matter, thereby subtly signaling his agree-
ment with Aristotle’s position. Indeed, for Maimonides, God created 
the world in a perfect manner, and thus He would not wish to intro-
duce any change, certainly any permanent change, in what he created, 
Maimonides argues in 2.29.39
A third example of a possible allusion to an esoteric position on the 
issue of creation is a comment made in passing in 3.45 in his discussion 
of the reason for the image of two cherubim on the ark of the Law. 
Maimonides begins his discussion with the following remark: “It is 
known that the fundamental principle of belief in prophecy precedes 
the belief in the Law. For if there is no prophet, there can be no Law. 
The prophet receives prophetic revelation only through the interme-
diary of an angel” (576). Maimonides concludes: “Consequently it has 
been made clear that belief in the existence of angels precedes the belief 
in prophecy and the belief in prophecy precedes the belief in the Law.” 
The question immediately arises of where in the picture one finds 
creation, which in Guide 2.25 was the basis for belief in the Law. This 
is exactly the point: one does not. Belief in angels upon which prophecy 
and the Law are dependent, that is to say belief in Separate Intellects 
and the faculties of the soul of the prophet, is in harmony with the 
doctrine of eternity. In short, one may believe in prophecy and the Law 
39 Maimonides indicates there that God may wish to introduce temporary changes, 
i.e. miracles, for historical ends. His discussion in 2.22, however, appears to deal 
with the possibility of permanent changes.
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even if one does not believe in creation. Lest this point be completely 
lost on his readers, Maimonides repeats it in the continuation of his 
discussion: “Thus it has become clear through what we have stated 
before that the belief in the existence of angels is consequent upon the 
belief in the existence of the deity, and that thereby prophecy and the 
Law are established as valid . . . this correct opinion, coming in second 
place after the belief in the existence of the deity, constituting the origina-
tive principle of belief in prophecy and the Law, and refuting idolatry, 
as we have explained” (577). Note that belief in angels does not simply 
supplement belief in creation in this context—it replaces it. No longer 
does creation come in second place after belief in the existence of the 
deity.40 This may well be an example of the seventh type of contradic-
tion discussed by Maimonides in the introduction of his treatise:
In speaking about very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal 
some parts and to disclose others. Sometimes in the case of certain 
dicta this necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis 
of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that 
the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting 
the first one. In such cases the vulgar must in no way be aware of the 
contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it 
by all means. (18)
The contradiction in the case of basing the Law on belief in angels as 
opposed to basing it on the world’s creation is far from glaring, for 
belief in creation does not contradict belief in angels. The contradic-
tion only becomes evident when one recalls that belief in angels (as 
Separate Intellects as well as the forces of nature) is in harmony with 
the philosophic view of the eternity of the world. Thus one may claim 
that the missing premise upon which Maimonides bases his remarks on 
Guide 3.45 is that the world is eternal. In this case, one can summarize 
the seventh form of contradiction as follows:
40 Maimonides speaks specifically of creation following the unity of God. It appears 
that he treats the existence and unity of God as essentially the same principle, 
though he divides them in his list of thirteen principles.
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Sometimes in the case of certain dicta this necessity [to defend the 
religion] requires that the discussion [in Guide 2.25] proceed on the 
basis of a certain premise [the creation of the world], whereas in 
another place [Guide 3.45] necessity [to present the truths of specu-
lation] requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another 
premise [the eternity of the world] contradicting the first one. In 
such cases the vulgar must in no way be aware of the contradiction; 
the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means 
[he plants in the course of his discussion of the reasons for the 
commandments a remark that is in harmony with the eternity of the 
world—that belief in the existence of angels follows belief in God 
and is the basis for belief in the Law—in order to allude to his stance. 
The vulgar do not discern that the premise upon which his discus-
sion is based contradicts the notion that the world is created].
A final example: as we have seen above, the most important theological 
reason that Maimonides advances for favoring the view that the world 
is created is that “with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all 
the miracles become possible and the Law becomes possible, and all 
that may be asked on this subject vanish. Thus it might be said: Why 
did God give prophetic revelation to this one and not to that” (Guide 
2.25: 329)? Following is a list of additional questions whose answers are 
ostensibly based on belief in creation, such as: “Why did God give this 
Law to this particular nation, and why did He not legislate to the 
others; why did He legislate at this particular time and why did He not 
legislate before it or after; why did He impose these commandments 
and these prohibitions . . . ?” The belief in creation allows one to answer 
all these questions in terms of a divine will that intervenes in history: 
“The answer to all these questions would be that it would be said: He 
wanted it this way or His wisdom required it this way” (329). Yet in his 
discussion of prophecy immediately following his discussion of creation, 
Maimonides in effect answers the question of why God gives prophetic 
revelation to one rather than another by upholding a naturalistic 
model—one who has attained all the conditions for prophecy receives 
the prophetic emanation and one who has not completed all the require-
ments does not. This suggests that a naturalistic model may also provide 
the answers to the other questions. Belief in creation is necessary for 
belief in the divine origin of the Law only in the case of the average 
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believer, since his commitment to the Law hinges on viewing the reve-
lation of the Law as a supernatural phenomenon.
A Philosophic-Esotericist Reading of Maimonides’ 
Position on Creation
Despite the strength of Maimonides’ philosophic arguments in favor of 
creation, there appear to be some flaws in his reasoning. Flaws in a 
philosophic argument in themselves certainly do not indicate an esoteric 
position. I would like to point out at least one flaw, however, that 
seems to involve a contradiction in Maimonides’ own thought, perhaps 
signaling an esoteric position in accordance with the seventh form of 
contradiction.
Maimonides’ version of the doctrine of particularization is different 
than the argument of Al-Ghazali against the philosophers in The Inco-
herence of the Philosophers, as Davidson has shown.41 Seeskin has picked 
up on this point and elaborated upon it.42 In Al-Ghazali’s version, 
particularization of the poles around which the spheres revolve or their 
direction of motion is the result of an arbitrary will. God’s will is 
capable of choosing between two completely similar possibilities. Even 
according to the principles of the philosophers, Al-Ghazali says, It 
would make no difference whatsoever if two other equidistant points 
were chosen, rather than the North and South Poles around which the 
spheres rotate, or if the highest sphere moved from West to East rather 
than East to West, while the other spheres rotate in the opposite direc-
tion.43 Similarly, Al-Ghazali maintains that God can choose when to 
create a non-eternal world, though there is no difference between the 
possible moments of creation.
Once I can establish that things are particularized without any 
reference to wisdom, that wisdom has no role at all to play in certain 
choices, I can establish a meaningful notion of divine volition. The very 
41 Herbert Davidson, “Argument from the Concept of Particularization in Arabic 
Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West 18 (1968): 299-314.
42 Seeskin, Maimonides on the Origin of the World, 127-143.
43 Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed. and trans. Michael Marmura 
(Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 1.48-64: 24-27.
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act of giving existence to the world, let alone when to give existence to 
the world, can be regarded as an arbitrary choice. There is no reason 
from the standpoint of wisdom to favor existence over non-existence.
Maimonides does not go this route, a route which in a crucial sense 
may be a more convincing way to prove creation. Rather, Maimonides 
appears to treat all divine decisions as reflecting purpose, and I inter-
pret the notion of “purpose” in Maimonides’ thought as an act reflecting 
the combination of wisdom and will.44 Maimonides frequently intro-
duces the notion of divine wisdom and not will alone in dealing with 
the act of creation.45 Moreover, in 3.25 he treats all of God’s actions as 
good and excellent, namely, “that accomplished by an agent aiming at 
a noble end, I mean one that is necessary and useful, and achieves that 
end” (503).46 Hence Maimonides feels that the direction and size of the 
spheres are not products of arbitrary will, but of an unfathomable 
divine wisdom. Maimonides’ argument is that a carefully designed 
world in which all details have a purpose—that is to say, are the product 
of wisdom and will—can only be maintained if one regards such a world 
as having been created. An eternal world is a necessary one, in which 
all parts of heaven should be uniform, and not a world that reflects a 
wisdom guiding the will to act in a purposive—and not arbitrary—manner 
by giving existence to the many different qualities possessed by the heav-
enly bodies in accordance with the divine purpose (Guide 2.19-21).47 
Moreover, it appears that for Maimonides the very act of choosing to 
create the world is a product of wisdom and not will alone, existence 
being preferable to non-existence.48
44 Guide 2.19; see Seeskin, Maimonides on the Origin of the World, 141-142.
45 Guide 2.18-19, 27, 29; 3.23, 25.
46 For a discussion of the concept “good” in Maimonides’ thought, see Kreisel, 
Maimonides’ Political Thought, 93-124.
47 Let me add parenthetically that even the details of the commandments are not 
arbitrary for Maimonides, despite his statement to the contrary in Guide 3.26; see 
Josef Stern, Problems and Parables of Law (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 25-33.
48 Maimonides’ position on the purpose of the existence of the world in its entirety is 
ambiguous. He concludes Guide 3.13: “When man knows his own soul . . . his 
thoughts are not troubled by seeking a final end for what has not that final end; or 
by seeking any final end for what has no final end except its own existence, which 
depends on the divine will—if you prefer you can also say: on the divine wisdom” 
Maimonides on the Eternity of the World  63
I find Maimonides’ reasons for dismissing the possibility of an 
eternal creation of such a world in accordance with divine purpose 
unconvincing. I do not see why the two propositions, 1) that the world 
always existed and 2) that it is the product of divine purpose, are treated 
by Maimonides as irreconcilable, particularly in light of the otherness 
of divine wisdom and the activities resulting from it in Maimonides’ 
thought. Why must purpose necessarily precede action and not exist 
with it simultaneously? Let us recall that one of the criticisms Maimonides 
aims against Aristotle is that the eternity of divine wisdom does not 
necessitate the eternity of the world since the unknowable divine 
wisdom may have regarded it as preferable to create a world having a 
temporal beginning (Guide 2.18).49 This argument, however, can be 
turned against Maimonides himself. The unknowable divine wisdom 
may have regarded it as preferable to create an eternal world according 
to the divine purpose. Eternal creation is certainly not a conceptual 
impossibility, so why dismiss this option?50 Furthermore, if existence is 
preferable to non-existence from the standpoint of wisdom, the option 
to create an eternal world appears to be the preferable one, at least from 
a human perspective.
Furthermore, if every divine choice for Maimonides is a product of 
wisdom, could God ever choose to act differently? Does not His very 
essence necessitate every choice? Only if we posit that there exist arbi-
trary choices, and the very purpose underlying the creation of the world 
as we know it is such a choice, can we escape this dilemma. Yet Maimon-
ides, as I have argued, does not appear to accept the existence of 
arbitrary choices—all divine actions are good and excellent in reference 
to their ends and not only to their means (Guide 3.25), even if we do 
not always fathom the wisdom underlying them. In short, we have 
arrived at the conclusion that God could never act differently than He 
(456). Maimonides may be interpreted as saying that existence is a final end in 
itself, and the choice between existence and non-existence is not between similar 
possibilities from the perspective of divine wisdom.
49 For the inscrutability of divine wisdom, see also Guide 3.23.
50 Among later Jewish philosophers, Ḥasdai Crescas treats the doctrines of divine will 
and creation ex nihilo as in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity of the world. 
See Or Ha-Shem 3.1.5.
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does, He cannot choose either to will or not will something, for He can 
never act contrary to wisdom and all choices are the product of divine 
wisdom. Though Maimonides at times speaks of divine choices and 
God’s ability to act in different ways,51 these “choices” appear to be 
purely theoretical and can never be actualized. The Aristotelian philos-
ophers are accused by Maimonides of ascribing necessity to God by 
positing eternal creation (Guide 2.21), yet the necessity of creating a 
non-eternal world is the conclusion to which Maimonides’ argument 
leads. The way out of this dilemma is to posit that necessity and voli-
tion are not necessarily contradictory terms and an act can be necessary 
from a certain perspective and volitional from another.52 If this is the 
case, the obstacle for positing eternal creation is removed—the act of 
creating an eternal world is necessarily mandated by divine wisdom, yet 
at the same time it is a voluntary act not caused by any reasons external 
to God.
As I have already noted, a philosophic flaw in the argument in 
itself hardly points to an esoteric position. Contradictions in Maimon-
ides’ stance, however, may. In this case we can certainly point to an 
apparent contradiction. Maimonides argues, as we have seen, that what 
is eternal and not changing is necessary, and necessity and volition are 
mutually exclusive. This argument appears to be based on the Aristotelian 
principle that what is possible must be realized in the course of eter-
nity.53 But does Maimonides consistently maintain this position? The 
answer is no. Consider Maimonides’ position in regard to the destruc-
tion of the world. In 2.27 he writes: 
However, in view of our claim, based on the Law, that things exist 
and perish according to His will, may He be exalted, and not in 
virtue of necessity, it is not necessary for us to profess that when He, 
may He be exalted, brings into existence a thing that had not existed, 
He must necessarily cause this existent to pass away. Rather does the 
51 See, for example, Guide 2.17: “And its Creator may, if He wishes to do so, render 
it [the world] entirely and absolutely nonexistent” (297).
52 See for example Crescas’s discussion of human volition in Or Ha-Shem 2.5.5.
53 See Physics 3.4, 203b; Metaphysics 9.4, 1074b; cf. Guide 2.1 (third proof for the 
existence of God).
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matter inevitably depend on His will: if He wills, He causes the 
thing to pass away; and if He wills, He causes it to last; or it depends 
on what is required by His wisdom. It is accordingly possible that 
He should cause it to last for ever and ever and to endure as He 
Himself, may He be exalted, endures. (332-333) 
The argument at first glance is simple. The Aristotelian natural prin-
ciple that what is generated must also pass away54 does not hold in the 
case of the passing away of the world. Its continuous existence is due to 
divine will and not natural necessity, just as is the case with its creation. 
But this leaves us with the strange conclusion that what is eternal—the 
existence a parte post of the world—is not necessary but the product of 
volition. Let us formulate Maimonides’ position in a slightly different 
manner: God could destroy the world but He never will. This certainly 
sounds like another way of saying that the eternal existence of the 
world is necessary. Isn’t that what Maimonides maintained in reference 
to the eternity a parte ante of the world? If in regard to the future exis-
tence of the world eternity does not exclude volition, how can 
Maimonides deny that this is not also the case with the past existence 
of the world?
There is yet another passage where Maimonides treats an eternal 
action as the product of choice and not necessity. In his description of 
the spheres and Separate Intellects in 2.7, he writes: “they apprehend 
their acts and have will and free choice (irāda wa-’ikhtiyār) with regard 
to the governance committed to them, just as we have will (irāda) with 
regard to that which from the foundation of our existence has been 
committed to us and given over to our power. Only we sometimes do 
things that are more defective than other things, and our actions are 
preceded by privations; whereas the intellects and the spheres are not 
like that, but always do that which is good” (266). In short, volition on 
one hand and acting through eternity in the same manner without 
change in accordance with wisdom on the other hand, are not regarded 
by Maimonides as mutually exclusive propositions. Again we may ask, 
54 Maimonides brings this principle also in Guide 2.14 (third method); see Aristotle, 
On the Heavens 1.12, 282a.
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why does Maimonides subsequently argue differently when it comes to 
the origin of the world? There seems to be different definitions of will 
and volition at the heart of Maimonides’ different discussions,55 not all 
of them contradicting the notion of the willful creation of a world 
without beginning.
Conclusion
The problems and even contradictions in Maimonides’ argument on 
behalf of creation that I have pointed out are probably not insurmount-
able and they should certainly not obscure the fact that Maimonides 
does present an excellent defense of creation. So why was Maimonides 
so philosophically ingenious in his defense of creation, if he did not 
really favor this doctrine from the standpoint of speculative truth? 
Perhaps he was interested in making an exceptional effort in hiding his 
esoteric position on this issue given his perception of the religious 
stakes involved. It was important for him to provide his co-religionists 
with good philosophical reasons to adopt creation in order to strengthen 
their commitment to the religious tradition. In short, what better 
defense against the philosophers can there be than by showing that 
their position not only conflicts with religion but also with philosophic 
reasoning, even if secretly Maimonides favored the philosophic posi-
tion and felt that all the salient doctrines of tradition could be understood 
in accordance with the philosophic world view. At any rate, I think that 
the esotericist can only hope to show that there are valid reasons for 
adopting this interpretation of Maimonides’ treatise in regard to the 
issue of creation, even if none of the arguments when taken individu-
ally are absolutely convincing. Given the strength of Maimonides’ 
explicit defense of creation, that in itself is no small task.
55 For a detailed study of the two terms Maimonides uses for divine will—irāda and 
mashī’ya—and the significance of his usage for the understanding of his philos-
ophy, see Avraham Nuriel, “The Divine Will in More Nevukhim,” Tarbiz 39 (1970): 
39-61 (Heb.) [reprinted in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philos-
ophy, 41-63].
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Appendix: The Platonic View of Creation from 
Eternal Matter and an Esotericist Reading of 
Maimonides
In his article “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation,”56 Davidson 
argues against the esotericist interpretation of Maimonides. He indi-
cates, however, that if one is prone to adopt an esotericist interpretation, 
it is far easier to defend the view that Maimonides agrees with the 
Platonic position of creation from eternal matter rather than with the 
Aristotelian position. In his book, Maimonides: The Life and World of 
One of Civilization’s Greatest Minds, Joel Kraemer accepts this interpre-
tation.57 There is much merit in the claim that the allusions to 
Maimonides’ acceptance of the Platonic position are more manifest 
than those toward the Aristotelian one. In 2.13 he classifies the Platonic 
position with the Aristotelian one, arguing: 
For they believe in eternity; and there is in our opinion no difference 
between those who believe that heaven must of necessity be gener-
ated from a thing and pass away into a thing or the belief of Aristotle 
who believed that it is not subject to generation and corruption. For 
the purpose of every follower of the Law of Moses and Abraham our 
Father or of those who go the way of these two is to believe that 
there is nothing eternal in any way at all existing simultaneously 
with God. (285) 
While refraining from discussing the Platonic position in the following 
chapters, in 2.25 he adopts a different position altogether on how he 
views creation from eternal matter: “For if creation in time were 
demonstrated—if only as Plato understands creation—all the overhasty 
claims made to us on this point by the philosophers would become void. 
In the same way, if the philosophers would succeed in demonstrating 
eternity as Aristotle understands it, the Law as a whole would become 
56 See above, n. 11.
57 New York: Doubleday, 2008, 382-387; see also 576-577, n. 153. Alfred Ivry argues 
that Maimonides accepts a Neoplatonized version of the Platonic view on this issue 
rather the Neoplatonized version of Aristotle’s view; see Ivry, “Maimonides on 
Creation,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 9 (1990): 115-137 (Heb.).
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void, and a shift to other opinions would take place” (330).58 Rather 
than identifying Plato’s position with Aristotle, in that they both posit 
something coeternal with God, he now identifies Plato’s position with 
the position of the Law, in that they both ascribe volition to God. 
Maimonides goes on in the next chapter to suggest that Rabbi Eliezer 
may have accepted the Platonic view, thereby showing that this view 
apparently had the sanction of a leading rabbinic authority. Maimonides’ 
explicit position in 2.32 that prophecy is a perfection that God can 
miraculously withhold from the worthy individual most closely corre-
sponds to the Platonic position that combines naturalism with divine 
voluntarism. One may add that some of Maimonides’ intimations, 
mentioned above, to the eternity of the world can be viewed as much a 
support of the Platonic position as the Aristotelian one.
Several approaches may be adopted in dealing with the problem of 
why Maimonides appears to hint at two different positions regarding 
the world’s eternity while explicitly upholding the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo. One is to dismiss altogether the view that he favored the 
Aristotelian position. As we have seen, most of the allusions to his 
acceptance of Aristotle’s view are exceptionally subtle and, it may be 
argued, originate in the mind of the interpreter rather than reflect 
Maimonides’ true intent. His allusions to Plato’s view, on the other 
hand, are more evident. The Neoplatonized version of Aristotle’s view, 
which posits the emanation of matter from incorporeal being, was 
particularly problematic from a philosophic perspective, perhaps not 
less than the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The doctrine of creation 
from eternal matter at least avoids this particular difficulty.
Another approach is to ascribe to Maimonides a quasi-skeptical 
position on this issue. He tended to accept the philosophers’ view that 
matter must be eternal, but debated between the Aristotelian and 
Platonic positions. His hints toward both views allude to his uncer-
tainty on this question.
A further approach, the one which I favor, is to view Maimonides 
as incorporating in his treatise levels of esotericism. He hints to both 
58 There is an interesting parallel between Maimonides’ statement and the position 
voiced by Halevi in Kuzari 1.67.
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the Platonic and Aristotelian positions because of the common denom-
inator between these positions—an incorporeal God cannot create 
matter. He provides more overt allusions to the Platonic position 
insofar as it is a less problematic position from the standpoint of the 
masses’ belief in the Law, while avoiding the major difficulty with the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In short, it is a good compromise position 
for those readers who would find the Aristotelian position too radical, 
too greatly opposed to tradition, yet at the same time are disturbed by 
the traditional position from a philosophic perspective. For this reason, 
Maimonides employs a more moderate esotericism in alluding to it.59 
Hence while he favors the Aristotelian position, his hints toward this 
position are far more subtle, to be grasped only by the most elite 
readers, because of its potential harm to the average believer. Of course 
one may argue that the exoteric reading of Maimonides is another alter-
native, but as I have tried to show, there are many good reasons for 
questioning this reading.
59 See Weiss, “Natural Order or Divine Will,” 24-26. For the notion of different 
levels of exotericism/esotericism in Maimonides’ Guide, see also Sarah Klein-
Braslavy, “Maimonides’ Exoteric and Esoteric Biblical Interpretation in the Guide 
of the Perplexed,” in Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought, ed. Howard Kreisel 
(Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2006), 137-164; Lawrence 
Kaplan, “Monotonically Decreasing Esotericism and the Purpose of The Guide of 
the Perplexed,” in Maimonides after 800 Years, ed. Jay Harris (Cambridge, MA: 








In his famous parable of the king in Guide of the Perplexed 3.51, 
Maimonides describes different groups of people in their physical 
proximity to the ruler.1 There are those who are completely outside 
the polis; those within the polis but who walk in the opposite direc-
tion of the palace; those facing the right direction but who are so 
distant from the palace that they do not see it at all; those who make 
their way to the outer wall of the palace and are searching for the 
entrance; those who have entered the palace grounds and are in the 
outer court; and finally, those who have entered the inner court and 
have come to be with the king. As typical of the parables that are 
brought in the Guide—and as opposed to prophetic and rabbinic para-
bles that, according to Maimonides, are designed to conceal as much as 
to reveal—he offers an explanation of the parable, lest the identity of 
the various groups be lost upon the reader. 
1 For a discussion of this parable and some of the studies dealing with it, see also 
chapter 2, 36-38.
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Let us begin our focus on those who made it to the palace walls but 
are looking for the gate. Maimonides labels them: “The jurists who 
believe in true opinions on the basis of traditional authority and study 
the Law concerning the practices of divine service, but do not engage in 
speculation concerning the fundamental principles of religion and make 
no inquiry whatever regarding the rectification of belief” (619).2 Those 
who have entered the gates are described as having, “plunged into 
speculation concerning the fundamental principles of religion.” One 
reaching the inner courtyard is said to have “achieved demonstration, to 
the extent that that is possible, of everything that may be demonstrated; 
and who has ascertained in divine matters, to the extent that that is 
possible, everything that may be ascertained; and who has come close to 
certainty in those matters in which one can only come close to it.”
One of the points that impresses the reader of the parable and its 
explanation is that these groups refer to divisions within the Jewish 
people. This stands in sharp contrast to those outside the city and those 
with their backs to the palace, groups that designate non-Jews in 
Maimonides’ explanation of the parable. The enumeration of the 
Jewish groups begins with those who do not see the king’s habitation 
but are facing in the right direction. Maimonides explicitly labels them 
“the multitude of the adherents of the Law, I refer to the ignoramuses 
who observe the commandments.” The last phrase—“the ignoramuses 
who observe the commandments”—is in Hebrew rather than Arabic, 
lest there be any doubt among Maimonides’ Jewish readers to which 
multitude he is referring. While the terminology employed by him in 
describing the subsequent groups is more neutral, and one may argue 
that it can also refer to jurists belonging to other religions, both the 
narrow context of the passage and its wider context support the view 
that Maimonides is referring to Jewish scholars. The “Law” (Arabic, 
din) is not any law, but specifically Jewish law. Only when Maimonides 
reaches the last group—those who know everything that can be known 
about divine matters in the manner most appropriate to knowing 
2 All English citations from this treatise in this chapter are from Shlomo Pines’s 
translation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963). All other translations in this 
chapter are my own unless noted otherwise.
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them—does one begin to wonder what is specifically Jewish in his 
description. True, this group appears to consist of those Jews who 
belonged to the previous one but took the additional step. Yet could 
not the same description be applied to Aristotle? Did he not speculate 
upon “divine matters”—that is, metaphysics—ascertaining all that was 
possible to ascertain in the most appropriate manner possible? Did he 
not literally write the book on the subject?
The problem only deepens in light of the continuation of the passage. 
Maimonides offers a second explanation regarding those who reach the 
king’s habitation. He indicates that those engaged in the mathematical 
sciences—for example, arithmetic and astronomy—are outside the walls 
and searching for the gates. Those who study the natural sciences have 
entered the antechambers. Finally, those who have achieved perfection in 
the natural sciences and have understood the divine science are in the 
inner court. In this case there appears to be no specific Jewish content to 
the required curriculum to reach the ruler. The curriculum is the standard 
philosophical one. What then is the relation between Maimonides’ two 
explanations? Is the second one an alternative, non-specifically Jewish, 
way to reach perfection, which he describes in a figurative manner in 
terms of physical proximity to the king? Or is it complementary to the 
first path Maimonides lays down, both being necessary, and ultimately 
merging, in reaching the final goal?
Everything I have written till now is well known to scholars of 
Maimonides, who have debated the meaning of the parable through the 
ages. At stake is the question how necessary is Judaism for reaching 
perfection. Within the context of Judaism, there can be no higher 
stakes. Maimonides may be excused for being vague, and deliberately 
so, by not indicating the relation between the two paths of learning he 
presents. In fact, the vagueness itself is significant. When all is said and 
done, it is unclear to which group belongs Aristotle, the great mono-
theist and chief of the philosophers in Maimonides’ estimation.3
Let us leave aside this problem for a moment and turn to a 
different, though related, one. How much closer do students who 
3 I have dealt with this issue above, chapter 2, 36-38.
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study Maimonides’ treatises get to the king in his view? Take, for 
example, the avid student of the Mishneh Torah, the pioneering work 
in which Maimonides codified all of Jewish law. He refers to this 
work as his “great (al-kabir) treatise,” for law is the primary means 
for directing society as a whole in the direction of human perfection. 
The person studying this composition will attain true opinions 
(according to Maimonides) on the basis of traditional authority and 
will know all the practices of the divine service. But as for specula-
tion concerning the fundamental principles, it is difficult to maintain 
that Maimonides supplies in this work the requisite knowledge, 
except for a few salient speculative details in the opening section of 
the treatise, “Laws of the Principles of the Torah.” In short, one who 
studies the Mishneh Torah in detail reaches the outer wall of the 
palace and is still looking for the gate, according to Maimonides’ 
parable. One may add that he also supplies directions in the Mishneh 
Torah, primarily in the opening section, to finding the gate and 
locating the key to enter, but hardly more than that. And what may 
be said to be the fate of the avid student of the Guide of the Perplexed? 
Has not this student, by the very act of careful reading and thinking 
about what is read, “plunged into speculation concerning the funda-
mental principles of religion,” as Maimonides puts it, which is the 
key to entering the antechamber of the king’s palace? Such a student 
will have an understanding of divine attributes, possess proofs for 
the existence of God, have engaged in speculation concerning divine 
governance, studied from a philosophic point of view the pros and 
cons of accepting the notion of creation ex nihilo, and learned addi-
tional significant theoretical matters that are discussed in the Guide. 
Moreover, this student will also absorb, by a careful reading of this 
treatise, the fundamentals for a true interpretation of Scripture and 
rabbinic midrash. From this perspective, one may say that the Guide 
was written as a continuation of the Mishneh Torah. The latter book 
brings its readers to the gate, and the former gives them entrance to 
the antechambers.
It is certainly clear, however, that the Guide does not bring its 
readers to the inner court in Maimonides’ view. Many subjects belonging 
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to the divine science are not covered at all, or covered only in a summary 
manner. At best, the Guide provides some preliminary knowledge to 
gaining access to the inner habitation of the ruler. Moreover, when one 
looks at the second path laid down by Maimonides for reaching the 
ruler—the path focusing on learning the sciences in their proper 
order—the relevance of the Guide becomes even more highly question-
able. It offers almost no guidance in the mathematical sciences, little in 
the natural sciences, and covers topics in the divine science in a very 
sketchy manner at best. The crucial point is that Maimonides expects 
his readers to already have learnt these matters, as he indicates in the 
dedicatory epistle of the Guide to his student, Joseph ben Judah of 
Ceuta, for whom he wrote his treatise (and for those like him). In the 
Guide, he at times excuses himself from not entering into certain phil-
osophic issues, such as the nature of the human intellect, directing his 
readers to the philosophic corpus that they should refer to instead.4 
One may argue that the Guide was written for those who were driven 
to the second path—and in the case of his select disciple, Maimonides 
himself was the one who drove him in this direction—and became 
perplexed because they saw a conflict between this path and the first, 
involving the principles of religion. The Guide is designed to show that 
there are no real contradictions between the two paths and that they 
complement each other. Moreover, it essentially indicates that those 
who follow the first path must also follow the second one if they are to 
reach perfection.
I will continue to leave aside the question of whether the opposite 
is also true—namely, whether one who follows the second path, the 
learning of the sciences, must also follow the first. There can be no 
doubt that Maimonides regarded Judaism as the religion most condu-
cive to the attainment of final perfection, but whether he thought it 
was absolutely necessary for all individuals engaged in this quest is far 
from clear. The important point is that he wrote the Guide, no less than 
the Mishneh Torah, as a Jew, directing his fellow Jews to perfection 
within the context of Judaism. Jews aspiring to perfection must know 
4 See, for example, Guide 1.68.
Chapter Four78 
and practice Jewish law, attain the fundamental beliefs of Judaism, and 
engage in speculation concerning them. This speculation necessarily 
entails a multi-year course in the sciences, in Maimonides’ view.5 Taken 
together, the Mishneh Torah and The Guide of the Perplexed supply the 
necessary knowledge for the “Jewish” aspect of the path. For the 
mandatory philosophic knowledge that must be attained, Maimonides 
refers his students to the writings of the scientists and philosophers.
Maimonides may have seen the Mishneh Torah as an effective 
replacement of all previous works devoted to Jewish law, as he should 
be interpreted as indicating in his introduction to this work,6 but he 
certainly did not see the Guide as a substitute for the books of science 
and philosophy. Significantly, when one looks at the entire corpus of 
his writings, one finds little inclination on his part to make any substan-
tial contributions to the philosophic path. His contributions to 
philosophy in the Guide, noteworthy as they may be in their own right, 
are presented in order to strengthen his readers’ loyalty to the Jewish 
aspect of the path to perfection, as Maimonides understood it. They are 
not presented as independent philosophic investigations—that is, inde-
pendent of an understanding of Jewish principles and teachings. Even 
Maimonides’ non-Jewish writings—namely his medical ones—are not 
really concerned with knowledge that is integral to the attainment of 
perfection, as distinct from the philosophic writings of Aristotle and his 
followers. On this point, Maimonides’ concerns in the Guide are to be 
distinguished from those of his illustrious fourteenth-century Jewish 
philosophic successor living in Provence, Gersonides, who wrote his 
famous treatise, The Wars of the Lord, to convey to his readers an under-
standing of Judaism precisely in those areas where he felt he also had 
original contributions to make in the domain of philosophy.7
5 Guide 1.34. Shen Tov Ibn Falaquera was later to describe the necessary curriculum 
in far more detail, together with the number of years required to complete it, in his 
book The Seeker.
6 Maimonides writes: “I called this composition Mishneh Torah (Repetition of the 
Law), for a person first reads the Written Law and afterwards reads this and knows 
from it the entire Oral Law, with no need for reading any other book.”
7 An English translation of this treatise has been prepared by Seymour Feldman, The 
Wars of the Lord, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984-1999); see 
Gersonides’ introductory remarks in vol. 1, 87-104.
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It is instructive to view the philosophic activity of the Jews of 
Provence from the end of the twelfth century, at the time Maimon-
ides completed his Guide, to the first half of the fourteenth according 
to these two paths. Whereas Maimonides in his philosophic treatise, 
written in Arabic, could refer his readers to the vast corpus of philo-
sophic literature, all available in Arabic, few Jews in Provence knew 
Arabic. At the end of the twelfth century this literature was still 
unavailable in Hebrew translation. One could say that the situation 
of the Jews in Provence was the opposite of the situation of part of 
the Jewish intellectual elite in Arabic-speaking countries. In the case 
of the latter, Maimonides addressed a group steeped in Jewish tradi-
tion, whom he wanted to read his treatise after they had attained also 
a solid grounding in the sciences. The teachings of Judaism, as they 
understood them, when viewed from the perspective of the physical 
and metaphysical sciences they had learnt, are the reason for their 
perplexity. The Guide shows them the compatibility of Judaism and 
science and their respective roles in the quest for perfection. The Jews 
of Provence, on the other hand, had to first read the Guide to under-
stand that a solid grounding in the sciences is necessary for the 
attainment of human perfection, which is the final goal of Judaism. 
Maimonides himself compiles a recommended bibliography in a letter 
to his translator, Samuel Ibn Tibbon: Aristotle, his ancient commen-
tators, and from the medieval philosophers—Alfarabi, Avicenna Ibn 
Bajja, and in a number of manuscripts of this letter, also Averroes, 
whose works were read by Maimonides only after he had written the 
Guide.8 It appears that Ibn Tibbon himself was not overly familiar 
with this literature. The audience for whom he was translating the 
Guide had no access to this literature at all. In short, we are dealing 
with a group of people who do not know that they should be perplexed 
8 See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot 
Press, 1988), 552-554. Shlomo Pines brings an English translation of the relevant 
part of the letter in the introduction to his translation of the Guide, “The Philo-
sophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed,” lix-lx. Doron Forte in an unpublished 
article discusses the different versions of this letter, the more trustworthy ones 
lacking any reference to Averroes, which appears to be a later addition of one of the 
copyists. That Maimonides read Averroes only after he wrote the Guide is attested 
to by one of his later letters to Joseph ben Judah; see Iggerot HaRambam, 299, 313.
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until they read the Guide; from the Guide they learn that they should 
be, and also learn the way out of the perplexity. From their reading 
they would certainly conclude that learning the sciences is necessary 
both in order to truly understand Judaism and to attain perfection. 
Yet precisely on this point the Provençal reader encounters the 
greatest obstacle. All the recommended reading on the subject is 
written in Arabic and unavailable in Hebrew.
Maimonides was certainly aware of the change in the function 
of his treatise from the one he originally intended, given the nature 
of his new audience. From the guide for one who has become 
perplexed in matters of religion because of one’s philosophical 
studies, the treatise assumes the role of being also the guide for 
understanding what knowledge is required in order to become 
perplexed. Guiding these new readers to perplexity in matters of 
philosophy because of their desire to learn Maimonides’ view of 
Judaism becomes an inevitable step in bringing them to perfection. 
Maimonides’ correspondence with the communities of Provence 
shows that he admires their intellectual curiosity, but is also aware 
of their lack of scientific-philosophic knowledge.9 He nevertheless 
does not discourage the translation of his treatise into Hebrew and 
cooperates with Ibn Tibbon in his endeavors. While in the introduc-
tion to the Guide he tells his elite reader that he must grasp each 
word in any given chapter, “for the diction of this treatise has not 
been chosen at haphazard” (15), he informs his translator:
Anyone who wants to translate from one language to another and 
who translates a given word in each instance by a single word, and 
who also preserves the order of what is written—will toil greatly 
and will produce a doubtful and faulty translation. . . . The trans-
lator from one language to another must first understand the matter, 
and afterwards present it in the manner appropriate to the language 
9 Maimonides’ remarks in his letter to astrology addressed to the Jewish community 
of Montpellier, for example, suggests the picture of a community striving to attain 
knowledge of the sciences, but which still lacks basic knowledge in this area. See 
Shailat, Iggerot HaRambam, 478-490; for an English translation of the letter see 
Ralph Lerner, “Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology,” History of Religions 8 (1968): 
143-158.
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into which it is being translated. This is impossible without changing 
the order of things, and translating one word by many words and 
many words by one.10
Maimonides’ position acknowledges his readiness to compromise with 
an important aspect of the treatise in order to reach his new audience. 
He is willing to accept a situation in which the translation of the 
Guide reflects the translator’s understanding of the meaning of a 
given sentence, and not necessarily what is the true intended meaning 
of each carefully chosen word. Even in its translated form, the reader 
of the Guide ascertains how important scientific-philosophic knowl-
edge is, and that ultimately it does not conflict with Judaism but is 
mandated by it.
This picture enables us to understand Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s activity, 
which sets the model for generations of Provençal scholars.11 In the 
wake of the translation of the Guide, Ibn Tibbon was pressured to 
begin translating the philosophic works that were necessary for an 
understanding of the Guide. He chose Aristotle’s Meteorology, since, as 
Maimonides pointed out in 2.30 of the Guide, this work is necessary 
for an understanding of the Account of Creation. Ibn Tibbon, who 
himself was interested in understanding the creation story in light of 
Maimonides’ approach, realized his own need to study Meteorology 
(subsequently he understood the need to study other Aristotelian works 
to accomplish this end). By agreeing to translate this work, he could 
both learn the material and begin to satisfy the demands of his patrons 
and the scholarly community of Provence in general.12
So the pattern is almost set. Let me continue to expand upon this 
story. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, as he delved more deeply into his philo-
sophic studies, saw the need not only to begin supplying the missing 
literature to his environment, but also to defend the approach to 
Judaism advanced by Maimonides, to expand upon it, and even to 
10 Shailat, Iggerot HaRambam, 532.
11 See in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric Char-
acter of the Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 6 (1981): 87-123. 
12 This translation has been edited and translated into English by Resianne Fontaine, 
Otot Ha-Shamayim (Leiden: Brill, 1995). For the reasons for Ibn Tibbon’s transla-
tion of this work, see her remarks in the introduction to her translation, xi-xii.
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radicalize it. Ibn Tibbon grew up in Judaism. As in the case of Maimon-
ides, and as a result of Maimonides’ influence, he saw in philosophy the 
key to understanding Judaism and, so it would appear, the most 
important component of the path to perfection. Nevertheless, he did 
not view philosophy as a substitute for Judaism. Yet if one essentially 
accepts Aristotle’s view of the structure of the world, as Ibn Tibbon 
did, Maimonides’ position can be seen as too ambiguous, his philo-
sophic understanding of fundamental Jewish issues too sketchy. One 
can say that Maimonides operates with a scalpel in guiding his readers 
to an understanding of the importance of studying philosophy, when 
the situation calls for a sledgehammer in Ibn Tibbon’s evaluation. 
There is a fight ensuing for hearts and minds among the intellectual 
elite of Provence. The philosophic program must be presented with a 
clarion call rather than in whispers.13
One has only to consider Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s most famous work, 
Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim. Even less than the Guide can it be consid-
ered a philosophic work in a formal sense. It is thoroughly a Jewish 
work, concerned with the exegesis of certain sections of Scripture. At 
the forefront of the work is the Account of the Chariot as presented 
in Isaiah and Ezekiel and the Account of Creation as presented by 
King David in Psalms (Psalms 104). This treatise in part results from 
Maimonides’ referral to philosophic literature to understand these 
accounts. Ibn Tibbon is not only more explicit than Maimonides in his 
acceptance of Aristotelian philosophy (with strong Avicennian influ-
ences) to understand both the story of creation and the nature of the 
heavenly world, but is also far more expansive. He justifies his explicit-
ness by the notion that the Gentiles possess and openly present the 
same wisdom that lies at the heart of the esoteric science of Judaism. 
Only Jews appear to now lack this wisdom as a result of esotericism. 
The time has come to teach these matters openly also to Jews.14 The fact 
that Christian circles in Provence taught Aristotelian philosophy quite 
13 Significantly, the same change of attitude was taking place in the Kabbalistic circles 
of Provence in this period. 
14 See Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Mordechai Bisliches 
(Pressburg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), chap. 22, 173.
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openly provides Ibn Tibbon with a model for emulation and a prod for 
his educational program.15
At one point Samuel Ibn Tibbon appears to break with Maimon-
ides by arguing that the Torah was designed primarily for the masses.16 
The difference between their positions, however, can be seen more as 
one of emphasis than substance. Ibn Tibbon adopts this position to 
show why the Torah must speak figuratively, when it would have been 
more appropriate to speak to the wise explicitly, much as Aristotle had 
done. Yet Ibn Tibbon, just as Maimonides, sees philosophic truths as 
underlying the Torah’s accounts, as well as those of the Bible in general. 
He does not see himself as reading these truths into the Torah, but as 
unpacking them from the Torah. The Torah is true. One should add 
that another figure that provided Ibn Tibbon, and Provençal thinkers 
in general, with an important model for their approach to Scripture is 
Abraham Ibn Ezra, who combined an emphasis on the true literal 
meaning of the biblical text based on meticulous philological study 
with an understanding of the underlying philosophic and scientific 
notions.17
Samuel Ibn Tibbon also expands upon a task that Maimonides 
only started to engage in—understanding rabbinic midrash along phil-
osophic terms. Maimonides wished to write a book devoted to this 
subject (Book of Correspondence) as he indicates both in his Commen-
tary on the Mishnah and in the Guide.18 He ultimately decided to refrain 
from writing it. In light of his initial intention, it is interesting to note 
that Maimonides brings relatively few examples of this type of exegesis 
in the Guide, though they certainly are far from absent.19 Provençal 
biblical commentators, starting with Ibn Tibbon, tend to bring far 
15 For more on this point, see chapter 7, 246-247.
16 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 20, 132.
17 Samuel Ibn Tibbon, however, is fairly critical of Ibn Ezra as a philosopher. Subse-
quent generations of Provençal scholars, starting with Moses Ibn Tibbon, became 
increasingly more positive in their attitude to this dimension of Ibn Ezra’s 
commentaries.
18 See Guide of the Perplexed, 1. Introduction, 9.
19 One has only to look at the index of rabbinic passages found at the end of Pines’s 
translation, 655-656, to see that Maimonides continued to view the great Sages of 
the Talmud, such as Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer, as philosopher-jurists. Yet it 
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more rabbinic material in their elaboration upon the philosophic truths 
found in Scripture. Following Maimonides’ view, Ibn Tibbon frequently 
illustrates how midrashic views are really philosophic-scientific elabora-
tions in figurative form of Scriptural accounts, which themselves 
figuratively express philosophic notions. Differences of opinions among 
the Sages in aggadic matters reflect scientific controversies, or they may 
reflect different perspectives for viewing the same issue. While we may 
say that Maimonides provides the blueprint for this type of exegesis, 
the Provençal commentators, starting with Ibn Tibbon, begin to build 
the working models.
Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim is not the only work written by 
Samuel Ibn Tibbon in accordance with this model. His earlier Commen-
tary on Ecclesiastes provides us with yet another example.20 The object 
of the model is to show the essential compatibility between, if not iden-
tification of, the philosophic path and the Jewish one. Its object is not 
only to make philosophy acceptable from a Jewish perspective, but also 
to show the truth of Judaism from a philosophic perspective. In short, 
the model is the product of a committed Jew who becomes committed 
to the philosophic pursuit but continues to maintain the commitment 
to Judaism. As already indicated, this exegetical model continued to be 
developed by the subsequent Jewish philosophic commentators in 
Provence, including members of his own family, such as Jacob Anatoli, 
author of the earliest book of philosophical sermons, Malmad 
ha-Talmidim.21
was more important for him in the Guide to underscore the underlying philosophic 
dimension of the books of prophecy.
20 This commentary was edited by James T. Robinson, who also translated much of it 
into English in his doctoral dissertation, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on 
Ecclesiastes” (PhD thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2002). The English 
translation of the commentary was subsequently published by him as Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tubingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2007). In several passages of Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, Ibn Tibbon 
mentions another work that he wrote dealing with the secrets of the Torah, Ner 
ha-Ḥofes. This work has not survived, not even in fragmentary form, and some 
scholars question whether he in fact completed the treatise.
21 Jacob Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim, ed. L. Silberman (Lyck: Mekize Nirdamim, 
1866). For a study of this thinker see Martin L. Gordon, “The Philosophical Ratio-
nalism of Jacob Anatoli” (PhD thesis, Yeshiva University, New York, 1974).
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The two paths laid down by Maimonides to the ruler’s habitation 
thus give rise to two literary directions in the philosophic literature of 
Provence. The philosophic direction lies in the translations of the 
Arabic philosophic and scientific literature, philosophic compendiums 
such as Ruaḥ Ḥen22 and eventually larger compendiums or small ency-
clopedias such as Sha‘ar Ha-Shammayim,23 and larger encyclopedias of 
science such as Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera’s De‘ot ha-Filosofim.24 It also 
later gives rise to the Hebrew commentaries on the philosophic litera-
ture increasingly available in Hebrew translation, particularly the 
commentaries of Averroes, as well as to independent philosophic trea-
tises.25 Many Jewish scholars not only wished to serve as middlemen 
but also took upon themselves the role of being actively engaged in 
contributing to the realms of science and philosophy. The other direc-
tion is the Jewish one, particularly philosophic commentaries on biblical 
literature. It is instructive to keep in mind that a good number of 
philosophers in Provence, from Samuel Ibn Tibbon to Gersonides, 
contributed to both paths—generally, however, in different composi-
tions. Most of the compositions certainly contain both Jewish and 
philosophical material, but the focus is generally on one area or the 
other.26 With this in mind I would like to turn to the crucial, yet under-
appreciated activity of Samuel’s son, Moses Ibn Tibbon.
22 For a study of this compendium and a critical edition of it see Ofer Elior, “Ruaḥ 
Ḥen as a Looking Glass: The Study of Science in Different Jewish Cultures as 
Reflected in a Medieval Introduction to Aristotelian Science and in its Later 
History” (PhD thesis, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2010) (Heb.).
23 For a study of this popular encyclopedia see James T. Robinson, “Gershom ben 
Solomon of Arles’ Sha‘ar ha-Shamayim: Its Sources and Use of Sources,” in The 
Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, ed. Steven Harvey 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 248-274.
24 On this encyclopedia, which has survived in manuscript but has as yet to be 
published, see Steven Harvey, “Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera’s De‘ot ha-Filosofim: Its 
Sources and Use of Sources,” in op. cit., 211-247. 
25 For a good overview of the dissemination of scientific literature among the Jews of 
Provence in this period, see Gad Freudenthal, “Les sciences dans les communautes 
juives mediévales de Provence: Leur appropriation, leur rôle,” Revue des études 
juives 152 (1993): 29-136.
26 Gersonides’ The Wars of the Lord is a notable exception to this rule in that its focus 
is on both areas simultaneously. It does not attempt to offer an exhaustive summary 
of science and philosophy or deal with all major issues involving Jewish belief. 
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Moses Ibn Tibbon: His Life and Works
Among the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, probably no one 
labored more than Moses Ibn Tibbon to make the philosophical and 
scientific literature written in Arabic accessible to the Jews of Chris-
tian Europe, whose cultural language was Hebrew. He belonged to 
the most famous family of translators in Jewish history. Yet while his 
grandfather Judah Ibn Tibbon and his father Samuel translated a rela-
tively small amount of exceptionally important treatises that served as 
the foundation for all subsequent Jewish philosophy, most of them 
written in Judeo-Arabic,27 Moses translated a veritable library of the 
great books of philosophy and science.
Little is known of the life of Moses Ibn Tibbon. He was born 
between the years 1190 and 1195, probably in Southern France. During 
this period his father wandered around a lot, living in Lunel, the city of 
his birth, Arles, Toledo, Barcelona, Alexandria, and from 1211 onwards, 
Marseille. It appears that in Marseille, Moses lived most of his life, and 
from there he moved to Montpellier in 1254, or slightly earlier. From 
the available evidence we can deduce that he began to engage in trans-
lation in 1244. The last dated translations we have are from 1274. His 
extensive translations of medical literature support the hypothesis that 
he, like his grandfather and father before him, was a physician by 
occupation.
Rather, it deals with those fundamental issues that are subject to dispute from a 
philosophic perspective, can be understood in different ways from a Jewish one, 
and which Gersonides felt he could resolve in a philosophically and religiously 
satisfactory manner. Another notable exception, though of a different nature, is 
Levi ben Avraham’s Livyat Ḥen, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
27 For a list of translations by Judah and Samuel Ibn Tibbon, see James T. Robinson 
and Uri Melammed, “Tibbon, Ibn,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd edition, ed. 
Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 
vol. 19, 712-714. For Samuel’s translations, see also James T. Robinson, “Samuel 
Ibn Tibbon,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/tibbon/#Tra (revised entry Feb. 10, 2010). In addition to Aristotle’s Meteo-
rology, Samuel translated a number of other scientific and philosophic treatises, or 
selections from them, from Arabic.
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Around 1246 Moses arrived in Naples, where he continued to 
engage in translation. During this period, his two sisters lived there. 
One of them was married to her (and Moses’) uncle (their mother’s 
brother), Jacob Anatoli, who worked in Naples as a physician in the 
service of the emperor Frederick II, as well as a translator of astro-
nomic and logical literature from Arabic into Hebrew. It is conceivable 
that Moses traveled to Naples not solely for the purpose of visiting 
his family but also in search of employment. In the same year, an 
edict was issued in Southern France forbidding Jewish doctors to 
administer to Christians. If we accept the hypothesis that Moses was 
a physician, it is clear that he lost an important source of income as a 
result of this edict. Nonetheless, he did not remain in Naples for long 
and he returned to Marseille, where he continued his work as a trans-
lator, and later moved to Montpellier. Moses had two sons, Samuel 
and Judah.28
As for Moses Ibn Tibbon’s activity as translator,29 he continued his 
father’s project of making Maimonides’ Arabic writings available in 
Hebrew by translating the Book of Commandments, the Treatise on 
Logic (1254), and at least a portion of the Commentary on the Mishnah.30 
Some of Maimonides’ medical compositions were also translated by 
28 While in Naples, Moses contracted with Bella, his other sister, an agreement of 
betrothal between their children—Moses’ son Samuel and her daughter Biongoda. 
Both of them eventually married others, though Samuel later on decided to sue for 
breach of contract. On this strange case, see Teshuvot Ḥokhmai Proventziyah, ed. 
Abraham Schreiber (Jerusalem, 1967), 54-85; and Alfred Freimann, The Arrange-
ment of Betrothal and Marriage after the Completion of the Talmud (Jerusalem: 
Mossad Ha-Rav Kook, 1945), 53-56 (Heb.); and most recently, Pinchas Roth, 
“Legal Strategy and Legal Culture in Medieval Jewish Courts of Southern France,” 
AJS Review 38 (2014): 382-389.
29 For a discussion of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s translations, see Ernest Renan, Les rabbins 
français du commencement du quatorzième siècle (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 
1877), 593-595; Mauro Zonta, La filosofia antica nel Medioevo ebraico: La traduzioni 
ebraiche medievali dei testi filosofici antichi (Brescia: Paideia, 1996), 182-188; Ottfried 
Fraisse, Moses Ibn Tibbons Kommentar zum Hohelied und sein Poetologisch-Philoso-
phisches Programm—Synoptische Edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 40-43; 
See also Freudenthal, “Les sciences dans les communautes juives mediévales de 
Provence,” 60-63.
30 Only the translation of the commentary to Mishnah Pe’ah 1.1 has survived, so it is 
not possible to determine how much of the commentary was translated by him. 
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him, such as Regimen on Health (1244), Commentary on Hippocrates’ 
Aphorisms (1260), On Poisons and the Protection against Lethal Drugs, 
and On Hemorrhoids. In the area of philosophy, he translated many of 
Averroes’ commentaries to the books of Aristotle: Epitome of On the 
Soul (1244), Epitome of On the Heavens and the World, Epitome of the 
Meteorology, Epitome of On Generation and Corruption (1250), Epitome 
of Parva Naturalia (1254, Montpellier), Epitome of the Physics, Epitome 
of the Metaphysics (1258), and Middle Commentary of On the Soul (1261). 
Moses did not limit himself to a translation of Averroes’ works but also 
translated other philosophers, thereby granting them an important 
place in the shaping of medieval Jewish philosophy in the following 
generations. These treatises include Themestius’ Commentary on Book 
Lambda of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1258), Questions on Natural Science, 
attributed to Aristotle (1264), Alfarabi’s Book of Principles, more 
commonly known as The Political Regime (1273), Al-Batalyawsi’s The 
Book of Circles, and Al-Tabrizi’s commentary on the twenty proposi-
tions of Aristotelian physics that Maimonides brings in his opening to 
the second section of the Guide. In the field of logic, Moses translated 
Alfarabi’s Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (1255), and 
Alfarabi’s Commentary on the Isagoge by Porphyry. Basic treatises on 
the mathematical sciences (arithmetic, geometry and astronomy), to 
which Maimonides ascribed an indispensable role in preparing the 
student for the study of the natural and metaphysical sciences,31 were 
also translated by Moses, among them: Euclid’s Elements with the 
commentaries of Alfarabi and Ibn Al-Haytham (1270), Theodosius’ The 
Sphere, Al-Hassār’s Book of Demonstration and Memorization (1271), 
Isagoge (or Introduction to the Phenomena) by Geminus (1246), On the 
Principles of Astronomy by Al-Biṭrūji (1259), and Jābir Ibn Aflāh 
Al-’Ishbilī’s Book on Astronomy (1274). Finally, Moses translated a 
number of important medical treatises: Al-Rāzī’s Antidotarium (1257), 
Ibn Al-Jazzār’s Provisions for the Traveller and the Nourishment for the 
Sedentary (1259), Avicenna’s Poem on Medicine with the commentary of 
31 See Guide 1.34; 3.51.
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Averroes (1260), and Small Compendium of the Canon, ascribed to 
Avicenna (1272).32
While the treatises translated by Moses Ibn Tibbon played a 
crucial role in the subsequent development of Jewish philosophy—
the vast majority of them survived in numerous manuscripts and 
many of them were eventually published—history has not been as 
kind to him in regard to his independent treatises. Most of them have 
not survived, except for a few fragments or citations.33 The Provençal 
scholar Isaac de Lattes, writing in the mid-fourteenth century about 
the rabbis of Southern France, lists three major treatises written by 
Moses: “The complete sage, R. Moses Ibn Tibbon, composed great 
and worthy treatises, among them Sefer Leqet Shikheḥot, Sefer Pe’ah, 
Sefer Taninim, and he also interpreted the Written Torah in an 
exceptionally wonderful manner.”34 He then proceeds to mention 
Moses’ activity as a translator.
Let us begin with the three compositions de Lattes singles out by 
name:35
1) Sefer Leqet Shikheḥot. This book has not survived. Moses refers 
to it in his Sefer Pe’ah, and Nissim of Marseille mentions it in Ma‘aseh 
Nissim.36 From both references it is clear that this book deals with 
providence and good and evil, and much of its discussion is devoted to 
an interpretation of the relevant biblical texts. Moses refers specifically 
32 For Moses Ibn Tibbon’s translations of medical writings and his terminology, see 
Gerrit Bos, Novel Medical and General Hebrew Terminology from the 13th Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47-72. Bos, it should be noted, has 
produced critical editions of many of these translations, together with the original 
Arabic and a parallel English translation.
33 See Colette Sirat, “La pensée philosophique de Moïse Ibn Tibbon,” Revue des 
études juives 138 (1979): 505-515. See also Fraisse, Moses Ibn Tibbons Kommentar 
zum Hohelied. Fraisse reedited Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Song of Songs 
and translated it into German. In the appendix to this edition he brings transcrip-
tions of many of the surviving fragments from Moses Ibn Tibbon’s works.
34 See Isaac de Lattes, Sha‘arei Ẓiyon, in Seder ha-Kabbalah le-Rabeinu Menaḥem 
HaMeiri, ed. Shlomo Z. Havlin (Jerusalem-Cleveland: Makhon Ofeq, 1995), 175.
35 For a fuller discussion of these compositions, see my introduction to The Writings 
of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, Avraham Israel (Beer-
Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 12-35 (Heb.).
36 For the references, see ibid., 15-16.
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to the first treatise in this composition, suggesting that in the other 
treatises this work may have dealt with other subjects as well.
2) Sefer Pe’ah. This composition has survived, at least in part, in a 
single manuscript (along with a number of additional fragments and 
citations).37 It deals with the tales and homilies of the Sages, particu-
larly those that appear to be exceptionally far-fetched in the eyes of the 
intellectuals. It also brings interpretations of various biblical passages 
and deals with a number of scientific matters, concluding with an inter-
pretation of the verses appearing toward the end of Ecclesiastes. In 
several passages, Moses refers to other compositions he wrote: The 
Gate of the King; The Gate of the Depiction of Existence; The Gate of 
Sacrifices; The Gate of the Tabernacle. The term “gate” normally indi-
cates a section of a larger composition, thereby raising the question of 
whether what we know as Sefer Pe’ah is really only a section of a much 
larger composition containing these various gates. It should be noted 
that this work is labeled Sefer Pe’ah by the copyist; the name does not 
appear in the composition itself.38 In a single manuscript page that 
preserves the beginning of the composition, a different copyist writes: 
“The Rational Interpretation of Some of the Haggadot from the Talmud 
by R. Moses ben Samuel ben Tibbon.” Moreover, the author of Ma‘ayan 
ha-Ganim cites a number of passages from this treatise, referring to it 
as the Interpretation of Homilies (Perush ha-Derashot). Moses himself 
refers to The Gate of the Haggadah in his Commentary on Song of Songs.39 
37 It has been published in The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 81-222. For a fuller 
discussion of this composition see my introduction there, 39-79. See also the discus-
sion of Colette Sirat, “Les deraisons des aggadot du Talmud et leur explication 
rationelle: Le Sefer Péa et la rhétorique d’Aristote,” Bulletin de philosophie 
médiévale 47 (2005): 69-86. Sirat also brings a French translation of Moses Ibn 
Tibbon’s introduction. Some of the salient ideas in this composition will be 
discussed below.
38 See MS Oxford 939, 10r. The table of contents seems to have been compiled by the 
copyist from the composition itself, and there is good reason to believe that some 
material from the original composition is missing.
39 For the various references see my general introduction to The Writings of R. Moshe 
Ibn Tibbon, 13-14.
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The matter he mentions there, however, has no parallel in our compo-
sition, so it is uncertain whether his reference is to the same work.40
3) Sefer Taninim. This short work has also survived in a single 
manuscript, whose first page is missing.41 It deals with the verses and 
homilies referring to the giant taninim that were brought into existence 
on the fifth day of creation, and which Moses Ibn Tibbon identifies 
with the leviathans. Most of the composition focuses on geographical 
matters, including the location of the place where Adam was created, 
the location of the Garden of Eden, and the places inhabited by Adam 
and his descendants after the expulsion from Eden. In this composition 
too Moses mentions The Gate of the Tabernacle, and also appears to 
refer to a passage in Sefer Pe’ah.
In addition to the three compositions mentioned by de Lattes, we 
know that Ibn Tibbon also wrote the following works:
4) Commentary on Song of Songs. This commentary has survived in 
a good number of manuscripts.42 Moses Ibn Tibbon treats this book as 
a philosophical allegory describing the conjunction of the human mate-
rial (passive) intellect with the Active Intellect by mediation of the 
acquired intellect. He divides Song of Songs into three major sections: 
1) 1:1–2:17, a description of the material intellect; 2) 3:1–5:1, a descrip-
tion of the individual of perfect intellect who achieves conjunction 
with the Active Intellect and immortality (one who eats from the Tree 
of Life); 3) 5:2–end, a description of one who succumbs to one’s phys-
ical inclinations (one who eats from the Tree of Knowledge of Good 
and Evil) and who will not experience eternal life. In this commentary, 
Moses refers to the following compositions that he wrote: The Gate of 
Seven Weeks, The Gate of the Garden, The Gate of the Counting of the 
Omer, The Gate of the Haggadah.
40 Yet, as has been pointed out above, there appears to be material missing from our 
composition.
41 It too has been published in The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 233-258. For a 
discussion of the ideas in this composition, see my Hebrew introduction there, 
225-232.
42 The commentary has been published twice, once by L. Silberman (Lyck: Mekize 
Nirdamim, 1874), and once by Ottfried Fraisse (see above, note 29).
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Overall, in his surviving compositions Moses refers to Leqet and to 
eight gates: 1) The Gate of the King; 2) The Gate of the Depiction of Exis-
tence; 3) The Gate of Sacrifices; 4) The Gate of the Tabernacle; 5) The 
Gate of Seven Weeks; 6) The Gate of the Garden; 7) The Gate of the 
Counting of the Omer; 8) The Gate of the Haggadah.43 Leqet clearly has 
the status of an independent treatise, but what is the status of the other 
compositions? Are all these “gates” parts of a larger work, as it highly 
unusual to refer to an independent work as a “gate,” and if they are 
parts of a larger work, what was its name? One possibility is that Sefer 
Pe’ah is the name of the all-inclusive work to which all these “gates” 
belong, including the composition on the rabbinic homilies mentioned 
above (The Gate of the Haggadah?), as well as the Commentary on Song 
of Songs, which are the only “gates” that have survived. This possibility 
also explains why Moses did not mention the name of the composition 
in the introduction to the composition we know as Sefer Pe’ah, which is 
unusual; the introduction was only intended for this particular “gate.” 
Yet several objections may be raised against this hypothesis. References 
to The Gate of the Tabernacle appears in both Sefer Pe’ah and Sefer 
Taninim. De Lattes refers to them as independent compositions, and if 
this is the case, they cannot contain the same “gate.” Furthermore, the 
Commentary on Song of Songs contains an extensive introduction, was 
copied numerous times as an independent composition, and does not 
appear to be a section of a larger work, though it contains references to 
many of the “gates” Moses Ibn Tibbon wrote. Could these various 
“gates” have been written originally as independent compositions that 
Moses subsequently decided to combine? Or perhaps he preferred to 
name many of his independent compositions “The Gate of . . . .” 
Another possibility is that the copyists simply chose to copy the section 
of the larger work that interested them, and Moses indeed wrote a 
multi-faceted work containing different topics pertaining to Judaism. A 
further question concerns de Lattes’ description of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s 
compositions. He does not mention the Commentary on Song of Songs or 
any of the “gates,” but speaks of Moses’ interpretation of the Written 
43 For the content of these “gates,” see The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 17-20 
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Torah. Was he referring to these various gates collectively, or was he 
thinking of a different composition? We shall return to these questions 
shortly after examining some of Moses’ other compositions.
In addition to the above mentioned treatises, two others have 
survived that many of the copyists attribute to Moses Ibn Tibbon:
5) Perush ha-Azharot le-Rav Shelomo Ibn Gabirol.44 Moses is not 
identified as the author in the body of the commentary, nor does the 
commentary contain any reference to his other compositions. Two of 
the copyists, however, ascribe this work to him, as does the great late 
fourteenth-early fifteenth-century Spanish rabbi, Shim‘on ben Ẓemah 
Duran. This composition is not solely an attempt to identify all the 613 
commandments that Ibn Gabirol presents in poetic form, but also, and 
perhaps primarily, to present a detailed comparison between Ibn Gabirol’s 
list of commandments and that of Maimonides. This commentary thus 
appears to have been written after Ibn Tibbon’s translation of Maimon-
ides’ Book of Commandments, and its main purpose was to promulgate 
Maimonides’ list of the commandments among Provençal Jewry by 
incorporating it into a commentary on the most famous of the azharot— 
a poem presenting all the commandments. In this commentary, Moses 
displays an impressive mastery of Jewish legal literature, in addition to 
knowledge of Hebrew philology. 
6) Sefer ‘Olam Qatan (The Book of the Microcosm).45 Many manu-
scripts of this composition have survived and most of the colophons 
identify its author as Moses Ibn Tibbon.46 As opposed to the more 
famous treatise of Joseph Ibn Ẓaddik by the same name, Ibn Moses’ 
treatise reflects more of an Aristotelian influence than a Neoplatonic 
44 This commentary has been published in The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 
279-421. For a discussion of this composition, see Avraham Israel’s introduction, 
261-277.
45 The book was edited by Zvi Almog, “Critical edition of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s ‘Olam 
Katan” (PhD thesis, Dropsie College, Philadelphia, 1966), who in his introduction 
traces the idea of the human being as a microcosm of the world in medieval Jewish 
thought. 
46 Ibid., 89, 119. It should be added that Levi ben Avraham cites an interpretation in 
the name of Moses Ibn Tibbon that has a parallel in this composition, lending 
further support to the view that it was indeed written by this author. See The 
Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 21. See below, chapter 5, 132.
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one, though the influence of the latter is also present.47 The treatise 
deals with the three main faculties of the soul—the spiritual (rational), 
the vital, and the natural—divides each of them into several functions, 
and ascribes each of them to a different major organ in the body: the 
brain, the heart, and the liver. Moses points out the similarity of each 
of these faculties to one of the three “worlds,” or levels of existent 
things: the Separate Intellects, the Spheres, and the world of genera-
tion and corruption, and how each organ is similar to a different part of 
the world of the Spheres. He also shows how the various motions of 
human beings also share some similarity with the motions of the 
spheres.48 While the treatise focuses almost exclusively on philosophic 
matters, Ibn Tibbon shows how some of these matters underlie one of 
the strange rabbinic homilies regarding the fallen angels Shamḥazai 
and Azazel.49
He wrote two other treatises that have not survived:
7) Sipur Toldot ha-Avot ve-Zulatam min ha-Qadmonim (The Account 
of the Descendants of the Patriarchs and Others from among the Ancients). 
Moses Ibn Tibbon mentions this book toward the beginning of his Sefer 
‘Olam Qatan: “After having written in The Account of the Descendants of 
the Patriarchs and Others from among the Ancients what appears to me, in 
which I alluded to the matter of the soul and what part of it may possibly 
survive and attain immortality . . . and I elaborated upon the account of 
their descendants and their many divisions, in order to reinforce this 
matter and confirm it in order that it be known, for many reject it—it 
47 For example, Moses speaks in the treatise of the Universal Soul—a notion that he 
may have borrowed from Al-Batalyawsi’s The Book of Circles—that serves as an 
intermediary between the active supernal entities and the passive entities composed 
of the four elements, enabling each of them to receive its essence, shape, limbs, and 
unique appearance. See ‘Olam Katan, 116-117. 
48 For a study of another central idea of this composition, see Ottfried Fraisse, 
“Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Concept of Vital Heat: A Reassessment of Peripatetic Epis-
temology in Terms of Natural Science,” in Jewish Philosophy: Perspectives and 
Retrospectives, ed. Raphael Jospe and Dov Schwartz (Boston: Academic Studies 
Press, 2012), 255-278.
49 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 21.
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being strange in their eyes and close to impossible.”50 A further apparent 
allusion to this treatise can also be found in the Commentary on Song of 
Songs, where he writes: “The faculties of the soul are four: the sensitive, 
the imaginative, the appetitive, and the rational, and these are generally 
the ‘Chariot of Pharaoh,’ for it [the evil inclination] overpowers and 
rules them . . . . The nutritive faculty was not counted among [the facul-
ties] of the human soul, because it is entirely natural and is found also in 
plants. It was also not listed among the number of wives of Jacob and 
their children, as I explained in its place.”51 The allegorical treatment of 
Jacob and his family, in which Jacob represents the intellect and each of 
the wives and children represent a different power of the soul, is cited in 
detail by Levi ben Avraham in the name of Moses Ibn Tibbon.52 Though 
Levi does not mention the name of the composition, there is little doubt 
that he draws his citation from this work. In this case too, the impres-
sion one gains from Moses Ibn Tibbon’s references to this work is that 
Sipur Toldot ha-Avot, Sefer ‘Olam Qatan, and Commentary on Song of 
Songs are all sections of a larger work and appear in it in this order.
8) Supercommentary on Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Commentary on the 
Torah. This supercommentary has not survived at all. We know of it 
from other supercommentaries on Ibn Ezra, which cite Moses Ibn 
Tibbon’s comments on Ibn Ezra’s views. Many of these citations are 
not necessarily derived from a supercommentary that he wrote, but 
may have been taken from one of his other lost works. Yet at least one 
supercommentator, Yehudah Mosconi, mentions explicitly having read 
a supercommentary ascribed to Moses Ibn Tibbon, of which he is crit-
ical, though occasionally he cites from it in his own work.53 Whether 
50 ‘Olam Katan, 90.
51 Commentary on Song of Songs 1:9 (Silberman, 10a; Fraisse, 229).
52 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, ed. Howard 
Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2014), 146-147 
(Heb.). See also Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, ed. 
Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2007), 
716 (Heb.).
53 See Abraham Berliner, “R. Yehudah Mosconi: The Introduction to Even ha-‘Ezer 
on R. Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Commentary on the Torah,” Oẓar Tov 2 (1877): 8 (Heb.). 
For a survey of the supercommentaries written on Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary, 
see in particular Uriel Simon, “Interpreting the Interpreter: Supercommentaries on 
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this supercommentary was in fact written by Moses, however, is not 
entirely clear.54 Also unclear is whether this is the composition that de 
Lattes has in mind when he refers to Moses Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation 
of the Written Torah. 
Finally, there are two surviving short works that Moses Ibn Tibbon 
wrote:
9) Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Comments on his Father’s Letter to 
Maimonides regarding Providence.55 While Samuel sees a possible 
contradiction in Maimonides’ approach to individual providence, with 
some of his comments suggesting that this is a completely naturalistic 
phenomenon while others suggest that it is a supernatural one, Moses 
sees Maimonides positing two forms of individual providence, one 
belonging to the philosophers and the other to the prophets, with 
both of them being natural.56 These comments either were part of an 
epistle or were copied from a larger work, such as Leqet Shikheḥot.57
10) Answers to Queries on Physics (also known as: Answers to Queries 
on Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim).58 This epistle has survived in a single 
Ibn Ezra’s Commentaries,” in Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings 
of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 86-128.
54 While there is no compelling reason to reject Moses Ibn Tibbon’s authorship, there 
are at least some reasons to question it. For a discussion of this point see The Writ-
ings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 23-25. Another early supercommentator, Solomon Ibn 
Yaish the Younger, also notes having seen Moses Ibn Tibbon’s commentary and 
brings an additional citation in his name, in this case explaining Ibn Ezra’s parable 
found in his commentary on Genesis 3:24, “From the light of the Intellect the Will 
is emitted . . . .” Overall, the available evidence supports the view that Moses 
wrote a supercommentary on Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary, though this issue 
requires further research.
55 Samuel’s letter and Moses’ response were published by Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel 
and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of Providence,” HUCA 11 (1936): 
341-366.
56 See below, chapter 11, 411-415.
57 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 26.
58 This treatise has been analyzed in depth by Hagar Kahana-Smilansky, “Moses Ibn 
Tibbon’s Answers to Queries on Physics: Sources and Problems,” Aleph 12 (2012): 
209-241. 
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manuscript whose copyist attributes it to Moses Ibn Tibbon.59 It deals 
primarily with the motion of the four elements in light of questions 
asked regarding some of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s statements in Ma’amar 
Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim. The questioner, apparently a close relative, also 
asks why Samuel brings more than one interpretation of Jacob’s ladder 
in his treatise, leading Moses to discuss this particular vision.
It should be added that a number of citations from Moses Ibn Tibbon 
can be found in the writings of subsequent thinkers, particularly Levi 
ben Avraham, without their mentioning, however, from which works 
they are taken.60
In light of de Lattes’ remarks, we are left with the question of 
whether Ibn Tibbon wrote a commentary on the Torah, or was de Lattes 
thinking of the various “gates” as collectively comprising a commentary. 
Moreover, did Moses intend for these “gates” to form a single encyclo-
pedic composition, one which could have served as a forerunner for the 
Jewish section of Levi’s encyclopedia?61 Until more evidence regarding 
Moses Ibn Tibbon’s treatises comes to light, the answers to these ques-
tions will have to remain in the realm of speculation.
Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Approach to Aggadah 
Moses Ibn Tibbon’s knowledge of Arabic and his numerous transla-
tions of philosophic and scientific treatises provided him with a solid 
background for the development of his own thought.62 He presents a 
59 MS Parma 2620, 91v-99v. Kahana-Smilansky has edited the text which is scheduled 
to be published by Brill.
60 For some of these citations, see The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 28-33. There 
are also a number of surviving fragments from other works that some have 
attributed to Moses Ibn Tibbon, one dealing with the beginning of Maimonides’ 
“The Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” and several containing part of a 
commentary on the Work of Creation. Some of these fragments are clearly not the 
work of Moses Ibn Tibbon, or at least there is no solid reason to assume that they 
are, except for one of the fragments dealing with the Work of Creation that may in 
fact belong to him. For a discussion of this point, see The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn 
Tibbon, 33-34. 
61 For a discussion of this encyclopedia, see the following chapter.
62 It should be noted that he at times cites from Arabic treatises that had not yet been 
translated.
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number of interesting general philosophic ideas in his surviving trea-
tises, such as in his Book of the Microcosm, and his approach to individual 
providence as discerned from his comments upon his father’s epistle to 
Maimonides should be regarded as a significant contribution to Jewish 
thought.63 Yet his primary contribution as a thinker is in the area of 
philosophic exegesis—the interpretation of Jewish sources in light of 
philosophic and scientific notions. He continues the project his father 
began, explaining the philosophic ideas concealed in King Solomon’s 
works by writing an exceptional philosophic commentary on what is 
considered to be the most esoteric of them, Song of Songs. Moreover, 
he went much further than his illustrious predecessors in presenting 
in his works philosophic-scientific interpretations not only of rabbinic 
homilies (midrashim), but also tales (aggadot), particularly in his Sefer 
Pe’ah. In a crucial sense, Sefer Pe’ah (or the section we possess of it) is a 
pioneering work in the philosophic interpretation of this genre of 
literature.64
In the introduction to this composition, Moses deals explicitly 
with the reasons that the Sages concealed their philosophic and scien-
tific views by presenting them in an allegorical form. It is important to 
note that he does not feel that all the tales have a concealed layer, or 
that all the Sages were also philosophers, but in many cases such a layer 
indeed exists in his view. As for the reasons they concealed philosophic 
and scientific truths in this manner, he writes as follows:
According to the thinking of the Sages, some matters should be 
presented in strange parables, which cannot possibly be true 
according to the intelligent,65 in order that the intelligent discern 
that they in fact are parables and that they contain a concealed layer, 
and hence they must exert themselves in order to discover their 
meaning. Moreover, if you inform the ignorant and the foolish of 
63 See below, chapter 11, 420-421.
64 A Provençal contemporary of Moses Ibn Tibbon who also wrote a rationalistic 
commentary on the aggadah, but who was far less grounded in philosophy, is Isaac 
ben Yedaiah; for a study of his composition, see Marc Saperstein, Decoding the 
Rabbis: A Thirteenth-Century Commentary on the Aggadah (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1980).
65 That is, when they are understood literally.
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the acts of God and His wonders as they really are, or inform them 
by rational parables of the justness of the order and God’s wondrous 
intelligence, they will not understand and will not believe in God’s 
ability or the goodness of His will, but will ascribe these matters to 
a wise and fixed nature. Therefore the Sages, that is to say, those 
who were true sages, thought to depict these true matters by fantastic 
parables that are strange and remote from what is known by the 
intellect as well as from nature. The ability of God and the goodness 
of His will are thereby increased in the eyes of the foolish, in [their 
belief] that God multiplied His wonders and miracles for His loved 
ones and those keeping His covenant. Therefore, anyone who is 
intelligent and has the spirit of God in him, when he sees a strange 
tale or saying ascribed to the Sages he should know that this matter 
has a concealed layer, and its strangeness is designed to astonish the 
foolish and to encourage the intelligent to understand what is hinted 
by it.66
Moses has no doubt that the concealed layer consists of philosophic and 
scientific views contained in the Arabic literature. As he indicates, the 
main reason that these views are concealed is that they are not 
conducive to strengthening the masses’ belief in God and divine prov-
idence—that is to say, for political-religious reasons. As Maimonides 
had already noted, the more absurd a midrashic view is when under-
stood literally, the more the masses (including those rabbis ignorant of 
philosophy) think it as reflective of God’s might.67 The wise, on the 
other hand, will discern that there is a concealed layer and discover its 
true meaning by dedicating themselves to learning the sciences and 
66 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 89-90. It is interesting to read these lines in 
light of Gershom Scholem’s view on the difference between the approach of the 
philosophers and the Kabbalists to aggadah. Of the philosophers Scholem writes: 
“Their treatment of the Aggadah . . . is embarrassed and fumbled.” Subsequently 
he argues: “The philosophers who had passed through the school of Aristotle, 
never felt at home in the world of Midrash. But the more extravagant and paradox-
ical these Aggadahs appeared to them, the more were the Kabbalists convinced 
that they were one of the keys of the mystical realm” (Major Trends in Jewish Mysti-
cism [New York: Schocken Publishing House, 1941], 31, 32). Moses Ibn Tibbon’s 
approach is not as distant from that of the Kabbalists as Scholem would have it. 
Moreover, the philosophic approach to midrash may have even played a positive 
role in the development of the Kabbalistic approach, but this point requires further 
investigation.
67 See Guide 2.6.
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philosophy, thereby understanding the true manner in which God 
governs the world.
As in the case of his father, the cultural climate in Provence 
provided Moses Ibn Tibbon with a strong catalyst in bringing to light 
the truths that he thought the traditional texts of Judaism concealed. 
Yet while his father spoke of the scathing criticism voiced by the Chris-
tians in regard to the Jewish ignorance of the philosophic ideas 
underlying the words of the prophets, which prodded him to make 
some of these ideas public,68 Moses focuses on their withering critique 
of rabbinic midrash:
Since I saw the gentile sages scheme against us by investigating the 
words of our tradition, and ridicule us and our holy ancestors, the 
authors of the Talmud, for the tales found in it are strange to 
the intellect and impossible by nature, despite the fact that they 
for the most part contain matters intended for those understanding 
their secrets. This [ridicule] befell us because of those among our 
nation who are wise in their own eyes, and pretend to be wise though 
they are without wisdom, who understood them [the tales] literally, 
just as is the case with many of the parables of Scripture and its 
esoteric allusions. They do not distinguish between natural matters 
and those brought about by way of miracle, and they do not under-
stand the difference between the impossible, the possible, and the 
necessary in regard to God, and what must be negated of Him. They 
do not know that the way of the sages of all the nations in antiquity 
was to speak of the sciences in parables and riddles and to hint by 
way of stories what befell them, their histories, moral matters, and 
the sciences, and that many of their words have an exoteric and 
esoteric layer. Therefore I, Moses ben Samuel ben Judah ben Tibbon 
from Spain [lit. the pomegranate of Spain], gathered up my strength 
and stirred myself to explain some of them, particularly the strangest 
ones, and to confirm their intent, to serve as a hint and allusion to 
some, and to show the way to understanding others, and to speak of 
some of them in a way that is possible, not that I declare that it is 
definitely so [in accordance with my explanation].69
The investigation of Jewish sources by Christians, in an attempt to 
convince the more educated Jews to convert due to the absurdity of 
68 See Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 22, 175; see below, chapter 7, 246-247.
69 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 83.
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many of the Talmudic tales, plays an important role in Moses’ decision 
to devote a composition to this subject.70 This problem is greatly aggra-
vated, he maintains, by the tendency of many of the Jewish legal 
scholars in his own period to accept these stories as true in accordance 
with their literal meaning—a tendency that Maimonides had severely 
criticized in his Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq. When he speaks of the 
approach of the sages of antiquity, Moses clearly has in mind the 
Platonic understanding of myths. It is important to note that not only 
scientific matters are on occasion presented in parable form according 
to him, but historical events as well.71 As we shall see below, he brings 
some exceptionally interesting examples of such parables from rabbinic 
literature.
In the continuation of his discussion, Moses addresses the problem 
of whether one is required to believe everything that is contained in 
rabbinic aggadot, just as one is required to accept all the commandments 
that are handed down in tradition and recorded in the Talmud:
Regarding the aggadot and stories that are written in the Talmud—
whether they concern natural science and astronomy, the divine 
science, or matters necessary to uphold the faith, as in the case of the 
stories regarding reward and punishment, either during one’s life-
time or after one’s death, or other matters—it is not written in what 
manner they are to be known, or how we are to establish what is true 
when there are conflicting opinions [between the Sages].72 Further-
more, when there are no conflicting opinions, are we still required to 
believe everything that is written on these matters, even though they 
are irrational and impossible by nature when understood literally? 
70 Ram Ben-Shalom has suggested in an unpublished talk that Moses Ibn Tibbon’s 
reference may be to Pablo Christiani. Christiani, who probably was born in 
Montpellier, was a Jewish convert to Christianity who tried to convert his former 
co-religionists in Provence by his preaching. Later he moved to Aragon, and in 1263 
was the adversary of Nahmanides in the Barcelona Disputation. Reports of the 
disputation reveal that the absurdity of many of the rabbinic homilies and tales 
was one of the points Christiani raised to illustrate the falseness and irrationality 
of Judaism.
71 Maimonides had already shown that a number of biblical parables should be under-
stood as referring to future events; see, for example, Guide 2.29.
72 According to Maimonides, in matters of opinion, as opposed to matters of action, 
there is no room to issue a legal ruling in cases of conflict; see, for example, 
Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10.3.
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Also, there are matters that are ascribed to “Tana devei Eliyahu,” 
and we do not know if this is the name of the possessor of the 
baraithot,73 or they are so labeled because they were received from 
the mouth of Elijah [the prophet] in a dream and vision of the night, 
or they are matters that are acquired by way of learning, logical 
deduction or tradition, and they are so labeled in order to conceal. 
We do not know if we are required to believe everything.74
Based on Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 2.8, where he shows that 
the Sages of the Talmud deferred to the opinion of the gentile sages in 
matters of astronomy, Ibn Tibbon concludes that we are certainly not 
required to believe what the Sages said in matters of science and philos-
ophy when no commandment or matter of faith is involved, if their 
opinions are irrational or when other sages demonstrated their false-
hood. This is true even when the rabbinic opinion appears to follow the 
prophetic one. The established scientific opinion remains the prefer-
able one.
Yet the primary purpose of this composition, as we have seen, is to 
show the conformity of the rabbinic views with the scientific ones to 
the extent that Ibn Tibbon thought possible. The interpreter should, 
he maintains, struggle to show how these tales reflect concealed truths. 
He concedes, however, that not all statements and tales should be 
treated in this manner—that is to say, as containing an esoteric level. 
Many of them should be seen as employing hyperbole in the descrip-
tions they bring. Other tales should not be ascribed to the Sages 
themselves, for some of those written by non-sages were incorporated 
into rabbinic literature. Moses divides the tales and homilies into the 
following categories: some are simply stories meant for entertainment; 
some interpret a verse in many different ways, of which only one alludes 
to an esoteric truth, while the others are designed to conceal; some are 
presented in order to strengthen the faith or to negate a false belief in 
the manner that is most appropriate for the readers. In other words, 
73 That is to say, a Sage from the period of the Mishnah who is responsible for trans-
mitting these teachings.
74 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 88.
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these tales are necessary for the preservation of the religion, even 
though they are not true.75
One of the strangest aggadic statements discussed by Moses Ibn 
Tibbon is the one in BT ‘Avodah Zarah 3b:
The day consists of twelve hours. During the first three God sits and 
devotes to Torah; during the second [three] He sits and judges the 
entire world. Since He sees that it merits annihilation, He gets up 
from the Throne of Judgment and sits on the Throne of Mercy. 
During the third [three] He sustains the entire world, from antelope 
horns to lice eggs. During the fourth [three] He sits and plays with 
[an alternative reading, ridicules] the leviathan, as it is said: The 
leviathan you formed to play with [Psalms 104:26].
Given the patent absurdity of this aggadah when understood literally, 
Moses interprets it as a philosophic parable. In his view it deals with 
the four stages of life, particularly of human beings. The first stage is 
the period of birth and growth of the entity, likened to the first three 
hours of the day, which are warm and moist as in the nature of Spring, 
the season of renewal. God studying Torah alludes to the divine wisdom 
that produces birth and growth of all life forms composed of the four 
elements, until the entity is fully formed. The next stage, likened to the 
second three hours of the day, alludes to the period in which the entity 
functions at full physical capacity and in which the food it intakes 
enables it to replace the bodily matter which is expended—”judgment” 
representing the sustaining of that which exists in an orderly, fixed 
manner. By the end of this period, however, most of the natural mois-
ture the entity possessed at birth has dried up, leading to the entropy 
of the body, characteristic of the next period. Hence in order to 
continue to sustain the entity, whether it be large or small, and enable 
it to function with the power of all its faculties despite the weakening 
of the body, God must now sit on the Throne of Mercy, for everything 
we see deteriorating we say that it requires heavenly mercy. In the final 
stage, the body is weak and diminished together with all its powers, and 
is like naught before God, who is represented as sitting in the heaven, 
75 Ibid., 89. Ibn Tibbon also points to the different types of parables enumerated by 
Maimonides in the introduction to the Guide.
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the eternal existent, and ridiculing it. Leviathan alludes to the corrup-
tion of entities, or to the evil inclination, which also weakens in old age. 
God ridicules it and informs it that it toiled in vain in seeking out phys-
ical pleasures. In a similar vein, Ibn Tibbon interprets the subsequent 
Talmudic discussion regarding God and the leviathan, and God’s 
nocturnal activity.76
Other strange tales, such as the story in BT Berakhot 18b of the 
righteous person who gave a dinar to a poor person, was forced out of 
his home by his wife as a result, and went to sleep in the cemetery, he 
also treated as philosophic parables—in this case, as one dealing with 
the intellect and the faculties of the soul.77 The strange statement in BT 
Sukah 4b-5a that the Indwelling did not descend below ten hand-
breadths and Moses did not ascend above ten, is explained as having an 
exoteric and esoteric meaning. On the exoteric level, it indicates that 
Moses received his revelation in the Sanctuary between the figures of 
the two cherubs above the curtain of the ark, which were higher than 
ten handbreadths from the ground. On the esoteric level, the ten hand-
breadths represent the ten spheres. The statement signifies that God 
had no direct connection with the material world, even the world of the 
spheres, while the human being cannot fully grasp even the ten spheres, 
let alone the Separate Intellects above them, only what is below, the 
world of generation and corruption.78
An example of an aggadic statement that conceals a philosophic 
idea precisely because it is not so strange, at least not at first glance, and 
only the wise will discern that it contains an esoteric level, Moses Ibn 
Tibbon discerns in BT Pesaḥim 54a. The passage deals with the ten 
things that God created on the very end of the sixth day, all of them 
referring to miraculous objects that will play an important role in Isra-
el’s future. While Maimonides interprets the parallel passage in 
Mishnah Avot 5.6 as showing the extent that the Sages tried to under-
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nature at the time of creation,79 Moses focuses on one of the things 
added to this list and the subsequent debate about it, which upon 
reflection is incongruous to the original list:
“Ten things were created [on the eve of the Sabbath] at twilight. . . . 
R. Judah said: tongs too.” On R. Judah’s saying “tongs too,” they 
[the Sages] stated: “He used to say: ‘Tongs are made with tongs, but 
the first tongs, who made them? Verily it was a heavenly creation.’ 
They said to him: ‘It is possible to make a mold and shape it simulta-
neously, hence it is a human creation.’” It is remarkable that R. Judah 
was oblivious to the fact that it is possible to make tongs in a mold or 
with two tiles. Hence it appears to me that R. Judah alluded to a very 
subtle esoteric matter and connected it to the things that were 
created at twilight. That is, the things that by nature are necessarily 
generated one from another were not necessarily created in order, 
the second from the first and the third from the second. For it is 
known to the wise and agreed upon by them that the First Cause, 
God the highly exalted may He be blessed, is one. He is a true unity, 
who is simple, separate, with no multiplicity or composition at all. 
All the philosophers are of the opinion that from a simple thing only 
a simple thing is necessitated, for the agent gives what is in itself to 
its effect. The Separate [Intellects] are not numerous or distinct, 
except by rank and causality.80 Tongs and scissors are composed of 
two things, the actual existence of one is not possible without the 
other. They represent the matter and form in the lower world of 
generation and corruption, made and existing by reason of the body 
of the sphere and its shape. It is possible that from the aspect of the 
body of the sphere, which is finite, the individuals of each species 
are generated; and from the aspect of its circular shape and motion, 
which has no beginning and end, first and last, they turn not when 
they go, each goes in the direction of its face [Ezekiel 1:9]—this refers 
to the preservation of the species by one coming after the other, a 
generation goes and a generation comes [Ecclesiastes 1:4], whether by 
virtue of birth, in the case of humans and animals, by eggs, in the 
case of fowl and fish, or seeds, in the case of vegetation, or by parts 
of roots, like garlic and roses. The continuation of the species is by 
79 See Commentary on the Mishnah, Avot, 5.6; cf. Guide 2.29.
80 That is to say, members of the same species are distinguished by their matter, since 
their form is the same. Since the Separate Intellects have the same form and no 
matter, the only way that one can be distinguished from the other is by rank, which 
is determined by the distinct level of knowledge of each of them, or by the fact that 
one is the cause of the other.
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means of the individuals of the species, in accordance with its period 
[of existence] in time and the end of its motion, rising and descending. 
But “the first tongs,” which are the body of the sphere and its shape, 
“who made them”—how do they come about by reason of the Sepa-
rate Intellects, and how did they derive from them and their power? 
This is not possible from the aspect of natural necessity. Therefore, 
the world is created by virtue of [divine] will, and His will has no 
mover and cause, unlike the will of a human being, as it is said: My 
thoughts are not your thoughts [Isaiah 55:8]. Heaven forbid that one 
should say that the sphere, which is the Throne of Glory, is without 
beginning, as the Sages said that the Torah and the Throne of Glory 
antedated the work of creation.81 Rather, the Throne and His Foot-
stool belong to the things that are inseparably joined together, like 
the circle and its center.82 The reason that “the first tongs” are 
connected to the things that were created on the twilight of the end 
of the six days of creation is because they are not necessitated by 
natural necessity—a thing that is necessitated by what preceded it 
and its being the reason for it . . . .83
The view of R. Judah regarding the existence of the first tongs, according 
to Ibn Tibbon, in effect is an argument for the doctrine of creation. 
Based on Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 2.22, Ibn Tibbon points out 
that natural necessity cannot account for the origin of the spheres—to 
which R. Judah alludes when he speaks of the first tongs—for according 
to the philosophers, only a simple thing can proceed from a simple thing. 
The existence of the spheres thus must be the product of divine will, 
even though the Separate Intellects are their immediate cause. More-
over, since the existence of the spheres and the earth are inseparable, 
they must have come into existence at the same time. This view is tied 
by R. Judah to the list of miracles implanted in creation, Ibn Tibbon 
explains, since they too could not have come about as a result of natural 
necessity alone, but they reflect the workings of divine will. 
While Moses Ibn Tibbon’s philosophic interpretations of some of 
the rabbinic homilies and tales display a high degree of ingenuity, more 
81 See BT Pesaḥim 54a; cf. Genesis Rabbah 1.4.
82 The Torah represents the Separate Intellects, the Throne represents the spheres, 
and the Footstool represents the earth. Moses Ibn Tibbon argues that the spheres 
and the earth are inseparably linked, so one cannot exist before the other in time, 
though the former is the cause of the latter.
83 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 93-94.
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novel are his historical interpretations. A good example of this is his 
fascinating explanation of the tale in BT Berakhot 54b involving the 
stone thrown by Og upon Moses:
“One who sees the stone that Og, the king of Bashan, threw upon 
Moses . . . .”84 The object mentioned in this baraitha is possibly a 
large stone thrown by Og upon Moses, or many stones thrown upon 
the camp of Israel, “stone” representing many stones and “Moses” 
representing all of Israel. These are stones used as projectiles or 
stones thrown from belfries, thus they said “stone” and not “moun-
tain.” . . . “He [Og] said: How large is the camp of Israel? Three 
parsangs. I will go and uproot a mountain that is three parsangs and 
throw it upon them and kill them. He went and uprooted a mountain 
that was three parsangs” etc. until the end of this tale in the Talmud, 
up to “[don’t read] ‘You broke’ [Psalms 3:8], but ‘You stretched.’” 
The literal meaning of this story is very strange, far removed from 
nature and reality, and something that the intellect cannot accept, 
that such a thing was within the power of human beings, let alone 
God’s enemies, even by way of a miracle. The Talmud, however, 
understood this story as involving a powerful king or noble, who was 
to help him [Og], as it is said: The stone rejected by the builders has 
become the chief cornerstone [Psalms 118:22], and as it is said: Who are 
you great mountain . . . and he shall produce the headstone [Zechariah 
4:7].85 Thus they interpreted the meaning of “he threw upon 
Moses”—”that he wanted to throw.”86 His saying: “How large is the 
camp of Israel? Three parsangs”—that is to say, how many belong to 
this nation that occupies an area of three parsangs? I will bring upon 
them a great king whom I will transfer and transport from his place, 
one whose army and camp are greater than the camp of Israel, and 
with his help we will defeat Israel and destroy them. The saying: 
“[He uprooted a mountain that was three parsangs] and placed it on 
his head”—he [Og] accepted him [the powerful king] as a sovereign 
and submitted himself and his kingdom to him to pay him corvée, 
as is the way of every noble who has a stronger enemy. “And God 
84 Ibn Tibbon had a slightly different version of this passage, and my translation is in 
accordance with his version and not with our printed texts.
85 “Stone” and “mountain” represent exceptional human beings. 
86 In our versions the baraitha reads: “The stone that Og, the king of Bashan, wanted 
to throw upon Israel” (BT Berakhot 54a), and in the subsequent citation the same 
wording is used (54b). In Moses Ibn Tibbon’s version, the wording was: “The stone 
that Og, the king of Bashan, threw upon Moses,” and in the subsequent citation: 
“The stone that Og, the king of Bashan, wanted to throw upon Moses,” leading 
him to comment upon the story in the manner he does.
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brought upon him locusts, which bore into the mountain, and it fell 
upon his head.” That is to say, in the city to which the king and his 
great army gathered in support of Og, God brought about a quarrel 
between them. As to the saying: “God brought upon him”—a thing 
that comes to fulfill God’s will, or to change and annul what is 
against the will of God, whether it is something volitional or natural 
or accidental, is [considered to be] sent by God, the Master of great 
deeds. They used the word qamẓa, which means locust, to hint at the 
swiftness of its coming, hopping and skipping. In the manner that a 
person can carry a mountain of three parsangs, it is possible that 
there be a locust that bore into the place [in the mountain] where his 
head was.87 Moreover, this is many more times the measure of the 
base of his foot to his ankle, even though this measure was 30 cubits.88 
Maybe this is the measure [from the ground] up to the place which 
he stood on his chariot in the wooden tower from which he was 
accustomed to make war, which then does not contradict the verse: 
his height was nine cubits [Deuteronomy 3:11], where it is specified, 
the cubit of a man. Perhaps the term qamẓa is used equivocally, refer-
ring to avarice and stinginess, in that his [Og’s] heart was divided on 
the matter of the expenses he no longer wanted to bear. Or the 
intent is that a small group of gossipers (qumẓa rekhilim) stirred up a 
quarrel between them, or a fierce controversy. Their saying: “it bore 
into”—it destroyed the union and love that was between them . . . .89
The mythic tale that the Sages tell in regard to the war between the 
Israelite and Og is interpreted by Ibn Tibbon in terms of wars in the 
feudal world, with which he was familiar—nobles pledge fealty to kings 
in order to help them against their enemies in exchange for forced labor, 
constant quarrels between allies, siege towers to breach fortresses, etc. 
The stone Og threw is treated by Ibn Tibbon as an actual stone that 
commemorated Og’s defeat, as evidenced by the baraitha that speaks of 
one praising God when seeing it. The mountain Og uprooted, on the 
other hand, is a metaphor referring to a powerful king to whom he 
turned and pledged fealty in exchange for help in his war against Israel. 
All the fantastic details of the story are explained accordingly. What 
87 Hence it is absurd to understand the story literally.
88 According to the continuation of the story, Moses stood ten cubits, and he took an 
ax that was ten cubits and jumped up ten cubits, striking Og in his ankle and killing 
him. This means that Og’s height up to his ankle was thirty cubits. Yet for him to 
carry a mountain of three parsangs, the height would have had to be much greater.
89 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 191-192.
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appears at first glance as a mythic story is transformed by Ibn Tibbon 
into a historical account, with the situation prevalent in his own period 
providing him with the key to understanding this rabbinic tale.90
Another exceptionally strange tale Moses Ibn Tibbon explains in a 
very down to earth manner is the one found in BT Baba Batra 58a, 
which reads as follows:
R. Bana’ah used to mark out caves [where there were dead bodies]. 
When he came to the cave of Abraham, he found Eliezer, the servant 
of Abraham, standing at the entrance. He said to him: What is 
Abraham doing? He replied: He is sleeping in the arms of Sarah, and 
she is looking fondly at his head. He said: Go and tell him that 
Bana’ah is standing at the entrance. Said [Abraham] to him: Let him 
enter; it is well known that there is no passion in this world. So he 
went in, surveyed the cave, and came out again. When he came to 
the cave of Adam, a voice came forth from heaven saying: You have 
beholden the likeness of my likeness, my likeness itself you may not 
behold. But, he said, I want to mark out the cave. The measurement 
of the inner one is the same as that of the outer one [came the 
answer]. . . . R. Bana’ah said: I discerned his two heels and they were 
like two orbs of the sun. Compared with Sarah, all other people are 
like a monkey to a human being, and compared with Adam Eve was 
like a monkey to a human being, and compared with the Shechinah 
Adam was like a monkey to a human being.91
Again drawing from the social reality with which he was acquainted, 
Moses explains this story as follows:92 R. Bana’ah was an artist in the 
business of decorating crypts for the dead. He once found himself in a 
house belonging to a person named Abraham, which contained a vault 
possessing exceptional ancient works of art, and he was interested in a 
90 A similar approach based on feudal reality characterizes Moses Ibn Tibbon’s expla-
nation of the Talmudic statement in Gittin 57a regarding the three hundred towns 
belonging to King Yannai; see The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 193-194. In his 
Sefer Taninim, he explains the strange tale in BT Baba Batra 74b of the male and 
female leviathans, the former castrated by God and the latter killed by God and 
preserved for the righteous in the future, as referring to past and future events 
occurring to the peoples living to the North and to the South of the Mediterranean 
Sea; see ibid., 233-237. 
91 As translated by Isidore Epstein for the Soncino edition of the Talmud.
92 In this case too, Moses Ibn Tibbon’s version of the story is slightly different from 
the version in our printed editions.
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description of them. He asked Eliezer, the servant in charge, about 
the vault, who answered that the entrance contained a depiction of the 
patriarch Abraham lying on the arms of Sarah as she looks down upon 
his head. R. Bana’ah had a professional interest in seeing this fresco 
with his own eyes so that he could retain a picture of it in his mind in 
order to duplicate it. He sent the servant to ask his master for permis-
sion to enter, which he was given. He saw that their pose was an 
immodest one, leading him to criticize the depiction, particularly 
insofar as it was created in a period known for its modesty. Neverthe-
less, as was only natural, he wanted to see more of the artwork, and he 
reached a room where there was a beautiful depiction of Adam. He is 
told that he may not see the picture, which no one can reproduce due 
to its great beauty, and even this picture does not do justice to the 
beauty of Adam when he was alive. In this manner Moses Ibn Tibbon 
continues to interpret the story, concluding with a discussion of the 
possible motivations of the ancients who made these beautiful yet 
immodest representations—either as a memorial or perhaps even to 
arouse sexual desire.93 In short, an incredible story depicting the 
viewing of our biblical ancestors as still alive and dwelling in some cave 
is transformed into a tale of the artist who discovers an ancient trea-
sure grove, not unlike such vaults that Moses had heard about in his 
own time. He is aware, however, that for all its ingenuity, his explana-
tion is not entirely satisfactory. It contains nothing ennobling or 
thought provoking that would explain why the story was included in 
the Talmud. For this reason he adds: “If he [the story teller] spoke by 
way of wisdom, the enlightened one should attempt to find its mean-
ing.”94 That is to say, perhaps the story is in fact a parable concealing 
philosophic truths, though Moses Ibn Tibbon himself does not make 
any attempt at such an explanation. For him it is sufficient to show 
that this story can be understood almost literally once one discerns 
what it is really describing.95
93 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 198-201.
94 Ibid., 200. See below, chapter 5, 144-145.
95 Compare his explanation of the story of Abba Saul, who entered the thigh bone of 
Og (BT Niddah 24b), which he treats as part of a giant ancient statue; see The 
Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 197-198.
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Some Additional Matters in Moses Ibn Tibbon’s 
Writings
The social situation with which Moses Ibn Tibbon was familiar in his 
own time also plays a role in his explanation of some of the command-
ments. The release of inadvertent killers from the cities of refuge 
with the death of the High Priest, for example, is likened to the 
amnesty granted at the time of the death of a king—a practice that 
Moses views as an ancient one, at times with even murderers being 
pardoned and released.96 His explanation of the reason why a person 
who sells his house in a walled city has only a year in which to redeem 
it is the need to insure that only those with means would own houses 
there due to the high general expenses to keep up the fortifications of 
the city and prepare it for siege, when it can serve also as a place of 
refuge for the surrounding population. A person who sells for reasons 
of poverty and can no longer help defray these expenses will not be 
able to redeem his house within a year, and it would be best if it 
passes permanently into the possession of a wealthy person, while a 
rich person who sells for whatever reason might decide to redeem it 
and is given this opportunity. For a similar reason, Ibn Tibbon main-
tains that the people living in the city should not be renters but only 
owners, since one who rents feels he has less of a stake in contributing 
funds to the defenses of the city.97
In addition to the social reasons Moses adduces for some of the 
commandments, he also sees naturalistic reasons as playing a prominent 
role in many of them. In his view, the strict laws pertaining to leprosy 
are due to its being a highly contagious disease. The different forms of 
impurity identified in the Torah in fact greatly contaminate the air and 
the surrounding objects, hence the stringent commandments pertaining 
to them.98 Ibn Tibbon also ascribes astrological reasons to some of the 
commandments.99
On occasion, Moses takes the opportunity to criticize certain prac-






physicians for not engaging in preventive medicine, but being more 
concerned with maximizing their fame and fees, at times even 
prolonging the patient’s illness to increase them. Many judges are seen 
by him as favoring the rich and even helping them out with their claims, 
instead of being impartial. Only the philosophers, the seekers of truth, 
behave in a moral manner in his view.100
Even though Moses Ibn Tibbon possessed a highly critical rational 
mind, as evidenced by his interpretation of traditional literature, he, 
like most of his contemporaries, was far from immune to a fascination 
with tales of exotic, faraway places. Some of the most popular books of 
this genre are collections of tales purportedly reporting the travels of 
Alexander the Great during his conquests, commonly termed the 
Alexander Romance. The earlier collections were written in Late Antiq-
uity and later collections in the Middle Ages. Moses was acquainted 
with a Hebrew translation of one of these collections.101 Despite the 
strangeness of many of the places and people described, he saw no 
reason to question the historicity of these tales. Furthermore, some of 
these tales provided him with an insight for interpreting a number of 
the early stories in the Torah.
After dealing with the location of the Garden of Eden and giving 
its geographic coordinates—which he locates in the area of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, or Lunes Montes in Latin (and in Hebrew, Har 
ha-Yareaḥ)102—Moses discusses the climatological traits of this region 
and its effects on the inhabitants. According to his view, the garden 
occupies a huge area straddling both sides of the equator, and is 
100 Ibid., 150.
101 The version known to Moses Ibn Tibbon was translated from the Arabic, though 
the original was probably in Latin. Some maintain that the Hebrew translator was 
his father Samuel. This version was published by Israel Halevi, “Sefer Toldot 
Alexander,” Kobez al Jad 2 (1886): 1-53. In his introduction on pages v-xvi, Halevi 
discusses the sources of this composition. This version was republished with notes 
by Joseph Dan, ‘Alilot Alexander Moqedon (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1969). A 
different medieval Hebrew version of the Alexander Romance was published with 
introduction and notes by Israel J. Kazis, The Book of the Gests of Alexander of 
Macedon (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1962).
102 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 237-238; cf. Abraham Ibn Ezra, Commen-
tary on Genesis 2:11.
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watered by the sources of the Nile. It is cut off from the surrounding 
regions by mountains and desert, possesses an ideal climate—
temperate throughout the year—and lush vegetation. No iron is to be 
found there, so no work implements can be made, and the inhabitants 
live off the food of the land. The heat of the region weakens the 
natural bodily heat, which in turn affects the character traits of the 
inhabitants, making them more lethargic, less courageous, and more 
humble—not seeking greatness, pleasures, and dominion—as opposed 
to the traits of those who live in colder climes. In support of this 
picture, Ibn Tibbon cites the account of Alexander’s travels in which 
he came upon groups of people who live in similar climatic conditions. 
They ate only what naturally grew from the soil and no meat, wore 
almost no clothes except for covering their private parts with fig 
leaves, built no homes and slept in caves, possessed no iron, sought no 
physical pleasures, and lived in perfect harmony with each other, 
having no need for judges and police, and were exceptionally healthy, 
having no need for doctors.103 While there is some confusion in Ibn 
Tibbon’s account, as well as in his source, whether this place was in 
India or Africa104—and thus may be the region of the original Garden 
of Eden—it is clear that he sees in it the key to understanding much 
of the biblical story. He also cites from Alexander’s account of an 
adjacent region,105 where Alexander beheld strange fantastic plants, 
of beautiful appearance and possessing a wonderful fragrance, which 
killed a person who touched them. Upon the trees were extraordinary 
103 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 238-240; cf. ‘Alilot Alexander Moqedon, 89-96. 
104 In Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew source, it is fairly clear that the account is of Alex-
ander’s travels in India. It speaks of two groups there, the “naked ones” and the 
Brahmins, with the traits described here belonging to the Brahmins, though the 
“naked ones” share many of the same traits. Yet the Hebrew source also speaks of 
this area as containing the Pishon River, which is said to flow into the Nile. Ibn 
Tibbon appears to favor the African location of this account, and that the traits 
described here belong to the “naked ones.” Yet he speaks also of the Brahmins in 
the same context, who live in an area not so far away, and who appear to possess 
the same traits. He also indicates that Alexander exchanged letters with them in 
Hindi. For more on medieval Hebrew descriptions of the Brahmins, see David 
Flusser, Sefer Yosifon (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1981), vol. 2, 216-236.
105 This is the region that separated the land of the “naked ones” and the land of the 
Brahmins.
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birds that made melodic sounds, and when they flew a burning wind 
issued forth from them that burned all that was below.106 In these 
birds, Ibn Tibbon sees a possible explanation of the identity of the 
cherubs that God placed at the entrance to the garden.
For all his indebtedness to Maimonides, Moses Ibn Tibbon is much 
more concerned with explaining in naturalistic terms the literal level of 
the story of the Garden of Eden, rather than the esoteric.107 He certainly 
does not deny the esoteric level of the story—his Commentary on Song 
of Songs is in large part based on the esoteric meaning of this story and 
there are also allusions to this level in his discussion in Sefer Taninim—
but his tendency is to show that even much of the literal level is true. 
Moreover, there is an integral relation between the literal level and the 
esoteric one. The moment Adam no longer heeded the divine command 
and no longer acted according to his natural traits—those that were 
possessed by the groups that Alexander encountered—but chose 
instead to pursue extraneous pleasures, then he could no longer remain 
in this region, which was unsuited for satisfying his new desires. Nor 
could he later return to it because of the great dangers involved in the 
journey. Subsequent biblical history highlights the traits acquired by 
human beings, and that the lands to which they wandered were more 
suitable from a climatological perspective for these traits. Living closer 
to the sea, for example, allowed for the import of goods to satisfy the 
pursuit of pleasure. The metaphorical Adam, Maimonides’ figure of 
pure intellect who loses his perfection when he turns to concentrating 
on physical matters, mirrors for Ibn Tibbon the historical Adam. Adam 
was created with an ideal temperament and lived in a physical environ-
ment best suited for it. Yet he is tempted to seek extraneous pleasures, 
and as a result can no longer live in a natural, perfect harmony with his 
surroundings or with others.
Many more examples can be adduced from the writings that have 
survived of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s naturalistic and novel interpretations 
106 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 239-240.
107 For an in-depth study of Maimonides’ account, see in particular Sara Klein-
Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis (Jerusalem: 
Reuben Mass, 1986) (Heb.).
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of stories in biblical and rabbinic literature, as well as his insights into 
some of the central theological issues of Judaism. While he has gone 
down in history for being a prime molder of subsequent Jewish philos-
ophy in wake of his activity as a translator, he certainly deserves to be 
better appreciated as a major pioneering philosophical exegete as well, 
one who contributed much to the development of this approach for the 
understanding of Judaism.
Introduction
Over 700 years ago, a Jew of Southern France decided to write an ency-
clopedia in Hebrew, an extraordinary undertaking by any measure. His 
name was Levi ben Avraham, and the name he gave his treatise is Livyat 
Ḥen.1 The decision to write a composition of this nature was probably 
influenced in part by the growing popularity of encyclopedias of science 
and philosophy in the Latin world in this period, as well as the fact that 
such encyclopedias were common in the Arabic world,2 though other 
considerations played a more dominant role, as we shall see momen-
tarily. He completed a shorter version of his encyclopedia sometime 
1 The name is of the composition is taken from Proverbs 1:9 and serves as a reminder 
of the name of the author. For an overview of Levi ben Avraham’s work, and the 
scholarly literature dealing with it, see Warren Harvey, “Levi ben Abraham of 
Villefranche’s Controversial Encyclopedia,” in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias, 
ed. Steven Harvey (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 171-188.
2 On a number of these encyclopedias, see Johannes B. Voorbij, “Purpose and Audi-
ence: Perspectives on the Thirteenth Century Encyclopedias of Alexander Neckam, 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus, Thomas, Thomas of Cantimpré and Vincent of Beau-
vais,” in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias, 31-45; Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt, 
“Medieval Arabic Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy,” in ibid., 77-98.
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after the year 1276, probably in Montpellier. He continued to revise it 
and produced a longer version in 1295 in Arles. Levi was not the first 
Jew to engage in such an undertaking; Jews began writing encyclopedias 
of science in Hebrew in the first half of the twelfth century.3 Neverthe-
less, Levi’s composition is in a crucial respect unique. While some of 
the earlier Hebrew encyclopedias of science touch also upon topics in 
Jewish theology, Levi’s treatise is the first we know of that offers an 
in-depth account of both science and Judaism in a single work.4
The general introduction to Livyat Ḥen, in which Levi undoubt-
edly revealed his reasons for writing this composition, is unfortunately 
lost. However, we do have the introduction to the encyclopedic poem 
he completed in 1276, Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Leḥashim, which heralded 
and was designed to promote his later composition.5 In this introduc-
tion, he writes as follows:
I saw that we possess no comprehensive composition that includes in 
one book all that is desired by one who wishes to arrive at the truth 
in ease; for the many sciences that he must first attain to reach the 
precious and lofty science weighs heavily upon him, leaving him for 
a long time in a state as though lacking a true God and pure faith.6
3 The earliest one that we have some information about is Abraham Bar Ḥiyya’s 
Yesodei ha-Tevunah u-Migdal ha-Emunah. On this encyclopedia, see Mercedes 
Rubio, “The First Hebrew Encyclopedia of Science: Abraham Bar Ḥiyya’s Yesodei 
ha-Tevunah u-Migdal ha-Emunah,” in ibid., 140-153. 
4 Bar Ḥiyya intended to include Jewish subjects in addition to scientific ones, but he 
apparently never completed his encyclopedia. An encyclopedia that appeared well 
before Livyat Ḥen and included Jewish subjects is Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah, but its 
discussion of Judaism can hardly be called extensive and it comprises only a small 
part of the work. On this encyclopedia, see Resianne Fontaine, “Judah ben Solomon 
ha-Cohen’s Midrash ha-Ḥokhmah: Its Sources and Use of Sources,” in op. cit., 
191-210.
5 For the parts that were published, see below. The entire poem was published in a 
private publication, whose editor unfortunately ignored the wise words of Ben-Sira: 
“Seek not things that are too hard for you. . . . You have no business with the 
things that are secrets” (Ben-Sira 3:21-22). In addition to these two compositions, 
Levi also wrote a polemic against Christianity that is lost, though some of the mate-
rial undoubtedly was incorporated in his polemic against Christianity in Livyat 
Ḥen; see below.
6 Israel Davidson, “L’introduction de Lévi Ben Abraham a son encyclopédie 
poétique Baté Ha-Néfeš Weha-Lehašim,” Revue des études juives 105 (1940): 90.
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Without doubt the “precious and lofty science” is the divine science, or 
metaphysics, and Levi wrote his encyclopedia to meet what he regarded 
as a great need—namely, a systematic presentation in a single composi-
tion of all the knowledge required to understand Judaism properly 
(which for Levi essentially means Maimonides’ approach to Judaism as 
presented in the Guide) and to attain human perfection. In a sense, 
more than any other single literary creation in Provence, Livyat Ḥen 
embodies and attempts to bring to fruition Maimonides’ pedagogical 
program.
While Levi’s majestic composition never achieved widespread 
popularity, neither was it completely ignored. On one hand, reports of 
some of the views and interpretations presented in this treatise aroused 
the ire of the Rashba (R. Shlomo Ibn Adret). He singled out Levi for 
condemnation in the letters accompanying his ban in 1305 against the 
study of philosophy prior to the age of twenty-five and against philo-
sophical allegorical preaching, labeled him and anyone who possesses 
his writings heretics, and ordered his works burned.7 On the other 
hand, the Provençal scholar Isaac de Lattes, writing in the mid-fourteenth 
century about the rabbis of Southern France, describes Levi in glowing 
terms: “The great sage R. Levi ben R. Avraham ben R. Ḥayyim was 
erudite in every area of knowledge and composed awesome and 
wondrous treatises, among them the noble treatise Livyat Ḥen, an 
7 The letters dealing with the controversy leading to Rashba’s ban, including those 
pertaining to Levi, were compiled by one of the key players in this whole affair, 
Abba Mari of Lunel, in his Sefer Minḥat Qena’ot. The book appears in Teshuvot 
HaRashba, ed. Haim Z. Dimitrovsky (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1990); see 
particularly 374-375, 537-548, 667-674, 732-738. For an overview of this contro-
versy, see Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: The Conflict over the Rationalism of 
Maimonides (New York: Bayard Press, 1935), 167-264. For a study of the reasons for 
the condemnation of Levi, see Abraham S. Halkin, “Why was Levi ben Hayyim 
Hounded,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 34 (1966): 
65-76; see also below. Rashba’s prior attacks on Levi already had an adverse effect 
on Levi’s social and economic situation, insofar as they led to his being ejected in 
1303 from the house of Samuel Sulami in Perpignan, where he was staying. Levi 
made his livelihood from tutoring in a wide range of subjects. 
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exceptionally noble and precious work, whose merit is known only to 
the few.”8
The Structure of Livyat Ḥen and Its Sources
Levi divided his composition into two “pillars,” naming them after the 
two pillars in the Temple of Solomon, “‘Akhin” and “Boaz.” The first 
pillar is a general philosophic one consisting of five sections: logic,9 
mathematics, astronomy, natural science, and metaphysics. Nothing 
has come down to us from the first section, or from the section on the 
natural sciences, and very little from mathematics (a single fragment 
dealing with geometry, which apparently is a subsection of this section). 
Of metaphysics we possess a lengthy portion of the latter part of this 
section.10 Only the section on astronomy (together with astrology) 
exists in full and it is quite lengthy, testifying to the great length of this 
pillar in its entirety.11
The second pillar of Livyat Ḥen, “Boaz,” focuses on Judaism.12 
This pillar is divided into two sections: the first consisting of the 
following subsections: Introduction (dealing mostly with ethics), Part 1: 
Prophecy and the Secrets of the Law (Sodot ha-Torah)—this part deals 
with prophecy, reasons for the commandments, and the biblical stories 
of the patriarchs and Moses.13 Part 2: The Secrets of the Faith (Sitrei 
 8 Isaac de Lattes, Sha‘arei Ẓiyon, in Seder ha-Kabbalah le-Rabeinu Menaḥem HaMeiri, 
ed. Shlomo Z. Havlin (Jerusalem-Cleveland: Makhon Ofeq, 1995), 178.
 9 No fragment has survived of this section, but Levi refers to it in the first chapter 
of the first part of treatise six, “The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the 
Torah.”
10 This part has been published as an appendix in Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The 
Work of the Chariot, ed. Howard Kreisel (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish 
Studies, 2013), 207-267 (Heb.). 
11 See Gad Freudenthal, “Sur la partie astronomique du Liwyat Hen de Lévi ben 
Abraham ben Hayyim,” Revue des études juives 148 (1989): 103-112. This section 
alone spans 315 folio pages in the one complete manuscript we possess that 
contains it.
12 The appendix below brings the table of contents of this pillar. For a description of 
this pillar and the extant manuscripts, see Colette Sirat, “Les différentes versions 
du Liwyat Hen de Lévi ben Abraham,” Revue des études juives 102 (1963): 167-177.
13 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the 
Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
Press, 2007) (Heb.).
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ha-Emunah)—among the topics this part deals with are divine attri-
butes, names of God, divine worship, free will, creation, miracles, 
providence and reward and punishment.14 Part 3: Work of Creation—
in addition to the story of creation at the beginning of Genesis and 
rabbinic homilies devoted to this story, this part deals also with the 
story of the Garden of Eden and the stories of the early generations of 
humanity.15 The second section of this pillar has two parts: Work of the 
Chariot16 and The Gate of Haggadah,17 which is devoted to showing 
how the leading Talmudic Sages were engaged in the study of science, 
and how scientific and philosophic ideas underlie many of the rabbinic 
homilies and tales. This pillar has survived in its entirety, either in the 
long version, the short version, or both.
As indicated above, prior to completing the first version of his 
encyclopedia Levi wrote an encyclopedic poem of over 1800 verses in 
rhymed meter, which he named Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Leḥashim. He 
divided this poem into ten sections, in addition to an introduction.18 
These sections essentially cover the same areas he deals with in his 
encyclopedia, and are as follows: moral virtues;19 types of syllogisms; 
the work of creation;20 the soul and its faculties;21 prophecy;22 the work 
14 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the 
Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
Press, 2014) (Heb.).
15 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, ed. Howard Kreisel 
(Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2004) (Heb.).
16 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot.
17 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the 
Haggadah.
18 As noted above, the introduction was published by Israel Davidson in Revue des 
études juives 105 (1940): 80-94. Davidson also notes the number of verses in each 
section.
19 This section was published by Israel Davidson, “The First Treatise of the Book 
‘Baté Ha-Néfeš Weha-Lehašim’,” Studies of the Research Institute for Hebrew Poetry 
5 (1939): 3-42 (Heb.).
20 This section was published by me together with all the commentaries in Livyat 
Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 423-452.
21 Part of this section was published by Dov Schwartz, “The Commentary of 
R. Solomon ben Menaḥem to ‘Batei ha-Nephesh ve-ha-Leḥashim’ on the Subject 
of the Intellect,” Kobez al Yad 13[23] (1996): 299-330 (Heb.).
22 This section was published by me together with all the commentaries, the first part in 
Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 909-967, and the 
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of the chariot;23 arithmetic and geometry;24 astronomy and astrology; 
the natural sciences; the divine science. The presentation of complex 
scientific and philosophic ideas, as well as philosophic interpretations 
of Jewish sources, in poetic form is an exceptionally challenging task. It 
is no wonder that Levi experienced a crisis in his attempt to write the 
poem, and only succeeded to do so when he was granted what he depicts 
as a form of divine inspiration:
I was horrified by the notion that this task was too great for me—I, 
of slumbering ideas, confused of thought—and was much alarmed in 
my mind that I could not do it, till I fell asleep with a burdened heart 
and in a state of perplexity. I then saw a person who spoke to me and 
aroused me, as a person who is aroused from his sleep. He said to me: 
Son of Man, awake! Arise and be strong in this task, and do not fear. 
Attain the desires of your heart, do what is in your soul and you will 
succeed. In the thirty-sixth year of creation25 I was startled, and as I 
gazed God placed the words in my mouth. He stirred my heart, 
aroused my spirit, strengthened me by His word, and granted me 
courage to compose a short treatise that included the roots of wisdom 
and its principles.26
While writing the poem presented great difficulties, understanding it 
was also far from a simple task. Levi was well aware of the problems its 
readers would experience in grasping many of the philosophical and 
scientific allusions, leading him to write a commentary on his own 
poem. Subsequently three other commentaries were written, one by 
Solomon ben Menaḥem and the other two by anonymous authors. The 
poem and the commentaries (which often cite Livyat Ḥen) are of partic-
ular importance in allowing us to gain a clearer idea of the material 
included in the missing sections of Levi’s encyclopedia.
second part in Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 
343-422.
23 This section was published by me together with all the commentaries in Livyat 
Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, 271-297.
24 This section was published by Israel Davidson, “Levi ben Abraham ben Hayyim: 
A Mathematician of the Thirteenth Century,” Scripta Mathematica 4 (1936): 57-65.
25 That is, the year 5036 (1276).
26 See Davidson, “L`introduction de Lévi Ben Abraham a son encyclopédie poétique 
Baté Ha-Néfeš Weha-Lehašim,” 86-87. This introduction is in rhymed prose.
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Levi is neither an original philosopher nor does he pave any new 
paths for biblical exegesis. He is an encyclopedist, whose knowledge of 
philosophic-scientific literature on one hand and traditional Jewish 
literature on the other is truly astounding. While Levi repeats the same 
basic ideas frequently in his exegesis of biblical and rabbinic litera-
ture, he does so by employing a multitude of ingenious variations based 
on his thorough knowledge of the Bible, earlier biblical commenta-
tors—particularly Rashi, Abraham Ibn Ezra, and Radak (R. David 
Kimhi)—the Babylonian Talmud, the Jerusalem Talmud, numerous 
midrashic compilations, all the works of Maimonides, the classic works 
on Hebrew grammar, and his exceptional knowledge of scientific- 
philosophic (including geographic and medical) literature. Levi assumes 
that most of his readers are not adequately familiar with the scientific 
and philosophic literature—hence the need for the first pillar. At the 
same time he presupposes that they, like him, are totally at home in the 
world of biblical and rabbinic literature. Often in support of one of his 
ideas he simply points to a rabbinic allusion without further explana-
tion or elaboration, based on the assumption that his readers are 
familiar with it and thus will understand the point he is making. After 
encountering so many different citations from biblical and rabbinic 
literature that are interpreted from a philosophic-scientific perspective, 
the reader is swayed to believe that this is in fact the intent of the tradi-
tional sources. There is an advantage in saying with a dozen citations 
what could just as easily have been said employing one or two. There 
is an advantage in writing a comprehensive work detailing the philo-
sophic-scientific underpinnings of the traditional texts, rather than 
bringing just a number of examples. Is not the deep impression that a 
work is meant to leave on its readers, in addition to all the knowledge 
it imparts, an important part of the Jewish philosophic program of 
how Judaism should be understood?
Aside from Maimonides’ dominant influence on Levi’s approach, 
other crucial sources are the works of the Ibn Tibbon family—Ma’amar 
Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim by Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Malmad ha-Talmidim by 
Jacob Anatoli, and most important from this group, the works of Moses 
Ibn Tibbon, Samuel’s son (whom Levi knew personally during his stay 
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in Montpellier). Not only did Moses’ numerous translations of Arabic 
philosophic and scientific treatises provide Levi with most of his knowl-
edge of the sciences, but his Jewish exegetical treatises, most of them 
lost to us,27 served as a source for many of Levi’s comments and for his 
very approach to rabbinic sources.
The one area of Judaism that Levi does not present in detail in his 
treatise is the legal one. He is not interested in his work in what 
Maimonides labeled the “science of the Law,” but rather what the 
Great Eagle referred to as the “science of the Law in its true sense.”28 
In his discussion of the reasons of the commandments, Levi at time 
digresses to deal with halakhic points in an attempt to show how some 
of the legal debates reflect different philosophic ideas. In these discus-
sions he displays a thorough familiarity with the corpus of Jewish law,29 
thereby demonstrating that it was not from a lack of knowledge that he 
refrained from engaging in this area.30 In addition to his command of 
the Mishneh Torah, he is familiar with the writings of R. Avraham ben 
David (Rabad), R. Avraham ha-Yarḥi (Sefer ha-Manhig), R. Isaac ben 
Abba of Marseille (Sefer ha-‘Ittur), and R. Isaac Alfasi. While he may 
have thought that the details of the Law were of secondary concern, a 
more basic consideration for him, as for the more radical philosophic 
camp in general, was that Maimonides had already accomplished this 
task in his Mishneh Torah. There was no reason, given Levi’s under-
standing of Judaism, to try to improve on Maimonides’ great legal 
treatise. One may even go so far as to say that a major reason for 
Maimonides’ writing of the Mishneh Torah was to free the intellectual 
elite from becoming enmeshed in legal discussions, enabling them to 
focus almost exclusively on an understanding of the inner core of 
27 For a listing of these works see the previous chapter.
28 See Guide, introduction, 5.
29 From a number of Levi’s comments, there is good reason to maintain that he 
studied by his uncle, R. Reuben ben Ḥayyim, who was also the teacher of Menaḥem 
HaMeiri. Levi may have known HaMeiri—they share a number of specific inter-
pretations—but he never refers to him by name.
30 Levi in fact expresses a critical attitude regarding those who continued to engage 
in the writing of legal compendiums, as we shall see below.
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Judaism.31 As we shall see below, Levi adopts this position in one of his 
discussions. As Maimonides indicates in his introduction to Mishneh 
Torah, he intended this book to replace all previous books as a source of 
knowledge of Jewish law, and thus only two books remained necessary 
for this purpose—the Torah and his own composition, hence its name. 
Levi clearly hoped that his encyclopedia would complement these two 
books and provide all the necessary theoretical knowledge and the 
proper understanding of Jewish lore and beliefs to complete the road to 
perfection.
Levi ben Avraham’s Biblical Exegesis
Maimonides’ influence on Levi’s philosophic approach is evident 
throughout his encyclopedia. While Levi favors the naturalistic approach 
to understanding God’s relation to the world, he is far from being a 
radical esotericist in his understanding of Maimonides’ thought, or a 
complete Aristotelian in developing his own. He accepts Maimonides’ 
proof of creation as valid and presents it as his own position, not 
appearing to allude to any esoteric view on this subject.32 Yet at the 
same time, as in the case of Maimonides, he interprets the creation 
story as referring to the natural process of generation of all that exists 
on earth.33 For this reason, Levi does not think that the days of creation 
each consisted of twenty-four hours. He inclines to the view that each 
31 Maimonides does not explicitly mention this point when he discusses in the intro-
duction to the Mishneh Torah, as well as elsewhere, the reasons for writing his code, 
yet there is reason to posit that this indeed is one of the reasons. For a discussion 
of these reasons, see Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 20-47. For a view of the moderate philosophic 
camp, personified by Menaḥem HaMeiri, who devoted much of his efforts specifi-
cally to the realm of Jewish law, see in particular Moses Halbertal, Between Torah 
and Wisdom (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000) (Heb.).
32 Levi deals with the issue of creation in chapter nine of the section “The Secrets of 
the Faith”; see Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 
65-79. For a discussion of this issue, see my introduction to this volume, 
xxxii-xxxiv.
33 For an in-depth study of Maimonides’ interpretation, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, 
Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1987) 
(Heb.). Levi interprets the creation story in Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 
chapters 10-12.
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lasted a thousand years, based on Psalms 90:4. Hence there was enough 
time for each stage in the natural process to be completed.34 Levi also 
agrees with Maimonides that the world will never come to an end and 
there will be no permanent changes in nature.35 He devotes much of his 
effort as a commentator to provide naturalistic explanations for most of 
the seemingly supernatural phenomena found in the Bible. The one 
major issue on which Levi breaks with Maimonides regards the status 
of astrology. While Maimonides completely rejected the truth of 
astrology and regarded it as inherently tied to idolatry and the belief in 
determinism,36 Levi, like Abraham Ibn Ezra, viewed it as a practical 
science, and made much use of it in his philosophic interpretation of 
the Bible.37 In the following chapters I will explore in some detail Levi’s 
approach to the Work of the Chariot, prophecy, Mosaic prophecy, 
miracles, the reasons for the commandments, and prayer. In this 
chapter I would like to explore a number of other areas relating to his 
biblical exegesis.
34 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 229-231. Levi derives this interpretation 
from Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim, which, following Moses Ibn Tibbon, he ascribes to Aver-
roes. For more on this treatise, see below, chapter 8, 304-305. Levi brings support 
for his view that the day of creation must refer to a much longer period of time 
from the midrash in BT Sanhedrin 38b, which details what happened every hour on 
the sixth day. For example, in the sixth hour Adam gave names to all the animals, 
in the ninth hour he was commanded not to eat of the tree of knowledge, in the 
tenth hour he disobeyed, in the eleventh hour he was judged and in the twelfth he 
was expelled from the garden. Levi argues that each of these events clearly took 
place over a period longer than an hour. Hence the Sages had in mind a “day” that 
lasted a thousand years.
35 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 86-92; cf. 
Guide 2.27-29.
36 On Maimonides’ approach to astrology, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides’ 
Repudiation of Astrology,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 123-158.
37 On Ibn Ezra’s astrological interpretations, see Shlomo Sela, Astrology and Biblical 
Exegesis in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 
1999) (Heb.); see also Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Some Astrological Themes in the 
Thought of Abraham Ibn Ezra,” in Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings 
of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay Harris 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 28-85.
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A good place to start is with the examples brought by the Rashba 
in his condemnation of allegorical preaching,38 all of which appear in 
Levi’s treatise:
They said about Abraham and Sarah that they are matter and form, 
and the twelve tribes of Israel are the twelve constellations. . . . They 
also said that the holy vessels, the urim and tumim, are an astrolabe. 
. . . The four kings that fought against the five are the four elements 
and five senses.39
Rashba goes on to condemn some of the preachers for treating all the 
stories up to the Giving of the Torah as parables, and also for viewing 
many of the commandments in this manner in order to lessen their 
burden. Furthermore, he censures them for their complete devotion to 
“Greek Wisdom,” particularly the philosophy of Aristotle, and in their 
claiming that without this wisdom, the Torah could not be understood 
properly, and those lacking this wisdom are like animals. Finally, he 
charges them with not believing in creation and denying the possibility 
of any change in nature.40 In a later letter, he adds another example, 
this time clearly alluding to Levi: “Their master [of the allegorical 
preachers] wrote in regard to their [the Sages’] saying: ‘Mem and samekh 
in the tablets stood in place by a miracle’ (BT Shabbat 104a),41 that this 
is not possible. Since they have mass they would not be able to stand in 
place except by some subterfuge—there was something inside [the 
tablets] that held them up.”42
38 For a study of this issue, see Gregg Stern, “Philosophic Allegory in Medieval Jewish 
Culture: The Crisis in Languedoc (1304-1306),” in Interpretation and Allegory, ed. 
Jon Whitman (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 189-209. It should be noted that Rashba’s ire 
was in no small measure due not only to the interpretations themselves, but the fact 
that they were taught publicly to a general audience.
39 Minḥat Qena’ot, 726-727. These examples appear in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of 
Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 613-616, 620, 659-661, 664-665, 878, 880, 885, 
890-891.
40 Minḥat Qena’ot, 727-728.
41 Since the letters of the tablets were engraved straight through so they could be seen 
on both sides, and these letters were round, they must have stood in place by a 
miracle.
42 Minḥat Qena’ot, 735; cf. Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the 
Torah, 254, 819.
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In essence, Rashba brings the following charges based on these 
examples: 1) early biblical history is treated as a parable, with the impli-
cation that the historicity of these stories is denied; 2) miracles as 
supernatural acts of God are rejected and naturalistic explanations are 
offered instead, such as the momentous decisions on what course of 
action the Israelites should take being made on the basis of astrology, 
rather than by a miraculous device by means of which God communi-
cated with the High Priest, or that certain apparent miracles were 
accomplished by subterfuge. In these examples, it should be noted, the 
miracles are not treated as parables, but God’s direct involvement is 
denied. The more general charges brought by Rashba involve the treat-
ment of commandments as parables in order not to have to fulfill them 
and the regarding of philosophy as the highest truth to which one must 
completely dedicate oneself. Even the Torah, in this view, must be 
understood accordingly. In short, God exercises no acts of volition, but 
His activity is confined to the fixed eternal order of nature.
There is a grain of truth in some of these charges when applied to 
Levi, while others are the product of a misunderstanding. Since Rashba 
based his condemnation on the reports that reached him, he was not 
able to see these views in their proper context.43 Yedaiah Bedershi 
correctly points out to Rashba in his Letter of Apology that the identifi-
cation of Sarah with matter and Abraham with form was not meant as 
an interpretation of the Bible itself, but of a rabbinic tale, and there 
certainly was no intent to deny their historicity.44 In the case of the 
43 Some of these examples appear in a letter to the Rashba from Don Crescas Vidal; 
see Minḥat Qena’ot, 369-370. It should be added that Levi himself responded to the 
charges against him, but his letter is lost. What remains is Rashba’s response to 
Levi’s defense; see Minḥat Qena’ot, 390-395. Rashba speaks of seeing Levi’s booklet 
(quntres), which apparently refers to Levi’s letter. This letter clearly made little 
impression on the Rashba, judging from his very critical response, in which he 
repeats many of the same charges against Levi and the allegorical preachers.
44 See Yedaiah Bedershi, Ketav Hitnaẓlut, in She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Jeru-
salem, 1976), no. 418, 212. For a study of this work, see Abraham S. Halkin, 
“Yedaiah Bedershi’s ‘Apology,’” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. 
Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 165-184. 
Yedaiah ascribes this interpretation to “one of our precious ones who is one of the 
important sages (ḥaverim) of that land and against whom there is the grievance”—a 
clear reference to Levi, whom he may have known personally when they both lived 
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identity of the twelve tribes with the twelve constellations, too, it is 
clear from Livyat Ḥen that Levi did not deny the existence of the tribes, 
and that he simply maintains that each of them fell under the dominion 
of a different constellation.45 Nevertheless, the issue of the historicity 
of the early stories of the Bible was a real one for the Jewish philoso-
phers. It is not always clear when the allegorical understanding of a 
story that they advance comes to replace the literal meaning, or when it 
comes to supplement it and reveal the story’s more profound meaning. 
With this in mind, let us turn to the problem of Levi’s view of the 
historicity of the early stories in the Torah, beginning with the story of 
the Garden of Eden.
Maimonides appears to reject the literal meaning of the story when 
he alludes to its allegorical meaning in the Guide,46 though in his Intro-
duction to Pereq Ḥeleq he accepts the view that such a garden exists and 
will one day be rediscovered.47 As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Moses Ibn Tibbon regards much of the story, though certainly not all of 
it, as essentially true, in addition to having an esoteric meaning.48 Levi 
accepts the view that “every parable is made up primarily of things that 
exist.”49 Like Moses Ibn Tibbon and Maimonides, he is convinced that 
the garden is a real place. Furthermore, he follows Ibn Tibbon in 
locating it in the vicinity of Mount Kilimanjaro, from where, in their 
view, flow the sources of the Nile.50 What all these thinkers have in 
common is the refusal to accept an alternative (mythic) reality in which 
the nature of the world as we know it is completely different. They all 
agree that serpents do not talk, the fruit of trees do not impart 
in Perpignan. The tale in question is the one in BT Baba Batra 58a concerning R. 
Bana’ah, which Levi deals with in Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate 
of the Haggadah, 305-308, and will be explored below. Yedaiah continues his work 
by dealing with the other problematic views mentioned by Rashba. 
45 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 620, 880.
46 For a discussion of this issue, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of 
the Adam Stories in Genesis (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1986), 299-305 (Heb.).
47 See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot, 
1987), 137.
48 See above, chapter 4, 112-114.
49 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 39.
50 Ibid., 39-41; see above, chapter 4, 112.
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knowledge or grant eternal life, and angels with swords that stand as 
guards do not exist. To the degree that they thought that they could 
interpret the details of the story in a way that was in conformity with 
nature, they were prepared to accede to their literal truth in addition to 
their allegorical meaning.
Yet it is the allegorical meaning that is of greater concern to Levi, 
even when the literal meaning is seen to be true. While there is a real 
garden in a region called Eden, the philosophical truths they represent 
are far more important. As in the case of parables in general, Levi sees 
no reason to limit them to a single interpretation. He brings two 
different meanings to the garden and to Eden and the river that flows 
from it: 1) the garden is the sublunar world, Eden is the world of the 
spheres, and the river represents the forces emanating from the spheres; 
2) the garden is the sublunar world, Eden is the Active Intellect, and 
the river represents the forms emanating from the Active Intellect. In 
addition, the garden may be seen as representing the body, or following 
a different line of interpretation, it represents the areas of wisdom that 
the human intellect is capable of attaining.51 Levi, like his philosophic 
predecessors, also shows how the Sages picked up on some of these 
meanings and expanded upon them, or understood the biblical parable 
in still other ways—a point that will be explored in more detail below. 
In a similar manner, Levi approaches the four rivers. They are real 
rivers that he attempts to identify, and at the same them they represent 
different scientific notions, such as the four elements and the qualities 
each one possesses.52
The children of Adam and Eve also illustrate this point. Levi is 
certainly far more interested in the allegorical meaning of their names 
and the events surrounding them than in the literal meaning of the 
51 Ibid., 47, 49-50.
52 Ibid., 39-46. Some of Levi’s allegorical explanations of other details of this story 
have been analyzed by Sara Klein-Braslavy, “R. Levi ben Avraham of Villefranche’s 
Interpretation of ‘Adam and Eve’ in the Story of the Garden of Eden,” in Tribute 
to Michael: Studies in Jewish and Muslim Thought Presented to Professor Michael 
Schwarz, ed. Sara-Klein Braslavy, Benjamin Abrahamov, and Joseph Sadan (Tel 
Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2009), 105-139 (Heb.). 
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stories.53 He leaves little doubt, however, that he sees in them actual 
historical individuals. While the great number of years lived by the 
ancients would appear to belie the fact that they were real individuals, 
or alternately, that nature does not change, Levi nonetheless accepts 
their historicity. He brings a number of explanations to show that their 
longevity is possible in nature due to geographical, astrological, dietary, 
behavioral, and hereditary factors.54
The actual occurrence of the flood is also not doubted by Levi, and 
he traces it to astrological reasons. The structure of the ark as specified 
in the Torah would indeed have enabled it to float on the water in his 
view. Yet Levi does not accept the literal truth of all the details of the 
story. The flood did not encompass the entire world, as already indi-
cated by the Sages who excluded the Land of Israel,55 nor could the ark 
53 Ibid., 152-160. Levi interprets the three children—Cain, Abel, and Seth—as refer-
ring to the three faculties of the intellect: the practical intellect that knows the 
crafts, the deliberative faculty that is responsible for governance, and the theoret-
ical intellect that knows the sciences.
54 Ibid., 318-326. Levi also cites Moses Ibn Tibbon’s explanation that these individ-
uals were leaders who laid down legislations, and the number of years each one 
lived refers to the period that his legislation was in effect. Levi adds a similar expla-
nation in his own name—each individual was the head of a family, and all of his 
descendants continued to be called by his name for the number of years stated. Ibn 
Tibbon’s explanation as cited by Levi was subsequently adopted by Nissim of 
Marseilles; see below, chapter 6, 201-202.
55 See BT Zevaḥim 113a; Genesis Rabbah 33.6. As mentioned above, Levi accepts the 
view that the world will continue to exist eternally and nature will never change. 
He follows Averroes in rejecting the idea advanced by Avicenna that even if a 
species becomes completely extinct, it can reappear when matter is again prepared 
to receive the form of that species, and this is true of the human species as well. 
According to Averroes, human beings can only be generated from members of the 
species. Samuel Ibn Tibbon mentions this controversy, while leaning toward 
Avicenna’s view in this matter—a view that allows for a continuous corruption and 
regeneration of the world; see Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Mordechai Bisli-
ches (Pressburg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), chap. 3, 8. For a study of this issue 
see Gad Freudenthal, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Avicennian Theory of an Eternal 
World,” Aleph 8 (2008): 41-129. While Levi denies the possibility of the corruption 
and regeneration of species, he agrees that the earth may still undergo widespread, 
though not total, destruction due to the strengthening of the element of fire leading 
to global warming, or the element of water leading to widespread flooding, as in 
Noah’s time; see Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 
89-90.
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contain so many animals. Hence the story should be interpreted as 
alluding to an esoteric level. The flood hints to the corruption of the 
human being—who is a micro-cosmos—due to his succumbing to the 
evil inclination and overly engaging in sexual activity. The ark represents 
the improvement of one’s morals, in order not to drown in one’s sins. 
Levi goes on to interpret many of the other details of the story along 
similar lines.56
The interplay between the exoteric and esoteric levels of the story, 
and the interpretation of the homilies of the Sages as expanding upon 
the esoteric level, characterize Levi’s treatment of the stories of Genesis 
in general. The Tower of Babel, for example, is a real tower at the same 
time that it represents the belief in God as the spirit of the sphere.57 
The city both is a real city and represents the religion of the inhabi-
tants. The “one language” they shared literally refers to a single 
language they all spoke, at the same time that it represents a single 
religion. The goal of the inhabitants according to the literal meaning of 
the story was to build a tower in order to attract all the inhabitant of 
the world to the same place, not to actually climb up to the heavens, 
which everyone knows is impossible. In so doing they wished to estab-
lish fraternity between all people and peace on earth, by having 
everyone live together, share the same temperament, language, opin-
ions, and belief, under the same ruler, whom Levi, following the 
midrash, identifies as Nimrod. Their dispersal to the four corners of the 
earth led to changes in their physical disposition, language, opinions 
and belief.58 On the figurative level, the story indicates that the argu-
ments for their religious belief were challenged by Abraham and his 
followers, who proved that the Mover of the sphere is separate from 
matter, thereby thwarting their attempt to unite everyone in their false 
belief. The midrash concerning the tower: “A third was burnt, a third 
was swallowed up, and a third exists” (BT Sanhedrin 109a), picks up on 
56 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 636-640.
57 See Maimonides’ description of the Sabian religion in Guide 3.29.
58 Following the doctrine of climatology, which maintains that the physical environ-
ment in which a people live plays an important role in molding their character and 
culture.
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both levels of the story. On the literal level, the Sages related what 
actually happened to the uncompleted tower. On the allegorical level, 
the midrash refers to the different aspects of the belief of the inhabi-
tants. The existence of the spirit of the sphere could not be known by 
the senses, hence it was “swallowed up.” The belief that the body of 
the sphere itself is the deity was demonstratively proven false, hence 
this opinion was “burnt.”59
The patriarchs were all real people, according to Levi, and all that 
the Torah describes and conforms with what is possible in nature actu-
ally happened to them. At the same time, Jacob and his family can be 
seen as alluding to the different faculties of the soul,60 and the four 
kings who fought the five can be seen as representing the four elements 
and five senses.61 Levi brings numerous explanations of both the 
exoteric and esoteric levels of many other stories found in Genesis. 
Only when he sees a problem from a rational perspective in accepting 
the exoteric aspect of a story does the figurative interpretation replace, 
rather than supplement, the literal interpretation, without necessarily 
rejecting the historicity of the story as a whole. In those instances in 
which it is clear that the events described took place in a prophetic 
vision, he treats the entire story as a product of the prophet’s own 
imagination that did not actually occur. As Maimonides had already 
indicated, stories in which the prophet sees or hears angels are in fact 
dreams or visions.62 This position in turn calls into question the histo-
ricity of a number of central stories in the Torah.
59 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 646-647. Levi does 
not interpret the meaning of “a third exists.” This apparently refers to the notion 
that the motion of the spheres influence the four elements and all that are composed 
of them, which was considered to be an empirical truth. For the range of medieval 
Jewish philosophical approaches to this story, see Michael Roni, “Medieval Jewish 
Philosophical Commentaries to the Story of the Tower of Babel” (PhD Thesis, 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2006) (Heb.).
60 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 716-717. Levi brings 
this interpretation in the name of Moses Ibn Tibbon; see above, chapter 4, 93.
61 Ibid., 659-663.
62 See Guide 2.42.
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One of these stories is that of the three angels who came to 
Abraham. Maimonides singled out this story as an example of a 
prophetic vision, a view that aroused the ire of Naḥmanides insofar as 
it denied the actual occurrence of the events depicted.63 Jacob’s wres-
tling with an angel falls into the same category.64 A similar position is 
adopted by Maimonides in regard to all the “crazy actions” that the 
prophets were commanded to perform, such as Ezekiel being ordered 
to dig in a wall, or Hosea being ordered to marry a harlot. These actions 
too were carried out only in the vision itself, according to Maimonides, 
and not in reality.65 In none of these cases, however, does Maimonides 
explain the parable; he simply points out that it should be treated as 
such. Certain crucial events that may be construed to have taken place 
in visions in accordance with the criteria Maimonides lays down—most 
notably, the binding of Isaac and the destruction of Sodom—are never-
theless treated by him as events that actually occurred.66 In this manner 
he preserves the historicity of those stories that play a more crucial role 
in upholding Jewish belief
Levi follows in Maimonides’ footsteps, while supplying multiple 
explanations for many of the stories that he regards as parables. He too 
regards the story of Abraham seeing three angels as having occurred in 
a prophetic vision. He picks up on the Sages’ identification of them as 
Raphael, Michael, and Gabriel,67 as a reference to the spheres of 
Mercury, the Moon, and the Sun. Abraham attained by way of his 
vision astrological knowledge foretelling future events: his being cured 
after his circumcision due to the activity of Mercury, Sarah’s giving 
birth due to the activity of the Moon, and the destruction of Sodom 
due to the activity of the Sun.68 In addition to his astrological interpre-
tation of this vision in accordance with what he sees as the intent of the 
63 Ibid.; cf. Naḥmanides, Commentary on Genesis 18:1.
64 Guide 2.42.
65 Guide 2.46.
66 Ibid., 3.24, 50.
67 See Genesis Rabbah 50.2; BT Baba Meẓi‘a 86b.
68 It should be noted that Levi does not doubt the actual occurrence of Sodom’s 
destruction, just as he does not deny the occurrence of the binding of Isaac, which 
he mentions in passing in a number of passages of his treatise.
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Sages, Levi offers a more philosophical explanation. He sees in these 
figures an allusion to the three powers of the rational faculty—the theo-
retical, deliberative and practical—or the three types of intellect: the 
passive, the acquired and the Active Intellect.69 For those who may be 
disturbed by the denial of the historicity of this story, Levi also brings 
the possibility that the “men” seen by Abraham were not angels seen in 
a vision but actual people—namely, fellow prophets, two of whom 
continued on to Sodom to rescue Lot.70
Jacob’s wrestling with an angel is also explained as a vision 
involving astrological knowledge, in light of the Sages’ identification 
of the angel as the Guardian of Esau71—an apparent reference to Mars, 
which was then in its ascendency. A further interpretation brought by 
Levi is that this vision alludes to the overcoming of the evil inclination 
by the intellect.72 Jacob’s subsequent limp as a result of his wrestling 
with the angel is also explained allegorically, and by extension, the 
reason for the commandment not to eat the sinew of the vein is an 
allegorical one reminding us to restrain our sexual appetite.73 Still 
another explanation of this vision sees in the angel an allusion to the 
Active Intellect and Jacob’s struggle to conjoin with it despite his 
preoccupation with earthly matters. Levi goes on to suggest that 
Jacob’s limp may even be understood literally, insofar as such intense 
visions weaken the bodily limbs and their powers. He cites Averroes’ 
discussion in Epitome on Parva Naturalia in corroboration of this view.74
The same pattern of interpretation characterizes subsequent 
biblical history, from the time the Israelites went down into Egypt. 
Levi casts no doubt on the literal truth of the stories, except in those 
instances where the story occurs in a prophetic vision, such as the story 
69 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 652-659.
70 Ibid., 658. The notion that prophets are at times called “angels” is presented by 
Maimonides; see Guide 2.41.
71 See Genesis Rabbah 77.3.
72 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 703-705.
73 Ibid., 705.
74 Ibid., 706-709; cf. Averroes, Epitome of Parva Naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg 
(Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1961), 48.
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of the burning bush.75 His discussion is devoted in large measure to a 
presentation of naturalistic explanations for many of the seemingly 
supernatural events experienced by the Israelites. At the same time, he 
points out allegorical meanings of the stories when he discerns them, 
such as the story of Jethro and his seven daughters.76
Levi follows Maimonides in offering social reasons for Israel’s 
sojourn in the desert for forty years. God does not perform miracles 
to change the nature of human beings, and the Israelites who left 
Egypt were not yet prepared to wage war and conquer the Land. Only 
the next generation who did not grow up in slavery would have the 
courage and other characteristics necessary for this endeavor.77 Levi 
adds four other reasons why a lengthy sojourn in the desert was bene-
ficial to the Israelites before taking possession of the Land: 1) to 
abolish the false beliefs of the Sabians and their practices, to which 
the Israelites were accustomed; 2) to prevent other nations from 
witnessing and rejoicing in God’s punishments of the Israelites for 
their sins, which God foresaw they would commit; 3) to accustom the 
Israelites to live without superfluous things and to strengthen their 
dependence upon God; 4) to abolish their belief in demons, which 
they believed inhabited the desert, when they see that during this 
whole period no demons appeared.78
Levi’s biblical exegesis at times reveals him as a subtle interpreter 
of Maimonides as well. Regarding the strange story of God attempting 
to kill Moses while on his way to Egypt until Zipporah saved him by 
circumcising their son,79 Levi argues that the story clearly did not 
happen in reality. God in the story refers to an angel that can only be 
“seen” in visions. Levi adduces a number of additional reasons why the 
story is exceptionally problematic when understood literally, and thus 
must be interpreted allegorically. Moses represents the intellect, and 
Zipporah represents the pure matter that obeys the rational faculty. 
75 Levi explains this vision in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of 
the Torah, 733-740.
76 Ibid., 726-727.
77 Ibid., 759-760; cf. Guide 3.32.
78 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 762-764.
79 See Exodus 4:24-26.
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The act of circumcision performed by Zipporah on their youngest son 
represents the cessation of pursuing the superfluous and the elimina-
tion of false ideas that result from the impure matter, which leads the 
rational soul astray. Levi continues:
And she caused it to touch (vatagga‘) his feet [Exodus 4:25], that is, she 
caused it to touch and understand its causes, and she saved her 
groom, husband, and her form.80 It says vatagga‘ in the active caus-
ative form of the verb, since the main intellectual activity is ascribed 
to the intellect. If this matter were in accordance with its literal 
meaning, it would have said: and she touched (vatiga‘) his feet, in the 
simple form of the verb. Similarly, and he caused it to touch (vayagga‘) 
my mouth [Isaiah 6:7]—that is, the seraph caused his word and spirit 
to touch my intellect. The Master [Maimonides] brought it [Exodus 
4:25] in connection with the touching of one body with another, in 
accordance with the literal meaning. He also brought in connection 
with this matter [the verse] he caused it to touch my mouth—this was 
in accordance with prophetic imagination that the angel caused the 
live coal to touch the mouth of the prophet. That which he [Maimon-
ides] brought whose meaning is equivocal and figurative, he brings as 
simple easy matters, and leaves aside the matters that were his main 
intent, for the purpose of concealment, and he relies upon the under-
standing of the erudite.81
Levi refers here to Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 1.18, where he 
discusses the terms qarob (to approach), nago‘a (to touch) and nagosh (to 
come near). As for “touching,” Maimonides defines its basic meaning as 
“drawing near of one body to another,” and brings as examples the use 
of this term in Exodus 4:25 and Isaiah 6:7. He subsequently brings the 
secondary meaning of this term, which is “union in knowledge and 
drawing near through apprehension,” and adduces Jeremiah 51:9 as an 
example of this usage. Levi points out that the true meaning of “to 
touch” in Exodus 4:25 and Isaiah 6:7 is precisely the secondary 
meaning and not the primary one. In both verses we are dealing with 
a prophetic vision in which “to cause to touch” signifies to bring about 
80 “Feet” alludes to cause; see Guide 1.28. That is, the elimination of the superfluous 
and false ideas enables the intellect to understand its causes, which leads to its 
perfection and salvation.
81 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 728-729.
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understanding. Maimonides certainly knew the true meaning of these 
verses, so the question arises why he nevertheless brought them as 
examples of physical touching, rather than other examples that were 
more appropriate. According to Levi, Maimonides did so in order to 
hide the true meaning of these verses from his less intelligent readers, 
while signaling it to his more astute ones. His method is to call attention 
to both verses by bringing them as examples of the first meaning, as if 
we are dealing with actual physical touching. His less intelligent readers 
will not discern that there is a problem with these examples. His more 
perceptive readers, on the other hand, will understand that the term “to 
cause to touch” in these verses should not be understood literally. The 
secondary meaning that Maimonides brings immediately afterwards—
that touching refers to understanding—is in fact the intended one. Levi 
may also be implying that Maimonides juxtaposed the two verses in 
order to hint that just as the verse in Isaiah refers to a prophetic vision, 
so does the one in Exodus. In this manner, Levi sheds further light on 
Maimonides’ methods of concealment at the same time as he elucidates 
upon the true meaning of a problematic story in the Torah.
As opposed to Maimonides, however, astrology plays a prominent 
role in Levi’s understanding of a number of biblical stories. While some 
of the plagues in Egypt were in part accomplished by Moses on the 
basis of his superior knowledge of all of existence, others were accom-
plished by Aaron on the basis of astrological knowledge. Even the 
Sages, Levi points out, hinted at Aaron’s expertise in this area when 
they said: “The seven clouds of glory were in virtue of Aaron” (BT 
Rosh Hashanah 3a)—an allusion to the seven planets. Levi explains 
that some of the plagues came about due to changes involving the 
element of fire, others air, others water, and others earth. The killing 
of the first born, according to one opinion brought by Levi, was due to 
pestilential air that became exceptionally hot and dry, thereby affecting 
in particular the first born, who tend to have more natural heat. For 
this reason the Jews were commanded to stay home and to take a bunch 
of hyssop dipped in blood in order to humidify the air.82 In Levi’s view, 
82 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 95-98.
Chapter Five138 
the wanderings of the Israelites in the desert and their different stations 
of rest for varying periods of time were all determined on the basis of 
the position of the stars. He gives a similar reason for why Amaleq 
chose to attack Israel when it did, and why Moses chose Joshua to lead 
the battle against them rather than lead the Israelites himself. Levi 
finds support for his view in a number of rabbinic homilies that expand 
upon the astrological interpretation of this story.83
Not only astrology underlies many of Levi’s explanations, but also 
certain parapsychological phenomena. Balaam’s ability as a soothsayer 
(qosem), for example, is explained by Levi in a number of ways. In 
addition to tracing this ability to a perfect imagination, which attains 
an emanation from the Active Intellect—an explanation advanced by 
Alfarabi, Maimonides, and Averroes—Levi raises the possibility that it 
results from an emanation from the World Soul, a view mentioned by 
Avicenna, Al-Batalyawsi, and the author of Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim.84 Levi 
also brings the rabbinic explanation that Balaam was an adept in 
astrology, enabling him to know the appropriate times to bless and to 
curse.85 Finally, he offers the following explanation for the efficacy of 
Balaam’s curses:
It is not impossible that there exists a venomous person who by his 
curse can inflict harm on everything that he sees, especially upon one 
whose power and body have deteriorated and who is susceptible to 
be instantly afflicted and exposed to harm, all the more so in a malev-
olent hour.86 This is due to the fact that a great disparity exists 
between the individuals of some of the [species of] animals. There 
are people who are not susceptible to the evil eye due to the strength 
of their temperament, as it is said: “I am of the descendants of Joseph” 
etc. [BT Berakhot 20a].87 I will explain this [statement] below in the 
83 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 770-771.
84 Ibid., 153-154. For the World Soul in Arabic and Jewish philosophy, see Alexander 
Altmann, “The Ladder of Ascension,” in Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented 
to Gershom G. Scholem, ed. Ephraim Urbach et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
1967), 1-32.
85 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 128, 157; cf. BT 
Sanhedrin 105b, BT Berakhot 7a. 
86 That is, when the position of the stars bodes evil for the individual.
87 The Talmudic passage reads as follows: “Rabbi Yoḥanan would often go and sit at 
the gates of the place of [ritual] immersion [where woman would go to purify 
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Gate of the Haggadah in connection with a different matter.88 You 
see how Balaam sought out places where he was able to see Israel. A 
person who believes in this and whose imagination is occupied with 
it will be more greatly harmed. Perhaps this occurs by mediation of 
the World Soul, which instills its power in the souls. Possibly in this 
manner some of the sages who possessed strong souls could punish 
those upon whom they directed their gaze, either killing them or 
marring their success, as it is said: “Every place upon which the 
sages gazed—either death or poverty resulted” [Ḥagigah 5b]. This 
did not occur solely by gazing. Rav Sheshet was blind, yet it is 
written about him in the chapter “One who Sees” that he glanced at 
a heretic who then turned into a pile of bones.89 This [ability] is 
aided by one’s natural temperament and the power of the 
constellation.90
Levi explains the efficacy of Balaam’s curses by ascribing to him an 
“evil eye,” which he treats as a natural phenomenon and whose exis-
tence was accepted also on empirical grounds. He traces this ability to 
a particularly powerful imagination that can affect matter outside the 
person himself, upon which he gazes. Avicenna had earlier presented a 
similar theory regarding the efficacy of the evil eye, which also serves as 
the basis for his view of the prophet as miracle worker.91 Levi adds that 
the victim’s physical and psychological disposition can make him either 
an easier target or one who is inured to the power of the evil eye. Astro-
logical factors for Levi play an important role as well. He raises the 
further possibility that the World Soul serves as an intermediary in this 
matter. Since it affects all souls, certain powerful souls may receive 
from it the capability to act on other souls in a similar manner.92 
Rabbinic literature brings a number of statements and stories that 
themselves]. He said: When the daughters of Israel ascend and come out from their 
immersion, they look at me and will have children as beautiful as me. The Sages 
said to him: Does not the Master fear the evil eye? He said to them: I am of the 
descendants of Joseph, upon whom the evil eye has no dominance.”
88 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 245.
89 See BT Berakhot 58a.
90 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 158-159.
91 See Shams Inati (trans.), Ibn Sina and Mysticism—Remarks and Admonitions: Part 
Four (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 105-107. For more on this approach, 
see below, chapter 9, 334.
92 On the World Soul, see above, note 84.
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mention the evil eye, lending further support to the existence of this 
phenomenon. In this case, Levi sees no need to interpret these state-
ments allegorically. The power of the imagination to affect matter lies 
at the heart of the Talmudic story of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who was not 
affected by the evil eye, but whose beauty left a deep impression upon 
the imagination of the women leaving the ritual bath, on their way 
home to have intercourse with their husbands. Their thinking of his 
beauty helped determine the traits of the children that were conceived. 
The notion of the power of the imagination in this matter characterizes 
not only humans but also animals, as Levi indicates regarding Jacob’s 
stratagem in using rods to produce streaked, speckled, and spotted 
cattle. He explains: “The story of the rods concerns a natural matter. 
The imagination and representation very much affect the nature of the 
newborn, since the sperm is something that comes from the animal 
with an imagination.”93
Levi ben Avraham’s Rabbinic Exegesis
Levi presents innumerable philosophic interpretations of rabbinic 
texts throughout the second part of his encyclopedia, and chooses to 
conclude his encyclopedia with an extensive discussion devoted exclu-
sively to this subject, thereby highlighting its significance in his view. 
He opens the Gate of the Haggadah with a discussion of “Greek 
Wisdom,” which is prohibited in the Talmud.94 The continuous contro-
versies in Provence concerning the permissibility of learning 
philosophy, which its opponents equated with “Greek Wisdom,” if 
not outright heresy, undoubtedly looms in the background of his deci-
sion to begin with this topic. Levi essentially argues at length two basic 
points. 1) “Greek Wisdom” includes all kinds of literature, some of 
93 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 209; cf. Livyat 
Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 677. In a similar manner, 
Radak explains this story; see his Commentary on Genesis 30:39.
94 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 187-192. 
See also my introduction, lx-ixvii, and Dov Schwartz, “’Greek Wisdom’—A 
Reexamination of this Issue in the Period of the Polemics on the Study of 
Philosophy,” Sinai 104 (1989): 148-153 (Heb.). The Talmudic prohibition is 
found in BT Sotah 49b.
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which were prohibited, such as books of Greek religion, while others 
were regarded as a waste of time, such as books on the art of poetry, 
Greek fables, chronologies of kings. Yet there certainly was never any 
intent on the part of the Sages to prohibit “the books of wisdom 
written by the true philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristot-
le.”95 2) The Jews of ancient times already possessed books of science 
and transmitted this knowledge to the other nations, who suppressed 
the origins of the knowledge they received. In the course of time, the 
Jews themselves forgot this knowledge and lost most of these books. 
Among the Sages there were still those that possessed much of this 
wisdom and even some of the ancient books in Hebrew that contained 
it, as evidenced by the scientific knowledge ascribed to them in the 
Talmud.96 While Levi’s first point shows that learning science and 
philosophy is in fact permissible, the second point shows its desir-
ability. Moreover, this point lays the foundation for reading philosophic 
and scientific views into many of the rabbinic homilies and tales, 
particularly the more outlandish ones. It shows why such a reading is 
not anachronistic, but uncovers the Sages’ original intent.
The idea of the antiquity of science and philosophy among the 
Jews, who then transmitted this knowledge to the gentiles, is one that 
existed well before Levi’s time. It served both to justify the contempo-
rary study of science and to underscore the greatness of the ancient 
Israelites as compared to all other nations.97 The manner in which Levi 
advances this idea is of particular interest. He does not hold that most 
of the knowledge possessed by the Sages in philosophic and scientific 
matters was originally received in revelation. Rather, it was knowledge 
that was discovered in ancient times by way of rational investigation, 
in the spirit of Maimonides’ depiction of the rational speculations of 
the patriarch Abraham pertaining to the existence of God.98 He also 
does not claim that the knowledge the Jews transmitted to the other 
95 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 192.
96 Ibid., 192-204.
97 For a comprehensive study of this notion see Abraham Melamed, The Myth of the 
Jewish Origins of Science and Philosophy (Haifa and Jerusalem: Haifa University 
Press and Magnes Press, 2010) (Heb.).
98 See Guide 3.29; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.3. 
Chapter Five142 
nations was the same knowledge that the Jews learned, or relearned by 
reading the Greek books in science and philosophy. It is clear from 
Levi’s account that the Sages learned many new things from these 
books. In turn, they took an active role in the further advancement of 
science, such as in the fields of astronomy and medicine. They wrote 
their own books on these subjects, which together with the older 
Hebrew books of science were lost or destroyed. In short, in Levi’s 
view there was a lot of Greek in Jewish Palestine when it came to phil-
osophic and scientific matters.
Following Moses Ibn Tibbon, Levi is not of the opinion that all the 
Sages possessed scientific and philosophic knowledge. Those who did 
generally lived in the Land of Israel, since they benefited from the 
superior qualities of this land.99 The rabbinic homilies that convey this 
knowledge, which were far more common in Israel than Babylonia, 
reveal the intellectual superiority of their authors. It is interesting to 
note that Levi draws a critical distinction between homilies and tales. 
The rabbinic homilies, midrashim, he sees as resulting from wisdom and 
inquiry, as evidenced from the Hebrew term derash, signaling that they 
in fact contain a concealed layer. The apparent disagreements among 
the Sages in many of the homilies should often be interpreted as 
reflecting disagreements in scientific and philosophic matters, though 
at times one of the opinions is simply supplementing the knowledge 
conveyed by a previous opinion. The same approach, however, should 
not be adopted in regard to the haggadot, which are stories; only some 
of them should be understood esoterically.100
In keeping with his approach to the Sages as philosophers and 
scientists, Levi denies that they believed in demons. As is true of most 
Aristotelian philosophers, Levi rejects the existence of such creatures, 
particularly since he does not believe in the possibility of the existence 
 99 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 207. For a 
study of this notion see Abraham Melamed, “The Land of Israel and Clima-
tology in Jewish Thought,” in The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed. 
Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer Ravitzky ( Jerusalem: Yad Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓevi, 
1991), 52-78 (Heb.).
100 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 207-208, 243
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of disembodied souls,101 hence the same stance he ascribes to the Sages. 
When they speak of such creatures, Levi interprets them as referring to 
the products of the imagination of weak minded people, or to small 
harmful creatures, or allegorically, as a reference to the evil inclination. 
In each instance, the demons should be understood in accord with the 
context in which they are mentioned.102 Levi also tries to show that 
many seemingly superstitious practices advocated by the Sages actually 
have a rational basis.103 In general, Levi advises his readers that they 
should attempt to interpret the words of the Sages as much as possible 
in a manner that conforms to what is known by the intellect.104
Levi does not ignore the issue of the reasons for the Sages’ esoter-
icism. Like his philosophic predecessors, he feels that philosophic and 
scientific knowledge in the wrong hands—namely, those who do not 
possess the required prerequisites for such study—can be detrimental 
to the individual’s belief.105 Yet in writing an encyclopedia of science 
he shows his agreement with Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who was convinced 
that the times had changed. The current situation requires that the 
learning of science and philosophy be encouraged among Jews, and that 
they should view this knowledge as underlying much of Jewish tradi-
tion. In other words, Levi’s endeavors were very much part of the 
battle for hearts and minds among his Jewish brethren in determining 
what they should believe.106
Despite his view that many of the stories in the Talmud do not 
contain an esoteric level, Levi offers explanations to a number of 
fantastic rabbinic tales, many of which he treats as dreams akin to 
prophetic ones. More than a few of the explanations brought by Levi 
101 From among the Islamic philosophers, Avicenna accepted such a possibility; see 
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura 
(Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 347-357.
102 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 296-301.
103 Ibid., 244-245.
104 Ibid., 264; cf. The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette 
Sirat, and Avraham Israel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 
2010), 198-201 (Heb.); see above, chapter 4, 000.
105 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 243.
106 See Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 22, 174. For a partial quote of Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon’s argument, see below, chapter 7, 247; see also above, chapter 4, 82-83.
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are taken from the writings of Moses Ibn Tibbon. On a few occasions 
Levi implicitly rejects Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation and offers an alter-
native one instead.
A good example is the interpretation of the strange Talmudic tale 
in BT Baba Batra 58a regarding R. Bana’ah, which we explored in 
the previous chapter.107 Moses Ibn Tibbon transformed the story of 
R. Bana’ah finding a cave in which he actually saw Abraham and 
Sarah, and even Adam, into a story of his finding a crypt in which 
these figures were artfully depicted. He ends his interpretation with 
the remark: “If he [the story teller] spoke by way of wisdom, the 
enlightened one should attempt to find its meaning,”108 though he 
himself rests content with his more literal but naturalistic interpreta-
tion. Levi, who was well acquainted with Moses Ibn Tibbon’s works 
and in all probability knew this explanation, picks up the gauntlet laid 
down by Ibn Tibbon. Rather than treat the story as depicting an 
actual occurrence concerning the discovery of a treasure trove of 
works of art, he interprets the story as a philosophic parable, or more 
precisely, as a prophetic type dream of these ancient figures, which 
represent philosophic notions. The cave represents the human intel-
lect dwelling in the body, Abraham represents a level of intellectual 
perfection to which R. Bana’ah aspired, and Sarah represents the 
pure matter that allows the intellect to achieve its perfection. R. 
Bana’ah succeeds in achieving this level, hinted at in the dream by his 
entering the cave and beholding Abraham and Sarah. He then aspires 
to achieve an even greater level of intellectual perfection, that of 
Adam, which is denied him. In this manner Levi continues his inter-
pretation, shedding light at the same time on his view of conjunction 
with the Active Intellect.109
107 See above, chapter 4, 109-110. 
108 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 200.
109 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 305-309. In a 
similar manner, Levi interprets the story of Abba Saul, who entered the thigh bone 
of Og (BT Niddah 24b), as an allegory referring to sexual desire, while Moses Ibn 
Tibbon treats the thigh bone of Og as part of a giant ancient statue. See Livyat 
Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 315-316; cf. The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 
197-198.
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One can easily understand why Levi was reluctant to accept Moses 
Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation, in keeping with Ibn Tibbon’s own advice. 
The more fantastic the story, the more it is a clear sign that it contains 
a concealed level, with the natural sciences and metaphysics providing 
the key to deciphering its true meaning. While Ibn Tibbon allows the 
possibility that the story of R. Bana’ah contains such a level, it is Levi 
who seeks to reveal it.
A similar approach marks Levi’s interpretation of the strange “tall” 
tale in BT Berakhot 54b of Moses smiting Og, whose head got stuck in 
the mountain he lifted to throw upon Israel. Moses Ibn Tibbon, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, treats the tale as a historical allegory 
describing the war between Og and the Israelites, and Og’s swearing of 
allegiance to a powerful king in exchange for help to destroy Israel. The 
alliance broke up due to mutual rancor, and Moses was able to slay Og 
while Og was sitting in his siege tower, which was thirty cubits high.110 
Levi does not reject Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation in this instance, but he 
adds another layer. He treats it as a philosophic allegory in addition to 
a historic one. It refers to the activity of the evil inclination that comes 
to overthrow the powers of the intellect and is not successful. The stone 
and the mountain refer to evil desires. The size of Moses is given as ten 
cubits to allude to his apprehension of all the forms of the sublunar 
world; his leap is given as ten cubits to allude to his apprehension of the 
motions of the spheres; and the size of his ax is given as ten cubits to 
allude to his apprehension of the Separate Intellects and his conjunc-
tion with the tenth one (the Active Intellect). In this manner he 
defeated Og, who denied the existence of non-material existents and 
God’s governance of the world.111 Levi’s encyclopedia contains many 
more examples of tales in which he discerns an esoteric level alluding to 
scientific and philosophic matters, in addition to the numerous homi-
lies he weaves into all his discussions and interprets in this manner.
110 See above, chapter 4, 107-109.
111 See Livyat Ḥen:The Work of Creation, 309-313.
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Levi ben Avraham as Social Critic
Levi’s discussion of “Greek Wisdom” and his attempt to disassociate 
it from science and philosophy reflects a defensive posture against the 
charges brought against the philosophers in his period on the part of 
the more staunch traditionalists. At the same time he expresses a 
strongly critical attitude of these traditionalists as well as of other 
social and intellectual trends that characterize his social environment. 
Levi’s entire literary enterprise, as we have seen, is based on the Aris-
totelian notion that human perfection lies in the perfection of the 
intellect, which in turn consists of knowledge of the sciences. More-
over, human immortality, according to him, results from the attainment 
of this perfection.112 Thus all actions and learning must be gauged from 
the perspective of how they contribute to or detract from it—a point 
that serves as the foundation of Maimonides’ philosophy.113 With this 
in mind, it is interesting to note what beliefs and practices Levi singles 
out in his own period as detrimental to achieving the goal of human 
perfection.
One of Levi’s criticisms echoes the age-old lament of all social 
educators and reformers against the pursuit of wealth for its own sake. 
Maimonides indicates clearly that the situation is no different in his 
own time and that the most defective of human goals “to which the 
people of the earth spend their lives is the perfection of possessions.”114 
He also describes the great lengths people go and the tremendous 
dangers to which they expose themselves to increase their wealth.115 In 
a similar vein, Levi notes that most of the people love their wealth 
more than their body. He points out that one of the Hebrew terms for 
the value of an object is damim, which is similar to the term blood, dam, 
alluding to the great devotion people have to their possessions. He also 
posits a relationship between damim and the word for imagination, 
112 For a discussion of this point in Levi’s thought, see my introduction to Livyat Ḥen: 
The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, xlvi-lv.
113 See, for example, Eight Chapters, 5; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Character Traits 3.2; 
Treatise on Logic, 14.
114 Guide 3.54: 634.
115 Guide 3.12.
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dimayon, to indicate that these things have only imaginary value.116 So 
prevalent is the goal of pursuing wealth, Levi maintains, that “even the 
wise are afflicted with this illness.”117 Levi’s personal situation, in which 
he was dependent upon the support of others and had to eke out a 
living by tutoring, adds a further dimension to appreciating his remarks 
on this matter:
It is appropriate to learn from the ways of God, who watches over 
and benefits those who are good. For this reason it is stated: and in 
her left hand are riches and honor [Proverbs 3:16]. In this generation 
and this land, however, there are few who help the wise befriend 
them and honor them.118
In addition to the pursuit of wealth, Levi’s discussion of ethics in the 
opening to the pillar “Boaz” singles out a number of other evil traits—
jealousy, domination, and grief. He may have focused upon these traits 
in particular precisely because of his feeling of their pervasiveness in 
his period, even among the wise.
Superstitious beliefs and practices are also seen by Levi as highly 
detrimental to the individual’s wellbeing, and he attempts to negate a 
number of them. This position may seem more than a little strange to the 
modern reader, given many of Levi’s own views. One must remember, 
however, that many of today’s superstitions belonged to yesterday’s 
science. Levi distinguishes between astrology, the special properties of 
certain objects, and the ability of certain souls to affect what is outside 
the body by the superior power of their imagination—which he treats as 
true insofar as they are supported by empirical observation and can be 
explained scientifically119—and certain beliefs and practices that he 
regarded as having no foundation whatsoever. As indicated above, he 
denies the existence of demons, hence the efficacy of all practices associ-
ated with them, such as spells and amulets.120 He regards the belief in 
116 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 4.
117 Ibid., 27.
118 Ibid., 9.
119 See above, note 91.
120 Compare Maimonides’ critique of the writers of charms in Guide 1.61, though his 
discussion there focuses on the belief in the power of the secret sacred names of 
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them, and more so, the belief in having seen them, as a result of 
feeble-mindedness and an overactive imagination. While Levi’s imme-
diate concern in his discussion of demons is to explain Talmudic tales 
that seem to accept their existence and the efficacy of certain practices 
to gain control over them or protect oneself from them, implicit in his 
remarks is a critique of many of his contemporaries who continue to 
believe in them. He expresses a similar critical attitude toward the 
belief in the ability of certain individuals to make miraculous long jour-
neys in almost no time, despite the traditional sources that appear to 
confirm such ability.121 Levi concludes his discussion by arguing that 
“one should only believe in what is sensed, or known by the intellect or 
received from our prophets and Sages. The perfect individual should 
not be tempted to believe anything outside these three.”122 Ironically, 
Levi borrows this argument from Maimonides, who brings it in his 
letter to Montpellier rejecting astrology.123 On this issue, Levi parts 
company with the Great Eagle, and views astrology as included in, 
rather than outside, the matters that should be believed.
Yet Levi’s indebtedness to astrology is not without reservation. He 
considers it an inferior area of knowledge, not worthy of devoting much 
time to it. The words of the Torah and the other sciences, such as 
astronomy, natural science, and metaphysics, should be the main object 
of one’s studies, for through them the soul attains its perfection. Similar 
to Maimonides, he also argues that the good and evil that befall a 
human being are in accordance with his acts, not in accordance with his 
constellation. While Levi clearly feels that the stars influence a person’s 
acts, they do not determine them. The laws of the Torah serve to 
God. For a study of this issue, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “Maimonides and his Disci-
ples on Linguistic Magic and ‘the Vain Imaginings of the Writers of Charms,’” in 
Jewish Culture in the Eye of the Storm: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Yosef Aḥituv, ed. 
Avi Sagi and Naḥem Ilan (‘Ein Tsurim: HaKibbutz HaMe’uḥad, 2002), 431-458 
(Heb.). For an extensive discussion of the controversy in medieval Jewish thought 
regarding the efficacy of amulets, see Dov Schwartz, Amulets, Properties and 
Rationalism in Medieval Jewish Thought (Bar-Ilan University Press: Ramat-Gan, 
2004) (Heb.). 
121 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 764-770.
122 Ibid., 770.
123 See Iggerot HaRambam, 479. 
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counter their incidental evil influence, hence “Israel is not governed by 
the constellation” (BT Shabbat 156a).124
Levi’s Aristotelian view that the soul does not remain when the 
person dies leads him at times to attack contrary beliefs. He mentions 
Naḥmanides and alludes to his esoteric view that the reason for Levi-
rate marriage is to enable the soul of the dead brother to transmigrate 
to the infant born of this union. Levi labels this opinion “corrupt.”125 
He also reports having heard an “Ashkenazi rabbi” explain the Talmudic 
statement in BT Shabbat 152b that the soul ascends and descends for 
twelve months while the body still exists, and when the body no longer 
exists the soul just ascends, as referring to the wicked, in whose case the 
descent of the soul imparts feeling to the decaying body, thereby 
resulting in its experience of suffering. Only after this period, when the 
body is completely corrupted, does the soul ascend to the Garden of 
Eden. Levi considers this opinion too as clearly false. With the death 
of the individual, he argues, the body begins to return to matter and is 
no longer fit to retain a soul, while the soul is no longer capable of 
movement or of maintaining any feeling or imaginative knowledge.126 
Levi also rejects the notion that “hell” (gehinnom) refers to an actual 
place, and he sees it as an allusion to the extinction of the soul, or its 
being “cut off” (karet), with the death of the body.127 Levi’s critique of 
certain views held by his contemporaries extends to the Kabbalists. 
They appear to have continued to flourish in Provence in this period, 
with some of them incorporating philosophic ideas into their system.128 
124 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 189.
125 Ibid., 240; cf. Naḥmanides, Commentary on Genesis 38:8. See also Bahya ben 
Asher, Commentary on Numbers 25:9.
126 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 279-280. This 
opinion may have been influenced by R. Saadiah’s approach in Book of Beliefs and 
Opinions 9.5.
127 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 161. Maimonides 
alludes to this view in his Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq, but does not make this point 
explicit. It should be noted that Levi, like Maimonides, is careful to defend the 
belief in bodily resurrection, though it is not completely clear whether this is his 
true opinion on the issue; see my introduction to Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith 
and the Gate of the Haggadah, lvi-lviii.
128 For the Kabbalistic circles that continued to exist in Provence in the second half of 
the thirteenth century, see Ram Ben-Shalom, “Kabbalistic Circles Active in the 
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Levi scathingly attacks them for positing a level of existence between 
that of God and the Separate Intellects.129 The critique against Naḥma-
nides, the Ashkenazi rabbi, and the Kabbalists shows that different 
alternatives to Aristotelian philosophic thought regarding such central 
issues as the soul and the structure of the higher world continued to 
find a home in Provence in the second half of the thirteenth century, 
and that Provence remained subject to ideological influences from both 
the South (Spain) and the North (Northern France and Germany).
As the controversy that erupted in Provence a few years after Levi 
completed his composition reveals, the main alternative to the philo-
sophic enterprise continued to come from the direction of those 
committed to traditional study, particularly of the Talmud. Levi not 
only defends the study of philosophy against the more tradition-
al-minded antagonists, but offers a scathing criticism of them as well:
Since our nation was the most perfect of nations, they did not have 
to engage in the interpretation of the commandments, rules of 
conduct, actions pertaining to the laws and matters requiring adjudi-
cation. Maimonides revealed his opinion on this issue in the opening 
to Mishneh Torah. This was how it was in the days of the prophets 
and the members of the Great Assembly, till the controversies in 
Israel grew more numerous.130 For this reason, the perfect of mind 
were able to engage in other sciences, until one became perfect and 
a person in truth. It is not good that a person devotes his study solely 
to the Talmud, and that he engages only in these matters. They [the 
contemporary scholars], however, do not think so. They think it is 
only right to engage solely in matters of [Talmudic] controversies and 
dialectics, in order to cry out and boast and be called “master,” in 
South of France (Provence) in the Thirteenth Century,” Tarbiz 82 (2014): 
569-605 (Heb.).
129 See Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, 189-190. For a further discussion of Levi’s 
critique, see below, chapter 7, 257-260.
130 The reference should be to Maimonides’ introduction to his Commentary on the 
Mishnah. For a discussion of the relevant passage, see below, chapter 8, 286-287. 
Levi interprets Maimonides as maintaining that due to the power of their intel-
lects, the earlier Sages were able to see immediately how the problems that arose 
should be decided, and moreover, they were in complete agreement with one 
another. Hence they did not require lengthy deliberations resulting in many 
controversies.
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their choosing imaginary domination.131 Many of them do not wish 
to know the final decisions that arise [from the legal controversies], 
but to engage more in their feeble reading. They do not aim at 
perfection and the eternal life of the soul, but flee from it. For what 
arises from the words of the Talmud is knowledge of the command-
ments and their fulfillment, and the final decision is what is intended 
in practical matters, and “everything follows from the ending” (BT 
Berakhot 12a).132
Levi essentially echoes the criticism voiced earlier by Jacob Anatoli 
against this traditionalist group, when he writes in his introduction to 
Malmad ha-Talmidim:
The Sages explained that the Work of the Chariot is a “great matter,” 
and all wisdoms are directed to it and are like preparations for it. . . . 
Regarding the controversies of Abaye and Rabba, they said that they 
were a “small matter.”133 This is because the teachings of the Mishnah 
and the rest of the decided laws suffice for those seeking wisdom. 
This is the opinion of our Sages, may their memory be blessed. But 
the “great matter” in the eyes of our scholars today, the masters 
of the tradition (gemara), is dealing with the issues of the Talmud—
not the clarification of the final decision but dealing with the 
problems raised there and the resolution of them. The “small matter” 
is in their eyes the Work of the Chariot, which is the divine science. 
In their eyes it is not even a “small matter” from among the good 
matters, but something bad and very bitter.
Jacob Anatoli too gives voice to the rejection of philosophic study on 
the part of many of his coreligionists who refuse to see the cardinal 
importance of this study. For both Levi and Anatoli, the main reason 
for Talmud study is to determine laws. Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah 
clearly alleviates the need for this endeavor, allowing the wise to devote 
more time to philosophic study. In his introduction to Mishneh Torah, 
Maimonides himself appears to hint that this treatise makes the study 
131 Levi also levels the charge that many of the contemporary scholars are motivated 
by a desire for domination rather than a quest for knowledge and truth in Livyat 
Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 31.
132 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 140. Levi changes 
the meaning of the Talmudic dictum, which speaks of the conclusion of benedic-
tions, to indicate that only the final decision is of importance.
133 See BT Sukah 28a.
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of the Talmud by and large superfluous. While he vociferously denied 
this point in a letter to Pinḥas Ha-Dayyan—indicating there that he 
wrote his composition for those not capable of entering into the depths 
of the Talmud134—his letter to his student Joseph ben Judah appears to 
confirm it:
I already admonished you that you should not be negligent in the 
effort to attain the entire treatise [Mishneh Torah], and make it your 
book, teaching it everywhere in order to spread its usefulness. For 
the end intended by what was composed in the Talmud and other 
compositions finds its completion in it [Mishneh Torah]. The end of 
[contemporary] scholars [however] is to waste time dealing with the 
proceedings in the Talmud, as though the intent and the end is to 
attain expertise in arguing and not anything else. This was not the 
[Talmud’s] first intent; rather the proceedings and arguments 
happened incidentally. When a statement was indecisive and one 
interpreted it in a certain way and another in the contrary manner—
each had to show proof in order that his interpretation should 
prevail. The first intent, however, was to know what was to be 
performed or avoided. This is clear to one such as you . . . .135
By equating the Work of the Chariot and Work of Creation with Aris-
totelian metaphysics and natural science in the first four chapters of 
Mishneh Torah, the Laws of the Principles of the Torah, and seeing in 
the knowledge of these subjects the fulfillment of the most fundamental 
commandments of Judaism, Maimonides clearly indicates to what 
studies the intellectual elite should devote most of their efforts.136 Levi, 
following Anatoli, essentially continues Maimonides’ battle against the 
staunch traditionalists, who see in the study of the legal arguments of 
the Talmud the highest vocation in its own right.
In a sense, Levi is more radical than his predecessors. He not only 
chastises his coreligionists for their total devotion to the study of 
Talmud, even accusing them of both misguidance and poor morals as 
their motivation, but he is critical of the Babylonian Talmud itself for 
134 See Iggerot HaRambam, 439.
135 Ibid., 257-258.
136 See also Mishneh Torah: Laws of the Study of Torah 1.12, where Maimonides incor-
porates these subjects into the study of Talmud.
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including so many of these legal arguments. The relative brevity of the 
Palestinian Talmud is not a shortcoming in his view, but an advantage. 
It reflects the advantage of the Land of Israel and its scholars, the 
creators of the philosophic homilies, over Babylonia and its scholars.137 
The Babylonian Talmud is even considered by him to be one of the 
reasons for the loss of knowledge of the sciences among the Jews:
The loss of knowledge in Israel is due to the severity of our Exile, 
and the paucity of lovers of knowledge and their helpers among us, 
and the length of the Babylonian Talmud that preoccupies us. Since 
the lifetime of a human is short, one should examine each area of 
knowledge succinctly, all the more so in the case of practical knowl-
edge in which it is sufficient for one [to know] how the matters are 
decided, and all the more so in the case of our nation than the others, 
which possess codices of all their laws that contain no differences of 
opinion. Every erudite person should have been content with the 
books of the Mishneh [Torah] composed by Maimonides, which is in 
truth a complete composition that clarifies the entire tradition thor-
oughly, or Sefer Miẓvot by Rabbi Moses of Coucy, were it not for the 
jealousy that engulfs our nation.138
The only justification that Levi could find for the length of the Babylo-
nian Talmud is that the Sages intended that it occupy the time of all 
those who were not prepared for the study of philosophy. They realized 
that if those who were not capable engaged in the study of theoretical 
knowledge, they would be harmed by it139—a clear jibe at the detractors 
of philosophy who glory in their knowledge of the Talmud.
Levi not only deals with some of the challenges to his approach 
posed by certain beliefs and trends within the Jewish world, but also 
with the challenges posed by Christianity to Judaism in general. He 
devotes a lengthy chapter in his treatise to negating the Christians’ 
beliefs and arguments from a philosophical, historical, and exegetical 
perspective.140 Most of Levi’s discussion appears to be based on earlier 
137 See Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 141, 207, 248.
138 Ibid., 234.
139 Ibid., 248. Maimonides agrees that philosophy is detrimental to the intellectually 
unprepared; see Guide 1.34.
140 See Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 287-303. The 
longer version of this chapter (chapter 12) was removed from the Parma manuscript 
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Jewish polemical writings. Like Maimonides, Levi views Christianity as 
a religion that was established well after Jesus, particularly the belief in 
Jesus’ divinity and the Trinity. Jesus himself only claimed to be the 
Messiah—a claim that can easily be dismissed in light of subsequent 
Jewish and world history.141 In addition, Levi addresses the issue of the 
miracles the Christians ascribe to their saints, a point of which he prob-
ably was aware from his environment. He regards them as based 
primarily on deception, with the objective of strengthening belief in 
the religion and earning money from the believers.142
As with all his coreligionists, Levi looked forward to a better 
period in history for the Jews as well as for all of humanity—the period 
when the true Messiah would finally appear. He ends the section “On 
the Secrets of the Faith” with a discussion of messianism.143 On this 
issue, too, Levi draws heavily from Maimonides.144 Levi’s discussion 
even includes a reckoning of when the messianic period is to begin 
(1345) and when it will reach its full glory (1390 or 1403).145 Yet what is 
and so only the shorter version remains. Levi attests to having written an indepen-
dent treatise against Christianity, which has not survived. It should be noted that 
references to Christianity are scattered throughout the treatise; see in particular 
Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 174-175. For more 
on Levi’s stance towards Christianity, see Howard Kreisel, “Christian Influences 
on Levi ben Avraham’s Livyat Ḥen,” Studia Hebraica 6 (2006): 45-53. For a study of 
the philosophical polemics against Christianity in Provence, see Daniel J. Lasker, 
“Christianity, Philosophy and Polemics in Jewish Provence,” Zion 68 (2003): 
313-332 (Heb.).
141 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 288-291. Maimon-
ides expresses a similar opinion in Epistle to the Jews of Yemen; see also Mishneh 
Torah, laws of Kings 11.6.
142 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 295-296.
143 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 173-184. Much of 
this section is devoted to a discussion of many of Maimonides’ thirteen principles. 
As opposed to Maimonides, who ends his list with resurrection, Levi chooses to 
end his presentation with the coming of the Messiah instead.
144 For Maimonides’ naturalistic-historical approach, see in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, 
“‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah,” in 
Perspectives on Maimonides, ed. Joel Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 221-256.
145 Maimonides too brought a family tradition in Epistle to the Jews of Yemen as to 
when prophecy was to return to Israel, signaling the beginning of the messianic 
period. Levi did not see this period beginning in his own lifetime, to the extent that 
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particularly significant about his discussion is not so much his view of 
the messianic period but his view of the Exile. While Levi presents the 
traditional view that the cause of the Exile was the sins of the Jews—
which he understands in a Maimonidean manner, that the sins led to 
the cessation of providential care and the exposure to incidental 
evils146—he also points out the positive aspect of this state. Not only 
did it humble the nation, thereby instilling in them a very important 
positive trait, but also provided them with materialistic advantages. 
The nations amongst whom the Jews were dispersed provided them 
with their physical needs, leaving them more time for study. Levi 
probably has in mind that agriculture and most crafts were no longer 
open to the Jews. Yet he sees an advantage in this situation, particu-
larly since the Jews in Southern France lived in relative tranquility and 
prosperity in his period. He adds:
An act of righteousness He performed for us in exiling us among the 
nations that possess a faith whose falseness is clear, as it is said: I will 
provoke them to anger in a vile nation [Deuteronomy 32:26], which is 
translated into Aramaic: “in a stupid nation.” He also performed for 
us an act of righteousness in dispersing us to all the corners of the 
world, in order that it would not be easy to annihilate our nation and 
obliterate us from the world.147
Levi also alludes to the benefits the Jews bring to the nations by 
spreading amongst them knowledge of the Torah.
After years of writing, revising, and expanding his majestic compo-
sition, Levi concludes the long recension with the following words 
based on Isaiah 40:29: “Blessed is the One who gives strength to the 
weary and increases the might of the helpless.” God may work primarily 
through the natural order for Levi, but he keenly felt God’s aid that 
enabled him to complete his unique treatise.
he took his reckoning seriously, but neither was it to occur in the distant future—a 
point that was important in lifting the spirit of his readers. 
146 See Guide 3.17-18.
147 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 173.
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148 Both the long and short versions of the introduction and the first part have survived 
and appear in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah. The 
table of contents of the long version of the three parts of treatise 6 appears at the 
end of the introduction, 84-87, based on the Parma manuscript. The names of 
the chapters brought below are based primarily on this table of contents, though 
at times I introduced changes based on the formulation of the chapter headings as 
they appear at the beginning of each chapter.
149 Levi devotes this section to all the positive traits that one who pursues perfection 
should develop.
150 That is to say, the ladder beheld by Jacob in his prophetic dream.
151 Referring to the two tablets containing the Ten Commandments.
152 At Mount Sinai on the day that the Ten Commandments were given, in accordance 
with rabbinic tradition.
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153 Only the short version of this chapter has survived; the long version was removed 
from the manuscript.
154 The ritual that is performed when a dead body is found in a field between two 
cities, and the killer is unknown; see Deuteronomy 21:1-9.
155 An alternate formulation of the chapter heading is: “On the Houses of a Walled 
City, the Heifer whose Neck is Broken, the Residing of an Inadvertent Murderer 
in the City of Refuge until the Death of the High Priest, and the Reason for the 
Leniency of the Sages in regard to some of the Punishments.” 
156 Levi deals here mostly with commandments whose fulfillment requires knowledge 
of the sciences, such as the intercalation of the time of the new moon, which 
requires knowledge of astronomy. 
157 For example, various prayers, rituals, and texts that revolve around the number 
three or the number ten.
158 That is to say, the generation of the Tower of Babel.
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159 See Exodus 24: 9-11.
160 This part survived only in the short version and appears in the volume Livyat Ḥen: 
The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah. The chapter listing here is 
based on the table of contents of the long version appearing in the Parma 
manuscript.
161 In Exodus 33:13, 18.
162 That is to say, the thirteen attributes of God appearing in Exodus 34: 6-7.
163 A translation of this chapter appears below, in the appendix to chapter 11.
164 That is to say, not to worship any intermediary, but to worship God alone. In the 
table of contents, the chapter heading continues: “and We will Explain in Brief the 
Existence of the Angels and the Intermediaries, and We will bring the Verse: and 
go astray after the gods of the strangers of the land (Deuteronomy 31:16), and also one 
of the Psalms of the Sons of Korah.”
165 An alternate reading: “the worship of it.”
166 In the table of contents the chapter heading continues: “and the Righteous indi-
vidual who is by Nature Righteous is more Perfect and Esteemed than the One 
who Conquers his Evil Inclination, and We will speak of the Repentant and the 
Conditions of Repentance and Its Value.” 
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167 Psalms 89.
168 Psalms 36:7; 71:19; 119:142. These verses are recited in the Sabbath afternoon 
service. 
169 This chapter is not found in the short version.
170 Chapters 15 and 16 appear as a single chapter in the short version.
171 Chapters 18 and 19 appear as a single chapter in the short version.
172 This part has survived in both the long and short versions and they appear in Livyat 
Ḥen: The Work of Creation.
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174 This part has survived only in the long version, which appears in Livyat Ḥen: The 
Work of the Chariot.
175 In some places this part is referred to as “The Gate of the Aggadah.” Levi uses 
these two terms interchangeably. This part is not divided into chapters. It has 
survived only in the long version, which appears in Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the 
Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah.
Introduction
“The Torah has seventy faces,” observed the Sages.1 Some commen-
taries attempt to ascertain the literal meaning of Torah, while others 
seek to uncover its mystical layer. Some are devoted to legal exegesis 
and others to homiletic interpretations. All these “faces” are formed 
from the encounter of the divine word with human thought. Despite 
the great differences, at times even contradictions, between these 
commentaries, they all represent the Torah’s manifold “faces,” since all 
of them are committed to the truths contained in the Torah as discerned 
by the human mind. Yet this raises the question of whether any 
commentary should be rejected as completely false and not a “face” of 
the Torah at all. It is this question that lay at the heart of the contro-
versy concerning the philosophic-scientific interpretation of Torah, 
which came to a climax at the very beginning of the fourteenth century 
in Provence. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the encyclopedia 
reflecting this rationalist approach to the Torah, Livyat Ḥen by Levi 
1 See Numbers Rabbah 13.15.
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ben Avraham, was singled out for particular condemnation by the 
antagonists of this approach.
Despite the controversy, the Jewish philosophers of Provence 
were not prepared to abandon their commitment to this “face” of Torah 
as its truest one. No medieval Jewish composition better exemplifies 
this commitment than Ma‘aseh Nissim (Work of Miracles) by Nissim b. 
Moses b. Solomon of Marseille, written in the early fourteenth century.2 
The first part of the treatise includes an introduction and fourteen 
chapters that deal with a range of topics—the principles of faith, divine 
providence, prophecy, Mosaic prophecy, reward and punishment, and 
miracles. The second part contains a commentary on the five books of 
the Torah.
As is the case with all those belonging to the rationalist camp in 
Provence in this period, Nissim saw in Maimonides the teacher par 
excellence, who laid the foundation for the true philosophic under-
standing of Judaism. This camp, however, was divided. Some, following 
the lead of Samuel Ibn Tibbon, leaned toward a radical philosophic 
approach, one that negates any direct personal involvement of God with 
humanity or any intervention in nature. They interpreted Maimonides 
as favoring this view and presenting it in an esoteric manner. Others 
adopted a more moderate approach, continuing to believe in creation 
of the world ex nihilo, and in a deity who produces miracles, created 
the voice heard by Israel at Sinai, and dictated the Torah to Moses 
2 This chapter is based primarily on the Hebrew introduction that appears in my 
edition of this treatise (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 2000). There I also discuss 
the various names given to this treatise and expand upon a number of ideas that I 
bring here in an abridged form. A different shorter version of this introduction 
appears in my “The Philosophical-Allegorical Exegesis of Scripture in the Middle 
Ages: Ma‘aseh Nissim by R. Nissim of Marseille,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies in 
Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Ezra Fleischer, 
Gerald Blidstein, Carmi Horowitz, and Bernard Septimus (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 2001), 297-316 (Heb.). See also my “The Torah Commentary of R. Nissim 
b. Moshe of Marseille: A Medieval Approach to Torah u-Madda,” The Torah 
U-Madda Journal 10 (2001): 20-36; and “Some Observations on Ma‘aseh Nissim by 
R. Nissim of Marseille,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, ed. Alfred 
Ivry, Elliot Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1998), 201-222, in which I append an English translation of Nissim’s 
commentary to the Torah portion “Mishpatim.”
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word for word.3 At times Nissim leaves his readers with the impression 
that he favors the latter approach, and ascribes to God the ability to act 
outside the boundaries of nature. A closer look at the composition, 
however, reveals a barely concealed radical Aristotelian approach.4 
Moreover, it becomes evident in the course of reading Nissim’s treatise 
that its primary aim is to explain all seemingly supernatural elements in 
the Torah in a rationalistic manner in conformity with Aristotelian 
philosophy and medieval science.
The date that Nissim completed his treatise cannot be established 
with certainty. Joshua Heschel Schorr, who analyzed this composition in 
depth and published extensive selections from it in his pioneering study 
of 1865, was convinced that it was written during the controversy 
in Provence surrounding the study of philosophy and the philosophical-al-
legorical interpretation of the Torah at the very beginning of the 
fourteenth century.5 His hypothesis was seemingly confirmed by Meyer 
Brayer, who in his edition of the section on Genesis transcribed the colo-
phon of the now lost and apparently original manuscript of this composition 
as follows: החמישי לאלף  ס"ד  שנת  ממרשיליא  משה  בן  נסים  דר'  במתיבתא   נכתב 
(Written in the academy of R. Nissim b. Moshe of Marseille in the 
3 For Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s approach and its subsequent influence on the interpreta-
tion of Maimonides, see in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and 
the Esoteric Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 6 (1981): 87-123, 
and Carlos Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel Ibn Tibbon: The Transformation of 
Dalālat al-Hā’irīm into the Moreh Nevukhim, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007) 
(Heb.). Perhaps the most important protagonist of the alternate approach is 
Menaḥem HaMeiri. For a study of Meiri’s more moderate philosophical approach, 
see Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000) 
(Heb.); and Gregg Stern, Philosophy and Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Interpretation and 
Controversy in Medieval Languedoc (New York: Routledge, 2008).
4 Nissim indicates in the introduction to his treatise that he intends to reveal his 
views in an esoteric manner; see Ma‘aseh Nissim, 53-54. In the course of his discus-
sion, however, he allows his true views to emerge almost explicitly.
5 Joshua Heschel Schorr, “R. Nissim b. R. Moshe of Marseille,” HeḤalutz 7 (1865): 
88-144 (Heb.). For a study of Schorr’s approach, see my “The Writing and 
Rewriting of Ma‘aseh Nissim by R. Nissim of Marseille,” in Écriture et réécriture des 
textes philosophiques médiévaux, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Olga Weijers (Turn-
hout, Belgium: Brepols, 2006), 311-328.
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sixty-fourth year of the fifth millennium [1304]).6 Yet there are good 
reasons to question this date and to conclude that an error was made in 
the transcription. In his treatise, Nissim cites a lengthy passage from 
Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences as translated by Kalonymos ben 
Kalonymos. This translation was made in 1314, according to the avail-
able evidence.7 Nissim also refers to the activity on the part of a newly 
crowned king of France, his description matching that of Louis X at the 
beginning of his reign in 1315.8 It thus may very well be that the date 
written in the colophon of the manuscript was 5084 (1324), with the 
Hebrew letter “peh” (80) mistakenly read as a “samekh” (60) due to 
their similarity. The colophon also raises the interesting question of the 
nature of Nissim’s academy.9
Of Nissim’s life, nothing is known except for that which can be 
inferred from his treatise. Some scholars attribute to him the author-
ship of a philosophic commentary on Ruth, based on the fact that it 
opens with the words: “Nissim began by expounding,” and is found 
immediately after Ma‘aseh Nissim in one of the manuscripts. This iden-
tification, however, is questionable. While there are significant 
similarities between the two compositions, there are also notable differ-
ences as to the ideas they present and the terminology they employ. 
6 Meyer I. Brayer, “Nissim of Marseille’s Commentary on the Pentateuch” (DHL 
thesis, Yeshiva University, 1970), 3 (Heb.). The manuscript was in the possession 
of Brayer’s family, and both he and his brother informed me in private communi-
cation that they could not locate it and that no copies of it were ever made.
7 See Moritz Steinschneider, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Nachdruck der Ausgabe, 
1925), 208. See also Mauro Zonta’s introduction to his edition of this treatise, La 
“Classificione delle Science” di Al-Farabi nella Tradizione Ebraica (Torino: Silvio 
Zamorani Editore, 1992), xxiii.
8 See Colette Sirat, “The Political Ideas of Nissim ben Moses of Marseille,” Jeru-
salem Studies in Jewish Thought 9 (1990), 54 (Heb.).
9 That is to say, was philosophy also being studied in this academy as is true of some 
of the later Spanish Jewish academies? On Jewish academies devoted to the study 
of philosophy, see Colette Sirat and Marc Geoffoy, “The Modena Manuscript and 
the Teaching of Philosophy in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Spain,” in Study 
and Knowledge in Jewish Thought Through the Ages, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer 
Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2006), 185-202.
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Moreover, neither composition refers to the other one or to any other 
composition that the author had written.10
Nissim was well grounded in all the traditional Jewish literature—
the Bible, the Talmud and midrashic literature, including the Book of 
Creation and Sefer Bahir, which he treats as rabbinic texts. He frequently 
cites from the commentaries of Abraham Ibn Ezra, and at times also 
from the commentaries of Rashi and David Kimḥi (Radak). He makes 
use of Judah Halevi’s Kuzari, and borrows from the works of Samuel 
and Moses Ibn Tibbon. He relies heavily on many of Levi’s exegetical 
comments in Livyat Ḥen, though in this case without once mentioning 
the author or his work by name. He apparently was also acquainted 
with HaMeiri’s Ḥibbur Ha-Teshuvah (Treatise on Repentance), and 
may have been acquainted with Baḥya ben Asher’s Torah commen-
tary, though they are not mentioned by name either. It is, however, 
Maimonides’ Guide, together with his Commentary on the Mishnah and 
his other writings, that exercised the most profound influence in the 
shaping of Nissim’s thought.
On one major issue, Nissim does not follow Maimonides’ lead. 
As is true of many of his rationalist contemporaries, he was well versed 
in astrology and regarded it as a practical science, as opposed to 
Maimonides’ view.11 Ibn Ezra’s astrological treatise Reshit Ḥokhmah 
(The Beginning of Wisdom) apparently served as his main reference 
work in this area. The extent of Nissim’s acquaintance with philosophic 
literature is harder to determine. In addition to Alfarabi’s Enumeration 
of the Sciences, he clearly is familiar with his The Political Regime (known 
as The Origins of Existents). Citations from a number of Averroes’ 
commentaries are also brought by Nissim in his treatise, including the 
short commentaries on Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima and Parva Natu-
ralia. Yet Nissim refrains from entering into any philosophic discussions, 
with the interesting exception of his critique of Averroes for misunder-
standing Avicenna’s view of the manner in which existence is a 
10 See my “A Fragment from a Commentary on Ruth Ascribed to R. Nissim of 
Marseille,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 14 (1998): 159-180 (Heb.).
11 For a study of Maimonides’ approach, see, for example, Y. Tzvi Langermann, 
“Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 123-158.
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contingent attribute of that which exists.12 The focus of the treatise is 
entirely on how Judaism is to be understood and the Torah interpreted. 
In this chapter, I will provide a summary of his approach to some of the 
central topics he touches on in his treatise and bring a number of exam-
ples from his commentary to illustrate its radical, rationalistic nature.
Political Philosophy
Nissim, following Maimonides’ lead, accepts the Aristotelian view that 
the perfection of the intellect is the final goal of the human being.13 
Moral virtue plays an essential role in aiding the human being to attain 
this goal. The restraint of one’s desires for corporeal pleasures, in 
particular, helps one to direct the faculties of the soul to the attempt to 
perfect one’s intellect, in addition to aiding in the preservation of one’s 
physical health. In the case of many individuals, however, the desire 
for pleasure is so strong that it prevents them from appreciating the 
value of ethical virtue and conducting themselves accordingly. For this 
reason, people require political leadership. Nissim provides an inter-
esting explanation to the Aristotelian dictum: “Man is by nature a 
political animal”14—that is, only through a leader who legislates moral 
laws and instills fear in the hearts of the inhabitants of the country can 
the individual be guided to the moral virtues by means of which one 
12 For a study of this issue in medieval thought, see Fazlur Rahman, “Essence and 
Existence in Avicenna,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958): 1-16; Alexander 
Altmann, Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1969), 108-127. See also Aviezer Ravitzky, “Possible and Contin-
gent Existence in the Exegesis of Maimonides in the Thirteenth Century,” Daat 
2-3 (1978): 67-98 (Heb.).
13 Much of the discussion that follows is reminiscent of Maimonides’ approach, 
particularly as it finds its expression in Eight Chapters and Guide 2.39-40; 3.27-28, 
54. I have dealt extensively with Maimonides’ approach to human perfection and 
the role of ethics in its attainment in Maimonides’ Political Thought (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1999). For an analysis of Maimonides’ political philosophy, see my “Maimon-
ides’ Political Philosophy,” in Cambridge Companion to Moses Maimonides, ed. 
Kenneth Seeskin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193-220. For a 
further study of Nissim’s political thought, see Sirat, “The Political Ideas of Nissim 
ben Moses of Marseille,” 53-76.
14 See Politics 1.2, 1253a. Aristotle’s Politics was not translated into Arabic or Hebrew 
in the medieval period, yet this dictum was widely known and cited. Maimonides, 
for example, mentions it in Guide 2.40.
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preserves one’s body and intellect.15 In addition, Nissim brings the 
well-known explanation that a human being is political by nature 
because he is in need of society to fulfill his physical needs.16
Nissim’s approach appears to be directly influenced by Alfarabi’s 
discussion in The Political Regime, which explains the necessity for a 
ruler as follows:
Since what is intended by man’s existence is that he attain supreme 
happiness, he—in order to achieve it—needs to know what happi-
ness is, make it his end, and hold it before his eyes. Then, after that, 
he needs to know the things he ought to do in order to attain happi-
ness, and then to do these actions. In view of what has been said 
about the differences in the natural dispositions of individual men, 
not everyone is disposed to know happiness on his own, or the things 
that he ought to do, but needs a teacher and a guide for this purpose. 
Some men need little guidance, others need a great deal of it. In 
addition, even when a man is guided to these two [that is, happiness 
and the actions leading to it], he will not, in the absence of an 
external stimulus and something to arouse him, necessarily do what 
he has been taught and guided to. This is how most men are. There-
fore they need someone to make all this known to them and to arouse 
them to do it. Besides, it is not in the power of every man to guide 
others nor in the power of every man to induce others to do these 
things. . . . The supreme ruler without qualification is he who does 
not need anyone to rule him in anything whatever, but has actually 
acquired the sciences and every kind of knowledge, and has no need 
of a man to guide him in anything. He is able to comprehend well 
each one of the particular things that he ought to do. He is able to 
guide well all others to everything in which he instructs them, to 
15 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 62-63. The source of this view is Plato’s Republic 4, 434a.
16 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 63-64. See Guide 2.40; cf. Guide 3.27. In these chapters, Maimon-
ides stresses the social function of ethics—i.e., it enables people of far different 
temperaments to function together in order to ensure the satisfaction of their 
corporeal needs—as opposed to its immediate contribution to the perfection of the 
individual. The latter idea, however, is also present in Maimonides’ writings; see 
my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 159-188. In the introduction to Commentary on 
the Mishnah, Maimonides brings still another explanation of the political nature of 
the human being, which also has its source in Aristotle’s thought—from a psycho-
logical perspective, human beings require the companionship of others.
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employ all those who do any of the acts for which they are equipped, 
and to determine, define, and direct these acts toward happiness.17
Nissim’s depiction of the perfect ruler is clearly in the spirit of the view 
of Alfarabi when he writes: “He possesses a very strong rational faculty, 
which always is subservient to his final form. For the true ruler and the 
one for whom leadership is appropriate, is the one who is perfect in his 
character traits, always aims for true happiness, and does not require 
the instruction of any other person. He leads others and his intellect 
leads him.”18
The promise of divine reward and punishment plays a crucial role 
in the governance of a state. The threat of the human leader’s punish-
ment is not sufficient to insure the adherence to morality, since there is 
no way for a leader to know what happens in private, nor can he place 
a policeman in every home, as Nissim notes.19 Furthermore, it is not 
possible for human leaders to reward in a just manner all those who 
carefully refrain from doing evil. Thus there is a need for supernatural 
reward and punishment, “so that a person will fear God privately just 
as he fears other individuals openly.”20
This view raises the fundamental problem in interpreting Nissim’s 
approach: is he of the opinion that the belief in supernatural reward 
and punishment is a necessary belief for the governance of a state as 
well as a true one, or does he regard it as a necessary but false one when 
understood in its literal sense? Maimonides had previously drawn the 
distinction between true beliefs and those that are necessary for gover-
nance, bringing as an example “our belief that He, may He be exalted, 
is violently angry with those who disobey Him and that it is therefore 
necessary to fear Him and to dread Him and to take care not to 
17 Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar, in Medieval Political Philosophy, ed. Ralph Lerner 
and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 35-36. For a study of 
Alfarabi’s political thought, see Miriam Galston, Politics and Excellence: The Polit-
ical Philosophy of Alfarabi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
18 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 64.
19 Ibid., 66.
20 Ibid., 66.
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disobey.”21 Easily discerned is the connection between Nissim’s approach 
and that of Maimonides; harder to discern is their true view on this 
matter. Maimonides explicitly rejects the view that one should ascribe 
to God the trait of anger. Anger is an affectation of the soul that is tied 
to the body, and all such traits must be categorically negated in regard 
to God.22 The question remains whether Maimonides hints here at the 
view that God does not punish in a supernatural manner, but it is 
crucial to impart to the masses belief in such punishment in order to 
ensure their obedience. In the case of Nissim, this view more clearly 
emerges from a number of his discussions, though he is careful never to 
state it explicitly. Few are those in his view who “accept what is true 
because of its truth, do what is good because of its goodness, and grasp 
what is right because of its rightness.”23 Hence supernatural acts or 
miracles are required in order to strengthen the belief of the masses in 
divine revelation—that is to say, God’s command to the prophet to 
bring His message to the people—and accept the opinions and actions 
communicated by the prophet. The miracles also forestall the attempts 
to negate these opinions and actions by human reason. As we shall see 
below, Nissim does not deny the occurrence of miracles, as is true also 
of the phenomenon of revelation, yet neither does he affirm their super-
natural quality as specific acts intended by God. Rather he views them 
essentially as naturalistic events employed, or at times brought about, 
by the prophet in order to accomplish his ends. In a similar naturalistic 
manner, he approaches the seemingly supernatural rewards and punish-
ments promised in the Torah. 
For example, he explains as follows the divine promise of rain as a 
reward for observing the commandments:
Regarding the fall of rain or its cessation, it is possible that this 
belongs to the category of the promises that are necessary for all 
those who lay down a law, because the masses and the entire nation 
will be impressed thereby, and they shall hear and fear and no longer 
21 See Guide 3.28: 512.
22 Ibid. 1.36, 54. For a study of this point, see Hannah Kasher, “The Myth of ‘God’s 
Anger’ in the Guide of the Perplexed,” Eshel Beer Sheva 4 (1996): 95-111 (Heb.).
23 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 75.
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act wantonly [Deuteronomy 17:13]. The lives of human beings and all 
their beasts are dependent upon the rain. It is also not improbable 
that this belongs to the category of promises that are necessarily 
fulfilled. One finds this promise only in regard to bowing down 
before other gods and to sacrificing to the heavenly bodies. Those 
who do so are the ones who abandon the laws of nature and its 
decrees, while trusting in and relying upon the making of images, 
such as talismans and similar objects, in order to bring down the 
supernal forces. They always seek the aid of objects with extraordi-
nary properties, which suffice [to accomplish their desired ends] in 
accordance with their opinion. They thereby are negligent in working 
the land, and they make no effort in planting and harvesting in 
accordance with what is proper and required. Consequently, the land 
will be utterly desolate [Isaiah 6:11], and not yield up its fruit [Deuter-
onomy 11:17]. Therefore the rain will not be of any benefit, for labor 
completes nature, just as nature completes labor in some matters. 
Hence there is no wonder in the fact that the purpose of the natural 
rain is the labor of sowing.24
Nissim interprets the divine punishment of withholding the rain as 
referring not to the actual cessation of rain but to a situation that 
produces similar results due to the practice of idolatry.25 In general, he 
divides the promises of rewards and punishments into three categories: 
those which the intellect shows necessarily result from one’s actions; 
those which are necessary to inculcate in order to maintain the religion; 
those which belong to the first category when understood in a non- 
literal manner and the second category when interpreted literally.26
The rewards promised for obeying the social laws are treated by 
Nissim as occurring in a naturalistic manner, even though the masses 
see in these rewards the hand of God. His political-social acuity can 
be discerned in his explanation of how God’s blessing to one who 
helps the poor—You shall surely give him and your heart shall not be 
grieved when you give to him because for this thing God your Lord shall 
24 Ibid., 120-121. It is interesting to note that Nissim’s argument is based on Maimon-
ides’ argument against astrology as found in his epistle on this subject; see below. 
25 Maimonides also mentions this punishment in Guide 3.30, which comes in his view 
to counter the promises made in the idolatrous religions that these practices will 
cause the rain to fall. He leaves it an open question, however, if he believes that 
God fulfills this promise in a miraculous manner.
26 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 118.
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bless you in all your works and in all that to which you put your hand 
(Deuteronomy 15:10)—comes about:
For by this he shall attract the hearts of the poor and extinguish the 
fire of their jealousy of him and his wealth. He will remain secure in 
his house and in his field and not fear for his flocks, grains, and 
fruits. He will procure them as servants who will serve him faith-
fully, and will be assisted by them to complete his labors. For the 
poor need the rich and are his right hand. For this reason, Scripture 
linked the blessing with his labors, not with the natural, for it did 
not say: “The land shall give its yield and the trees of the field their 
fruit,” but only: “in all your works and in all that to which you put 
your hand.” . . . One should do all that is possible to be aided [in this 
manner], and by this will he be blessed, and he should not rely solely 
on the reward for this commandment and remain idle. It is sufficient 
if he is blessed and succeeds in all the work of his hands.27
The theme that social justice naturally leads to a thriving society while 
injustice inevitably leads to the breakup of society, defeat at the hands 
of one’s enemies, and exile recurs throughout Nissim’s treatise. In a 
similar manner, the long life promised to one who honors his parents is 
explained by the example one sets for one’s children, who in turn will 
help care for him and preserve his life.28 In all these cases Nissim 
thereby shows how the reward and punishment need not be under-
stood in a supernatural manner. 
Certainly the ultimate supernatural event in Jewish tradition is 
the handing down of the Torah to Moses from heaven. Nissim hints in 
a number of passage that this belief is not to be understood in a literal 
manner, and that Moses himself legislated the Torah on the basis of the 
perfection he attained.29 Following Maimonides’ lead, he sees the 
fundamental difference between the Torah and other legislations as 
lying in the fact that the latter are concerned solely with the “welfare 
of the body”—that is to say, social order—while the Torah is concerned 
also with the perfection of the intellect. In short, the divinity of the 
Torah is discerned by its purpose rather than its immediate agent. 
27 Ibid., 458-459.
28 Ibid., 338-339.
29 For a further discussion of this point see below and see chapter 9, 332.
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Only a law that leads to human perfection and not just social order 
deserves the epithet “divine.”30 Maimonides’ view that the command-
ments of the Torah reflect a perfect “equibalance,” neither excessive 
nor deficient in the demand to worship God or in the restraint of one’s 
appetites, is also echoed by Nissim. This perfect equibalance is a further 
reason why the Torah is called Divine Law.31 While Nissim explicitly 
attacks the view that the Torah should be traced to a human agent 
rather than God, insofar as all that it commands and teaches is shown 
to be mandated by the intellect,32 at the same time he alludes to his 
esoteric opinion that the belief in the supernatural origin of the Torah 
is intended for the masses. For example, he elaborates upon the ulti-
mate perfection attained by Moses, which leads him to attempt to 
perfect others and to protect them from the evils that they bring upon 
themselves through poor choices, particularly in following their corpo-
real appetites. To illustrate this point, Nissim refers to the 
commandments to limit sexual intercourse, food, and drink, implying 
thereby that they were formulated by Moses himself.33 This view is 
presented almost explicitly in a subsequent passage, where Nissim sees 
it as the view hinted at also by the Sages:
Another citation commenting on the first verse: And He [God] called 
to Moses [Leviticus 1:1]. “It is written above in the section on the 
Tabernacle: As the Lord commanded Moses. This is analogous to a 
king who commanded his servant: ‘Build me a palace.’ On each item 
the servant built, he would write the name of the king—on the walls, 
pillars, and ceilings. Similarly, when the Lord said to Moses: ‘Build 
me a tabernacle’—on each item that he built he would write: As the 
Lord had commanded Moses. God said: Moses paid me the highest 
honor and here I am inside and he is on the outside. Call him to 
enter before Me inside. For this reason it is said: And He called to 
Moses [Leviticus Rabbah 1.7].” The Sages alluded here to a great 
secret, in accordance with what we hinted in this chapter. That is to 
say, the command in general was from God to Moses’ intellect. He 
30 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 67; cf. Guide 2.40. For a further discussion of Maimonides’ 
approach to this issue see above, chapter 2, 23-25.
31 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 68, 160-162; cf. Guide 2.39.
32 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 172-173; for a further discussion of this point, see below.
33 Ibid., 100.
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related to his intellectual part the matters in a general way—all the 
directives of the Torah, its commandments and prohibitions—in 
order to maintain the corporeal part and to lead it, and that it 
should always be directed to what is suitable and salutary, and 
distanced from what is harmful to the body and the soul. And Moses 
would write by each detail: “As God commanded Moses,” in order 
to honor God, and to elevate these matters in the eyes of the Israel-
ites, in order that they fear God and refrain from sin.34
This midrash is in fact quite a radical one, for it implies that God issued 
the general command to build a tabernacle and it was Moses himself 
who planned all the particulars of the tabernacle and ascribed each of 
them to the divine command. Nissim takes this idea much further and 
sees it as true of the Divine Law as a whole. That is to say, the command 
to Moses was to legislate a law for the people, and it was Moses himself 
who formulated all of the particular commandments and ascribed each 
of them to God. Moreover, Nissim does not see this command coming 
to Moses by supernatural means, such as by way of a creation of a 
divine audible voice. Rather it was attained by the intellect of Moses. 
Nissim hints thereby that it resulted from a prophetic emanation, 
which he treats as a naturalistic phenomenon.35
Insofar as the Torah is the ideal legislation in Nissim’s view, its 
teachings are essentially in harmony with philosophy, except for those 
that are necessary in order to ensure the faith of the masses. Yet it is 
precisely these irrational teachings that make it susceptible to rejection 
on rationalist grounds. Nissim sees theology as providing the means for 
rationally defending these problematic teachings and upholding the 
religion in the face of the rationalist critique. He cites from Alfarabi’s 
Enumeration of the Sciences the various apologetic theological approaches 
one should adopt to achieve this end.36
Nissim summarizes the purpose of the Torah as follows: “The 
intent of the Torah and its purpose is twofold: to perfect the rationalists 
34 Ibid., 177-178.
35 For a further discussion of Nissim’s approach to prophecy, see below, 187-190.
36 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 70-71. Cf. Alfarabi, Enumeration of the Sciences, chapter 5. This 
chapter was translated into English by Fauzi M. Najjar and appears in Medieval 
Political Philosophy, 27-30. 
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in true opinions, and the masses in fine virtues and characteristics, so 
that the political community will be rectified and ordered, and the 
perfect among them will merit life in the world to come.”37 While 
Maimonides’ stance in Guide 3.27 is evident in this summary, the differ-
ences are also glaring. Maimonides obscures his view on who will merit 
eternal life. Nissim, on the other hand, is quite explicit on the point 
that the perfect alone will, for only they are capable of perfecting their 
intellect. Moreover, he sees them as acting morally due to the dictates 
of their intellect, hence the commands of the Torah are more crucial for 
the conduct of the masses who are under the sway of their appetitive 
faculty.
The tension in the fact that the Torah is designed primarily to lead 
those capable of human perfection in the right direction, but must 
constantly compromise with the intellectual limitations of the masses in 
order to ensure their obedience and moral behavior, is evident in 
Nissim’s thought, just as in the case of Maimonides.38 Furthermore, the 
masses’ misunderstanding of the true teachings of the Torah and their 
attacks on the philosophers serve to undermine the attainment of the 
Torah’s ultimate objective—a view that appears to underlie much of 
Maimonides’ life work in his attempt to rectify this situation and refine 
the people’s beliefs. This leads Nissim to offer a scathing critique of the 
popular understanding of Judaism and strongly defend the loyalty of 
the Jewish philosophers to religious practice against their detractors, a 
loyalty he traces to their superior understanding. At the same time, he 
shows his appreciation of the masses’ dedication to the religion despite—
or because of—their fundamental ignorance, hence the need not to 
disturb their naïve faith:
It is fitting that the masses be left alone, and they [be allowed to] 
continue to maintain their thoughts, and not be budged from all that 
they imagine. For the women and mass of fools who are immersed in 
their beliefs in the imaginary and always believe in the impossible, 
nonetheless possess something good—they uphold the Torah and 
commandments with all their might, and they are exceptionally 
37 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 149.
38 See my discussion of this issue in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 189-223.
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stringent in the observance of the practical commandments. The 
reason for this is their forementioned imaginary fear. They are 
willing to subject their bodies and souls to great dangers in order to 
fulfill the Torah and its commandments. . . . If one informs the 
masses of all the matters as they truly are, their intellects will become 
confused. They will fall into a deep despair and experience great 
perplexity, which may lead them to heresy and to abandon the reli-
gion. The women, and men following their path, observe the 
commandments solely with their limbs since they do not understand 
the reasons for the practical commandments, and for what end they 
were commanded. They labor to observe them scrupulously, without 
knowing their purpose and utility. They are like a burden-carrying 
mule that knows nothing of the purpose of its labors and the utility 
of its activity. The rationalists (maskilim) observe the command-
ments with the requisite scrupulousness because of their purpose 
and utility. They observe the commandments with their limbs, and 
even more with their thought and heart, for every practical command-
ment comes either in order to teach a correct opinion or to reject a 
false opinion; to help a person acquire a noble quality or distance the 
person from an opprobrious one.39 Just as it happens that the masses, 
due to their fear, do not sin and they are scrupulous in their obser-
vance since they do not know anything, it happens at times that they 
perform the less significant commandments, abandon the more 
precious ones and are lenient in their observance of the weighty ones 
because of their limited discernment. For this reason, people are 
mistaken when they judge the rationalists as not being committed to 
the practical commandments. They say of them that they are solely 
committed to rational opinions and true beliefs. In reference to the 
masses, they say that they are the ones committed to the practical 
commandments and they are the pious ones (ḥasidim). How greatly 
mistaken are those who say this, for as our sages have already main-
tained: “The ignorant one is not pious” (lo ‘am ha’aretz ḥasid) 
[Mishnah Avot 2.5].40
The Torah, for Nissim as for Maimonides, is the quintessential prac-
tical expression of political philosophy. Given the great difference in 
people’s temperaments, hence the great wisdom required in order to 
mold them into a harmonious polity, and even more important, the 
great difference in their intellectual ability, the Torah continuously 
balances the need to purify the thought of its adherents in order to 
39 See Guide 3.27-28, 31.
40 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 115-117.
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guide them to perfection and the need to safeguard them from experi-
encing a crisis of faith that could easily lead to heresy.
The Principles of Judaism
Perhaps the most significant innovation of Maimonides in advancing 
the Torah’s objective as he understood it was in formulating the thirteen 
principles of Judaism, and in treating them as legally binding upon all 
Jews.41 Despite the fact that no comparable list of dogmas existed in 
Judaism prior to Maimonides’ time, he makes no attempt to defend his 
list or to indicate the criteria he used in determining what constitutes a 
principle. In order to fill this lacuna, Nissim devotes a chapter of his 
treatise to discuss the nature and purpose of these principles.42 He 
defines what constitutes a principle of religion along lines borrowed 
from natural philosophy:
Every religion has cornerstones and independent principles. If one 
envisions their absence, the religion would be annulled. Every 
natural and humanly created object has parts that facilitate its exis-
tence and define it, some which are in common with other objects 
and some which distinguish it from them in an essential manner. It 
also has special and accidental qualities, which are not required for 
its existence, insofar as they are not essential to it. Similarly, the 
Torah and the religion have essential principles. Other inessential 
matters are also appended to it.43
Nissim does not dispute Maimonides’ list; his discussion is primarily a 
commentary on it. He opens his discussion by raising two questions 
concerning these principles: “Are they mandated by the intellect or are 
they set down on the basis of faith alone, and in what respect are they 
41 Maimonides presents these principles at the end of his Commentary on the Mishnah, 
Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq. For a study of Maimonides’ thirteen principles, its 
antecedents and subsequent influence on Jewish thought, see Menachem Kellner, 
Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
42 For a study of Nissim’s approach, see also Barry Mesch, “Nissim of Marseille’s 
Approach to the ‘Iqqarim’,” Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish 
Studies, 3 (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 1986), 85-92.
43 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 148.
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principles of our religion, the divine and perfect religion of Moses?”44 
As we shall see, Nissim regards this list as primarily political in nature, 
though some of the principles clearly serve a crucial pedagogical 
function.
Nissim’s tendency toward categorization finds its expression in his 
approach to this subject, and mirrors his categorization of the rewards 
and punishments set down in the Torah:
We say that they are divided into parts: some are proven by the 
intellect; some are not known by the intellect but are necessary and 
established on the basis of faith alone; and some are composed of 
both these facets. Eight are known by the intellect, and they are: the 
existence of God; His unity; He is not a force in a body; it is not 
proper to praise and worship another; He knows the actions of 
human beings and nothing is unknown to Him; the belief in 
prophecy; it is not possible that there will be any change in the laws 
of the religion, its commandments, beliefs, and benefits, for it is 
beneficial and good at all times, and the truth does not change; the 
belief that there will come a time that redemption, salvation, and 
kingship will return to Israel. Three are necessitated and established 
on the basis of faith: the resurrection of the dead; creation; the 
difference between the prophecy of Moses and that of the other 
prophets. Two are composed of both these facets, and they are: 
Torah from heaven; reward and punishment. All these are essential 
beliefs, for if one of them is absent the Torah would not be what it 
is—that is, the Divine Law of Moses—and its form which its Giver 
intended will be corrupted.45
All these principles, Nissim points out, are in the realm of opinions, 
“for actions serve as the ‘matter’ for opinions and beliefs, in order to 
impress upon the hearts of the people that which is intended by them, 
that it should not depart from them.”46 He goes on to explain the 
44 Ibid., 149.
45 Ibid., 149.
46 Ibid. This view essentially follows the one that Maimonides presents in his 
approach to the commandments in The Guide of the Perplexed; see below, chapter 
10. Compare also to Ibn Ezra’s approach in Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, ed. Joseph 
Cohen (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), chap. 7, 140. Ibn Ezra writes 
as follows: “Pay heed to my words and know that all the commandments written in 
the Torah or accepted on the basis of tradition or the enactments laid down by the 
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importance of each of the principles in upholding Judaism, while 
obscuring his opinion regarding the truth of the ones that are laid 
down on the basis of faith alone.
The first three principles that are known by the intellect—the exis-
tence of the one incorporeal deity—lie at the root of metaphysical 
knowledge. They should be considered principles, “since the primary 
intent of the Torah and its goal is to set straight the human intellect 
with true opinions, which are the primary beliefs for all other true 
beliefs.”47 As for belief in prophecy, the philosophers verify the exis-
tence of this phenomenon. It is to be considered a principle in Nissim’s 
view, since without it there is no belief in the prophecy of Moses, by 
means of which the Torah was transmitted. In regard to God’s knowl-
edge of particulars, Nissim is well aware from Maimonides’ discussion 
in the Guide that the Aristotelian philosophers disagree with this view. 
He accepts Maimonides’ arguments that God’s perfection must include 
such knowledge, though in a manner we are incapable of grasping, for 
otherwise He would be subject to privation. God knows all particulars 
by way of His Self-knowledge as the cause of all that exists, hence this 
knowledge is not external to His essence.48 Nissim considers this belief 
a principle due to its necessity in upholding the belief in reward and 
punishment, which in turn serves as a principle in every religion, for 
without it the masses would not observe the precepts.49 The principle 
that God alone is worthy of worship is also regarded by Nissim as a 
belief rooted in the intellect, a view that Maimonides expresses in the 
introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah but appears to retract 
in his Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry.50 Nissim deems this belief a 
principle of Judaism insofar as it comes to eliminate the worship of 
figurines or talismans, with the intent of bringing down forces from 
patriarchs, even though most of them involve deed or speech, all of them are for 
the purpose of rectifying the heart.” 
47 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 150
48 See Guide 3.16, 19-21.
49 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 152. Nissim thereby alludes to the reason why this belief immedi-
ately precedes reward and punishment in Maimonides’ list and does not immediately 
follow the other beliefs directly relating to God.
50 See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 88.
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heavenly bodies at fixed times. The worship of these figures, in turn, 
reinforces belief in the eternity of the world as against the principle of 
creation, and serves as a substitute to engaging in all the natural tasks 
required to produce sustenance and protect one’s land—an argument 
taken from Maimonides’ epistle to Montpellier condemning the belief 
in astrology.51 Finally, this principle prevents the masses from believing 
the contemptible falsehood that the talismans themselves are gods.52
The two remaining principles that Nissim considers to be known by the 
intellect are explained in an interesting manner. The belief that the 
Torah will not be abrogated or undergo any form of change is based on 
the view that it is of the utmost perfection and any change thus would 
be a defect, a view that Maimonides himself voices in Guide 2.39. 
Nissim stresses that the commandments were designed to benefit the 
“chosen masses” in every period and place, as opposed to human legis-
lations which are promulgated in accordance with specific temporal 
circumstances. It is clear in his view that this belief should be desig-
nated a principle, for it ensures the continued existence of the Torah.53 
The final principle in this category, the coming of the messiah, is also 
proven by the intellect, based on the Aristotelian principle that “the 
possible in the things that exist for eternity must be realized.”54 Since 
Israel will exist eternally, as the prophets foretell,55 and the coming of 
the messiah is possible, this event therefore must occur. Nissim considers 
this belief to be a principle, since:
This hope will join us together in the observance of our religion, and 
unite us in our belief, and strengthen our hands, and make us into 
51 For an English translation of this epistle, see Ralph Lerner, “Maimonides’ Letter 
on Astrology,” History of Religions 8 (1968): 143-158. Maimonides’ essentially 
stresses the belief in determinism entailed by the belief in astrology, in addition to 
the fact that astrology is a false science and promotes the belief that the planets are 
deities.
52 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 152-154. Compare Maimonides’ discussion of the origin of idolatry 
in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 1.1-2. Interestingly, Nissim adduces naturalistic 
explanation why at times this worship does help one to learn the future by helping 
to strengthen the individual’s imaginative faculty.
53 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 155-156.
54 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.4, 1047b.
55 See Isaiah 66:22.
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one nation, though we are dispersed to all corners of the world and 
to the distant islands. Due to this promise and hope, we will not 
stumble and despair in the harshness of our exile, convert from our 
pure religion and assimilate with the other peoples.56
The second category of principles—those based on faith alone—include 
not only resurrection and the unique nature of Mosaic prophecy, but 
also the creation of the world. All three of these principles revolve 
around the notion of a divine will that is not limited to the workings of 
the natural order. Nissim surprisingly ignores the philosophic argu-
ments adduced by Maimonides for creation,57 focusing solely on the 
religious reasons for maintaining this belief. While Nissim echoes 
Maimonides’ argument in Guide 2.25 that without belief in creation 
one cannot believe in the principle that the Torah is from heaven, his 
formulation of this idea is highly significant:
Without the belief that the Torah came from heaven in the way that 
is generally accepted, the masses will not believe in what is appro-
priate to believe and will not accept chastisement. . . . In laying 
down a beginning and creation of that which God created, it follows 
that God, the Lord is truth [Jeremiah 10:10], for by reason of [the 
belief in] creation, they will believe what the intellect mandates as 
true. Or it means that they will believe in truth that God is the Lord 
and He gave them this Torah, and consequently they will accept His 
decrees and commandments.58
Nissim thereby alludes to the view that the belief in creation is neces-
sary for the masses, for only by means of this belief will they be prepared 
to believe in the existence of God—a belief that is shown to be true by 
the intellect—as well as in the divine origin of the Torah, which in turn 
is the basis for accepting its commandments. His discussion suggests 
that he does not regard this as a true belief, but one that is politically 
and pedagogically necessary. As we have seen, his discussion of the 
56 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 156.
57 For a discussion of this issue, see above, chapter 3. In an earlier chapter of his 
treatise, Nissim indicates that the intellect does not disprove creation; see Ma‘aseh 
Nissim, 83.
58 Ibid., 157.
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Torah suggests that God was not its immediate author and this belief 
too is necessary for the masses, while the wise accept the Torah because 
of its perfection. This interpretation is further strengthened by his 
treatment of the other two principles that belong to this category.
The importance in believing in the categorical difference between 
the prophecy of Moses and that of the other prophets, insofar as the 
prophecy of Moses did not involve the imagination,59 is crucial in 
accepting the commandments in accordance with their literal meaning 
and not viewing them as parables.60 The reason Nissim sees this as a 
principle that is accepted on the basis of faith alone, he explains as 
follows:
The philosopher, though he believes in the existence of prophecy 
and verifies its words, does not believe in “Go and speak to,”61 and 
in novel acts of [divine] will. He also does not believe that prophecy 
reaches the human species except by the mediation of the activity of 
the imagination, and that its distinctive subject and purpose is 
knowledge of future events and specific hidden existing things. The 
apprehension of truths, rejection of falsehood, choice of the good 
and fine activities, and abandonment of their opposite in accordance 
with what is grasped by the intellect—all this according to them 
results from the activity of the human intellect while awake, and this 
is its intended purpose.62
In a subsequent discussion, Nissim stresses the divine volitional or 
supernatural element even in non-Mosaic prophecy—a view that he 
traces to Maimonides’ stance in Guide 2.32 regarding the withholding 
of prophecy from the worthy63—in contradistinction to the philoso-
phers’ completely naturalistic approach. Yet there too he subtly alludes 
59 See, for example, Guide 2.45. This trait underlies most, if not all, of the differences 
between the two types of prophecy that Maimonides posits in Mishneh Torah, Laws 
of the Principles of the Torah 7.6. See also below, chapter 9, 316.
60 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 158, 173.
61 That is to say, in the prophetic mission as commanded by God.
62 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 159. That the distinctive characteristic of normative prophecy is 
divination is a view also voiced by Maimonides despite his stress on the intellectual 
perfection of the prophet; see Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Principles of the Torah 
10.3. For a further discussion of this point, see below, chapter 8, 282-284.
63 For a discussion of this chapter, see Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an 
Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 222-230.
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to the view that this stance was prompted by political-pedagogical 
considerations.64
The resurrection of the dead, Nissim notes, belongs to the great 
miracles that are impossible by nature.65 The significance of this belief 
lies in the fact that, “without it, all the masses will not hold on to the 
good or refrain from evil. For this reason all the religions teach it and 
lay it down [as a principle].”66 In light of Nissim’s subsequent discus-
sion of miracles, it is clear that he regards this belief too as politically 
necessary rather than true.
The final category consists of the two principles that have two 
facets: one that is posited on the basis of faith alone, and the other that 
is known also by the intellect. These principles are: Torah from heaven, 
and reward and punishment. The content of the Torah is shown to be in 
harmony with the intellect and its utility is manifest, while the notion 
that Moses received it from God and recorded what he heard without 
changing a single word is known on the basis of faith alone. Similarly, 
there are rewards and punishments to the body and to the soul that 
are shown to be true by the intellect, while others are miraculous 
and are known by faith alone.
While Nissim treats all the principles as essential in upholding the 
religion, it is interesting to note that some of them are subordinate to 
others. Belief in creation, for example, serves to bolster belief in Torah 
from heaven and the existence of God. Belief in prophecy is necessary 
for the belief in the unique prophecy of Moses. In general, it appears 
that most of the principles are formulated for the sake of the masses in 
order to ensure their obedience. This is true not only of all the princi-
ples rooted in faith alone, but even many that are mandated by the 
intellect in Nissim’s view, such as belief in the coming of the messiah. 
In light of the Torah’s dual goal as posited by Nissim—to guide the 
rationalists to intellectual perfection and the masses to moral perfec-
tion—we may conclude that most of the principles promote the latter 
64 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 178-179. For Nissim’s discussion of prophecy, see below, 187-190.
65 Ibid., 140.
66 Ibid., 157.
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goal, while those pertaining to the essence of God primarily promote 
the former.
One wonders, however, how Nissim—or the Sages and Maimon-
ides according to his view—could insist that all Jews, even the 
rationalists, accept each one of these beliefs or else be treated as here-
tics, if he in fact did not believe in their literal truth. Nissim alludes to 
this problem in the course of discussing the principle that the Torah 
is from heaven, while dealing with the case of one who openly expresses 
the opinion that the Torah originated in the human intellect, and it 
is the intellect that is given from heaven. Nissim’s stance on this issue 
is exceptionally noteworthy:
This one is also a heretic and it is fitting to eliminate him from the 
world. For this reason, to my way of thinking, the language of the 
Sages is: “One who says that the Torah is not from heaven” [Mishnah 
Sanhedrin 10.1], and not: “One who believes.” For by speaking alone 
he harms the multitude and commits heresy, even if he believes as 
we do that the Torah is of great utility. . . . For the speech that issues 
forth from him is ruinous and destructive, to him and to others, a 
severe transgression and most blameworthy. For this reason the 
Sages said: “One who says.” Even if he interprets and rectifies his 
speech in any manner whatsoever, it will not help him to avoid being 
labeled a heretic. He causes others to weaken their hope in the 
Torah, and thwarts God’s intent, since Moses His prophet wanted 
“for Israel to be righteous, hence he multiplied for them the Torah 
and commandments” [Mishnah Maqqot 3.16], and commanded in 
His Name what he commanded.67
An astute reader of this passage could hardly fail to grasp Nissim’s 
intent, though Nissim carefully conveys his position so as to avoid 
being guilty of heresy in accordance with his own definition of this 
grievous sin. It is not the truth that is heretical but the proclaiming of 
truth to those who cannot handle it, which would serve only to weaken 
their commitment to the divine Law.
67 Ibid., 160. Note that in the quote in the Mishnah, Moses is not mentioned; “The 
Holy One blessed be He wanted Israel to be righteous . . . .”
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Providence
From all of Maimonides’ esoteric positions, the one that comes closest 
to being presented almost explicitly is his view regarding individual 
providence. A careful reading of Maimonides’ position reveals that 
God does not exercise providence directly, but the instrument of divine 
providence is the human intellect itself. The more the individual 
develops the intellect, the more the intellect protects him from physical 
evils by guiding him in all his actions and directing him to pursue only 
what aids him to attain final perfection.68 It shows him, for example, 
how to preserve his health and live in harmony with others, what is 
truly important in life and what has only imaginary value and should 
not concern him. We already saw that some of the Provençal philoso-
phers prior to Nissim, such as Samuel Ibn Tibbon and his son Moses, 
discerned Maimonides’ naturalistic approach to this subject.69
Nissim continues in this vein in the presentation of his own views.70 
The intellect is the “angel” that protects the individual. The individual 
of perfect intellect—that is, the one who attains prophecy—is further 
protected since he can also foretell harmful events about to take place 
and take steps to avoid their evil effects. In this manner, Nissim inter-
prets Psalms 91, the Song of Mishaps, and ties providence not only to 
prophetic divination but also to astrological knowledge:
For He will save you from the fowler’s trap [Psalms 91:3]. The intellect 
will inform you and counsel you, which will enable you to protect 
yourself from the fowler’s trap—that is, from changes [resulting from] 
the order [of the stars], which is like a hidden trap that suddenly 
ensnares. You will know by virtue of your wisdom their matter, 
path, changes in their situation, conjunction, and opposition, and 
what they determine for good or for bad, and you will take counsel 
and flee, a prudent man foresees evil and hides himself [Proverbs 22:3], 
hide yourself for a short moment until the wrath shall pass [Isaiah 
26:20]. In this manner one will be saved and the order will not be 
68 Guide 3.17-18. See above, chapter 3, 46-47; see also below, chapter 11, 412-415.
69 See above, chapter 4, 96; see also below, chapter 11, 415, 420-421.
70 For a study of Nissim’s approach to providence, see also Abraham S. Halkin, 
“Nissim ben Moscheh on Providence,” in Hommage à Georges Vajda: Études d’his-
torie et pensée juive, ed. Gerard Nahon and Charles Touati (Louvain: Éditions 
Peeters, 1980), 219-225. 
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destroyed. Solomon said: He who keeps the commandment shall know 
nothing evil, and a wise man’s heart knows the time and judgment 
[Ecclesiastes 8:5]. That is to say, by keeping the commandments and 
knowing the times and the judgments of the order [i.e., astrology], 
one will be saved from many troubles. Furthermore, the person who 
adheres to his intellect and always contemplates God and His acts 
and wonders, not temporal vanities, will be illuminated by the Active 
Intellect with knowledge of future events, which he will then inform 
[others]. Thereby he will save himself and all those who heed him, 
who fear the word of God. This is the highest level of the human 
intellect. . . . A single prophet can save and straighten [the path of] 
tens of thousands.71
Even passages in the Bible that suggest divine miraculous protection 
should be understood in a naturalistic manner:
A thousand may fall on your left side, ten thousand on your right, but it 
shall not reach you [Psalms 91:7], That is to say, many will kill each 
other in disputes and wars between them, but it shall not reach you, 
since you are at peace with everyone, and do not bring about [social] 
rifts. Thus no one will touch you and lift their hands against you. It 
is not necessary to say that you will not fall, that is to say, die, in the 
manner that a thousand and ten thousand fall on your left side and 
your right, since they also will not injure you or strike you, and no 
one will touch you.72
God, according to Nissim, does not change the order of nature, but 
human beings learn to protect themselves and others from the occa-
sional harm that results from the order. By means of the intellect, the 
individual can save himself from the three types of evil that Maimon-
ides lists in Guide 3.12: natural disasters; evils individuals inflict upon 
71 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 90-91.
72 Ibid., 96. Maimonides’ treatment of this Psalm in Guide 3.51 perplexed Samuel 
Ibn Tibbon, since it suggested miraculous providence, as opposed to his other 
views in the Guide on this subject. See Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn 
Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of Providence,” HUCA 11 (1936): 341-366. Nissim, 
following Moses Ibn Tibbon and Levi ben Avraham, understands these verses in a 
naturalistic manner.
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each other; and evils that one inflicts upon oneself.73 Prophetic divina-
tion offers further protection against these various types of evil.
In the end, however, physical evils inevitably result due to the 
nature of matter, yet one should not attach to them any importance. 
Following Maimonides, Nissim sees this as the ultimate lesson that Job 
learns.74 Thus the most important task of the intellect is to direct the 
individual to true perfection, the perfection of the intellect and conjunc-
tion with the supernal world:
And show him My salvation [Psalms 91:16]. For as long as the body is 
alive and its bodily powers have not yet been extinguished, this 
person will realize the salvation of the intellect. That is to say, with 
the conjunction with its intelligible it reaches its perfection and the 
experience of spiritual pleasure, akin to the World to Come, as in the 
saying of the sage: “In withdrawing (be-hitbodedi)75 with my soul, I 
removed my body from it and remained like a soul without a body. I 
contemplated the world of the angels and thought myself as one of 
them. I experienced a wondrous felicity that mouths are incapable of 
expressing and hearts are incapable of apprehending. Then I attained 
a bit of salvation of the soul.”76
73 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 98. Nissim divides the first type of evil into two categories: those 
resulting from the privation characterizing matter and those resulting from the 
influences of the stars.
74 Ibid., 194-195; see Guide 3.23. For a study of Maimonides’ interpretation of the 
story of Job, see Robert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43-77.
75 For a study of this term in medieval thought, see Moshe Idel, “Hitbodedut as 
Concentration in Jewish Philosophy,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 7 (1988): 
39-60 (Heb.); see also idem, “Hitbodedut as Concentration in Ecstatic Kabbalah,” 
Daat 14 (1985): 35-81 (Heb.). For Gersonides’ use of this term see Sara Klein-
Braslavy, “Prophecy, Clairvoyance, and Dreams and the Concept of Hitbodedut in 
Gersonides’ Thought,” Daat 39 (1997): 23-68 (Heb.).
76 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 99; cf. 407. The citation is from the Theology of Aristotle. For the 
Arabic version of the Theology of Aristotle in which this passage appears, see Abd 
al-Rahman Badawi, Plotinus apud Arabes (Cairo, 1955), 22-23; for an English trans-
lation of this passage, see Geoffrey Lewis, Plotini Opera, ed. Paul Henry and 
Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1959), vol. 2, 225. The Theology 
is based on the latter books of Plotinus’ Enneads. This passage depicting Plotinus’ 
ecstatic experience appears in Enneads 4.8.1; for an English translation see Plotinus, 
Enneads, trans. Stephen Mackenna (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962), 357. For 
Judah al-Harizi’s medieval Hebrew translation of this passage, see Paul Fenton, 
“Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera and the Theology of Aristotle,” Daat 29 (1992): 28 n. 8 
(Heb.). For a general study of the Theology of Aristotle in Hebrew sources, see Paul 
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Prophecy
As we have seen in the previous section, prophecy is in essence a form 
of divine providence, inasmuch as it enables one to know the future 
and warn others of impending evils. These evils result from the changes 
brought about by the movements of the heavenly bodies. For this 
reason, Nissim draws an integral connection between astrology and 
prophecy, though the astrologer attains his knowledge by observation 
and the prophet by way of emanation from the Active Intellect.77 
Drawing upon his philosophic predecessors, Nissim describes non- 
Mosaic prophecy as follows:
The prophecy of the rest of the prophets consists of knowledge that 
comes by way of a divine emanation, descending from the Separate 
Intellect to the intellectual faculty by mediation of previous knowl-
edge—either regarding matters pertaining to the prophet himself or 
those upon whom his thought is focused and are already known to 
him together with their affairs—and from the intellectual faculty to 
the imaginative faculty, till impressions of future particulars are 
impressed upon it. The activity of the intellect always involves 
universal knowledge, and the activity of the imagination—particu-
larly alluding to personal matters. What the imagination attains from 
the faculty of the intellect is then secured by it, as is always the case 
[also] regarding what a person apprehends with his senses, which 
after its disappearance from them is secured by the imagination and 
impressed upon it. The goal of this emanation is to protect the 
human species from every adversary that it is not in the power of the 
theoretical intellect to know and guard against, as though this emana-
tion completes what was deprived of the theoretical intellect at 
Fenton, “The Arabic and Hebrew Versions of the Theology of Aristotle,” in Pseu-
do-Aristotle in the Middle Ages, ed. Jill Kraye, W. F. Ryan, and C. B. Schmitt 
(London: Warburg Institute, 1986), 241-264. The last sentence of the citation 
brought by Nissim does not appear in any of the above mentioned sources.
77 Gersonides, Nissim’s contemporary, also posits an integral relationship between 
astrology and prophecy. For both thinkers, prophetic knowledge is essentially a 
superior form of astrological knowledge—a position already advanced by Ibn Ezra 
in his commentary to Exodus 33:21. For a detailed analysis of Gersonides’ approach 
to prophecy, see Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philos-
ophy, 316-424. For a study of divination in Gersonides’ thought, see also Sara 
Klein-Braslavy, Without any Doubt: Gersonides on Method and Knowledge (Leiden: 
Brill, 2011), 221-323.
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creation in regard to the safeguarding of the human species at the 
appropriate time in accordance with its natural power.78
The activity of the rational and imaginative faculties in divination is 
described by Nissim also in an earlier passage in his treatise:
Know that the future that is about to occur is impressed more easily 
upon the intellect of the prophet or in the thought of the individual 
as a universal [premise]. The intellect then conveys it to the imagina-
tion, which grasps it as particular. The imagination gives and 
receives—it gives to the intellect what it receives of the particulars 
impressed upon the sensory organs and the intellect receives them as 
universals, and it receives from the intellect the universal causes and 
the imagination takes them as particulars regarding the one upon 
whom one’s thoughts and mind are focused. The matter thereby 
appears to him in a nocturnal dream. If his imagination is stronger, 
at times it brings the matter to the senses in a vision while awake.79
While the influence of Maimonides’ description of prophecy in Guide 
2.36 is evident in these passages, just as important is Averroes’ approach 
as found in his Epitome of Parva Naturalia, where he writes as follows:
. . . it cannot be denied that the Separate Intellect endows the imag-
inative soul with the universal nature that the individual that comes 
into being possesses, that is to say with a comprehension of its 
causes, and the imaginative soul will receive it as particular by virtue 
of the fact that it is in matter. It may receive the individual of that 
which has been comprehended, in reality, or it may receive some-
thing similar to it. Just as the Intellect endows one with the universal 
perfections of the soul and matter receives them as particulars, so 
here too the Intellect endows the imaginative soul with the final 
perfection as a universal, and the soul receives it as a particular. It 
has therefore been made clear that the Active Intellect endows only 
the primary perfections of the particular faculties of the soul, that is 
of the five senses and of the imaginative faculty, for that which 
endows them with the final perfection are the sense-objects. But in 
the spiritual perception which occurs during sleep or the like, it will 
78 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 163-164.
79 Ibid., 92. The similarity to Gersonides’ account is striking, though that of Gerson-
ides is far more detailed in its explanation of this phenomenon and the role played 
by each of the faculties.
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endow the imaginative soul with the final perfection. Just as the 
skilled physician among us can predict what will arise in the body of 
Zaid and in his soul at a determinate time by two premises: one, an 
universal intelligible premise, and the other a particular sensible 
premise, so it is with this prediction. The knowledge thereof is 
completed through the universal, which is endowed by the Intellect, 
and through the particular thing that is conveyed to the imaginative 
soul and is related to that universal object.80
While Maimonides in his account of prophecy defines this phenom-
enon as an emanation from the Active Intellect to the rational and 
then imaginative faculty, whereas in non-prophetic divination the 
emanation is to the imagination alone,81 he does not explain the nature 
of this emanation or the precise role of each of the faculties. It is not 
even clear from his account if the rational faculty plays any role at all 
in the divinatory ability of the prophet, or if its role is restricted to the 
prophet’s attainment of theoretical knowledge.82 Averroes in the 
passage quoted above also appears to posit an immediate connection 
between the Active Intellect and the imagination in the attainment of 
the knowledge of the future. Nissim, on the other hand, denies an 
immediate connection between the two. The emanation from the 
Active Intellect reaches first the rational faculty of the individual in 
the form of universal knowledge and from there emanates to the 
imagination, which applies it to specific individuals.83 Thus the person 
must already possess awareness of the individuals or groups in ques-
tion, a view stressed also by Averroes.84 Furthermore, the imagination 
dresses this knowledge in images borrowed from the prophet’s 
80 Harry Blumberg (trans.), Averroes: Epitome of Parva Naturalia (Cambridge, MA: 
The Medieval Academy of America, 1961), 46-47.
81 See Guide 2.37.
82 There is good reason to maintain, however, that for Maimonides the rational 
faculty contributes to the prophet’s ability to know the future too. For more on this 
issue, see below, chapter 8, 274-275.
83 Gersonides agrees with this view, though in the case of non-prophetic divination 
he posits an immediate connection between the imagination and the heavenly 
bodies rather than with the rational faculty. Nissim’s discussions too suggest that 
there is an immediate connection between the forces of the spheres and the imagi-
nation of the non-prophetic diviners.
84 See Epitome of Parva Naturalia, 47.
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everyday experience.85 Just as Maimonides posits that prophecy can 
only come to one possessing all the requisite perfections when the indi-
vidual’s soul is not overcome by sorrow or anger but in a joyous state, 
Nissim sees the state of the imagination as playing an important role 
in this regard. As we shall see below in the discussion of the reasons of 
the commandments, some of them in his view serve as aids in preparing 
the imagination to receive divinatory knowledge by arousing it to this 
end and helping it to achieve the state conducive to attaining such 
knowledge.86
Miracles
The final subject Nissim addresses in the first part of his treatise is that 
of miracles. In his discussion till this point, he hints at the view that the 
miracles recorded in the Bible do not in fact result from the guiding 
hand of God in history. Three additional options for how to understand 
the tales of miracles were available to him from his philosophic sources: 
1) to reject a literal understanding of the stories; 2) to view miracles as 
natural events that the prophet was able to predict in advance and 
utilize to his advantage; 3) to view them as events that the prophet 
himself had the ability to bring about. While Maimonides obscures his 
view as to the precise role of God in the performance of miracles, he 
clearly rejects the actual occurrence of some of them. His discussion in 
Guide 2.35, for example, shows that he certainly did not believe that 
the sun and moon literally stopped in their tracks for Joshua. Other 
miracles occurred in a vision of prophecy rather than in reality according 
to him, such as Balaam’s talking donkey.87 Maimonides does not state 
explicitly that many of the miracles would have occurred naturally even 
without a prophet, but he does indicate that many are possible by 
nature,88 which suggests that he may in fact have thought that this was 
the case. The view that the prophet himself is the immediate agent of 
85 Cf. Guide 2.46.
86 For a further discussion of Nissim’s approach to prophecy, see below, chapter 8, 
307-310, and chapter 9, 330-332.
87 See Guide 2.42; 3.22.
88 See the end of his Treatise on Resurrection.
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miracles—one which was already presented by Abraham Ibn Daud and 
Ibn Ezra, following in the footsteps of Avicenna—is not mentioned by 
Maimonides at all, but there is some basis for maintaining that he 
secretly entertained this view.89
All of these alternative explanations are accepted by Nissim. He 
divides the miracles into two categories: those that occurred through 
the mediation of a prophet or other exceptional individual and those 
that did not. The first category consists of two sub-categories: 1) the 
prophet was alone when the miracle occurred; 2) the prophet was in 
the company of others. The latter sub-category is further divided into 
two classes: 2a) the miracle resulted from an activity performed by the 
prophet by means of divine instruction; 2b) the miracle was an event 
that the prophet was able to predict would occur at a specific time. 
Tales of miracles in which no prophet was involved are also divided into 
two sub-categories: 1) those that are to be interpreted as occurring as 
described; 2) those whose depiction should not be understood literally, 
but as hyperbole or a parable.
The miracles that occurred while the prophet was alone, such as 
the story of Moses and the burning bush, should be interpreted as 
occurring in a prophetic vision according to Nissim, and they do not 
have any reality outside the soul of the prophet which produced the 
vision. Those which occurred in the presence of others were either 
performed by the prophet himself by virtue of his intellectual perfec-
tion, or they were rare natural events that the prophet was able to 
predict. The first type of miracle belonging to this category is exempli-
fied by Moses’ ability to sweeten the water of Marah, and even to 
transform a staff into a serpent and to produce terrifying voices at 
Mount Sinai, while many of the plagues in Egypt exemplify the second. 
Some of the miracles that occurred without the mediation of a prophet 
can be explained in a naturalistic manner; thus one should understand 
them literally and not as parables. This, for example, is the case with 
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, which resulted from an 
earthquake. Others are parables, such as the serpent’s speech to Eve. 
89 I discuss this point in further detail below, in the appendix to chapter 9.
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In order to signal to his readers in the course of his subsequent commen-
tary on the Torah how he understands each of the miraculous events 
recorded there—and, in fact, his commentary focuses almost exclu-
sively on all the tales and phenomena that appear to be miraculous or 
supernatural—he arbitrarily assigns one of the words for miracles to 
each of his sub-categories. He notes that he will use the term nes to 
indicate an event that occurred as a result of the action of the prophet; 
mofet to refer to an event that the prophet was able to predict; pele’ to 
an event that occurred while no prophet was present; and ot to an event 
that occurred in a prophetic vision and not in reality.90 Nissim’s expla-
nations of the various miracles are in basic harmony with Aristotelian 
physics, though in some cases he grounds them also in astrology and the 
special properties of certain objects. In the next two sections of the 
chapter, we shall see some examples of these explanations.91
Reasons for the Commandments
As in the case of Maimonides, Nissim views each of the command-
ments as contributing to the moral and intellectual perfection of society. 
He accepts most of Maimonides’ explanations for the manner in which 
the commandments contribute to these perfections, but he is not 
entirely comfortable with Maimonides’ historical approach to many of 
them—i.e., that they were legislated primarily in order to combat the 
beliefs and rituals of the idolatrous religions of old. Nissim supplements 
this reason with timeless symbolic and, where he thought possible, 
naturalistic reasons, as we shall see in more detail in chapter 10. His 
break with Maimonides on this issue is nowhere more evident than in 
his approach to sacrifices, which Maimonides treats as a type of histor-
ical compromise. The Law in Maimonides’ view accepts the inferior 
form of worship to which the Israelites were accustomed, while it 
attempts to wean them away from it by limiting its scope.92 After approv-
ingly citing Halevi’s approach in Kuzari 3.53 regarding the wondrous 
90 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 213.
91 For a further discussion of Nissim’s approach to the miracles performed by Moses, 
see also below, chapter 9, 331-332. 
92 See Guide 3.32; for a discussion of Maimonides’ approach, see below, chapter 10.
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effects of the sacrifices on the soul of the individual, Nissim writes 
regarding the view of Maimonides:
Maimonides’ opinion that the sole reason for sacrifices is to remove 
them [the Israelites] from those they were performing for the demons 
and ba‘alim and ‘ashtoroth, is insufficient. The practice of sacrifice is 
ancient, and they performed it for God and it was pleasing to Him. 
. . . If there were no utility in the sacrifices themselves, except to 
remove them from idolatrous practices, why was it commanded to 
them for all generations, and why did God command to always 
perform two daily sacrifices? It would have been sufficient for that 
generation [at the time of the Giving of the Torah] or for two gener-
ations [to be given this commandment], as is the case with many 
commandments in the Torah that were not for all generations, only 
for a fixed period, such as the service of the Tabernacle, and others. 
Moreover, if it were not possible for it to be [instituted] except for 
all generations, why did God command to multiply them [by sacri-
ficing] twice a day? It would have been sufficient [to sacrifice] once a 
year! How difficult and farfetched from the standpoint of the reason 
[is the view] that all these numerous and esteemed activities are 
without utility. From this it is seen that the practice of sacrifices is 
intended for its own sake and is of great utility—namely, that the 
Indwelling would then envelop the priests in order to impart to them 
a supernal power by means of the sweet savor. . . . Though the special 
properties of these acts are unknown to us, they were known to God 
and Moses His prophet who commanded them.93
The supernal power granted to the priests is particularly important for 
the ability to divine the future and avoid impending evils, as Nissim 
states in a previous discussion exploring the reason underlying Moses’ 
request to Pharaoh to allow the Israelites to go to the mountain of the 
Lord in the desert in order to sacrifice there:
The matter of sacrifices was well known in antiquity to all who 
attempted to discern the future, whether they were those who had 
priestly duties, the priests of the “high places,” or the ba‘alim and 
‘ashtoroth, the makers of figurines and talismans—that is to say, they 
were aided by the sweet savor. For the savor of burnt meat and fats 
have a wondrous special property for this. This was ancient [prac-
tice], as proven in the case of Balaam, as well as his predecessors, 
93 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 361.
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such us Abel, Noah, and Abraham. Adam too was said by the Sages 
to have offered sacrifices . . . . In addition, they [the sacrifices] 
prepare the thought and arouse the imagination to this end [of 
knowing the future], so its practitioners would not be diverted by 
extraneous thoughts. Perhaps for this reason one’s thought can 
[legally] invalidate the sacrifice.94 For if one sacrifices without the 
proper intent and thinks extraneous thoughts, it is possible that he 
will not attain the future that he seeks to know.95
Nissim also offers additional reasons regarding animal sacrifice. It 
provides a means of livelihood for the priests, thereby enabling them to 
devote their time to spiritual matters and to be teachers of Torah. It 
also reminds individuals that their flesh will disintegrate just as the 
flesh of the sacrificed animals, and hence they should concentrate on 
what remains after death—namely, the intellect. Together with this, 
there are symbolic lessons to be learned from the parts of the animals 
that are burned on the altar, such as the liver, which symbolizes one’s 
inclination to physical pleasures. The burning of the fat too symbol-
izes the need to rid oneself of what is superfluous, in addition to its 
being a poor source of nourishment, and thus should not to be eaten. 
These symbolic reasons in turn encourage the individual to engage in 
repentance.
Nissim’s belief in astrology, and even the efficacy of figurines and 
other practices involving astral magic, leads him to address the question 
of why the Torah prohibits their use if they are beneficial. Maimonides 
had already argued that all the practices associated with astrology that 
are prohibited by the Torah are in fact false,96 while Naḥmanides 
appears to hold the view that the Torah prohibits even useful practices 
when they negatively affect one’s trust in God.97 The debate between 
the proponents of the efficacy of astral magic and their detractors 
continued long afterward in Provence, in Spain, and elsewhere.98 
94 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Invalid Sacrifices 13.1.
95 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 207.
96 See Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah: ‘Avodah Zarah 4.7. See also his 
Book of Commandments, prohibition no. 32.
97 See Naḥmanides’ commentary to Genesis 17:1 and Deuteronomy 18:13.
98 For an in-depth study of this subject, see Dov Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval 
Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1999) (Heb.).
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Nissim, despite his high regard for Maimonides, essentially adopts 
Naḥmanides’ position on this issue. Yet as opposed to the more lenient 
ruling on the part of one of the leading rabbinic authorities of his time, 
R. Solomon Ibn Adret (Rashba), who was a disciple of Naḥmanides, 
Nissim advocates a very stringent prohibition against all such 
practices:99
For this reason the Torah prohibited and warned: You shall not make 
with me gods of silver, neither shall you make for yourselves gods of gold 
[Exodus 20:20]. The intent in saying with me—inasmuch as my 
Indwelling is found among you, you have no need for those figu-
rines. . . . What Scripture added in saying: neither shall you make for 
yourselves—means, in my opinion, that it admonished them and 
said: Do not bring down supernal powers by means of the figurines 
that are known to you, that is to say, in order to cure known illnesses. 
According to this, anyone who makes a figurine, whether for knowing 
the future or for curing a certain illness, violates a prohibition. It is 
possible that pe‘or was a figurine that was made in order that 
everyone who relieves himself before it receives a power and a special 
property to discharge [from his body] vapors and residue. . . . Simi-
larly, the images of teḥurim are figurines that cure hemorrhoids. If 
one asks: Why did God prohibit us these benefits, whether to know 
the future or as medications to illnesses? The answer is: For this will 
lead to immeasurable harm to the masses, in that they at the end will 
come to believe that these figurines are deities.100
Nissim maintains that from all these ancient practices that were 
employed to divine the future, the only one that the Torah permitted 
was sacrifice.
Nissim sees vestiges of the astrological rituals of old that were 
rejected by the Torah as surviving in Christian practice, affording him 
an opportunity to polemicize against this rival religion.101 He treats 
some of the Christian practices as even more contemptible than those 
 99 Rashba allowed the use of figurines for medicinal purposes. Both Abba Mari and 
HaMeiri were also strongly opposed to this ruling. See Stern, Philosophic and 
Rabbinic Culture, 146-150.
100 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 167-168.
101 On anti-Christian philosophical polemics in medieval Provence, see Daniel J. 
Lasker, “Christianity, Philosophy and Polemics in Jewish Provence,” Zion 68 
(2003): 313-332 (Heb.). 
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of the idolaters, since the ancient rituals at least had some efficacy. 
Even the beliefs of the Christians are of greater falsehood than those of 
the idolaters in his view—one that stands in sharp contrast to a more 
positive attitude toward Christian belief exhibited by some of the other 
Provençal thinkers, such as HaMeiri.102 For example, in explaining the 
prohibition against passing one’s son and daughter through the fire,103 
Nissim does not bring Maimonides’ explanation,104 though he too 
connects it with idolatry, but cites a different one that he had heard 
instead: 
There is one who said that the ancient custom of the Christians, 
who on their well-known festival on the summer solstice light great 
fires in the markets and streets, is a vestige remaining from this 
root, for they do it without knowing the reason why. It is possible 
that this custom predates them, [its purpose being] to announce 
that at this time begins the period that is hot and dry like the 
nature of fire, and to inform them to behave accordingly. For the 
ancients, though they made talismans and worshipped them, were 
wiser than those who are [living] today, for they [the latter] believe 
an impossible, contemptible, worthless and false belief in regard to 
the Deity, which invalidates itself.105 They annulled the earlier 
paths and held on to something more contemptible, as though 
fleeing from the embers into the fire. Similarly, there are matters 
predating the Christian faith, and they are the figures and talis-
mans [that were set up] in certain known places, mountains and hill 
tops, for [the purpose of] either foretelling the future or curing 
certain known diseases. They would go there always or at fixed 
times, when the power of the star or stars would assist that figure.106 
When those who lay down the faith of the Christians arrived, they 
were not able to wean the masses from the obvious benefits [of 
these practices], but only to bring them to their faith, and from the 
high places they did not turn aside [I Kings 15:14]. Over time they 
102 On HaMeiri’s approach to Christianity, see, for example, Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness 
and Tolerance (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), 114-128. 
103 See Deuteronomy 18:10.
104 See Guide 3.37.
105 That is to say, God took the form of a human being, Jesus, which is impossible from 
a philosophical perspective.
106 Nissim’s explanation here of the belief in the efficacy of talismans is similar to the 
one Maimonides brings in Guide 3.37, with the critical difference that Maimonides 
ascribes to them no value whatsoever.
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would attribute this [the benefits] to certain known saints. The 
ancient benefits soon were eliminated, the figurines became obso-
lete, and the masses would be left with a strong imaginary belief in 
the saints. Since their faith was strong as was the strength of their 
trust in them [the saints] due to their stupidity, it appeared to them 
that they [the saints] would perform miracles. I write this in order 
that you should not be deceived when you hear tales of their 
miracles.107
In this associative manner, Nissim ties up the prohibition of passing 
one’s children through fire with the festival of the Birth of John the 
Baptist, still observed in Europe on June 23 to this very day, with the 
lighting of great bonfires, which Nissim knew of from contemporary 
practice in his own day. This in turn leads him to contrast astrological 
practices, in which he sees some utility, with the practices involving the 
worship of the relics of saints, whose origin was in these ancient astro-
logical practices, but were of no benefit at all.108
The notion that certain practices and objects possess special 
qualities underlies Nissim’s explanation of the most paradoxical of 
commandments—that of the red heifer:
The matter of the red heifer that purifies the defiled and defiles the 
pure—is like the matter of the non-edible poisonous drugs that 
undoubtedly heal the sick and afflict the healthy who are in no need 
of medication. As for the matter of the ashes of the heifer, cedar 
wood, scarlet, and hyssop, which are burnt with it—who can inform 
us [the reason for this] aside from God and Moses His prophet? 
Know that the special properties are many, and many of them are 
hidden from us, for what we know of them is by way of experience 
over time, not by way of logical deduction.109
This explanation is tied to the view shared by many of the Provençal 
Jewish philosophers that impurity refers to things that are physically 
harmful. Dead bodies physically contaminate things in which they are 
107 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 461-462.
108 For a study of this issue, see Judah Galinsky, “Different Approaches towards the 
Miracles of Christian Saints in Medieval Rabbinic Literature,” in Ta Shma: Studies 
in Judaica in Memory of Israel M. Ta-Shma, ed. Avraham Reiner et al. (Alon Shevut: 
Tevunot Press, 2011), 195-219 (Heb.).
109 Ma‘aseh Nissim., 421.
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in contact, and many commandments are designed to protect from this 
contamination or cleanse it.110 The symbolic meaning of the ritual 
involving the ashes of the red heifer is also presented by Nissim in the 
continuation of his discussion, for the same commandment often has a 
myriad of reasons for its legislation. It should be stressed that he regards 
the symbolic reasons as part of the Law’s initial intent and not as later 
“poetical conceits” introduced by the rabbis, as Maimonides labels 
many of the explanations in this category.111
Additional Ideas in Nissim’s Commentary on the 
Torah
Nissim’s rationalistic approach finds its expression not only in his inter-
pretation of the stories of the Torah but also the homilies of the 
Talmudic Sages. As in the case of Maimonides and Nissim’s philosophic 
predecessors in Provence, he understands these homilies as esoteric, 
philosophic-scientific interpretations of the esoteric ideas in the Torah. 
Earlier in the chapter, we encountered one of the most radical exam-
ples of this approach in his interpretation of Moses’ active role in the 
legislation of the Torah and how the Sages also alluded to this view. 
Even with the opening story of the Torah Nissim’s exegesis reflects a 
similar approach.
Following in the footsteps of Maimonides, Nissim sees the biblical 
story of creation as focusing on the earth and its parts.112 Thus the sun, 
moon and planets were not actually created on the fourth day after the 
appearance of dry land and vegetation, but the story depicts the stage 
of existence of the earth in which the heavenly bodies and their influ-
ences on it are discernable.113 Nissim, who appears to incline toward the 
view that the world is without a temporal beginning, interprets the 
descriptions found in each day as indicative of their causal and natural 
order, while leaving the question of whether they refer also to temporal 
110 See below, chapter 10, 381-382.
111 See Guide 3.43.
112 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 215-249; cf. Guide, 2.30. For an in-depth analysis of Maimon-
ides’ approach, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of 
Creation (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1987) (Heb.).
113 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 234-235.
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order.114 He further maintains that even if one interprets “day” in the 
story of creation as a temporal period, one still should not regard it the 
description of what occurred on each day as referring to a twenty four 
hour period, but to a much longer period of time.115 Nissim follows his 
philosophic predecessors in regarding Aristotle’s Meteorology as the 
most important source for understanding the natural processes taking 
place in the sublunar world that underlie the biblical story of creation. 
Maimonides in his interpretation of the Account of Creation had noted: 
“Reflect, if you are one of those who reflect, to what extent he has 
made clear and revealed the whole matter in this statement, provided 
that you consider well, understand all that has been demonstrated in 
the Meteorologica, and examine everything that people have said about 
every point mentioned in that work.”116 In this passage, Maimonides 
refers specifically to Rabbi Akiva’s warning to his compatriots in their 
ascent to pardes: “When you come to stones of pure marble, do not say: 
Water, Water, for it is written: He that speaks falsehood shall not be 
established before My eyes [Psalms 101:7] (Ḥagigah 14b).”117 Maimonides 
in this manner alludes to the view that the story does not deal with a 
heavenly journey but is a parable for the scientific study of the world—in 
this case, an understanding of the different levels of the earth’s 
atmosphere, which is the firmament (raqi‘a) in the biblical account. 
Moreover, he shows how the Talmudic homilies should be interpreted 
as esoteric philosophic elaborations upon this account.118 The Jewish 
philosophers of Provence, beginning with Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the 
translator of Aristotle’s Meteorology as well as Maimonides’ Guide, 
essentially accepted Maimonides’ approach, while presenting different 
interpretations of the details of the story, as well as providing more 
examples of how to interpret various rabbinic homilies pertaining to it.119 
114 Ibid., 222-225.
115 Ibid., 243-244.
116 Guide 2.30: 353.
117 Ibid.
118 For an analysis of Maimonides’ comments on this issue see Klein-Braslavy, Maimon-
ides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation, 160-168. 
119 See Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Mordechai Bisliches 
(Pressburg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), esp. chapter 20, 122-162. See also Levi 
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Their fundamental assumption was that the biblical account should be 
understood in accordance with the Aristotelian view of the laws of 
nature and that the rabbinic homilies follow the same path. This 
assumption governs Nissim’s own interpretation.
The point at which the Torah’s account regarding the beginning 
of humanity should be understood as true on the exoteric level—that 
is, historically true—and not only on the esoteric one, was not easy 
for the philosophers to determine. While none of them rejected the 
historicity of the biblical patriarchs, or even Noah and his descen-
dants, they were not of one mind on the question of Adam and Eve 
and their children. In his interpretation of Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden, Maimonides is concerned with the esoteric level of 
the story—that is to say, to understand the story as a parable for 
human perfection and the loss of perfection, or more accurately, the 
state of perfection in contrast to the human being’s natural state of 
lacking perfection. The various figures in the story—Adam, Eve, and 
the serpent—represent different faculties of the soul, while the two 
trees represent different types of knowledge.120 Maimonides, however, 
does not indicate whether he rejects the historicity of Adam and Eve 
and their progeny, though it is clear that he does not accept the literal 
truth of the Garden story. Nissim, who leans toward the view of the 
eternity a parte ante of the world, tends to see the story of the life of 
Adam and Eve and their progeny solely as a parable, though he does 
not completely dismiss the possibility of the existence of these indi-
viduals at some point in history, as he notes: “Similarly, the three sons 
of Adam—Cain, Abel, and Seth—are a parable, or if they in fact 
existed and were born to Adam, the names they were called hint and 
allude to the three perfections of the human being.”121 These perfec-
ben Avraham’s extensive interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis and rabbinic 
homilies pertaining to it in Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, ed. Howard Kreisel 
(Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2004), chapters 10-12, 208-301 (Heb.).
120 For an extensive analysis of Maimonides’ approach to the Garden of Eden story see 
Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis (Jeru-
salem: Reuben Mass, 1986) (Heb.).
121 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 271.
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tions are those of acquisition (Cain), moral virtue and proper 
leadership (Abel), and the perfection of the Intellect (Seth). The 
killing of Abel by Cain thus represents the victory of the appetitive 
faculty over moral virtue, while the perfection of the intellect person-
ified by Seth is the true perfection of the human being.122
On the extraordinary longevity of the ancients as recorded in the 
Torah, Nissim offers two explanations, the first in the name of Maimon-
ides, which accepts the Torah’s account in a literal manner:
Maimonides has already written in chapter 48 of the second part [of 
the Guide] that only those individuals who were mentioned lived so 
long a life, whereas every [other] person lived only the natural, usual 
duration. The anomaly in the individual in question may be due to 
numerous causes: either as a result of his nutrition and regimen, or 
by way of a miracle and an anomaly that occurred [resulting in] a 
wondrous strengthening of nature. Therefore, it is of the type [of 
miracle] that I labeled pele’.123
Perhaps because Nissim was not entirely satisfied with Maimonides’ 
approach, he brings in addition a non-literal, political-historical 
interpretation:
There are those who interpreted the life span [of each of these indi-
viduals] as referring to the persistence of his nomoi and regimen 
during the period of time mentioned, whether during his lifetime or 
after his death. For it is possible that these were famous individuals 
who legislated laws and nomoi, and others would act in accordance 
with their traits, as well as adopt their practices regarding food, 
drink, and dress. After the period of time mentioned, it is possible 
that all this was forgotten and people chose a different path. Or, 
one may say, no one arose during this period of time who was compa-
rable to the individual in his level of knowledge of how to lead the 
people of his generation. At that point someone comparable in rank 
122 Ibid., 271-272. Cf. Guide 1.7.
123 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 273-274. That is to say, it is a story that does not involve a prophet 
and one should understand it literally. The chapter Nissim cites from the Guide is 
in accordance with Judah Al-Ḥarizi’s translation. In Ibn Tibbon’s translation, this 
issue is discussed in chapter 47. Nissim makes use of both translations in his trea-
tise, though he relies more heavily on that of Ibn Tibbon.
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arose, who adhered to this individual’s thought and intent [in lead-
ership], and the former individual’s spirit alighted upon him in the 
manner that the spirit of Elijah alighted upon Elisha. Even if the 
latter one who arose never saw the former and did not live in his 
period, it is possible that he learnt from his treatises or meditated 
upon the words that were received in his name . . . .124
Nissim’s explanation is taken from Levi’s Livyat Ḥen, who himself cites 
it in the name of Moses Ibn Tibbon.125 Nissim appears to favor this 
interpretation, since he brings rabbinic homilies that support a non- 
literal interpretation of the number of years certain individuals are 
reported to have lived. As long as people follow in the path of a certain 
individual, Nissim comments, he is said to live all those years.126
While Nissim does not question the historicity of the subsequent 
stories in Genesis that clearly do not involve prophetic visions, such as 
Noah and the flood and the building of the Tower of Babel, he continues 
his tendency to interpret them in a naturalistic manner. The stories in 
Exodus provide a greater challenge, since the supernatural dimension 
in them is even more pronounced. In Nissim’s view, Moses’ unique 
state and superior knowledge allowed him either to predict and utilize 
rare natural events or learn the manner of bringing them about. All the 
plagues in Egypt are explained by Nissim in this manner. The killing of 
the first born is regarded by him as a rare form of pestilence, from 
124 Ibid., 274. Alfarabi’s view of successive ideal lawgivers is evident in this 
interpretation.
125 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 324-325. Moses Ibn 
Tibbon brings this interpretation in his Ma’amar ha-Taninim; see The Writings of 
R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, Avraham Israel (Beer-
Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 241 (Heb.). Levi criticizes 
Maimonides’ approach limiting such long lifespans to only a few individuals, 
bringing in its stead the possibility of a different naturalistic explanation of this 
phenomenon, which also allows us to understand it literally. He traces the shorter 
lifespans of the later generations to physiological changes in their physical makeup; 
see Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation, 318-322; see above, chapter 5, 130. For a 
study of this issue in medieval Jewish exegesis, see Frank Talmage, “So Teach Us to 
Number our Days: A Theology of Longevity in Jewish Exegetical Literature,” in 
Frank Talmage, Apples of Gold in Settings of Silver, ed. Barry Walfish (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), 172-185.
126 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 274-275. Nissim cites Maimonides’ interpretation of “to bear chil-
dren” in Guide 1.7 as referring also to the instruction of an individual.
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which the Israelites were spared by virtue of remaining in their homes 
and burning the paschal offering, which helps purify the pestilential air. 
The blood on the doorposts served a similar purpose, as well as to 
remind the Israelites not to leave their houses. It also helped fortify 
their spirits so they would not be frightened to death by what was 
happening around them.127 
The splitting of the Sea of Reeds and the manna are treated by 
Nissim as exceptionally rare natural events, while the bitter waters 
were made drinkable by the properties of a special tree known to 
Moses by virtue of his prophetic knowledge.128 The fire from heaven 
that consumed the sacrifices at the consecration of the Tabernacle was 
brought about by Moses. This same fire killed Nadav and Avihu, who 
were unaware of its secret, and whose death for their disobedience was 
necessary in order to instill in the masses the proper reverence for the 
Tabernacle.129 Even the seemingly unique supernatural event of the 
hearing of the voice of God at Sinai was in fact the voice of Moses 
himself, in Nissim’s view; Moses’ voice was greatly augmented by a 
natural object he found on the mountain.130 Nissim sees this action on 
Moses’ part as a necessary subterfuge in order to instill awe in the heart 
of the masses so that they would observe the ideal law that he lay down.
As can be seen from most of the examples above, the dominant 
tendency in Nissim’s thought in approaching the Torah’s accounts of 
supernatural events is to treat them literally, but in a natural manner. 
This allows Nissim to preserve the historicity of the Torah, which is 
crucial for Jewish belief, since it allows God to be treated as the agent 
of these events even though the philosophers and masses understand 
the divine involvement in a far different manner. However, Nissim is 
also prepared to treat some crucial events as occurring solely in a 
vision of prophecy, as did Maimonides in the case of Balaam’s donkey.131
127 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 311, 314-315.
128 Ibid., 318-324.
129 Ibid., 369-370
130 Ibid., 333. For a translation of this passage, see below, chapter 9, 350-351.
131 Ibid., 426; Guide 2.42; 3.22. See also above, 190.
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Aside from the redemption from Egypt and revelation at Sinai, 
perhaps no event is more important from the standpoint of Jewish 
tradition than the Binding of Isaac. Abraham’s response to the divine 
command was seen throughout Jewish history as the ultimate paradigm 
for complete love of God. To question the historicity of this event 
could be seen as undermining the foundation of Jewish faith, despite 
the very problematic aspects of God’s command and Abraham’s response. 
Even Maimonides treats this event as having actually occurred,132 
despite the fact that stories in which God or an angel speak to individuals 
are normally regarded by him as happening in a prophetic vision.133 Nissim 
also understands the stakes involved in this story, yet does not refrain 
from alluding to his view that the entire story is in reality a report of a 
vision experienced by Abraham, a view he sees hinted at by Ibn Ezra. 
Abraham’s vision is certainly indicative of his internal state and the 
complete devotion he feels to God, for whom he is prepared to sacrifice 
that which is dearest to him, but it is not indicative of actions that he 
actually committed. I would like to conclude this chapter with Nissim’s 
comments on this story, for they provide another excellent example of 
the manner in which he reveals his true views on sensitive issues and 
tries to show how these were the views of the Sages, while he still 
slightly veils them for the benefit of the less astute readers who are not 
prepared to appreciate them.
The matter of the act of the Binding—Ibn Ezra already wrote in his 
commentary on the prophecy of Jonah what he wrote, and revealed 
his opinion regarding this as well as the matter of Jonah in the bowels 
of the whale.134 According to this [opinion], everything said and 
done, and the ram that was prepared for him by being caught in the 
thicket by his horns—is of the type [of miracles] I called by the term 
ot.135 Genesis Rabbah [65.1]: “On the third day Abraham lifted his eyes 
132 See Guide 3.24.
133 Ibid., 2.41. Yet Maimonides perhaps also subtly alludes to the view that the entire 
story of the Binding took place in a vision of prophecy; see below. 
134 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Jonah 1:1. Ibn Ezra maintains that all prophecies 
come to the prophets in visions and dreams, with the exception of Moses. He sees 
the whole story of Jonah’s fleeing from God as occurring in a prophetic dream and 
juxtaposes this story with Abraham’s ordeal of the Binding of Isaac.
135 That is to say, an event appears in a prophetic dream and not in reality. 
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[Genesis 22:4]—on the third day of Jonah, as it is stated: Jonah was 
in the bowels of the fish for three days” [Jonah 2:1]. They hinted in this 
manner that the same is true of both, and one should not be surprised 
by the designation of the [number of] days in them. . . .136 To my way 
of thinking, the Sages also alluded in Genesis Rabbah to the inter-
pretation of the sage [Ibn Ezra] by way of a profound hint and veiled 
secret. They said: “And Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled 
his ass [Genesis 22:3]. Yet how many servants did he have!—Love 
spoils the order. Hate too spoils the order, as it is stated: And Balaam 
arose early in the morning and saddled his ass [Numbers 22:21]. Yet 
how many servants did he have!” etc. They also stated there [in 
Genesis Rabbah 55.8]: “The saddling that Abraham performed in 
order to go and do the will of the ‘One who said and the world was’ 
stands against the saddling that Balaam performed in order to curse 
Israel.”137 See how they compared between these two matters, and 
you already know [the matter] of Balaam’s donkey.138
Despite the fact that anyone who follows up on Nissim’s allusions can 
easily discern what his true view is, Nissim sees the danger of letting his 
discussion rest on this point, and so he adds for the benefit of the less 
astute reader:
In my opinion, there is no need for all this. Better and more correct 
in my view is to believe that this command, written by Moses our 
Master, was in fact from God to Abraham that he sacrifice his only 
son, just as we believe regarding all the other commands that 
God commanded Moses—the practical commandments and those 
involving opinions and beliefs—that they were commanded from 
the mouth of God, and not from the mouth of Moses and his intel-
lect. Everything was from the mouth of God, and Moses wrote what 
136 In other words, just as it is true that Jonah did not live for three days in the bowels 
of a fish but the event took place in a prophetic vision, the same is true of the story 
of Abraham. See also Guide 2.46, where Maimonides indicates that in visions of 
prophecy just as in ordinary dreams the prophet may see himself performing certain 
actions with intervals of time mentioned between them, as well as his going from 
one place to another. Maimonides’ examples are taken from Ezekiel, Isaiah, and 
the story of Abraham and the Covenant of the Pieces. Yet his description could just 
as easily fit the story of the Binding.
137 Nissim writes: “to curse the enemies of Israel” for apparently he did not want to 
write explicitly “to curse Israel.”
138 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 284-285. That is to say, that the whole story of Balaam’s journey 
and talking donkey took place in a vision of prophecy; see above.
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was commanded from the mouth of God.139 In general, everything 
that was given to us, said to us and reported to us is for our benefit, 
in order that the awe of God be instilled in us so we will not sin, and 
to circumcise the uncircumcised heart of our masses, and to separate 
Israel from all the nations in our being more special to God than any 
other nation. We will believe in this story as a necessary belief, just 
as we believe in creation on the basis of the story in Genesis. There-
fore we do not have to seek an inner meaning, for this—that is to 
say, the literal meaning of the words—was the intent, to inform us in 
the Torah of a tale of a matter that will straighten all the masses in 
the love of God, just as the commands from the mouth of God also 
include the commandments of the intellect. I already commented 
upon them above.140 Understand this and do not be astonished, and 
your confusion will vanish. For it is proper that all these stories and 
those similar to them be lain down in every religion, and expounded 
to the masses. These are the matters that are proper to instill in their 
hearts.141
For all the radical views found in Nissim’s treatise, he does not advance 
them in order to undermine the Torah. Rather, it is because he regards 
the Torah as true and philosophy as true, and he sees in the latter the 
key to understanding the former, for the seal of God is Truth. Nissim 
goes much further than any of his predecessors to unveil the truth as he 
sees it out of his deep commitment to the Torah and his desire to illu-
minate the minds of his coreligionists with its real meaning. Yet in the 
spirit of Maimonides, he too understands that as a responsible public 
philosopher one must continue to remain sensitive also to the situation 
of the masses and frame one’s presentation accordingly.
139 Compare to Maimonides’ eighth principle of faith that he brings in his Introduction 
to Pereq Ḥeleq. 
140 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 172.
141 Ibid., 287.







In his Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed, written at the turn of 
the fifteenth century, Don Isaac Abarbanel presents twenty-eight stric-
tures to Maimonides’ interpretation of the Account of the Chariot.1 
1 Abarbanel completed his commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed after 1496 
while living in Italy, but apparently wrote the strictures earlier, while still in Spain. 
Commenting on Abarbanel’s view of Maimonides’ interpretation of the Account 
of the Chariot, Eric Lawee notes: “If, as regards Maimonides’ interpretation of the 
‘Account of the Beginning,’ Abarbanel accepted the ‘good’ (most notably what he 
generally believed was Maimonides’ literal interpretation of the opening verses of 
Genesis 1) and rejected the ‘bad’ (what he deemed Maimonides’ partial annulment 
of the contextual sense of Genesis 2-3), things were otherwise in the case of 
Maimonides’ interpretation of the ‘Account of the Chariot’: here Abarbanel found 
only degrees of bad”; See “‘The Good We Accept and the Bad We Do Not’: Abar-
banel’s Stance towards Maimonides,” in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of 
Isadore Twersky, ed. Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005), 
149. For a study of the philosophy of Abarbanel see Seymour Feldman, Philosophy 
in a Time of Crisis (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). For a study of Abarbanel’s 
commentary on Maimonides’ Account of the Chariot, see David Ben-Zazon, “The 
Commentary of Don Isaac Abarbanel to the Guide of the Perplexed” (PhD thesis, 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2009), 201-252 (Heb.). 
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The first one captures the essence of Maimonides’ interpretation and 
the reason for Abarbanel’s rejection of it:
If what Ezekiel apprehended was in accordance with the opinion of 
the Master [Maimonides] in the manner he elucidated, then Ezekiel’s 
apprehension is similar to what is apprehended by the philosophers 
of the natural sciences or metaphysics. It is very strange that rational 
investigation should attain what is given by prophetic emanation. If 
this were the case, our Sages would not so emphatically command to 
conceal this subject. . . . Behold in the academies of the gentile 
nations they expound these matters in assemblies of tens of thou-
sands, consisting of young and old, making no effort at concealment. 
Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon already was aware of this stricture, and 
Rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas expanded upon it in his treatise, The Light of 
the Lord. Narboni, however, wrote that the Master’s intent is to 
show that this is what is apprehended by those engaged in specula-
tion. For this reason, Maimonides states in the introduction to the 
third part [of the Guide] that the reward of one who conceals the 
secrets of the Torah, which are lucid and clear to those engaged in 
speculation, is very great. . . . The Master’s contention that they are 
“clear to those engaged in speculation” is his own fabrication, for the 
Sages made no such assertion.2
Abarbanel’s stricture points to a remarkable development in medieval 
Jewish thought. The cream of Jewish esoteric wisdom, the Account of 
the Chariot, is identified by Maimonides and his disciples with Aristo-
telian philosophy—both metaphysics and the natural sciences, at least 
according to Abarbanel’s description. How and why this identification 
came about and its implications for the study of the Bible and of 
rabbinic midrash—that is to say, for the study of Judaism—encom-
passes much of the history of Jewish philosophy. In this chapter, I 
would like to touch upon some of the salient points of this story, from 
its rabbinic origins to Jewish philosophy in Provence at the end of the 
thirteenth century.
Early Traditions of the Account of the Chariot
The first mishnah of the second chapter of Tractate Ḥagigah reads:
2 See Sefer Moreh Nevukhim […] ‘im Arba‘ah Perushim (Jerusalem: 1960), part 3, 71b. 
All translations in this chapter are my own unless otherwise noted.
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The [subject of] forbidden relations may not be expounded in the 
presence of three, nor the Account of Creation in the presence of 
two, nor the [Account of the] Chariot in the presence of one, unless 
he is a sage and understands by his own intelligence.3
While the subject matter of the first category, forbidden relations, is 
evident, though the reason for the restriction less so,4 and that of the 
second, the Account of Creation, is also obvious, as is its esoteric 
nature, the subject matter of the third category, the Account of the 
Chariot, is in itself a mystery. Clearly a biblical text is involved, as the 
term “expound” (dorshin) indicates.5 The Babylonian Talmud elabo-
rates upon some of the traditions associated with the Account of the 
Chariot, including an identification of the biblical text that stands at 
its core:
R. Joseph studied the Account of the Chariot. The elders of Pumbe-
ditha studied the Account of Creation. They said to him: Master, 
teach us the Account of the Chariot. . . . They said to him: We have 
already studied therein as far as, And He said to me: Son of man 
[Ezekiel 2:1]. He [R. Joseph] replied: This is the very [text of] the 
Account of the Chariot. An objection was raised: How far does the 
[text of] the Account of the Chariot extend? Rabbi said: As far as 
the second And I saw [Ezekiel 1:27]. R. Isaac said: As far as ḥashmal 
[ibid.]6—As far as I saw may be taught; from there on only the 
3 As translated by Israel Abrahams (with some modifications) in the The Babylonian 
Talmud: Seder Mo‘ed (London: Soncino Press, 1938), vol. 4 (Ḥagigah), 59.
4 The talmudic discussion following the mishnah does not bring any mystical tradi-
tion associated with this subject, nor do the early commentators.
5 The only biblical text that deals with chariots in a prophetic context is Zechariah 
6, but it is hard to discern how this prophecy warrants the severe restrictions placed 
on its instruction. Interestingly, there is no explication of any verse from Zechariah 
in which a vision of chariots appears in the subsequent talmudic discussion. As we 
shall see, this chapter is included among the merkavah texts by some of the medi-
eval Jewish philosophers.
6 Ezekiel 1:26-28 reads: [26] And above the firmament that was over their heads was the 
likeness of a throne, in appearance like a sapphire stone; and upon the likeness of the 
throne was the likeness of a man upon it above. [27] And I saw something like the color 
of electrum [ḥashmal], like the appearance of fire round about enclosing it; from what 
appeared to be his loins upward; and from what appeared to his loins downward I saw 
what appeared to be fire, and there was a brightness round about him. [28] As the 
appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of 
the brightness round about, this was the appearance of the likeness of the Glory of the 
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chapter headings may be transmitted. Some say: As far as I saw the 
chapter headings may be transmitted, thenceforward, if he is a sage 
able to speculate by himself, yes; if not, no [BT Ḥagigah 13a].7
According to this discussion, the Account of the Chariot is limited to 
the first chapter of Ezekiel, though the term “chariot” (merkavah) does 
not occur at all in this vision. The chapter itself culminates, beginning 
with verse 27, in the most esoteric part of the vision—a description of 
the appearance of the one who sits on the throne. While the Talmud 
does not explicitly explain the reason for the name merkavah, the 
appearance of heavenly creatures termed ofannim (wheels) in Ezekiel’s 
vision provides the most evident explanation. Some of the traditions 
brought by the Talmud, particularly those associated with R. Joḥanan 
ben Zakai and his disciples, point to the esoteric nature of this study, 
the supernatural phenomena that accompany its proper explication, 
and the heavenly reward thereby attained, that is, a place among the 
angels in the world to come. The dangers involved in this study are also 
presented.8
The talmudic treatment of the Account of the Chariot includes an 
explanation of a number of verses by way of esoteric etymologies:
What does ḥashmal mean? Rav Judah said: Living creatures speaking 
fire [an abbreviation of חיות אש ממללות]. In a baraitha it is taught: At 
times they are silent (ḥash), at times they speak (mal). When the 
utterance goes forth from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be 
He, they are silent, and when the utterance does not go forth from 
Lord; and when I saw it, I fell upon my face and I heard the voice of one that spoke. 
According to the first opinion, only to the end of verse 26, in which the appearance 
of a man sitting on the throne is introduced, may be expounded. According to the 
second opinion, the meaning of the electrum may also be transmitted.
7 I. Abrahams (with modifications), 76-77.
8 For the dangers involved, see BT Ḥagigah 13a, 77: “For behold there was once a 
child [yanuka] who expounded the [mysteries of] ḥashmal, and a fire went forth and 
consumed him.” A number of scholarly studies are devoted to a detailed analysis of 
the talmudic discussion of the Account of the Chariot in Ḥagigah. See, for example, 
David J. Halperin, The Merkabah in Rabbinic Literature (New Haven: American 
Oriental Society, 1980); Ira Chernus, Mysticism in Rabbinic Judaism (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1982).
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the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He, they speak [BT Ḥagigah 
13a-b].9
Tales that are mythic in nature are also presented:
Now as I beheld the living creatures, behold one wheel (ofan) upon the 
earth by the living creatures [Ezekiel 1:15]. R. Eliezer said: It refers to 
a certain angel who stands on the earth and his head reaches unto the 
living creatures. A baraitha teaches: His name is Sandalfon; he is 
higher than his fellows by a distance of five hundred years’ journey, 
and he stands behind the Chariot and wreathes crowns for his 
Maker. But is it so? Behold it is written: Blessed be the Glory of the 
lord from His place [Ezekiel 3:12], accordingly, no one knows His 
place! He [Sandalfon] pronounces the Name over the crown and it 
goes and rests on His head [BT Ḥagigah 13b].10
From the various traditions brought by the Babylonian Talmud, it is 
clear that the Sages did not regard the first chapter of Ezekiel as the 
only text devoted to this subject. Isaiah’s vision in chapter 6 is 
compared to Ezekiel’s more detailed vision. Ezekiel 10:4 is explained 
in reference to Ezekiel’s vision in chapter 1. Verses from other biblical 
books—in particular, Daniel 7:9-10—are expounded in the course of 
the discussion.11
The Babylonian Talmud continues its discussion with the story of 
the four sages who entered into an orchard (pardes)—Ben Azzai, Ben 
Zoma, Elisha ben Avuya, and Rabbi Akiva—and brings various tales 
concerning the protagonists of this story. Rabbi Akiva, the only one 
who is said to have entered and departed unscathed by the experience, 
is reported as warning his fellow travelers: “When you arrive at the 
stones of pure marble, say not: Water water, for it is said: He that speaks 
falsehood shall not be established before my eyes [Psalms 101:7]” (BT 
Ḥagigah 14b). The context in which this story is brought suggests an 
integral connection with the tradition of the Account of the Chariot, 
though the story itself is of a different nature. There is no hint in the 
 9 I. Abrahams, 78.
10 Ibid., 78-79.
11 BT Ḥagigah 13b-14a.
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story that he is expounding a text. Rather the story suggests one of 
heavenly ascent and the dangers involved.12
Some of the traditions reported in the Babylonian Talmud 
concerning the Account of the Chariot appear also in the Tosefta and 
in the Jerusalem Talmud with a number of variations.13 From these 
various traditions, one can discern at least two major approaches to 
the nature of this subject. The dominant one is that the Account of the 
Chariot consists of an esoteric explication of a number of biblical texts, 
primarily from the beginning of Ezekiel, dealing with the various crea-
tures constituting the heavenly world together with the one who sits on 
the throne—in all likelihood a figurative reference to God. The proper 
understanding of these texts brings about a revelatory experience as 
well as reward in the hereafter. The study itself, however, is fraught 
with physical dangers for the unprepared, and hence the severe limita-
tions placed on those desiring to engage in it. The second approach, 
which is described by an entrance or ascent to an orchard (pardes), 
suggests a heavenly ascent, in which no text is the object of study. 
Rather the mystic is described as beholding different sights on his 
journey and warned not to misinterpret their true reality. In this 
approach, the dangers involved are emphasized. As we shall see below, 
the rabbinic approach in the geonic period, which developed in wake of 
the growing popularity of mystical literature, focused more on the 
second approach, despite other possible interpretations of the story of 
the entrance to an orchard—for example, as a parable for the esoteric 
12 For another possibility to interpret the story, see below. For an analysis of this 
story, see the studies cited above, n. 8; see also Ephraim Urbach, “The Traditions 
about Merkabah Mysticism in the Tanaitic Period,” in Studies in Mysticism and 
Religion Presented to Gershom Scholem, ed. Zvi Werblowsky, Ephraim Urbach, 
Chaim Wirszubski (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), 1-28 (Heb.); Yehuda Liebes, 
The Sin of Elisha: The Four Who Entered Pardes and the Nature of Talmudic Mysticism 
(Jerusalem: Academon, 1990) (Heb.); Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “Four Entered Para-
dise Revisited,” Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995): 133-169. For a discussion 
that summarizes and critiques the various approaches, see Joseph Dan, History of 
Jewish Mysticism and Esotericism: Ancient Times, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Mercaz Zalman 
Shazar, 2008), 290-316 (Heb.).
13 Tosefta Ḥagigah 2:1-2; Jerusalem Talmud Ḥagigah 2:1, 8a-9b.
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study of biblical texts—which perhaps are more in harmony with the 
views of the sages of the Talmud.
The subsequent midrashic compilations that were edited in the 
geonic period, and the mystical literature written at this time or toward 
the end of the talmudic period,14 combine and elaborate upon these 
approaches. In the Heikhalot (palace) literature, such as Heikhalot 
Rabbati and Heikhalot Zutarti, the merkavah (chariot) is conceived as a 
palace, and detailed descriptions are brought of the ascent through the 
seven palaces of the upper heaven, the dangers encountered by the 
mystic, the secret names and seals that are presented to the heavenly 
gatekeepers in order to continue one’s ascent, and the awesome and 
terrifying sights of God and the angels that are beheld when reaching 
the throne room.15 These texts are presented as belonging to the tanaitic 
tradition. While some of the motifs found in these texts are derived 
from Ezekiel’s vision, there is no attempt to link the heavenly ascent to 
the study of this biblical text.
Shi‘ur Qomah, a small treatise existing in a number of different 
recensions and ascribed to R. Ishmael and R. Akiva, which achieved 
canonical status among many Jews in the geonic period, goes so far as 
to describe the measurements and secret names of the limbs of God, in 
14 Some researchers ascribe an earlier date to these texts, or at least to the traditions 
on which they are based—namely, the tanaitic period, if not even earlier. For a 
survey of the various approaches to this issue, see Rachel Elior, The Three Temples 
(Oxford: Littman Library, 2004), 242 n. 4. I have found no persuasive argument to 
date the composition of the texts before the end of the talmudic period, or even 
prior to the geonic period, and to treat them accordingly. One, of course, should 
not reject out of hand the possibility that these texts contain much older traditions, 
as some of the researchers took great pains to show, but in the absence of new 
evidence it does not appear to me that it is possible to prove this claim.
15 For an analysis of the texts comprising this tradition, see Ithamar Gruenwald, 
Apocalyptic and Merkavah Mysticism (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 127-217. For a study of 
the relation of these texts to pre-talmudic and to mysticism in the time of the 
Talmud, see Gershom Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism and 
Talmudic Tradition (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 
1960); David J. Halperin, The Faces of the Chariot (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1988): 
Elior, The Three Temples, 241-277; Dan, History of Jewish Mysticism, vol. 2, 678-713.
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all probability based on a mystical exegesis of Song of Songs.16 According 
to one of the recensions of this text:
R. Ishmael said to his disciples: I and R. Akiva pledge that one who 
knows this measurement of our Maker and the praise of God is guar-
anteed a place in the World to Come, so long as he recites this text 
every day.17
By presenting itself as the authoritative teaching of the most esoteric 
part of Ezekiel’s vision—namely, of God, Shi‘ur Qomah in a crucial 
sense attempts to usurp Ezekiel’s text as well as other biblical texts, as 
the main object of study for those seeking to delve into the Account of 
the Chariot. The authors of this text, as well as of the Heikhalot texts, 
were clearly interested in popularizing their mystical-magical approach, 
and no longer severely limiting the study of the Account of the Chariot 
to the intellectual elite, which was done in accordance with the decree 
of Rabbi Judah the Prince in the Mishnah. They recorded their 
approach in texts, thereby making them more readily accessible to the 
Jewish community. They ascribed these texts to the leading rabbinic 
authorities of old, thereby conferring upon them binding authority, 
16 Shi‘ur Qomah takes its inspiration from the descriptions of the lover in Song of 
Songs, essentially viewing this book as a parable of the love between God and 
Israel. Song of Songs thus may be seen as the most esoteric of biblical texts. Perhaps 
this is the reason for the great esteem with which it was held by R. Akiva, who 
remarked: “All Scriptures are holy and Song of Songs is the holy of holies” (Mishnah 
Yadayim 3:8), even though no mystical traditions related to this text are recorded 
in Tractate Ḥagigah. On early rabbinic approaches to Song of Songs, see Saul Lieb-
erman’s appendix to Gershon Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, 118-126. See also Dan, 
History of Jewish Mysticism, vol. 3, 891-898. Song of Songs Rabbah 1:27 brings the 
story of the four scholars who entered pardes in the explanation of the verse: The 
king has brought me into his chambers (Song of Songs 1:4), which also may help 
explain why the merkavah was transformed into the chambers of the highest heav-
enly palace.
17 See Peter Schäfer et al. (eds.), Synopse zur Hekhalot-Literatur (Tübingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr, 1981), 261, par. 711. For a study of this treatise and a translation of one of 
the recensions, see Martin S. Cohen, The Shi‘ur Qomah: Liturgy and Theurgy in 
Pre-Kabbalistic Jewish Mysticism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983). 
See also Asi Farber-Ginat, “Studies in the Book Shi‘ur Komah,” in Massu’ot: Studies 
in Kabbalistic Literature and Jewish Philosophy in Memory of Ephraim Gottlieb, ed. 
Michal Oron and Amos Goldreich (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1994), 361-394 
(Heb.); Dan, History of Jewish Mysticism, vol. 3, 887-913.
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and they encouraged the study of these texts by emphasizing the 
rewards their mastery brings.18 There is much evidence that the mystics 
enjoyed considerable success in their endeavors. Many motifs from this 
mystical literature found their way into the liturgical poetry and many 
Jews were convinced that mystical texts such as Heikhalot Rabbati and 
Shi‘ur Qomah in fact belong to the tanaitic tradition.
One of the most important pieces of evidence indicative of the 
inroads made by this literature is to be found in a question addressed to 
R. Sherira Gaon, the head of the Academy of Pumbeditha in the second 
half of the tenth century, by the Jewish community of Fez. The commu-
nity juxtaposes the severe limitations placed on the study of esoteric 
traditions in the second chapter of Tractate Ḥagigah, together with the 
warning in the Mishnah that “whoever does not consider the honor of 
His maker, it were a mercy if he had not come into the world,” with 
the promise made by R. Ishmael and R. Akiva in Shi‘ur Qomah that 
everyone who understands this text and recites it every day attains the 
World to Come. They ask R. Sherira:
Did R. Ishmael state what he learned from his teacher, and his 
teacher from his teacher, as a law (halakhah) of Moses from Sinai, or 
did he state it as his own opinion? And if this was his own opinion, 
did we not learn in the Mishnah: “Whoever does not consider the 
honor of his Maker, it were a mercy if he had not come into the 
world”? May our Master thoroughly explain this matter to us.19
R. Sherira responds by indicating that Rabbi Ishmael was stating an 
authentic tradition, but this tradition should not be understood liter-
ally, as God has no limbs or measurements. A true understanding of 
these matters, which R. Sherira sees as belonging to the merkavah 
tradition, and is in fact the most esoteric part of this tradition, must 
remain confined to the elite few as the Mishnah mandates. He thus 
18 The opening of Heikhalot Rabbati reads like a recruitment manual, spelling out the 
rewards and powers accruing in this world to the one who masters the subject and 
successfully completes the mystical journey.
19 See Simcha Emanuel (ed.), Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot (Jerusalem: Machon 
Ofek, 1995), 217.
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excuses himself from delving into these secrets and offering a thor-
ough explanation.20
One can detect in R. Sherira’s response an ambivalent attitude 
towards the text in question. On one hand, he does not challenge its 
authenticity. On the other hand, he seeks to neutralize the tradition it 
represents by indicating that it should not be understood literally and 
suggesting that the simple recitation of this tradition has no eschatolog-
ical significance.
A fundamental question raised by R. Sherira’s response is: how 
should Shi‘ur Qomah be understood in his view? What were the alter-
native approaches to the Account of the Chariot traditions in the geonic 
period? It appears that the most important one is that of R. Saadiah 
Gaon. In a passage from a lost polemical work of his, preserved by 
R. Judah ben Barzilai al-Barceloni in his commentary on the Book of 
Creation, R. Saadiah goes so far as to challenge the authenticity of 
Shi‘ur Qomah. Even if it is an authentic tanaitic text, he continues, it 
clearly is not meant to be a description of God but of a special created 
light, known also as God’s Glory (kavod).21
A description of the Glory is brought by R. Saadiah in Book of 
Beliefs and Opinions 2.10. After interpreting the corporeal descriptions 
of God in the Bible in a figurative manner, R. Saadiah turns to the 
problem of understanding the nature of the image of God sitting on the 
throne, as reported in a number of biblical passages, including Ezekiel 
1:26. He writes:
The form was something created. Similarly, the throne and the 
firmament, as well as its bearers, were all of them produced for the 
first time by the Creator out of fire. . . . It is a form nobler even than 
that of the angels, magnificent in character, resplendent with light, 
which is called the Glory of the Lord. It is this form too that one of 
the prophets described as follows: I beheld till thrones were placed and 
one that was ancient of days did sit [Daniel 7:9], and the Sages 
20 Ibid., 217-218.
21 Judah al-Barceloni, Perush Sefer Yetsirah, ed. S. J. Halberstam (Berlin: Mekize 
Nirdamim, 1885), 20-22.
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characterized as shekhinah. Sometimes, however, this specially 
created being consists of light without the form of a person.22
R. Saadiah’s approach provided a theological alternative to the mysti-
cal-anthropomorphic approach of the Heikhalot tradition. The image 
sitting on the throne is of a visible creature, the noblest one created by 
God, who can take on different shapes or no shape at all, appearing 
solely as a special light, in accordance with the divine decree.23 R. Sherira 
may have had R. Saadiah’s view in mind when he indicates that Shi‘ur 
Qomah should not be understood literally. Unlike R. Saadiah, he does 
not go so far as to question the authenticity of this work.
It is not clear from R. Saadiah’s account, however, what are the 
secrets involved in the study of the Account of the Chariot. R. Saadiah 
points to the danger in beholding the face of the Created Glory—it can 
lead to the physical decomposition of the person24—but not in studying 
traditions regarding this creature or the different heavenly creatures 
mentioned in Ezekiel. Nor does his theology suggest that the study of 
the heavenly world will lead to witnessing this sight. The Created Glory 
is revealed to the one chosen by God to be a prophet in order to confirm 
the prophetic mission.25 Aside from reading the first chapter of Ezekiel 
in a literal manner while substituting the Glory of God, rather than 
God, as the subject of the end of the chapter, R. Saadiah has left us 
with no deeper understanding of Ezekiel’s description.
No less important than R. Sherira Gaon’s response for showing the 
inroads made by the Heikhalot literature in its acceptance by the Jewish 
22 Saadiah Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 121. For an analysis of R. Saadiah’s concep-
tion of the Created Glory, see Alexander Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: 
Its Origin and Background,” in Saadya Studies, ed. E. I. J. Rosenthal (Manchester: 
University of Manchester Press, 1943), 4-25. See also Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), 59-91.
23 It should be noted that R. Saadiah also accepts the existence of angels as ethereal 
creatures who serve the incorporeal deity and make their way from heaven to earth.
24 Book of Beliefs and Opinions 2.12: 130. See Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea 
in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 131.
25 Ibid., 2.10; 3.5.
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public by the end of the tenth century and beginning of the eleventh, 
is the response of his son R. Hai Gaon to questions addressed to him 
regarding the interpretation of the story of the four sages who entered 
pardes:
Know that it has never been our way to conceal anything or to inter-
pret it not in accordance with the thought of its author, as others do. 
We will interpret for you the view of this tana [sage of the Mishnah], 
the matter as he intended and the truth as he held it, without guar-
anteeing at present that [acceptance] of these matters is legally 
binding (halakhah). . . . Perhaps you are aware that many of the sages 
were of the opinion that one who is upright . . . when he wishes to 
gaze upon the merkavah and glance at the palaces of the angels on 
high, there are several ways to accomplish this: He should fast on 
certain known days and place his head between his knees and whisper 
to the ground many songs and praises, which have been disclosed. 
Then he glimpses its [merkavah’s] innermost parts and chambers as 
one who sees with his eyes seven palaces and gazes at them as though 
he goes from palace to palace and sees what is in each one. There are 
two books of Mishnah that the tanas taught regarding this matter, 
and they are called Heikhalot Rabbati and Heikhalot Zutarti. This 
matter is well known. Regarding gazing [upon the merkavah], this 
tana taught: “Four entered pardes.” He likened these palaces to an 
orchard and pictured these four [sages], in accordance with his 
opinion, as gazing at the merkavah and viewing the entrance to the 
palaces as one who enters an orchard. This interpretation is clear 
from the context [of the story]. First, the passage of the mishnah 
upon which this teaching is brought is: “. . . Nor [is taught] the 
[Account of the] Chariot in the presence of one, unless he is a sage 
and understands by his own intelligence.” Furthermore, it is stated 
in the baraitha explicity: “R. Akiva said: When you arrive at the 
stones of pure marble, say not: Water water.” In Heikhalot Zutarti, 
this is explained as follows: “The entrance to the sixth palace appears 
as though it contains thousands of myriads of waves of water, yet it 
contains not a single drop. Rather it contains luminous air and trans-
parent stones of pure marble, like a palace whose luminous appearance 
is similar to water.”26 . . . R. Akiva was more perfect than the others, 
for he glanced as required and gazed properly and his mind was able 
to contain these frightening sights, so God granted him life. Every-
thing upon which he gazed he grasped properly with the correct 
26 For a slightly different variant of the text, see Rachel Elior (ed.), Heikhalot Zutarti 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1982), 30.
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understanding. Know that this interpretation was accepted by all the 
earliest [sages] and none of them denied it, since they said that God 
performs signs and wonders by means of the righteous just as He 
does by means of the prophets, and He shows the righteous wondrous 
sights as He does for the prophets. . . . The master R. Samuel Gaon 
and others like him, who frequently consulted the books of the 
gentiles, maintain that these sights were seen only by the prophets, 
and no miracle is performed except for a prophet. They deny all tales 
in which it is claimed that a miracle was performed for the righteous 
and say that this is not a legally binding opinion. Even the tale 
regarding R. Akiva gazing upon the palaces, and what is told about 
R. Neḥunia ben Haqana and R. Ishmael and others like them27—
they say that belief in all these stories is not legally binding. We, 
however, are of the opinion that God performs miracles and great 
wonders for the righteous, and it is not farfetched that He shows 
them inwardly the sights of His palaces and the status of His angels.28
R. Hai neither casts any doubt on the view that the talmudic story of 
the four who entered pardes is an allegory for gazing at the merkavah, 
nor does he question the authenticity of the Heikholot literature as 
tanaitic compositions describing the merkavah and the preparations an 
individual must undergo in order to be able to gaze at it. From his 
response, one can detect to what extent the Heikhalot literature was 
considered the primary one for understanding the Account of the 
Chariot in his time. Though he expresses some doubt as to whether one 
must accept these views as absolute truth, he himself is clearly convinced 
of their veracity. 
As for the position of his father-in-law, R. Samuel ben Hofni Gaon,29 
head of the academy at Sura, who appears to reject the authenticity of 
27 The reference here is to the stories found in Heikhalot Rabbati of the ascents of 
R. Neḥunia ben Haqana and R. Ishmael and the wondrous and terrifying sights 
beheld by each of them. 
28 Compare to R. Nathan ben Yeḥiel, Sefer Arukh ha-Shalem, ed. Alexander Kohut, 
vol. 1 (Vienna, 1878), 14 (entry: avnei shayish [stones of marble]): “. . . baraitha, not 
that they ascend to on high, but they see and gaze in the chambers of their hearts 
like a person who sees and gazes on something distinct with his eyes, and they hear 
and speak with an eye that sees by the holy spirit. This is the interpretation of 
R. Hai Gaon.”
29 On the thought of R. Samuel, see David Sklare, Samuel ben Hofni Gaon and his 
Cultural World (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
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this literature by questioning whether the righteous are granted the expe-
riences described in it, R. Hai criticizes him for being influenced by 
gentile literature—an allusion to the Moslem theologians, the 
mutakallimūn, who were of the opinion that God performs miracles only 
in order to verify the mission of the prophets.30 R. Samuel follows here in 
the footsteps of his predecessor, R. Saadiah, who presented this view in 
his Book of Beliefs and Opinions,31 and, as we have already seen, ques-
tioned the authenticity of Shi‘ur Qomah. From R. Hai’s response, one 
gains the impression that the skeptics were in the minority, and that their 
views on this issue were to be rejected, since they were influenced by 
non-Jewish sources. We may conclude from what we have seen till now 
that the Heikhalot literature, Shi‘ur Qomah, and the Book of Creation 
attained and maintained their lofty status among the Jews of the geonic 
period.32
Both the Heikhalot tradition and R. Saadiah’s approach were 
known to the Jewish thinkers of Spain in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, but neither of these approaches dominated their thinking. 
Many adopted Neoplatonic philosophy in understanding the order of 
existence, conjunction with the higher world being the goal of this 
study. The stage was set to interpret the Account of the Chariot in 
terms of the Greek philosophic tradition, which reached them by way 
of Arabic translations of the Greek texts and compositions by Moslem 
thinkers influenced by this tradition. Yet in the dominant Jewish phil-
osophic treatises of this period—for example, Solomon Ibn Gabirol’s 
Fountain of Life and Joseph Ibn Ẓaddik’s The Book of the Microcosm—
there is no attempt to explain Ezekiel’s vision. The wedding between 
Neoplatonic philosophy and the Account of the Chariot can be detected 
in Ibn Gabirol’s poetry, particularly his majestic poem The Royal Crown. 
30 See Michael Schwarz’s remark in his Hebrew translation of the Guide of the 
Perplexed (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2002), 214 n. 62. 
31 See Book of Beliefs and Opinions 3.4.
32 This literature also left its impression on Rashi. See, for example, his commentary 
on BT Ḥagigah 14b. For a discussion of the influence of the Heikhalot literature on 
Rashi, see Ephraim Kanarfogel, Peering through the Lattices: Mystical, Magical, and 
Pietistic Dimensions in the Tosafist Period (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
2000), 149-151. 
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At the heart of this poem is a description of the nine principle celestial 
spheres, in keeping with Ptolemaic astronomy. Above these spheres is 
the “Sphere of Intelligence”:
Who shall descend as deep as Thy thoughts?
For from the splendor of the sphere of Intelligence Thou hast 
wrought the radiance of souls
And the high angels that are the messengers of Thy will,
The ministers of Thy presence,
Majestic of power and great in the Kingdom of heaven,
“In their hand the flaming sword that turneth every way” 
. . .
From a holy place are they come,
And from the fount of light are they drawn.
They are divided into companies,
And on their banner are signs graven of the pen of the swift scribe.
There are superior and attendant bands,
And hosts running and returning,
But never weary and never faint,
Seeing but invisible.
And there are some wrought of flame,
And some are wafted air,
And some compounded of fire and water,
And there are Serafim in burning rows,
And winged lightnings and darting arrows of fire,
And each troop of them all bows itself down
“To Him who rideth the highest heavens.”33
Ibn Gabirol uses many motifs borrowed from Ezekiel’s vision in 
describing the world of the supernal Intellect. In the next stanza he 
deals with the final level, the Throne of Glory:
33 Israel Davidson (ed.), Selected Religious Poems of Solomon Ibn Gabirol, trans. Israel 
Zangwill (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1923), 100-101.
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For beyond the sphere of Intelligence hast Thou established the 
Throne of Thy glory;
There standeth the splendor of Thy veiled habitation,
And the mystery and the foundation.
Thus far reacheth Intelligence, but cometh here to a standstill,
For higher still hast Thou mounted, and ascended Thy mighty 
throne,
“And no man may go up with Thee.”34
One may interpret the images in Ibn Gabirol’s poem in light of his 
philosophical discourse in the Fountain of Life, in which he describes 
the supernal simple beings—Universal Soul and the Universal—that 
are found above the material world and serve as the source of the indi-
vidual forms. These beings are alluded to in the poem in the description 
of the “Sphere of Intelligence.” The Throne of Glory signifies the levels 
above them—Universal Form and Universal Matter. At the pinnacle of 
the hierarchy of being are found the divine Will and the First Being, an 
apparent reference to God, the apprehension of which is beyond human 
ability.35 Even if one accepts this interpretation, it does not provide us 
with a detailed understanding of the components of Ezekiel’s vision in 
Ibn Gabirol’s thought.
A more explicit understanding of the Account of the Chariot may 
be found in Judah Halevi’s philosophic treatise, the Kuzari. He adopts 
an ambiguous stance in his understanding of the celestial realm, which 
leads him to present three different approaches to the Account of the 
Chariot. The first approach follows in the footsteps of R. Saadiah, 
who views the Created Glory as the most sublime of God’s creations, 
34 Ibid., 102.
35 For a study of Ibn Gabirol’s philosophy, see Jacques Schlanger, La philosophie de 
Salomon Ibn Gabirol (Leiden: Brill, 1968). See also Sarah Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’s 
Theology of Desire: Matter and Method in Jewish Medieval Neoplatonism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). Harry A. Wolfson interprets the Throne of 
Glory as a figurative representation of Universal Matter. In support of his interpre-
tation he refers to Fountain of Life 5.42, where Universal Matter is described as a 
cathedra for the One, and upon which sits the Will. See Harry A. Wolfson, Reper-
cussions of the Kalām in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), 118.
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and which is represented by the man who is sitting on the throne at 
the beginning of Ezekiel. The second approach appears to be based on 
the notion of the pleroma found among the mystics. Halevi writes 
(Kuzari 4.3):
Concerning the visions seen by Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, there is 
some doubt whether their objects were newly created, or of the 
number of these lasting spiritual beings. “Glory of God” is that 
subtle substance which follows the will of God, assuming any form 
God wishes to show to the prophet. This is one view. According to 
another view, the Glory of God means the whole of the angels and 
spiritual beings, as well as the throne, chariot, firmament, wheels, 
spheres, and other imperishable beings. All this is styled “Glory,” 
just as a king’s retinue is called his splendor.
According to both these interpretations of the Glory, the beings beheld 
the prophets were made visible to the prophets’ eyesight. Halevi adds: 
“The higher degrees of these beings are so transcendent that even the 
prophets cannot perceive them, and if he attempts to perceive them his 
body will decompose” (ibid.), a description taken from R. Saadiah’s 
discussion of the consequences of seeing the face of the Glory.36 Halevi 
understands the Jewish mystical traditions in light of the idea of the 
Created Glory that the prophets merit seeing, mentioning explicitly 
the Account of the Chariot and Shi‘ur Qomah in this context.37
Halevi considers a third possibility, namely that “some angels . . . 
are lasting, and are perhaps those spiritual beings of which the philoso-
phers speak” (ibid.)—a clear reference to the Separate Intellects that 
are dressed in corporeal forms by the prophet’s imagination.38
36 See above, note 24. Both authors use the same Arabic expression to indicate the 
decomposition of the body.
37 See Kuzari 4.3. For an analysis of the extensive use by Halevi of motifs taken from 
older Jewish mystical traditions, see Elliot Wolfson, “Merkavah Traditions in Phil-
osophical Garb: Judah Halevi Reconsidered,” Proceedings of the American Academy 
for Jewish Research 57 (1990-91): 179-242.
38 For a discussion of this issue, see Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medi-
eval Jewish Philosophy, 125-136; see, however, Warren Z. Harvey, “Judah Halevi’s 
Synesthetic Theory of Prophecy and a Note on the Zohar,” Jerusalem Studies in 
Jewish Thought 12 (1996): 141-155 (Heb.). In Kuzari 3.65 Halevi mentions the 
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The understanding of the Account of the Chariot in terms of the 
Neoplatonic philosophic tradition emerges clearly from a number of 
Ibn Ezra’s works.39 As in the case of his predecessors, he does not 
present a detailed explication of this subject, at least not in his extant 
works. In his commentary to Isaiah 6, he indicates that he will explain 
the components of this vision in his commentary to Ezekiel, but no 
such commentary has survived and it is questionable whether Ibn Ezra 
completed one. In several passages in his commentaries, most notably 
in his long commentary to Exodus 3:15 and in his commentary to Daniel 
10:21, Ibn Ezra equates the angels with those beings who exist as forms 
without bodies, a reference to the supernal intellects, and with the 
heavenly spheres.40 In Yesod Mora, Ibn Ezra indicates that Ezekiel’s 
vision of God as a man sitting on a throne should not be interpreted 
literally.41 In a later passage in the treatise, he describes the content and 
significance of the highest knowledge attainable by the human being:
God alone created all, and knows all the parts in a general way 
 for all the parts change. Only the ,[ה' לבדו בורא הכל ויודע חלקי הכל בדרך כל]
human soul bestowed by God is like a tablet prepared to be written 
upon. And when the writing of God is written on this tablet—that 
is, knowledge of the principles of what is generated from the four 
roots [earth, water, air, and fire], and knowledge of the spheres, the 
Throne of Glory, and the secret of the merkavah and knowledge of 
the Supernal [or: and the Supernal Intellect, דעת עליון]—then the soul 
Account of the Chariot, and he also agrees with the view that the Heikhalot litera-
ture was written by the Sages of the Mishnah.
39 I do not mean to suggest that Ibn Ezra’s esoteric theological views are derived in 
their entirety from Neoplatonic philosophy, whether that of Ibn Gabirol or 
Avicenna, and all his vague references should be understood in terms of this philos-
ophy. Clearly other sources also underlie his theological views, as evidenced by his 
discussion of the divine names in his long commentary to Exodus 3:15 and the 
mathematical significance of the letters composing the Tetragrammaton that he 
presents there.
40 Both sources present three levels of existents, but they divide the levels differently. 
See also his long commentary to Exodus 33:21. For a discussion of these sources see 
Howard Kreisel, “The Term Kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra: A Reappraisal,” Revue des 
études juives 153 (1994): 39-48.
41 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, ed. Joseph Cohen (Ramat-Gan: 
Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), chap. 1, 84.
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conjoins with the glorious Name while it still dwells in the person, 
and so [it remains] when it separates from the body.42
In this passage, Ibn Ezra mentions in passing the main subjects belonging 
to the natural and divine sciences without entering into detail. The 
study of the chariot follows the study of the spheres and the Throne of 
Glory, suggesting that it refers to the incorporeal world. The mastery of 
these sciences leads to conjunction and immortality. As in the case of 
Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ezra gives a poetic expression to this approach. In his 
Hebrew adaptation of Avicenna’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, Ibn Ezra describes 
the nine spheres, followed by the supernal world of the various groups 
of angels beyond the spheres, and culminating with God.43 While Ibn 
Ezra does not explain these classes, they probably should be under-
stood in terms of the Aristotelian view Avicenna adopted of the 
Separate Intellects, who are the Movers of the spheres. Ibn Ezra does 
not attempt to list ten classes of angels, corresponding to the ten Sepa-
rate Intellects (nine Movers of the spheres and the Active Intellect) in 
Islamic Aristotelian philosophy, but among those he mentions are 
keruvim, serafim, and ofannim—groups of angels found in the account 
42 Ibid., chap. 10, 168-169. The term דעת עליון occurs a number of times in Ibn Ezra’s 
writings, but it does not appear that it is used in a consistent manner. In his 
commentary to Genesis 6:2, Exodus 25:6, and Psalms 89:7, the term appears to 
refer to astrological/astronomical knowledge. In other passages, such as the short 
commentary to Exodus 33:12 and the commentary to Psalms 94:10, it refers to the 
Supernal Intellect. In the alternate (long) commentary to Genesis 3:21, it is used in 
an ambiguous manner. On the question of whether the Supernal Intellect is a refer-
ence to the Deity or to a hypostasis beneath the Deity, see Kreisel, “The Term Kol 
in Abraham Ibn Ezra,” 51; see, however, Elliot Wolfson, “God, the Demiurge and 
the Intellect: On the Usage of the Word Kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra,” Revue des 
études juives 149 (1990): 105.
43 See Israel Levin (ed.), Abraham Ibn Ezra Reader (New York and Tel-Aviv: Israel 
Matz Hebrew Classics, 1985), 73-87 (Heb.). Levin brings also a Hebrew translation 
of Avicenna’s poem on pages 91-99. For a study of Avicenna’s poem, see Henry 
Corbin, Avicenne et le récit visionaire (Tehran: Département d’Iranologie de l’In-
stitut Franco-Iranien, 1954). For a comparison between the two poems, see Aaron 
Hughes, “A Case of Twelfth-Century Plagiarism? Abraham Ibn Ezra’s ‘Ḥay ben 
Meqitz’ and Avicenna’s ‘Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān,’” Journal of Jewish Studies 55 (2004): 
306-331. 
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of Ezekiel or Isaiah.44 It should be added that Ibn Ezra mentions Shi‘ur 
Qomah in his long commentary to Exodus 33:21 and Yesod Mora. Like 
R. Sherira Gaon and Judah Halevi before him, he accepts the authen-
ticity of this text but indicates that it should be interpreted in an 
allegorical manner.45
The most explicit attempt to understand the Account of the 
Chariot in terms of Aristotelian philosophy prior to Maimonides can be 
found in Abraham Ibn Daud’s Emunah Ramah.46 Ibn Daud presents 
the view that the stars are intelligent beings far superior to human 
beings. In showing how Scripture supports this view, he writes the 
following:
One who studies the beginning of Ezekiel on the Account of the 
Chariot and looks at what he says about the four living creatures: 
They had the likeness of a man [Ezekiel 1:5], and his further saying: 
As for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man and they four 
had the face of a lion on the right side and they four had the face of an 
ox on the left side; they four also had the face of an eagle [Ezekiel 1:10] 
. . . and his saying: When those moved they moved; and when those 
stood still these stood still; and when those were lifted up from the earth, 
the wheels were lifted up along with them, for the spirit of the living 
creature was in the wheels [Ezekiel 1:21]—one who looks at all these 
things will apprehend subtleties that we shall not explain insofar as 
our ancestors prevented us from so doing in their saying: “Whoever 
does not consider the honor of his Maker, it is proper that should 
not come into the world” (Mishnah Ḥagigah 2:1).47
While Ibn Daud pointedly refrains from entering into any of the details 
of Ezekiel’s vision, it is clear from his treatise that it should be under-
stood in terms of the nature of the heavenly existents and their influence 
on the earthly elements—a topic he describes in detail in light of 
44 Abraham Ibn Ezra Reader, 82-83.
45 Yesod Mora, chap. 1, 84; chap. 12, 201. See Alexander Altmann, “Moses Narboni’s 
‘Epistle on Shi‘ur Qoma,’” in Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (London: 
Routledge, 1969), 180-209.
46 For a study of Ibn Daud’s philosophy see T. A. M. Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: 
Abraham Ibn Daud (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1990).
47 Abraham Ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah, ed. Samuel Weil (Frankfurt A.M.: n.p., 
1852), 1, 8:43.
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Avicenna’s Neoplatonized version of Aristotle’s philosophy.48 As opposed 
to Ibn Ezra, who links the Account of the Chariot to the study of the 
world of incorporeal existents, Ibn Daud apparently understands Ezekiel’s 
vision as focusing upon, or at least including, the heavenly spheres. 
Emunah Ramah, however, made little impact on the generations imme-
diately following its appearance, as it was quickly eclipsed by 
Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.
Maimonides on the Account of the Chariot
It was left to Maimonides to develop the connection between the 
Account of the Chariot and the Greek philosophic tradition. Given 
the legal stature of the author, his treatment carried much weight by 
his contemporaries and continued to exert a profound influence on 
subsequent Jewish thought. In his commentary on Mishnah Ḥagigah 
2.1, Maimonides explains:
They [the Sages] understand by the Account of Creation natural 
science and an in-depth exploration of the principles of existence. By 
the Account of the Chariot, they understand divine science [or: the 
science of God, theology], which is an examination of existence in 
its entirety; the existence of the Creator and His knowledge and 
attributes and that all existents are necessarily derived from Him; 
the angels; the soul and intellect of man; and what transpires after 
death. Because of the stature of these two sciences—the natural and 
the divine—and their superiority, they were forbidden to be taught 
in the same manner as the propaedeutic [or mathematical] sciences.49
Maimonides attempts to tread a fine line between maintaining the 
esoteric nature of these subjects and at the same time giving an explicit 
indication of their content and clear allusions to the philosophic litera-
ture that elucidates these matters. The terms “natural” and “divine” 
science underscore Maimonides’ approach. Certainly anyone with knowl-
edge of the medieval Aristotelian tradition would appreciate his allusions. 
48 Ibn Daud deals with the heavenly spheres and their influences on the four elements 
in Emunah Ramah 1, 6:32; 2, 4, 2:59.
49 See Joseph Kafiḥ (ed. and Hebrew trans.), Mishnah ‘im Perush ha-Rambam: Seder 
Mo‘ed (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1963), 251.
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It is tempting to posit that one of the factors influencing Maimonides’ 
decision is the desire to halt the influence of Jewish mystical approaches 
found in the Heikhalot literature, Shi‘ur Qomah, and the Book of 
Creation, which he regarded as completely false and which hindered his 
co-religionists from appreciating the philosophic truths underlying 
Judaism.50 By and large he ignores these traditions, or one may say, 
treats them with silent distain, except for two notable passages in which 
he mentions Shi‘ur Qomah explicitly. The first is in his elaboration of 
the seventh principle of Judaism, dealing with the unique status of the 
prophecy of Moses, presented in the introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq in his 
Commentary on the Mishnah. Maimonides indicates that this work 
should be interpreted in the same manner as the prophetic visions of 
God—a clear indication that they are the product of the Sages’ imagi-
nations and should be interpreted allegorically.51 Only in a later epistle 
does Maimonides, going much further than even R. Saadiah, reject this 
anthropomorphic work out of hand, treating it as the work of “one of 
the Greek homilists” (i.e., a non-philosophical pagan work) that should 
be completely eradicated. Moreover, he denies having ever considered 
this composition one of the works of the Sages.52 For Maimonides there 
is only one true key to understanding the secrets embedded in the Bible 
and the Talmud regarding the esoteric sciences, and that key is to be 
found in the Aristotelian philosophic tradition.53
50 See Menachem Kellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism (Oxford: 
Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006), 1-32.
51 See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans), Haqdamot HaRambam la-Mishnah (Jeru-
salem: Ma‘aliyot, 1992), 143.
52 See Yehoshua Blau (ed.), Teshuvot ha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Reuben Mass, 1989), 
200-201. For a study of this issue, see Raphael Jospe, “Maimonides and Shi‘ur 
Qomah,” in Minḥah le-Sarah: Meḥqarim be-Filosofiyah Yehudit ve-Qabalah, ed. 
Devora Dimant, Moshe Idel, and Shlomo Rosenberg (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
1994), 195-209 (Heb.). It should be noted that Maimonides subsequently erased 
from his Commentary on the Mishnah the reference to Shi‘ur Qomah; See Shailat, 
Haqdamot HaRambam la-Mishnah, 143 n. 27.
53 Maimonides alludes to this view in his discussion of the sixth principle of Judaism; 
See Shailat, Haqdamot HaRambam la-Mishnah, 142. In the Guide, he is much more 
explicit on this matter: see, for example, Guide 1.68; 2.2. The great esteem with 
which Maimonides held Aristotle and his disciples—which can be discerned in all 
his compositions even regarding those issues on which he apparently disagreed 
with them—testifies to the fact that he did not equate the “Greek homilists” with 
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Maimonides’ acceptance of the Aristotelian tradition and his desire 
to identify this tradition with the Account of Creation and Account of 
the Chariot receives its most explicit expression in the first four chap-
ters of the first book of the Mishneh Torah, Book of Knowledge, in the 
Laws of Principles of the Torah. In the first two chapters, Maimonides 
deals with the Account of the Chariot, the subject of these chapters 
being God and the “Separate Forms” that exist independent of body—a 
clear allusion to the Separate Intellects. He lists ten classes of angels,54 
corresponding to the most widely accepted number of such Separate 
Intellects in Aristotelian thought, particularly among Alfarabi and his 
followers.55 The two highest classes listed by Maimonides are the ḥayyot 
and ofannim appearing In Ezekiel’s vision, which refer to the Mover of 
the outermost sphere and to the Mover of the sphere of fixed stars 
respectively. Maimonides thus appears to give a clearer expression to the 
view Ibn Ezra alludes to that the Account of the Chariot is concerned 
with the world of incorporeal being. Maimonides outlines the Account 
of Creation in the next two chapters, and the subject of this science is 
the material existents—the celestial spheres and the sublunar existents. 
Maimonides ends his outline of this subject by mentioning the form of 
human intellect that attains immortality—“the intellect that is the form 
of the soul”—a clear allusion to the “acquired intellect” as depicted by 
Alfarabi.56 He concludes his entire presentation by presenting a novel 
the Aristotelian philosophers, but rather with those whose were inspired by Greek 
mythology. It is important to note that this tradition as it developed in the Arabic 
world is permeated by many Neoplatonic ideas, giving it a more mystical bent—
particularly the idea of conjunction of the human intellect with the supernal 
intellect and the illumination of the intellect experienced in this state. Maimon-
ides’ rejection of the earlier Jewish mystical tradition does not reflect a rejection of 
mysticism per se, which was very much part of the philosophic tradition in his 
period. See Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides’ Attitude toward Jewish Mysti-
cism,” in Studies in Jewish Thought, ed. Alfred Jospe (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1981), 200-219.
54 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 2.7.
55 See Richard Walzer (ed. and trans.), Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 101-105.
56 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 4.8. This intellect, according to 
Alfarabi, is no longer dependent upon the body for its existence. It is acquired 
from the Active Intellect when a person completes his studies, grasps the essence 
of the incorporeal existent—namely, of the Active Intellect—and consequently 
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interpretation of pardes as it appears in the story of the four sages in 
Tractate Ḥagigah. It does not refer to a heavenly ascent, but to the 
investigation of the natural and divine sciences. Only one who is intel-
lectually capable and fully prepared by completing all the necessary 
preliminary studies can emerge intellectually and spiritually unscathed 
from an exploration of these sciences.57 Yet only with the mastery of 
these sciences does one completely fulfill the highest of religious obli-
gations, the love and fear of God.58
The course is now set. Any follower of Maimonides pursuing the 
path he laid down would understand that the mastery of the Aristote-
lian sciences is far from an act of heresy, as many prior to and after 
Maimonides would have it. Rather, this activity is a legal obligation 
and the road to human perfection—a view that would soon give impetus 
to the translation of Aristotle and his commentators, particularly Aver-
roes, into Hebrew in the non-Arabic-speaking Jewish world of Western 
Europe, the translation of other philosophic and scientific treatises, 
the writing of supercommentaries and encyclopedias of philosophy 
and science,59 and the writing of commentaries on the Bible and the 
Midrash that are based on philosophical literature in the spirit of 
Maimonides’ approach.
conjoins with the Active Intellect. For a discussion of this intellect, see Herbert 
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 48-70. Maimonides’ description of the perfect human intellect is in 
harmony with this view, as he writes there: “And the additional intellect which is 
found in the soul of a person is the form of the person of perfect intellect. Regarding 
this form, the Torah says: Let us make a man in our image and likeness [Genesis 
1:26], that is to say, that he will possess a form that knows and grasps the intellects 
that have no body, like the angels that are form without body, till he resembles 
them.” Compare this to Maimonides’ description of the prophet in Mishneh Torah, 
Laws of Principles of the Torah 7.1; see also Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political 
Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 137-139.
57 Maimonides, however, makes no allusion to physical dangers. Compare Guide 1.32.
58 For a discussion of the love and fear of God in Maimonides, see Maimonides’ Polit-
ical Thought, 225-266.
59 See Gad Freudenthal, “Les sciences dans les communautes juives mediévales de 
Provence: Leur appropriation, leur role,” Revue des études juives 152 (1993): 29-136. 
Many of these encyclopedias have been studied in Steve Harvey (ed.), The Medieval 
Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000).
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Though one may infer from Maimonides’ pronouncements in his 
various writings which sciences one must learn in order to attain intel-
lectual perfection, less clear is the scope of the divine science, or the 
Account of the Chariot, in his thought. Is this science completely iden-
tical with Aristotelian metaphysics or is there a difference between the 
topics with which Aristotle deals in his Metaphysics and those which 
Maimonides regards as belonging to the divine science? Moreover, do 
the prophetic parables belonging to the Account of the Chariot, after 
they are properly deciphered, agree completely with the views of the 
Aristotelian philosophers according to Maimonides, or are there signif-
icant points of disagreement between them? To these questions there 
are no unequivocal answers, as we shall see—a point that would prove 
critical for the subsequent interpretation of Maimonides’ thought.
Aristotle offers three essential definitions of metaphysics: 1) the 
study of that which is eternal and incorporeal; 2) the study of being qua 
being (or substance qua substance); 3) the study of the principles under-
lying the individual branches of the sciences, such as mathematics and 
physics.60 Aristotle’s definition, it should be noted, carries within it the 
60 The contents of metaphysics in medieval Jewish philosophic thought, together with 
the Greek and Islamic background, have been explored by Harry Wolfson, “The 
Classification of Sciences in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Hebrew Union College 
Jubilee Volume (1925): 263-315. Alexander Altmann expanded upon, as well as 
corrected, some of Wolfson’s observations regarding Maimonides and his prede-
cessors in his article, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” 
in Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklaerung (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1987), 77-84. Altmann’s article essentially aims at rebutting Pines’ view on the 
limitations of knowledge in Maimonides’ thought; see Shlomo Pines, “The Limita-
tions of Human Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” 
in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University, 1979), 82-109. Altmann was followed by Herbert 
Davidson, who went about trying to achieve this objective in a much more direct 
manner in his article “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” Maimonidean 
Studies 3 (1992-93): 49-103. See also Gad Freudenthal, “Maimonides on the Scope 
of Metaphysics alias Ma‘aseh Merkavah: the Evolution of his Views,” in Maimónides y 
su época, ed. Carlos del Valle, Santiago Garcia-Jalon and Juan Pedro Monferrer 
(Madrid: Sociedad Estatel de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2007), 221-230. An 
expanded Hebrew version of this article, “Four Observations on Maimonides’ 
Four Celestial Globes (Guide 2:9-10),” appears in Maimonides: Conservatism, Origi-
nality and Revolution, ed. Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Shazar Center, 2009), vol. 
2, 499-527. For a treatment of the issue of the scope of metaphysics in Avicenna’s 
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seeds of blurring the distinctions between many of the sciences. Aristotle 
himself brings extracts from Physics and from other treatises in the 
course of his discussion in Metaphysics. The reason for this fact is not 
hard to discern. While metaphysics is concerned primarily with incor-
poreal existents, corporeal existents also enter into the picture, since 
they constitute part of the study of substance per se, in addition to the 
fact that a study of the principles underlying their existence and motion 
is, for Aristotle, a metaphysical topic. Moreover, insofar as Aristotle’s 
proof of God, as well as the other incorporeal Movers, is based on the 
motion of the spheres, the study of the spheres is integrally related to 
metaphysics. Aristotle himself notes in Metaphysics:
That the Movers are substances, then, and that one of these is first 
and another second according to the same order as the movements of 
the stars, is evident. But in the number of the movements we reach 
a problem which must be treated from the standpoint of that one of 
the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy—viz. of 
astronomy; for this science speculates about substance that is percep-
tible but eternal . . . .61
According to Aristotle, there are subjects that are common to meta-
physics and the other sciences and in essence belong to more than one 
area. As we shall see below, the problem of where to draw the line 
between metaphysics and the other sciences becomes all the more 
evident in the medieval treatments of this subject, particularly that of 
Maimonides.
While not all medieval thinkers equated divine science with 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics or with the topics included in this work, Aristo-
tle’s approach played a dominant role in defining divine science or 
theology in medieval philosophy. In his Enumeration on the Sciences, 
Alfarabi adopts Aristotle’s view and expands upon it.62 He divides the 
natural sciences into eight parts, beginning with the principles common 
thought and its philosophic antecedents, see Dmitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aris-
totelian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 237-267.
61 Metaphysics 12.8, 1073b, l.1-5 (translated by W.D. Ross).
62 The Hebrew translation by Kalonymos ben Kalonymos was edited by Mauro 
Zonta, La “Classificione delle Science” di Al-Farabi nella Tradizione Ebraica (Torino: 
Silvio Zamorani Editore, 1992), 23-30.
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to all natural substances, moving on to an exploration of the heavenly 
bodies and the four sublunar elements and culminating in an explora-
tion of the human soul and phenomena associated with it. In detailing 
each part, he points to the treatises or sections in which Aristotle 
treated the subject, beginning with Physics, continuing with On the 
Heavens, On Generation and Degeneration, Meteorology, On Minerals, 
On Plants, and On Animals, and ending with the treatises On the Soul 
and Parva Naturalia.63 The divine science is divided into three topics and 
confined to one Aristotelian text, Metaphysics. The topics are as follows: 
1) the existents and the accidents accompanying them; 2) the founda-
tions of each science; 3) non-corporeal entities, their different ranks, the 
First Cause (God), God’s attributes, how the existents came to be from 
God, their ranks, their connections with each other, and their perfec-
tion. The first topic is equivalent to the study of being qua being.64
Maimonides is aware of Alfarabi’s approach and adopts it, though 
in none of his writings does he follow it slavishly. In Commentary on 
the Mishnah: Ḥagigah and Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the 
Torah, Maimonides offers two different divisions between the natural 
sciences and the divine science. In the former treatise, he does not 
elaborate on the scope of the natural sciences, but includes a list of 
topics belonging to the divine science: a study of being in general; a 
study of God, His attributes and His role as the cause of all existents; 
a study of the angels, which Maimonides does not identify in this 
63 It is strongly doubted that the treatises On Minerals and On Plants were written by 
Aristotle. He did write five treatises devoted to living creatures, which were 
condensed in the Arabic version to a single treatise, On Animals. Parva Naturalia 
consists of a number of his short treatises devoted to dreams, divination, and the 
factors that determine the length of life. Ibn Falaquera cites Alfarabi’s list in his 
treatise Reshit Ḥokhmah (The Beginning of Wisdom), but then offers a slightly 
different division; see Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera, Reshit Ḥokhmah, ed. David Moritz 
(Berlin: M. Poppelauer Press, 1902), 50-52. 
64 La “Classificione delle Science,” 29-31; cf. Ibn Falaquera, Reshit Hokhmah, 53-55. 
Ibn Falaquera posits five divisions of the divine science, essentially subdividing 
Alfarabi’s third division into three parts: 1) God; 2) the eternal spiritual existents 
(the Separate Intellects) and the secondary spiritual existents (either the Active 
Intellect or the souls of the spheres) that are appointed over the heavens and 
govern nature; 3) knowledge that the heavenly bodies and those of the lower 
world are subservient to these spiritual existents.
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context, but elsewhere in his commentary he treats as the Separate 
Intellects; and a study of the human soul and immortality. In contrast 
to Alfarabi, Maimonides does not mention the principles of the indi-
vidual sciences among the topics of the divine science, and he sees the 
study of the soul and immortality as belonging to this science, and not 
to the natural sciences. In the Mishneh Torah, he distinguishes between 
the Account of the Chariot and the Account of Creation on the basis 
of the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal existents. The 
issue of the nature of substance in general is not mentioned, and more 
significantly, the nature of the human soul and its immortality are 
included in a discussion of the natural sciences, not the divine science. 
In both sources, the topic of the celestial bodies belongs to the Account 
of Creation, in the former implicitly and in the latter explicitly. It 
should be noted that Maimonides’ division here is reminiscent of, 
though not identical to, the distinction between the divine science and 
the natural sciences in the Treatise on Logic, irrespective of the problem 
of whether he is the author of this work.65 In the fourteenth chapter of 
the Treatise on Logic, the divine science is divided into two parts, the 
first dealing with the incorporeal existents—God and the Separate 
Intellects—and the second with the “remote causes of the subject 
matter of the other sciences.”66 The natural sciences, on the other 
hand, deal with all existents in nature, ranging from the minerals to 
the animals, and their properties.67 In this classification, neither the 
study of the human soul nor the spheres is mentioned explicitly.
The reason for the ambivalent position occupied by a study of the 
human soul is not hard to discern. On one hand, the human soul is 
attached to a body, hence its study belongs to the natural sciences. 
65 Maimonides’ authorship of this work has been challenged by Herbert Davidson, 
“The Authenticity of Works attributed to Maimonides,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies 
in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life, ed. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
2001), 118-125. See, however, Ahmad Hasnawi, “Réflexions sur la terminologie 
logique de Maïmonide et son contexte farabien: Le Guide des perplexes et la Traité 
de logique,” in Maïmonide: Philosophe et Savant, ed. Tony Lévy and Roshdi Rashed 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 69-73.
66 See Israel Efros (ed. and trans.), Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (New York: Amer-
ican Academy for Jewish Research, 1938), 63.
67 Ibid.
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Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul was classified by Alfarabi as the culmi-
nating work on the natural sciences as we have seen. On the other 
hand, the soul has the potential of achieving the state of immortality as 
an incorporeal being, hence its study belongs to the divine science.68 At 
any rate, Maimonides reverts to a more strict Aristotelian approach in 
the Mishneh Torah.
Maimonides’ approach in the Guide reiterates his identification of 
the Account of Creation and Account of the Chariot with the Aristote-
lian sciences,69 and at the same time complicates matters. He includes 
in his treatise a commentary, albeit an esoteric one, on the Account of 
the Chariot in the book of Ezekiel. Moreover, he indicates in his 
introduction to this commentary that it is not based on a received 
tradition (Guide 3.introduction: 416):
There is the fact that in that which has occurred to me with regard 
to these matters I followed conjecture and supposition; no divine 
revelation has come to me to teach me that the intention in the 
matter in question was such and such, nor did I receive what I 
believe in these matters from a teacher. But the texts of the prophetic 
books and the dicta of the Sages, together with the speculative prem-
ises that I possess, showed me that things are indubitably so. Yet it 
is possible that they are different and that something else is intended.
The speculative premises are clearly those of Aristotelian philosophy, as 
a comparison of his commentary with his discussion on God’s gover-
nance of the world at the beginning of part 2 of the Guide makes 
evident.70
68 Maimonides’ source for including the study of the soul in the divine science is less 
clear. In his encyclopedia, Al-Shifā’, Avicenna deals with the human soul and its 
immortality in the section devoted to the natural sciences, but he returns to the 
latter topic toward the end of his discussion of the divine science.
69 See Guide 1.introduction: 6, 9; 1.34: 77; 2.2: 253-254. Page numbers refer to Shlomo 
Pines’ translation of The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1963). All English citations from the Guide in this chapter are taken from 
this edition.
70 Maimonides himself notes in Guide 2.2 the relation of these chapters to the natural 
and divine sciences. In Guide 2.6: 265, he summarizes his position on this issue: 
“There is then nothing in what Aristotle for his part has said about this subject that 
is not in agreement with the Law. However, a point on which he disagrees with us 
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What is far less clear is the scope of the Account of the Chariot or 
the divine science according to his discussion in the Guide. In 1.35: 
80-81, he writes:
As for the discussion concerning attributes and the way they should 
be negated with regard to Him; and as for the meaning of the attri-
butes that may be ascribed to Him, as well as the discussion 
concerning His creation of that which He created, the character of 
His governance of the world, the “how” of His providence with 
respect to what is other than He, the notion of His will, His appre-
hension, and His knowledge of all that He knows; and likewise as for 
the notion of prophecy and the “how” of its various degrees, and the 
notion of His names, though they are many, being indicative of 
one and the same thing—it should be considered that all these are 
obscure matters. In fact, they are truly the mysteries of the Torah 
and the secrets constantly mentioned in the books of the prophets 
and in the dicta of the Sages, may their memory be blessed. These are 
the matters that ought not to be spoken of except in chapter head-
ings, as we have mentioned, and only with an individual such as has 
been described.
While Maimonides does not explicitly equate these topics with the 
Account of the Chariot or the divine science, he labels them “mysteries 
of the Torah” and applies to them the same limitations that the Sages 
placed on the study of the Account of the Chariot.71 Some of the topics 
belonging to the divine science that we have seen till now are not 
mentioned explicitly, such as a study of being qua being and angels or 
Separate Intellects (though the latter topic is subsumed in God’s gover-
nance). Instead, other topics are included: creation, divine governance, 
divine providence, and prophecy. A number of these topics are 
mentioned explicitly in some of Avicenna’s treatises as belonging to the 
divine science.72 It should be added that Maimonides’ discussion of 
in all this is constituted by his belief that all these things are eternal and that they 
proceed necessarily from Him.”
71 See Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” 110.
72 In his Compendium on the Soul, Avicenna lists the following topics as belonging to 
the divine science: proof of the First Cause; the first effect; the universal soul; the 
way in which creation occurs; the rank of the intellect with respect to the creator, 
the soul to the intellect, matter and forms to the soul, the spheres, stars and gener-
ated beings to matter and form, and why there is such a stark divergence in priority 
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divine governance of the world in Guide 2.2-12 follows directly on the 
heels of his proofs for the existence of God, which certainly belongs to 
the divine science.
The situation becomes even more perplexing when one turns 
directly to Maimonides’ commentary on the Account of the Chariot in 
the beginning of the third part of the Guide and contrasts it with his 
commentary on the Account of Creation found in Guide 2.30. More 
specifically, it is significant to see how he treats the study of the heav-
enly spheres in light of his earlier approach to the subject. In his 
Account of Creation, Maimonides explicitly indicates that ha-shamayim 
in the first verse of Genesis refers to heaven and “all that is in heaven,” 
a clear reference to the celestial bodies. Later on in his discussion he 
cites the midrash that states that God created the heavenly bodies on 
the first day and suspended them in the heavens on the fourth.73 He 
goes on to indicate, however, that the subsequent appearance of 
shamayim, which is equated with the firmament (ha-raqi‘a) in Genesis 
1:8, refers to the earth’s atmosphere and that both terms are equivocal. 
To prove the equivocality of the term raqi‘a, he cites Genesis 1:17, 
which deals with God’s creation on the fourth day: and God set them in 
the firmament of heaven. In this context, raqi‘a refers to the heavens, 
and the verse comes to indicate that all the planets are located in the 
heavenly sphere and there is no void in the heavens. Maimonides 
refrains from explaining the meaning of the suspension of the planets 
on this day. It appears that he should be interpreted as alluding to 
their relation to earthly phenomena,74 and not their literally being 
and posteriority among them. See Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 
252. This list may be seen as an expansion of that of Alfarabi, mentioned above, 
which includes among metaphysical topics the ranks of the existents and their 
connections with each other. Gutas notes the differences in Avicenna’s writings 
regarding the topics included in the divine science, and ascribes to him an attempt 
to expand the list in order to include topics that are central to Islam. See ibid., 
252-261.
73 See BT Ḥagigah 12a.
74 See below.
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“suspended” in the heavens on that day. In short, his discussion suggests 
that the entire creation story focuses on the earth and its creatures.75
More startling, he sees R. Akiva’s warning to his colleagues not to 
cry out “water water,” recorded in the context of the story of the four 
who entered pardes in BT Ḥagigah 14b, as pertaining to the nature of 
the atmosphere, and points to Aristotle’s Meteorology—at least according 
to the medieval and most of the modern translations of the Guide—as 
providing the key to understanding this story.76 Toward the end of the 
Guide (3.51), Maimonides indicates that Ben Zoma, one of the protag-
onists of the story, engaged only in the study of the mathematical 
sciences and had not yet reached an understanding of the natural 
sciences. He thereby confirms his view that R. Akiva was dealing with 
a topic belonging to the natural sciences. Maimonides includes in his 
account a discussion of the human soul and human intellection as repre-
sented in the story of Adam and Eve and their children.77 The conclusion 
to be drawn from Maimonides’ discussion is that the Account of 
Creation concerns all existents up to the sphere of the moon, including 
the human soul, but not beyond.
Maimonides’ commentary on the Account of the Chariot is even 
more veiled than the one on the Account of Creation, in keeping with 
the nature of its subject matter.78 He writes in introducing his commen-
tary (3.introduction: 416):
75 For a detailed analysis of Maimonides’ treatment of the creation story, see Sara 
Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation (Jerusalem: 
Reuben Mass, 1987) (Heb.).
76 Only Joseph Kafiḥ among the translators of the Guide does not interpret Maimon-
ides as referring here to Aristotle’s work. See his edition and Hebrew translation of 
the Guide (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1972), 384 n. 53. For a discussion of 
Maimonides’ interpretation of this story, see Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpre-
tation of the Story of Creation, 160-174.
77 For a detailed analysis of Maimonides’ allegorical treatment of this story, see Sara 
Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis (Jeru-
salem: Reuben Mass, 1986) (Heb.).
78 For a study of Maimonides’ interpretation in the Guide of the Account of the 
Chariot, see Shoey Raz, “Metaphysics and the Account of the Chariot: Maimon-
ides and Işhaq Ibn Laţīf,” Daat 64-66 (2009): 139-149 (Heb.).
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I shall interpret to you that which was said by Ezekiel the prophet, 
peace be on him, in such a way that anyone who heard that interpre-
tation would think that I do not say anything over and beyond what 
is indicated by the text, but that it is as if I translated words from 
one language to another or summarized the meaning of the external 
sense of the speech.
Maimonides cautions his astute readers to understand all the chapters 
of the treatise, “every chapter in its turn,”79 in order to understand his 
interpretation. In his discourse on the Account of the Chariot, he 
constantly alludes to views he presents at the beginning of part two of 
the Guide dealing with God’s governance of the world through the 
mediation of the Separate Intellects and the spheres, thereby estab-
lishing a strong connection, if not identity, between these subjects.80 
While commentators were hardly of one opinion as to how to interpret 
Maimonides’ approach to the Account of the Chariot in the third part 
of the Guide, one point emerges clearly—the celestial spheres consti-
tute one of the main subjects in Ezekiel’s vision and at least some of 
the classes of angels Ezekiel mentions refer to them. This view is remi-
niscent of that of Ibn Daud on the subject, as we have seen above.81 
Moreover, Maimonides’ comments clearly suggest that the ḥayyot and 
ofannim refer to the spheres and the four elements respectively.82 This 
approach reflects a sharp break with his earlier stance in the Mishneh 
Torah, in which the topic of the spheres belongs to natural science or 
the Account of Creation, while the ḥayyot and ofannim described in the 
Account of the Chariot in Ezekiel refer to the two highest classes of 
Separate Intellects.83 Just as surprising is Maimonides’ explicit claim 
79 Compare to what he writes in Guide 1.introduction: 15.
80 See above, note 70.
81 See above, note 47; see also Herbert Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and his 
Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 350.
82 See Guide 3.2-3. In his discussion, Maimonides also interprets the opinion of Yona-
than ben Uziel based on the Aramaic translation of Ezekiel that bears his name. 
From his interpretation it is clear that he ascribes to Yonathan ben Uziel the view 
that the ḥayyot refer to the Separate Intellects and the ofannim refer to the spheres. 
See Guide 3.4. Maimonides, however, does not accept this opinion, as can be 
clearly inferred from his discussion.
83 Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 2.7.
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that the image of the man sitting on the throne does not represent 
God,84 leaving us to interpret this image as referring to the Mover of 
the outermost sphere. Thus the most detailed vision belonging to the 
Account of the Chariot leaves out the most important subject of the 
divine science—the Deity. As for the content of Ezekiel’s vision, 
Maimonides’ exposition suggests that Ezekiel described four primary 
celestial spheres containing the planets and stars, an astronomic possi-
bility that he defends in Guide 2.9. One should keep in mind that the 
dominant astronomic conception, the one Maimonides himself followed 
in his Laws of Principles of the Torah, posits eight such spheres, in 
keeping with the view that Mercury and Venus were situated between 
the Moon and the Sun.85 His discussion leads to the problem of the 
veracity of Ezekiel’s vision, or whether the view apparently favored by 
Ezekiel should be preferred to the dominant scientific view due to its 
prophetic origin.86
84 Guide 3.7: 430.
85 Maimonides reiterates this position in Guide 2.19, though one may argue that he 
simply is reiterating the dominant scientific view in this context. More signifi-
cantly, he brings the same position again in Guide 3.14, and also sees it as the 
position of the Sages.
86 See Guide 2.9-10; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 3.1-2. For 
a discussion of Maimonides’ positing of four spheres, see Gad Freudenthal, 
“Maimonides on the Scope of Metaphysics alias Ma‘aseh Merkavah: The Evolu-
tion of his Views.” Freudenthal argues that Maimonides in fact changed his mind 
from the time he wrote the Mishneh Torah and came to favor the view of four 
spheres which he presents as his own innovation. Freudenthal may be correct in his 
interpretation (however, see the previous note), but it should be pointed out that 
Maimonides presents this view, which he traces to the “ancients,” as a possibility 
that concerns primarily an astronomic issue, not a philosophic one. Maimonides 
does not at all retreat from the Aristotelian view of the structure of the world. 
Aristotle himself, Maimonides notes, never decided the issue of the number of 
spheres, and had posited fifty (Guide 2.4). Moreover, Maimonides seems less 
drawn to this view, if he in fact accepted it, because of its apparently prophetic 
origin and more because of the symmetry that it introduces into the order of the 
world—four sublunar elements, four levels of sublunar existents, four causes for 
the motion of the spheres and four spheres affecting the elements (Guide 2.10). In 
short, if he favored this view it was primarily for philosophic reasons, despite the 
fact that he was well aware that astronomic considerations lend greater weight to 
the view that there are eight spheres containing heavenly bodies. The view of four 
spheres, however, made very little impact on his followers in Provence, none of 
whom, to the best of my knowledge, accepted it outright, and who generally 
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In his discussion of both the Account of Creation and the Account of 
the Chariot, Maimonides cites a number of rabbinic homilies (midrashim), 
viewing them as allegorical elaborations upon the allegorical treatment 
of these subjects in Scripture. Yet in keeping with his remarks in the 
introduction to his treatise, he only hints at their true meaning. For 
example, he writes regarding the talmudic etymology of the electrum, 
ḥashmal, seen by Ezekiel (Guide 3.7: 429-430):
They have explained that the word ḥashmal is composed of two 
notions, ḥash and mal; this means, of the notion of rapidity, indi-
cated by ḥash, and of that of cutting, indicated by mal, the intention 
being to combine through a simile two separate notions regarding 
two sides, above and below. They also give a second hint, saying that 
the word derives from the notions of speech and silence, saying: 
“they sometimes ḥashoth [are silent] and sometimes memalleloth 
[speak]” [BT Ḥagigah 13b]. They ascribe the meaning “silence” [to 
ḥash] from the verse: heḥesheiti [I have been silent] for a long time 
[Isaiah 42:14]; there is thus an allusion to two notions through the 
indication of speech without a sound. There is no doubt that their 
dictum: “they sometimes ḥashoth [are silent] and sometimes memal-
leloth [speak],” refers to a created thing.87
The question immediately arises why Maimonides treats the Account 
of the Chariot as well as the Account of Creation in a veiled manner if 
the key to understanding them is the Aristotelian view of the structure 
alternated between an attempt to interpret Ezekiel in keeping with the dominant 
astronomic view or to ascribe to Ezekiel an error. For a discussion of the possibility 
of prophetic error, see below.
87 Maimonides’ remarks here are exceptionally vague. The medieval interpreters of 
the Guide agreed that according to Maimonides as the color of the ḥashmal refers to 
the Separate Intellects, as does the likeness of the man. Though the Separate Intel-
lects are incorporeal, they do not possess the same level of unity that characterizes 
God but are comprised of two notions. According to Moses Narboni in his commen-
tary on the chapter, the upper part of each of the Separate Intellects alludes to the 
fact that it is the cause of the Intellect below it in the hierarchy of being, while the 
lower part alludes to the fact that it is an effect of the First Cause. In a similar vein, 
each one grasps itself as a possible existent, and this is the lower part, and grasps 
its Cause as necessitating its existence, and this is the upper part. This is the 
meaning of the two interpretations of the division in the word ḥashmal (rapidi-
ty-cutting/silence-speech). Compare the commentaries of Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, 
Efodi, and Asher Crescas to the chapter.
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of the world, which he is willing to present quite explicitly in the 
Guide.88 If the angels seen by Ezekiel refer to the celestial spheres, the 
knowledge of which is quite readily available to anyone engaged in phil-
osophic study, why did he not see fit to offer a clear cut exposition of 
the subject and append it to the chapters on divine governance in part 
two? One may contend that the extent of the correspondence between 
the prophetic and philosophic views is precisely the fact that must 
remain hidden from the masses. Maimonides is willing to guide his 
readers to the view that the prophets are not describing worlds beyond 
those conceptualized by the philosophers, but he does not feel that the 
time is yet ripe to make the degree of their agreement completely 
explicit, to connect all the dots as it were, for the harmful effects it will 
have on the average believer.89 His esoteric commentary still leaves 
room to interpret the prophets as referring to truths not ascertained by 
the philosophers, even if both groups share the same view of the basic 
structure of the world.
Maimonides’ stature in the field of Jewish law lent great weight to 
his theological views in the eyes of the succeeding generations. Those 
who adopted his approach were left with a clear cut direction to follow 
in trying to understand the Account of Creation and the Account of 
the Chariot, namely the study of the Aristotelian corpus, together with 
its most important commentators,90 and the dominant astronomic trea-
tises. The desired goal is the apprehension of the order of existents, or 
of being, culminating in knowledge of God in accordance with human 
88 See Davidson, Moses Maimonides, 351.
89 This interpretation complements Narboni’s view as cited by Abarbanel; see above, 
note 2. Significantly, Maimonides, in a crucial sense, was more explicit in the reve-
lation of these matters in the Laws of Principles of the Torah. See Shlomo Pines, 
“The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides’ Halakhic Works and the Purport of 
the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. Shlomo Pines and 
Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 1-14. See also Kreisel, 
Maimonides’ Political Thought, 189-223.
90 See Maimonides’ recommended bibliography of philosophic works that should be 
studied that he sent to his translator, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, in Isaac Shailat (ed. 
and Heb. trans.), Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot, 1987), vol. 2, 552-554. 
Shlomo Pines translates excerpts from this letter and discusses Maimonides’ bibli-
ography in the introduction to his translation of the Guide, “The Philosophic 
Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed,” lvii-cxxxiv (particularly lix-lxi).
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capacity. They were also instructed to interpret rabbinic midrash along 
philosophic lines. At the same time, they were left to wrestle with many 
problems as to the details of these accounts and their subject matter, 
which Maimonides had failed to elucidate. Given the parable form in 
which Scripture presents these subjects, it is no easy matter to decipher 
the true meaning of each of the verses contained in the scriptural 
accounts. The same is the case with the rabbinic homilies. Even the 
topics that belong to the Account of the Chariot and the ones that 
belong to the Account of Creation are not clearly delineated. More 
important, Maimonides’ followers were faced with the problem of 
determining to what extent the prophets should be seen as Aristotelian 
philosophers and the content of their visions, after they are stripped of 
the images in which they are presented, should be interpreted as corre-
sponding to the philosophic understanding of the natural and divine 
sciences. Does not the content of their visions go beyond the knowl-
edge possessed by the philosophers?91 Or perhaps the opposite is true, 
and through advances in science one now is in a position to discern 
what even Ezekiel could not?92 The stakes for the future of Judaism 
were immense. Despite the esoteric nature of Maimonides’ commen-
tary, it opened up the question of the relevance of the writings of the 
prophets, as well as rabbinic literature, for attaining the theoretical 
91 Maimonides suggests that this is the case in his discussion of creation (Guide 2.23) 
as well as his discussion of prophecy (Guide 2.38). A further hint to this view can 
be found in the parable of the lightning flashes that he brings in 1.introduction: 7. 
The prophets are depicted as seeing the world in a direct manner when illuminated 
by a flash of lightening, while the philosophers see it by way of reflection by means 
of a polished stone. For a further discussion of this issue, see below, chapter 8, 278. 
92 Maimonides leaves no doubt that while the homilies of the Sages of the Talmud 
should be interpreted along philosophic lines, at least those of the greatest of 
the Sages, not all of the views reflected in rabbinic midrash are correct. See for 
example his stance in Guide 1.introduction: 20, on the reasons for contradictions in 
the midrash; cf. 2.8: 267. In the case of the prophets, his explicit statements on 
the subject indicate his acceptance of the complete truth of their knowledge, but 
we shall see that this may not have been his personal view. Even if the indefatiga-
bility of the prophets is his true position on the issue, the problem remains how to 
interpret their views.
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knowledge by which human perfection is achieved in a far more explicit 
manner than any of the writings of his predecessors.93
The Account of the Chariot in Jewish Philosophy in 
Provence till the End of the Thirteenth Century
The first translator of the Guide, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, wrestled with 
some of these problems in his writings, particularly in his treatise 
Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim (Treatise of the Gathering of the Waters), 
written between the years 1221-1231. Ibn Tibbon views the desire to 
inculcate in the masses the belief in the existence of God as the reason 
for the Bible concealing certain conceptions which might weaken this 
belief, in light of the idolaters’ belief that the stars are the deities.94 Yet 
biblical history for him contains increasing allusions to these secret 
conceptions, beginning with the writings of David and Solomon, and 
continuing in rabbinic times with further elaborations by way of 
midrash. According to Ibn Tibbon, Maimonides continues the tendency 
of revealing these doctrines, albeit still in an elusive manner, after he 
discerned that few were capable of understanding the purport of the 
allusions found in the previous literature.95 Ibn Tibbon sees himself as 
the next link in this chain, but he, unlike his predecessors, decided to 
make these doctrines completely explicit. What has made the task of 
revealing esoteric doctrines all the more pressing is the spread of the 
sciences among his Christian neighbors:
93 For a discussion of this issue, see my “Esotericism to Exotericism: From Maimon-
ides to Gersonides,” in Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought, ed. Howard Kreisel 
(Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2006), vol. 1, 165-184.
94 Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Mordechai Bisliches (Press-
burg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), chap. 22, 174. For a study of Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon’s thought, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric 
Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 6 (1981): 87-123; James T. 
Robinson, “Maimonides, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, and the Construction of a Jewish 
Tradition of Philosophy,” in Maimonides after 800 Years: Essays on Maimonides and 
His Influence, ed. Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
291-306; Carlos Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel Ibn Tibbon: The Transforma-
tion of Dalālat al-Hā’irīm into the Moreh Nevukhim (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
2007), 1-227 (Heb.).
95 This appears to be Maimonides’ own view, as emerges from his discussion in the 
introduction to the Guide.
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It is time to act for the sake of God [Psalms 119:126]. I saw that the 
truths that were concealed since [the time of] our prophets and the 
Sages of our Torah have become well known among the nations of 
the world, and in most places they interpret [Scripture] in accor-
dance with the truths concealed in the Torah and in the words of the 
prophets and those speaking by means of the holy spirit. Our nation 
is ignorant of them completely, and by virtue of this ignorance they 
[the gentiles] mock us and abuse us saying that we only possess the 
shells of the words of the prophets. . . .
I, the youngster who follow him [Maimonides], also saw that 
[the number of] those understanding his hints has greatly declined, 
all the more so those who understand the hints in Scripture. I saw 
also that the true sciences have become much better known among 
the nations under whose sovereignty and in whose lands I live—
much more than the familiarity with them in the lands of Ishmael. 
And I perceived the great need to illuminate the eyes of the intelli-
gent by the knowledge and understanding of His words that God 
has granted me.96
Like Maimonides, Ibn Tibbon does not claim that he received any 
tradition in this area. Rather, it is the study of the Guide and the Aris-
totelian corpus, which provides him with the key to understanding the 
esoteric doctrines found in the Bible and elaborated upon by the Sages. 
He does not present a running commentary on the Account of the 
Chariot but devotes a number of chapters to elucidating issues in 
Isaiah’s and Ezekiel’s accounts and in Maimonides’ commentary on 
these accounts.97 He also sees Jacob’s dream of a heavenly ladder as 
belonging to this subject.98 Thus Isaiah and Ezekiel, according to this 
view, essentially elaborate upon a subject that is already to be found in 
the Torah.
96 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 22, 175. This is the passage to which Abarbanel 
alludes in his first stricture; see above, note 2.
97 See Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, 176-184. 
98 See Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 11, 54-57. Maimonides deals with this 
prophetic parable in Guide 2.10, which touches upon a number of topics that belong 
to the Account of the Chariot. For a study of this parable in Maimonides’ thought, 
see Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Maimonides’ Interpretations of Jacob’s Dream of the 
Ladder,” Bar-Ilan 22-23 (1988): 329-349 (Heb.). For the significance of the motif of 
the ladder in medieval Arabic and Jewish thought, see Alexander Altmann, “The 
Ladder of Ascension,” in Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (London: 
Routledge, 1969), 41-72.
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A number of significant points emerge clearly from Ibn Tibbon’s 
discussion, following up on some of the hints Maimonides scattered in 
his theological treatise:
1) The study of the celestial spheres—their essence, structure, 
and motion—belongs to the Account of the Chariot.99 Astronomy thus 
is not only a propaedeutic science, but its principles, at least, constitute 
a component of the divine science.
2) Ibn Tibbon sees the ḥayyot in Ezekiel’s vision as referring to 
the celestial spheres, and the ofannim to the four sublunar elements.100 
Consequently, there is an overlap between the Account of Creation and 
the Account of the Chariot. The former focuses on sublunar phenomena 
and notes the roles played by the celestial spheres and the Active Intel-
lect in bestowing the sublunar forms, though Ibn Tibbon points to the 
philosophic controversy, found also among the Sages, concerning the 
problem of which existents receive their form from the Active Intel-
lect.101 The Account of the Chariot too deals with the Separate Intellects, 
the celestial spheres, and the earthly elements, but from the standpoint 
of their connection to God and how they serve as intermediaries in the 
divine governance of the world. In short, both sciences deal with the 
same entities, but from a different perspective.
3) Ibn Tibbon does not address the problem of the extent of the 
identity of the views of the prophets and those of the philosophers 
directly, but a number of his positions are worthy of note. Like Maimon-
ides, he treats many problems regarding astronomy as remaining open. 
 99 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chaps. 8-10, 28-53.
100 Ibid., chap. 10, 45-48. As we have seen above, this is the most likely interpretation 
of Maimonides’ approach. The serafim in Isaiah 6:2, on the other hand, represent 
the Separate Intellects in Ibn Tibbon’s view.
101 Ibn Tibbon interprets the controversy between R. Yoḥanan and R. Ḥanina on 
what day the angels were created, the former saying the second and the latter the 
fifth (Genesis Rabbah 1:3), as relating to the philosophic controversy regarding 
which earthly existents require the mediation of the Separate Intellect. Do the 
existents possessing a vegetative soul created on the third day require the Separate 
Intellect in order to exist, or does the human being, who was created on the sixth 
day, alone among the sublunar creatures requires the mediation of the Separate 
Intellect to grant the rational soul? See Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 4, 
12-15; and Robinson, “Maimonides, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, and the Construction of a 
Jewish Tradition of Philosophy,” 300-301.
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He approvingly cites a more recent astronomic theory regarding the 
direction of the orbit of the spheres—according to which all nine 
spheres move from east to west rather than west to east, with the excep-
tion of the outermost sphere—indicating that progress in this area is 
still being made.102 On some questions, he favors the accepted philo-
sophic view over what appears to be the prophetic view. He hints, for 
example, that Maimonides alludes to an error in Ezekiel’s prophecy, 
which ascribes sounds to the heavenly bodies.103 The notion that the 
spheres produce sounds, Maimonides maintains (Guide 2.8), is in accord 
with the view accepted by the Sages, but rejected by Aristotle, that the 
spheres are stationary and the planets within them move. Both Maimon-
ides and Ibn Tibbon favor Aristotle in this matter. Ibn Tibbon regards 
these questions as belonging completely to the area of speculation 
rather than tradition (and by implication prophecy), as evidenced by 
the fact that the Sages were not convinced that they were correct in 
their view of the movement of the planets, and on a different astro-
nomic issue even acceded to the view of the gentile scholars.104 As for 
102 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 10, 47-48. The reference is to the astronomic 
views of Al-Biṭrūjī found in his On the Principles of Astronomy, written in Arabic at 
the end of the twelfth century and subsequently translated into Hebrew by Moses 
Ibn Tibbon. An English translation of this work was prepared by Bernard R. Gold-
stein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). For a discussion of Ibn Tibbon’s 
references to Al-Biṭrūjī and for an English translation of the passage in Ma’amar 
Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim in which Al-Biṭrūjī’s view is presented, see James T. Robinson, 
“The First References in Hebrew to Al-Biṭrūjī’s On the Principles of Astronomy,” 
Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism 3 (2003): 145-163. Maimonides 
himself notes the progress made in the area of astronomy in Guide 3.14.
103 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 10, 52. Ibn Tibbon writes in reference to 
Ezekiel 3:13: “As to the matter of the sound of the wings—he [Maimonides] already 
alluded to it in the second part in a sufficient manner.” For a study of the issue in 
medieval Jewish philosophy of the possibility of prophetic error, see Charles 
Touati, “Le problème de l’inerrance prophetique dans la théologie juive du 
moyen-âge,” Revue de l’histoire des religions 174 (1968): 169-187.
104 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 10, 52. As opposed to Ibn Tibbon, Maimonides 
does not explicitly mention Ezekiel in this context; hence it is not clear whether he 
was of the opinion that Ezekiel too was mistaken in regard to the motion of the 
spheres. He may have understood the verse in a manner that was in harmony with 
the accepted scientific opinion. The issue of how Maimonides was to be in inter-
preted in regard to the sounds heard by Ezekiel, as well as whether Ezekiel’s view 
was to be preferred over the accepted scientific one, was a matter of controversy 
Chapter Seven250 
the opinion that Mercury and Venus are above the sun, Ibn Tibbon 
points out that Maimonides favors this view, which also appears to 
underlie Ezekiel’s vision.105 In this case, however, he does not indicate 
explicitly which view he accepts, though his discussion suggests that he 
favors the dominant view placing Mercury and Venus below the sun. 
While astronomic views provide the key to interpreting Ezekiel’s 
vision, the vision itself appears to have no import in determining the 
correctness of a certain view in Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s treatment.
4) Ibn Tibbon cannot accept Maimonides’ view that the man on 
the throne in Ezekiel’s vision, as opposed to Isaiah’s, does not refer to 
God.106 The Deity is the ultimate subject of the divine science. Maimon-
ides had argued that since Ezekiel talks of two parts of the figure sitting 
on the throne, it cannot be a reference to the one God. Ibn Tibbon 
suggests that the figure represents God and the Separate Intellects, 
with the upper part referring to God and the lower to the Separate 
Intellects, or the upper part to God and the Separate Intellects and 
the lower to the Active Intellect. Hence both visions deal with the 
same topics—Isaiah providing a more detailed treatment of God and 
the Separate Intellects, according to Ibn Tibbon, and Ezekiel focusing 
more on the spheres and their governance of the sublunar elements.107
Ibn Tibbon was not the only early Provençal Jewish thinker to deal 
with the topic of the Account of the Chariot in the spirit of Maimon-
ides. His contemporary, R. David Kimḥi (Radak), who in most of his 
commentaries further develops Ibn Ezra’s philological approach, wrote 
among later interpreters; see Ofer Elior, “‘The Conclusion whose Demonstration 
is Correct is Believed’: Maimonides on the Possibility of Celestial Sounds, 
According to Three Medieval Interpreters,” Revue des études juives 172 (2013): 
283-303.
105 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 10, 53.
106 Compare Guide 3.7, where Maimonides deals with Ezekiel’s vision, and Guide 2.45 
(seventh degree of prophecy), where he indicates that Isaiah saw God in a prophetic 
dream. Maimonides maintains that the prophet, however, cannot see God in a 
prophetic vision (that is to say, when the prophet receives the prophetic emanation 
while awake).
107 Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 10, 50-52.
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an esoteric commentary on the beginning of Ezekiel.108 In a way, his 
commentary is more faithful to Maimonides in that it is more esoteric 
than that of Ibn Tibbon, though its intent is clear to a reader versed in 
philosophy. For Kimḥi too the true intent of the vision is to describe 
the world of Separate Intellects and celestial spheres, and to show 
God’s governance of the world by way of these intermediaries. What is 
absent from his commentary is any allusion to the scientific controver-
sies relating to the structure and motion of the celestial world or to the 
possibility of prophetic error.
In subsequent Jewish philosophical literature in the thirteenth 
century, we find further treatments of the scope and content of the 
divine science. The most detailed, extant Jewish philosophical account 
of the divine science is to be found in Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera’s De‘ot 
ha-Filosofim.109 This encyclopedia is devoted solely to the natural and 
divine sciences and is based primarily on Averroes’ commentaries on 
Aristotle.110 Ibn Falaquera divides the section on the divine science into 
108 The esoteric Ezekiel commentary is printed in the back of Miqra’ot Gedolot 
editions of Ezekiel. The best edition of this text has recently been published in 
Menachem Cohen (ed.), Miqra’ot Gedolot ‘HaKeter’: Ezekiel (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan 
University Press, 2004), 329-333. It should be noted that Kimḥi also wrote an 
esoteric commentary on the Garden of Eden story, which is found in Louis 
Finkelstein (ed.), The Commentary of David Kimḥi on Isaiah (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1926), lii-lxxiv (Heb.). For a study of Kimḥi, see Frank E. 
Talmage, David Kimḥi: The Man and the Commentaries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975).
109 The section on the divine science survived intact in MS Parma 3156, 234r-292v, and 
in part in MS Leiden 4758, 333v-343v. For a discussion of this encyclopedia, see 
Steven Harvey, “Shem-Tov Ibn Falaquera’s De‘ot ha-Filosofim: Its Sources and Use 
of Sources,” in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, 
211-247. For a discussion of the place of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (or more precisely 
Averroes’ commentaries on the Metaphysics) in this encyclopedia, see Mauro Zonta, 
“The Place of Aristotelian Metaphysics in the Thirteenth-Century Encyclopedias,” 
in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, 422-425. For a 
discussion of Ibn Falaquera and his works, see Raphael Jospe, Torah and Sophia: 
The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College 
Press, 1988). It should be noted that it is not clear whether Falaquera, who prob-
ably was born in Spain, wrote any of his treatises in Provence.
110 Ibn Falaquera also wrote a short compendium of the sciences, Reshit Ḥokhmah, 
which is based primarily on Alfarabi’s Enumeration of the Sciences and Avicenna’s 
Division of the Theoretical Sciences. For a discussion of this work, see Jospe, Torah 
and Sophia, 37-42; see also above, notes 63-64.
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three parts. In the first he discusses the Active Intellect; in the second, 
the various types of substance and their underlying principles, as well 
as the secondary principles—that is, the Movers of the spheres (the 
Separate Intellects); and in the third, God as Prime Mover and First 
Cause. Among the topics he includes in the last treatise are divine 
unity, governance of the world, the order of emanation from God, and 
the manner in which all existents are connected to God.111 While Ibn 
Falaquera mentions the celestial spheres in the course of his discussion 
of emanation, his far more extensive treatment of this subject is in the 
last treatise of the section on natural sciences. Significantly, he treats 
this subject at the end of his discussion of the human soul. This reflects 
a break with the ordinary ordering of the subjects in Aristotelian 
thought—the treatise On the Heavens follows on the heels of the 
Physics, with the subject of the human soul (including the topics 
contained in Parva Naturalia, such as dreams and the longevity of life) 
as the final one rounding off the natural sciences.112 The reason for this 
change may be Ibn Falaquera’s desire to underscore the fact that the 
spheres are the most noble of corporeal beings, more noble even than 
human beings.113
Ibn Falaquera’s ordering of subjects in his encyclopedia essentially 
reflects Maimonides’ earlier division, one that is also supported by 
Alfarabi’s division of the sciences, which sees the main distinction 
between the natural and divine sciences as revolving around corporeal 
and incorporeal existence. Thus the topic of the spheres belongs to the 
natural sciences. In keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, Ibn 
Falaquera includes the subject of substance and its underlying princi-
ples, as well as the relation between God and the world and the 
connection between all its parts as also belonging to the divine science.114 
111 For a complete list of the topics of this section, see Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 60-61.
112 Such is the case in Alfarabi’s list of subjects in the Enumeration of the Sciences as 
well as Ibn Falaquera’s Reshit Ḥokhmah.
113 See Guide 3.13-14.
114 It should be noted that his short scientific compendium Reshit Ḥokhmah differs 
from his encyclopedia on a number of points. Under the influence of Avicenna, he 
includes prophecy and human immortality as “branches” of the divine science; 
see Reshit Ḥokhmah, 55 and compare with the end of the ninth and beginning of 
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Unfortunately, he has left us with no commentary on the Account of 
the Chariot, which would enable us to see how Ezekiel’s vision is inter-
preted in light of his treatment of the divine science.115
A similar distinction between the natural and metaphysical sciences 
implicitly characterizes the most popular of the medieval Hebrew ency-
clopedias, Gershom ben Solomon’s Sha‘ar ha-Shamayim, written at the 
turn of the thirteenth century.116 In this case too the section dealing 
with the spheres follows the section dealing with the human soul and 
immortality. The most striking feature of this encyclopedia is that it 
devotes no section to a discussion of metaphysics, neither to God nor 
to the Separate Intellects. Natural science, or the study of corporeal 
existents, is the sole subject of Gershom’s treatise.117
The most extensive philosophic treatment of the Account of the 
Chariot in the latter part of the thirteenth century belongs to Levi ben 
Abraham. Levi completed the long recension of his encyclopedia, 
Livyat Ḥen, in 1296.118 He devotes a section to the divine science in the 
context of his discussion of the sciences—only a part of this section has 
survived—and another section to the Account of the Chariot in the 
context of his discussion of Judaism. In short, he is one of the few 
the tenth book in the section on the divine science in Avicenna’s Al-Shifā‘ 
(Michael E. Marmura [ed. and trans.], Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing 
[Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005], 347-366). In De‘ot ha-Fi-
losofim, Ibn Falaquera deals with these subjects in the context of his treatment of 
the human soul.
115 In general, extant philosophic commentaries on the Account of the Chariot in the 
latter half of the thirteenth century are scarce. It appears that one such commen-
tary was written by Moses Ibn Tibbon, but it has not survived. See my introduction 
to The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and 
Avraham Israel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 30. 
Ibn Tibbon deals in passing with Ezekiel 1:26 and some other motifs from Ezekiel 
in Sefer Pe’ah; see The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 186-188. For a study of this 
thinker, see above, chapter 4.
116 This encyclopedia has been printed in a number of different editions, the most 
popular being Warsaw, 1876. For a study of this encyclopedia, see James T. 
Robinson, “Gershom ben Solomon’s Sha‘ar ha-Shamayim: Its Sources and use of 
Sources,” in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, 248-274.
117 One can only hypothesize why he chose not to delve into the cream of the sciences. 
He may well have thought that this area should continue to be treated as the 
“secrets of the Torah” whose teachings should not be disseminated publicly.
118 For a study of this thinker and his encyclopedia, see above, chapter 5.
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philosophers, if not the only one, to deal with the subject in detail from 
both a theoretical and an exegetical perspective. It should be noted 
that Levi also wrote a poem outlining all the sciences, Batei ha-Nefesh 
ve-ha-Leḥashim, which contains these two sections and helps us to 
complete, at least in outline form, the missing part of the section 
dealing with the divine science in Livyat Ḥen.119
Levi divides his account of the divine science into the following 
topics: infinity; space; motion; time; continuous and discreet; potenti-
ality and actuality; substance and corporeality; unity and multiplicity; 
God as remote efficient, final and formal cause; proof of the existence 
of God and His Unity; the order of the Intellects and their activities; 
the ranks of the celestial bodies; the order in the world of generation, 
and good and evil; the level of the lower world; God’s governance of 
the world in its entirety; the existence of multiplicity and unity; 
the name of the One and the Existent; negation [of attributes]; the 
sublime knowledge.120 As one can see, included in his treatment of the 
divine science are not only topics related to God (e.g., divine unity, 
negative attributes) and the Separate Intellects, but also the principles 
of mathematics and physics (e.g., infinity, place, time, motion), and 
more significantly, the order of existents in the celestial and sublunar 
worlds and the manner in which God governs these worlds. In short, 
the divine science deals not only with incorporeal existents but is the 
science that gives us the big picture of all the parts of the world, their 
interconnection and their connection with God, as well as the 
principles of the other sciences. The natural sciences focus on the 
details of the existents in the sublunar world, culminating in a discus-
sion of the human soul.121 The two primary sources for his discussion of 
119 I have published the section of Livyat Ḥen devoted to the Account of the Chariot, 
the surviving part of the section on the divine science, together with the part of the 
poem devoted to the Account of the Chariot in Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The 
Work of the Chariot, ed. Howard Kreisel (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish 
Studies, 2013) (Heb.).
120 The list of topics is taken from the section on the divine science in Levi’s poem. 
The section from the short version of the encyclopedia devoted to the proofs 
for the existence of God till the end has survived.
121 Levi’s treatment of the natural sciences in Livyat Ḥen has not survived, but in this 
case too we can reconstruct the topics he deals with on the basis of his poem. In 
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the divine science are Maimonides’ Guide and, more important, Aver-
roes’ Epitome of the Metaphysics as translated into Hebrew by Moses 
Ibn Tibbon.122
In Levi’s treatment of the Account of the Chariot, he explicates 
most of the points noted by Samuel Ibn Tibbon but in more detail, at 
times taking issue with Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation. Levi also identifies 
additional biblical texts devoted to this subject, such as Zechariah 6—
the one vision in which chariots are explicitly mentioned—and the 
vision of Elijah’s ascent to heaven in I Kings 19, which deals in his view 
with conjunction. He also sees the serafim in Isaiah 6 as representing 
the Separate Intellects, with the one in whose hands is the live coal that 
touches the prophet’s lips signifying the Active Intellect. As in the case 
of his predecessors, he regards the ḥayyot in Ezekiel’s first vision as 
referring to the spheres and their motions, though he also brings addi-
tional interpretations. In the dispute between Maimonides and Samuel 
Ibn Tibbon as to the explanation of the man sitting on the throne, Levi 
prefers Maimonides’ view that he does not represent God, and his two 
parts represent two levels of Separate Intellects.
The different versions of the Account of the Chariot, particularly 
Ezekiel’s more detailed visions, focus only in passing on God, a little 
more on the Separate Intellects, and primarily on the spheres, their 
motions, and their influence on the four sublunar elements. As in the 
case of Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Levi is well aware that Ezekiel’s visions 
suggest two major issues on which he differs with accepted scientific 
opinion—the order of the planets and the view that they emit sounds, 
hence they move rather than remain stationary within the sphere. Levi 
does not reject the possibility of prophetic error out of hand, but he 
prefers to interpret Ezekiel’s visions as corresponding to the accepted 
scientific opinion:
Batei ha-Nefesh, he does not treat the spheres at all in the section devoted to the 
natural sciences.
122 A far more detailed treatment of Levi’s approach to the divine science as well as 
the Account of the Chariot can be found in my Hebrew introduction to Livyat Ḥen: 
The Work of the Chariot, 53-97.
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It appears to us that Ezekiel connected the five planets only insofar 
as they participate in a single type of activity.123 The actions and 
great changes and disorders that occur in the sublunar world by 
virtue of the force [generated] by the motion of the spheres and 
planets, he called “din” (ra‘ash). And in this manner we can interpret 
the visions of Ezekiel in order not to ascribe to him a false opinion, 
as we shall explain.124
In general, his commentary abandons all pretense of esotericism and 
discusses the various visions along scientific lines.125
Following Maimonides and Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Levi approaches 
rabbinic midrash as expanding allegorically upon the philosophic ideas 
contained in the prophetic visions. The rabbinic etymology of ḥashmal 
as consisting of two words, ḥash (is silent) and mal (speaks),126 he 
explains as follows:
Our Sages commented on the matter of the ḥashmal: “At times they 
are silent (ḥash) at times they speak (mal). When the utterance goes 
forth from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He, they are silent 
. . .” [BT Ḥagigah 13b]. This means, insofar as each [Separate Intel-
lect] receives the emanation from its Cause, it is said to be silent, and 
insofar as it emanates its effects [a different Separate Intellect and a 
sphere], since its intellect is in actu and apprehends and sees every-
thing together in no time, it is said to speak.127 
Levi interprets the angel Sandalfon128 as referring to the Active Intel-
lect, and writes as follows:
“A baraitha teaches: His name is Sandalfon; he is greater than his 
fellows by a distance of five hundred years’ journey, and he stands 
123 This a reference to the fact that they all act primarily upon the element of air. 
124 Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, chap. 3, 133-124; see also chap. 4, 147-148. See 
however chap. 4, 154, where Levi suggests that perhaps Ezekiel was in error.
125 It should be added that Levi sees predictions of future events as also included in 
these visions.
126 See above, note 9.
127 Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, chap. 6, 185. Levi anticipates the interpreta-
tion brought by later interpreters; see above, note 87.
128 See above, note 10.
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behind the Chariot and wreathes crowns for his Maker” [BT Ḥagigah 
13b]. They said: “stands behind the Chariot,” because he emanates 
from the Mover of the sphere of the Moon, which is the last of the 
ḥayyot, and he exercises providence and acts vis-à-vis the earth. A 
difficulty was raised on this point: “And wreathes crowns for his 
Maker. But is it so? Behold it is written: Blessed be the Glory of the 
Lord from His place [Ezekiel 3:12], accordingly, no one knows His 
place!” that is, He has no special place—for the objector understood 
this saying [about God] in a physical sense. Or perhaps he intended 
to resolve this ambiguity concerning his words, and he responded: 
“He [Sandalfon] pronounces the Name over the crown and it goes 
and rests on His head”—that is, he spoke in a non-corporeal sense. 
The meaning of this is that the truth of his intellection and compre-
hension arranges pleasant and truthful praises for his Maker, and he 
conjoins with Him and is perfected through Him, in the manner 
that the known conjoins with and is perfected by what is known.
Levi further maintains that just as Ezekiel’s visions hint also to astro-
logical matters, the rabbinic homilies elaborate upon these matters in a 
figurative manner.129
Perhaps the most novel aspect of Levi’s commentary is his summary 
description of the kabbalistic doctrine of the ten sefirot above the level 
of the angels or Separate Intellects and his critique of this doctrine:
Since the Pure Forms are ten, and there is no quantitative or spatial 
division between them, it is said: “Ten sefirot that are boundless (beli 
mah)” [Book of Creation 1.7]. It is taught that they have no extremi-
ties by which they can be joined, but their end is their beginning, as 
it is said: “their end is contained in their beginning” [ibid.]. There 
are those who interpreted “ten sefirot” ten crowns of praise and 
perfection in God, corresponding to His names, which are not sepa-
rate in Him, for they all revert to one simple essence. Hence he says 
“boundless.” We already spoke of this in the ninth chapter of the 
section on faith.130
The kabbalists considered the ten sefirot to be ten degrees 
(ma‘alot), one above the other overflowing from it, and they called 
129 For example, Levi cites the midrash in BT Yoma 77a based on Ezekiel 9.2, which he 
explains in terms of future events that result from the influences of the planets. See 
Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, chap. 4, 174-175.
130 This section survived only in the shorter version of Levi’s encyclopedia and the 
interpretation of this citation from the Book of Creation is not found there.
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them “Emanations” (Aẓilot). The first three are spiritual, and are 
called: the Sublime Crown (Keter ‘Elyon), Wisdom (Ḥokhmah) and 
Understanding (Binah). The first one does not at all resemble any 
other thing. And the seven corporeal ones are called: Greatness 
(Gedulah), Might (Gevurah), Glory (Tif’eret), Triumph (Neẓaḥ), 
Majesty (Hod), Truth (Emet), and Loving-kindness (Ḥesed). Abraham 
attained Loving-kindness and Jacob [attained] Truth, as it is stated: 
Give truth to Jacob and Loving-kindness to Abraham [Micah 7:20]. 
The lowest of them is called Land (Ereẓ), and in this manner they 
interpret: [God] blessed Abraham in everything (bakol) [Genesis 24:1]. 
They say that the angels are below all of these, and there emanated 
from each sefirah one angel. The lowest sefirah is higher than the first 
of the angels. They assent to the view that the angels move the 
spheres, each one moves its designated sphere, it being its immediate 
cause. Each of these Emanations is divided into two branches, in 
accordance with the division into its powers and activities. For this 
reason, they attribute to them a right and a left side, and they 
mention the Great Hand.131 Moses grasped the sefirah Tif’eret, as it is 
said: That caused His glorious hand to go to the right of Moses [Isaiah 
63:12]. From some come the strong measure of mercy and from 
others the weak; from some the strong measure of judgment, from 
others the weak, and from others the intermediate. The human soul 
overflows from the third level called Binah, as it is said: The breath of 
Shaddai that gives them understanding [Job 32:8], and it is said: And 
breathed into his nostrils [Genesis 2:7]. For this reason, Israel is more 
dear [to God] than the ministering angels, and can grasp in his life-
time [the sefirah] Emet or Ḥesed, and after his separation from matter 
he returns to his source, which is [the sefirah] Binah. It is stated in 
the Jerusalem Talmud, in [the chapter] “Bameh Madliqin” (With 
What Do We Light): “[And the appearance] of the fourth is like an 
angel [Daniel 3:25]. He saw the angel put out the fire before them, 
and Ḥananya, Misha’el and ‘Azarya did not see him” [PT Shabbat 6, 
9, 39b]. The reason for this is due to the fact that they became spir-
itual beings and conjoined with God and became greater to an angel.
There is no need to expand upon what we ascertained regarding 
the superiority of the level of the angels, for we already have done 
so. The serafim immediately follow the level of God, as it is written: 
Serafim stand above him [Isaiah 6:2], and it is stated: Bless the Lord, 
O His angels, mighty creatures who do His bidding [Psalms 103:20]. 
Furthermore, all their words are based on conjectures and imagin-
ings, with no logical proofs. Furthermore, the first one who may be 
referred to as Wisdom is God. They maintain that they received 
131 See Exodus 14:31.
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these notions by way of tradition, and they bring proofs from 
verses and midrashim and from Sefer HaBahir which is ascribed to 
R. Neḥunya ben Haqanah.132
It appears from his account that certain fundamental kabbalistic ideas 
had spread beyond kabbalistic circles by Levi’s time, at the end of the 
thirteenth century, though we know of no famous kabbalists living in 
Provence in his period. The kabbalistic centers moved to Spain much 
earlier in the thirteenth century. One also does not find other Jewish 
philosophers in Provence reacting against the kabbalists in his period, 
or in the following generations, and one must go back in time half a 
century to find such a reaction—in Milḥamet Miẓvah by Meir ben 
Simeon HaMe‘ili of Narbonne, written between 1239 and 1245.133 It is 
not clear from which sources Levi culled his knowledge, which on a 
number of significant points differs from the more accepted kabbalistic 
views of the time. It appears to reflect a later kabbalistic tradition that 
developed in Provence.134 According to Levi’s presentation, this tradi-
tion accepts much of the metaphysical worldview of the philosophers 
while adding another level of metaphysical reality and ascribing a much 
nobler position to the human soul—particularly of the Jews—which is 
reminiscent of Neoplatonic thought.135 At any rate, Levi clearly felt 
132 Livyat Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, chap. 6, 189-190.
133 This composition is primarily a polemic against Christianity, but toward the end 
HaMe‘ili turns to an attack against the kabbalists; see MS Parma 2749, 228v-235v 
(part of this section was published by Gershom Scholem, “A New Document for 
the History of the Beginning of the Kabbalah,” in: Sefer Bialik, ed. Jacob Fichman 
[Tel Aviv: Omanut, 1934], 148-150 [Heb.]). There is very little in common between 
Levi’s criticism and that of HaMe‘ili. It should be noted that the latter regards the 
Sefer HaBahir as a heretical work, while Levi regards it as an authentic rabbinic 
one, which reflects the change in this book’s fortunes even among the Jewish 
philosophers of Provence by the end of the thirteenth century.
134 See most recently Ram Ben-Shalom, “Kabbalistic Circles Active in the South of 
France (Provence) in the Thirteenth Century,” Tarbiz 82 (2014): 569-605 (Heb.). 
135 For a discussion of the relation between Levi’s presentation and the doctrines and 
motifs found in the kabbalistic sources of his period, see my introduction to Livyat 
Ḥen: The Work of the Chariot, 93-97. For a contrast between Neoplatonic and Aris-
totelian thought on the issue of the level of the human soul, see my “The Place of 
Man in the Hierarchy of Existence in the Philosophy of Ibn Gabirol and Maimon-
ides,” in Alei Shefer: Studies in the Literature of Jewish Thought, ed. Moshe Halamish 
(Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1990), 95-107.
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that it was important to respond to the kabbalistic doctrine as it was 
known to him, if only in passing, perhaps in part because the kabbalists 
rooted their doctrine in traditional texts, including the Book of Creation, 
which Levi, like the other Jewish philosophers of Provence, accepted as 
an authoritative text.
Levi rejects the kabbalistic approach for presenting fanciful notions 
without proof or authentic tradition, there being no level between 
God and the Separate Intellects in his view. Nor can human beings 
attain a level of knowledge and existence superior to that of the Sepa-
rate Intellects. Levi’s presentation and critique reflects his awareness 
of the emergence of a new mystical alternative to the philosophic 
approach, and he is one of the first to challenge it from a philosophic 
perspective.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show how the mythical-mystical approach 
to prophetic texts as reflected in rabbinic midrash and the Heikhalot 
literature is replaced in Jewish philosophical circles by a scientific 
approach to the meaning of these texts, with the Aristotelian corpus 
and the works the Arabic thinkers who drew from it providing the main 
key for their interpretation. It is also a story of a growing exotericism 
in the scientific interpretation of the text, due in part to the desire to 
meet certain cultural challenges—the acceptance of the authority of the 
older Jewish mystical tradition on the part of a wide circle of Jews in 
Maimonides’ time while at the same time a sophisticated philosophical 
theology had already developed in the Islamic world, or the widespread 
knowledge of the sciences and their application to Scripture in Chris-
tian circles in Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s time. In Levi’s period a new 
challenge arises, the new mysticism that has appropriated much of 
Maimonides’ approach but is closer in spirit to the rabbinic midrash and 
to the mystical-magical components of the older mysticism. Levi is one 
of the earliest philosophers to react against it, though he devotes only a 
brief discussion to it in his treatise.
In the Maimonidean tradition, the philosophic interpretation of 
the Account of the Chariot and the scope of the divine science focuses 
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on the entire order of existence in order to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the world, the understanding of which, in the eyes of the 
philosophers, leads to human perfection. The personal eschatological 
motive in this study—in this case, the attainment of immortality—
plays a dominant role, just as it did in the rabbinic and early mystical 
tradition. For many of the Maimonidean philosophers, astronomy becomes 
a key component in the divine science, for it provides the basis for 
proving the existence of the Separate Intellects and God.
In a crucial sense, the acceptance and development of Maimon-
ides’ approach can be seen as undermining the authority of the Bible, 
as evidenced by the philosophic interpretation of the Account of the 
Chariot that I have mentioned, even though Ibn Tibbon, Levi, and 
many of the other philosophers maintained their loyalty to Judaism and 
attempted to harmonize between the two traditions. For all effective 
purposes, science and philosophy supplant religious tradition as the 
source of truth. This is not to say that the Aristotelian philosophers 
were in complete agreement with each other on all the cardinal issues, 
nor is it to deny that at times Jewish philosophers leaned toward those 
views that were more easily harmonized with Scripture.136 Overall, 
tradition played a secondary role in determining the truth of a given 
scientific or philosophic view. How could it be otherwise, when the 
authoritative texts of Judaism were seen as presenting truths in an 
136 Avicenna, being closer to the Islamic tradition than Averroes, presented many 
doctrines that were easier to harmonize with Jewish tradition, whether it be God 
as First Cause of the very existence of the world (by way of emanation) and not just 
the First Cause of all motion and change, individual immortality, the advantage of 
the prophet who attains illumination of the intellect over the philosopher, the 
occurrence of many of the miracles (albeit on the basis of a naturalistic explana-
tion), and more. Despite the great influence of Averroes on all post-Maimonidean 
Jewish philosophy, many of Avicenna’s doctrines continued to be accepted by the 
Jewish philosophers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, particularly in light 
of the fact that Maimonides presented many of the same doctrines. For a study of 
Avicenna’s reception among Jewish thinkers, see Gad Freudenthal and Mauro 
Zonta, “Avicenna among Medieval Jews: The Reception of Avicenna’s Philosoph-
ical, Scientific and Medical Writings in Jewish Cultures, East and West,” Arabic 
Sciences and Philosophy 22 (2012): 217-287.
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esoteric manner, hence open to many different and even conflicting 
interpretations?
It is easy to see how Maimonides’ approach to understanding 
Judaism in light of the philosophic tradition, and moreover, the growing 
exotericism displayed by the Jewish philosophers in Provence in 
promoting this approach, sets the stage for the conflicts in Provence 
and Spain concerning the status of philosophy and its application to 
Judaism which erupt in the fourth decade of the thirteenth century and 
again at the beginning of the fourteenth.137
The trend among the Maimonideans of interpreting the Account 
of the Chariot in terms of Aristotelian philosophy continues throughout 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. At times this trend is opposed 
even by thinkers who appreciate philosophy but reject reducing the 
speculative teachings of Judaism to Aristotelian thought, as can be seen 
from the attack of Abarbanel.138 This part of the story, however, will 
have to wait for a future telling.
Appendix: Some Comments on Maimonides’ 
Esotericism
From Samuel Ibn Tibbon till modern times, the esoteric reading of 
Maimonides’ philosophy has been based on the premise that the reason 
for his esotericism stems from religious-political concerns. That is to 
137 A useful survey of these controversies remains: Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: 
The Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides (New York: Bayard Press, 1935). 
138 It should be noted that even among the Jewish philosophers of the thirteenth 
century, not all of them were content to equate the divine science with Aristotelian 
metaphysics. This point, for example, is evident when examining the early 
thirteenth-century encyclopedia by Judah ben Solomon ha-Cohen, Midrash 
ha-Ḥokhmah, written in Arabic in his native Spain and later translated by him into 
Hebrew when he moved to Italy. While recognizing Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the 
basis for the study of divine science and offering a summary of this work based on 
Averroes’ Middle Commentary, Judah is interested in showing the difference 
between Jewish divine science, based on revelation, and philosophic divine science, 
particularly as pertaining to God’s role as creator. In addition to commenting on 
various verses and midrashim, Judah also enters into a theosophic discussion of the 
Hebrew alphabet. For a discussion of this encyclopedia, see the articles by Resi-
anne Fontaine, Y. Tzvi Langermann, and Mauro Zonta in The Medieval Hebrew 
Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, 191-210, 371-389, 420-422 respectively.
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say, it was dangerous for Maimonides to reveal to the masses some of 
his philosophic views, since these views would undermine their commit-
ment to Judaism or condemn their holder as a heretic. Moreover, he 
sees the prophets and many of the rabbinic sages as holding the same 
views and not revealing these matters explicitly for the same reason, 
while at the same time they laid down severe limitations regarding to 
whom and how they were to be revealed. Certainly to maintain that 
prophecy and providence are completely naturalistic phenomena and 
God is neither directly involved in history nor acquainted with any of 
the individual’s deeds—assuming that these are Maimonides’ esoteric 
views—would lead them to throw off the yoke of Judaism, rather than 
continue to be loyal to Judaism as the most conducive social path in the 
striving for human perfection, and thus should be adhered to for its 
inherent worth. Esotericism was the way for Maimonides to signal his 
agreement with the Aristotelian philosophic worldview without under-
mining the faith of the masses. In short, it serves as a substitute for 
philosophic allegories, as well as Maimonides’ way of guiding the reader 
to the explanation of those allegories that he sees in the Bible and in 
many of the rabbinic homilies. Only on issues that Maimonides feels he 
can publicly proclaim his philosophic doctrine without undermining 
the faith of the masses does he do so, most notably, regarding the incor-
poreality of God.139 In other cases he explicitly tries to steer his readers 
to a position closer to that of the philosophers, such as in his treatments 
of divine governance of the world and prophecy, while still leaving 
some room for the personal God of tradition.
There have been a number of attempts in our own time to maintain 
that there is indeed an esoteric level to the Guide, but it should be 
understood along different lines. Maimonides himself, it has been 
pointed out, in his introduction to the Guide advances another reason 
why certain subjects cannot be taught explicitly:
Know that whenever one of the perfect wishes to mention, either 
orally or in writing, something that he understands of these secrets, 
according to the degree of his perfection, he is unable to explain with 
139 For a discussion of this issue, see Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought, 189-223.
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complete clarity and coherence even the portion that he has appre-
hended, as he could do with other sciences whose teaching is 
generally recognized. Rather there will befall him when teaching 
another that which he had undergone when learning himself. I mean 
to say the subject matter will appear, flash, and then be hidden again, 
as though this were the nature of this subject matter, be there much 
or little of it. For this reason, all the Sages possessing knowledge of 
God the Lord, knowers of the truth, when they aimed at teaching 
something of this subject matter, spoke of it only in parables and 
riddles. (Guide 1.introduction: 8)
Maimonides appears to be arguing that language by essence is incapable 
of conveying profound metaphysical truths.140 These truths come to an 
individual in “flashes” and can be conveyed only in a similar manner, 
because discursive descriptions are essentially inadequate to express 
them. The ramifications of this view for Maimonides’ philosophy of 
language are profound.141 He may well be interpreted as positing a level 
of thought that is beyond language, just as God presumably does not 
think in words.142 Images in fact may be more conducive to convey the 
knowledge that lies beyond discursive thought, but only to the one who 
has attained the requisite philosophic background.
While I am in agreement with the view that Maimonides accepted 
a level of knowledge beyond discursive knowledge, and this is the 
level of prophetic illumination,143 I do not see the methodology of 
introducing deliberate contradictions and scattered hints as involving 
140 See Moshe Halbertal’s discussion of the second approach to Maimonides’ 
esotericism in Concealment and Revelation: Esotericism in Jewish Thought and Its 
Philosophical Implications (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
141 For a study of Maimonides’ philosophy of language and its implications for his 
philosophy, see Josef Stern, “Maimonides on Language and the Science of 
Language,” in Maimonides and the Sciences, ed. Richard S. Cohen and Hillel 
Levine (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 173-226.
142 See Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish philosophy, 622-625.
143 Thus the parable form may serve the dual function of both transmitting such 
knowledge to one with the proper philosophic training and concealing certain 
truths from the masses. Furthermore, the emanation to the prophet’s imagination 
may have enabled this individual to grasp certain matters that the intellect alone 
may have been incapable of grasping. See ibid., 255-257.
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this type of esotericism.144 Furthermore, the few parables Maimonides 
brings in the Guide serve as a pedagogical aid, for he himself goes on 
to explain them, including the parable of the lightning flashes. On 
most of the issues where he appears to hide his true views, discursive 
descriptions are in fact the appropriate means for conveying knowl-
edge, whether it be the issue of creation, prophecy, or providence. 
The knowledge that cannot be adequately attained or conveyed 
involves, in my view, grasping the essence of incorporeal substance. 
In the Guide, Maimonides is not attempting to impart this knowl-
edge, only the philosophic road to attain it, the issues surrounding it, 
and its relation to the texts of Jewish tradition.
Another possible reason that has been advanced for Maimonides’ 
esotericism revolves around his skepticism to attain knowledge in 
certain areas. Maimonides’ secret is that he has no final answer to certain 
fundamental issues.145 In other words, this approach comes to negate the 
view that Maimonides’ esotericism conceals his agreement with the 
Aristotelian philosophers on the weighty questions with which he deals. 
It posits instead that the secret Maimonides wishes to hide is the fact 
that he does not accept any definite conclusions on these profound 
issues; at best he can only explore possible alternatives and see to what 
conclusions they lead. Maimonides does not want his less astute readers 
to discern that neither philosophy nor religion transmit definite conclu-
sions that should be held as absolute theoretical truth. In this view, 
uncertainty can be even more problematic and unsettling to Maimon-
ides’ readers than his upholding the God of Aristotle.
144 Admittedly, Maimonides draws a parallel between his “flashing” truths in profound 
matters to his readers and the type of truth that only comes to an individual in 
“flashes.” One, however, is hard put to find an example of his doing this in the 
Guide. One may interpret him as indicating that a similarity exists between his 
presentation and the presentation in parable form of those that attempted to relay 
this type of truth in biblical and rabbinic times, not that this is the reason for his 
own esoteric writing. One should note that when Maimonides indicates that such 
a “flash” occurred to him (see Guide 3.22: 488; cf. 3.51: 624), it involves under-
standing how to interpret Scripture on the issue of providence and he presents the 
interpretation in a completely explicit manner.
145 See Yair Loberbaum, “On Contradictions, Rationality, Dialectics and Esotericism 
in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Metaphysics 55 (2002): 711-750.
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It appears to me that this approach is more reflective of the contem-
porary geist than Maimonides’ intent. One major problem with this 
approach is that Maimonides gives explicit expression to our inability to 
reach demonstrative conclusions on a range of subjects belonging to the 
“secrets of the Torah.” He certainly does not hide his stance that we 
can only produce dialectical arguments for deciding many metaphysical 
questions and even those that belong to the natural sciences, hence our 
conclusions must be regarded as tentative.146 Of certain matters, we 
have no knowledge at all and can never have such knowledge, such as 
positive knowledge of God’s essence; we can only know what God 
is not and God’s actions—i.e., the order of nature. With Aristotle, 
however, he still agrees that one should favor certain views over 
others—namely, those supported by the strongest arguments and 
subject to minimal objections.147 This point is most clearly exemplified 
by his discussion of creation, even if the apparent conclusion he 
reaches is opposed to that of Aristotle. While any conclusion based on 
dialectical premises is in principle capable of being negated, this does 
not mean that we should not accept it as true, even if a question mark 
remains.
There are those who have seen Maimonides’ philosophic skepti-
cism as more fundamental and extending to the possibility of knowing 
anything metaphysical, or even many matters relating to the heavenly 
bodies, and this is the view underlying the esoteric level of his writings. 
It has been further argued that Maimonides maintains that we have no 
demonstrative proof for God’s very existence, and some of the contra-
dictions in the Guide revolve around this issue.148 This conclusion 
regarding Maimonides’ philosophical skepticism, in turn, is extremely 
146 See Guide 1.31; 1.33.
147 Ibid., 2.23.
148 At the end of Guide 2.24, Maimonides writes a very problematic sentence that 
may be interpreted as indicating that the existence of God cannot even be 
proven by us from the heavens—a view that stands in stark contradiction to his 
previous statements on the subject. Most of Aleph 8 (2008) is devoted to an 
in-depth investigation of this chapter and its problematic sentence on the part 
of many leading Maimonidean scholars, including Herbert Davison, Alfred 
Ivry, Josef Stern, Gad Freudenthal, Joel Kraemer, Y. Tzvi Langermann and 
Warren Z. Harvey.
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significant for his theory of human perfection and immortality. If immor-
tality, as Alfarabi sees it, followed by Maimonides, can only be attained 
with the grasping of the essence of the Active Intellect, and this knowl-
edge, or even lower levels of knowledge, is absolutely impossible for 
even the perfect individual, then immortality for anyone in any 
form is also impossible—a conclusion that Alfarabi himself reached. 
The engagement with philosophy may still be seen as providing the 
human being with extreme pleasure during his lifetime and is certainly 
one of the noblest of human activities, but ultimately it serves as prepa-
ration for engaging in political activity in the best possible manner. The 
only life we have is this life, and the philosopher’s task is to apply his 
understanding to perfecting society. This may be seen as Maimonides’ 
ultimate esoteric message, and it finds its most important expression at 
the very end of the Guide, where Maimonides appears to posit political 
perfection as standing above intellectual perfection.149 In short, 
according to this view, two levels of esotericism exist in the Guide, one 
aimed at hiding the truths from the masses for religious-political 
reasons, and one aimed at hiding the truth from the Aristotelian philoso-
phers and masses alike, since it undermines belief in immortality shared 
by all, the philosophic view that intellectual perfection is the road to 
attain it, and thus much of the value of philosophic speculation, which 
in fact is very limited in the extent of the knowledge that it can impart 
to us once we embark on a study of the heavens and beyond. 
This is not the place to analyze the evidence for and against this 
view, which has been done by a number of leading scholars.150 In 
general, it appears to me to stand in stark opposition to Maimonides’ 
educational and speculative philosophy as I understand it. Maimon-
ides, even in his legal writings, constantly encourages the wise to reach 
the stage in which they master the natural and divine sciences to the 
149 This essentially is the position taken by Shlomo Pines, with his article “The Limita-
tions of Human Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides” 
serving as the foundation for upholding this approach. Herbert Davidson directly, 
and Alexander Altmann indirectly, sought to negate Pines’s view in this matter, as 
well as the consequence that Maimonides rejected any form of immortality. See the 
articles cited above, n. 60. See also Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought, 141-148. 
150 See the previous two notes.
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extent of human capacity, and he consistently ties this knowledge with 
human perfection?151 According to the conclusion that Maimonides 
embraces philosophical skepticism, this activity may provide an intel-
lectually satisfying pastime but appears to contribute little if anything 
to one’s perfection and certainly nothing to attaining immortality. At 
the same time the study of Aristotelian philosophy poses dangers to 
one’s commitment to tradition, a commitment that remains for 
Maimonides politically crucial, no matter how you interpret him. More-
over, it is Maimonides himself who encourages his readers to study 
Aristotelian philosophy, as evidenced by the dedicatory letter accompa-
nying the Guide as well as many statements in the Guide itself, while 
knowing all too well that this study will inevitably lead to perplexity 
regarding religious teachings. As we have seen, the Guide, whose 
avowed purpose is to solve the perplexity that confronts one when one 
begins to learn Aristotelian philosophy in light of the teachings of 
Jewish tradition, proved to be the catalyst for learning philosophy 
among its readers in Provence, and I would argue that they accurately 
understood its message. Yet why would Maimonides encourage the 
wise to engage in such study and become religiously perplexed by 
philosophic teachings if the final message is that there is no chance of 
ever escaping philosophical perplexity? Is the Maimonides of the Guide 
in fact an individual whose final view on all profound issues is one’s 
inability to know the truth at all, or at best remain with a question mark 
regarding diametrically opposed possibilities with no way of militating 
between them?
In conclusion, given our own intellectual climate, there is a certain 
affinity many modern readers may have for the position that Maimon-
ides’ esotericism stems from epistemological considerations rather than 
religious (or political) ones. Without denying that Maimonides’ episte-
mological views raise a number of profound problems, I see little basis 
for the claim that a desire for the concealment of his embrace of 
philosophical skepticism underlies them. Given the far disparate inter-
pretations of Maimonides’ Guide over the ages, one may be excused for 
151 See, for example, his introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah; Mishneh 
Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 4.8; Guide 3.27: 51.
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looking upon it as an open book, with the reader, as the deconstruction-
ists would argue, creating the text. Maimonides, in his instruction to the 
readers of his treatise in the introduction of his work, is well aware how 
differently his treatise will be interpreted by them. Yet he also wants the 
astute reader to arrive at the meaning he himself intends, in order “to 
liberate that virtuous one from that unto which he has sunk, and I shall 
guide him in his perplexity until he becomes perfect and he finds rest.”152 
The “rest” to which he refers in my view is not the peace of mind that 
philosophical skeptics find in their denial of being able to know reality 
truly as it is with the Bible too incapable of providing definitive answers,153 
but rather the peace of mind that the Jewish follower of Aristotle finds in 
the true knowledge of reality and in his understanding how this knowl-
edge stands at the foundation of the biblical text.
152 Guide 1.introduction: 16-17.
153 As opposed to what is termed “fideistic skepticism,” which comes in the service of 
upholding religious doctrines due to the limits of reason.
Introduction
After the destruction of the Temple prophecy was taken from the 
prophets but retained by the sages, we are told in BT Baba Batra 12a. 
The Talmudic discussion continues by bringing the well-known dictum 
by Amemar: “The sage is superior to the prophet.”1 Left unanswered 
are the crucial questions raised by this dictum and by the discussion 
preceding it: what exactly is prophecy, what exactly is wisdom, what is 
the relationship between them, and by extension, what are the charac-
teristics and task of the sage in comparison to those of the prophet?
1 For a survey of approaches to this dictum in the history of Jewish thought, see Alon 
Goshen-Gottstein, “’The Sage is Superior to the Prophet’: The Conception of 
Torah through the Prism of this Proverb through the Ages,” in Study and Knowl-
edge in Jewish Thought, volume 2, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev, 2006), 37-77 (Heb.).
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Maimonides does not cite Amemar’s dictum,2 but he addresses the 
questions it raises extensively in a number of his writings.3 Insofar as 
Maimonides consistently holds the view that all prophets are also sages, 
for wisdom is a necessary condition for prophecy,4 yet not all sages 
possess the requisite conditions to be prophets, it would appear that he 
rejects Amemar’s view and regards the prophet as inevitably superior 
to the sage. In regard to the view ascribing prophecy to non-sages prior 
to the destruction of the Temple, Maimonides clearly holds the opinion 
that there never was a period in history in which prophecy, at least true 
prophecy, was attained by non-sages.5 Yet Maimonides’ discussions 
suggest additional perspectives to view this issue, leading one to wonder 
whether in the final analysis he sees the prophet qua prophet as supe-
rior to the sage, or whether the prophet’s superiority is due solely to the 
fact that in addition to being a sage he possesses the further (secondary) 
gift of prophecy. To answer this question, one must explore Maimon-
ides’ definition of prophecy and what he sees as the distinct attainment 
and task of the prophet, in contrast to his definition of wisdom and 
what he sees as the distinct task of the sage. As we shall see, some of 
Maimonides’ positions raise as many questions as they answer, leaving 
room for interpreting his views in far disparate ways.
2 It appears in an epistle ascribed to Maimonides and addressed to his disciple, 
Joseph ben Judah. While David Tzevi Baneth accepts the authenticity of this 
epistle, Shailat brings a number of arguments against this claim; see Isaac Shailat 
(ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot Press, 1988), 
694-695.
3 I have dealt at length with Maimonides’ approach to prophecy in my book Prophecy: 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), 148-315. Much of my analysis in this chapter is based on what I 
wrote there.
4 See, for example, Guide of the Perplexed 2.32; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of 
the Torah 7.1; Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq, sixth principle; Eight Chapters, 7.
5 See Guide 2.32. Maimonides notes that diviners are also at times referred to in the 
Bible as prophets, since the term is used equivocally. At any rate, one should not 
regard them as true prophets. According to Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 2.36, 
in the period of the Exile prophecy ceased for natural reasons, yet he subtly alludes 
in the Guide to the view that this phenomenon continued throughout history, 
though it did not produce public prophets. See Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an 
Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 308-311.
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It is clear from Maimonides’ writings that one type of knowledge 
that the prophet possesses but the sage lacks is that of divination, a gift 
that the prophet shares to some degree with non-prophetic diviners.6 
Insofar as the prophet is also a sage, he shares with non-prophetic sages 
knowledge of the theoretical sciences—that is to say, knowledge of all 
the sciences culminating in metaphysics—for it is this knowledge in 
particular that characterizes the wise in Maimonides’ view. It is also 
this knowledge, as opposed to any other type of knowledge or any other 
trait, which constitutes the human being’s final perfection.7 The main 
question I wish to explore in this chapter is whether Maimonides was 
of the opinion that the prophet qua prophet attains theoretical knowl-
edge that the non-prophetic sage is incapable of attaining, and what is 
the nature of this knowledge. I would also like to view the public func-
tions of both prophet and sage in Maimonides’ thought and how their 
functions are related to the types of knowledge they attain. This leads 
to the further question of his view of the relation of the rabbinic sage 
to the philosophic sage, as well as the question of the authority of 
the rabbinic sage in comparison to that of the prophet. Finally, I would 
like to show how Maimonides’ followers in Provence treated the rela-
tionship between sage and prophet in respect to their attainment of 
theoretical knowledge.
Maimonides’ Approach to Prophecy
Prophecy for Maimonides is a natural perfection. In the Introduction to 
Pereq Ḥeleq, sixth principle of faith, and in Mishneh Torah, Laws of 
Principles of the Torah, 7.1, he defines prophecy as conjunction (ittiṣāl) 
of the intellect with the Active Intellect, which is attained after appre-
hending all that exists. In the sixth principle, he mentions also the 
emanation that comes from the latter intellect to the former one when 
6 For a discussion of this point, see below. 
7 Maimonides maintains this position in his introduction to Commentary on the 
Mishnah and his Eight Chapters, reiterates it in several places in his Mishneh Torah, 
most notably in the “Laws of the Principles of the Torah,” and presents it 
throughout the Guide. For Maimonides’ discussion of different types of wisdom, 
with knowledge of the sciences being considered wisdom proper, see Guide 3.54.
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it has reached this state. In Guide 2.36, he brings a fuller, though some-
what more cryptic, definition:
Know that the true reality and quiddity of prophecy consist in it 
being an overflow overflowing from God, may He be cherished and 
honored, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect, toward 
the rational faculty in the first place and thereafter toward the imag-
inative faculty. This is the highest degree of man and the ultimate 
term of perfection that can exist for his species; and this state is the 
ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty. (369)
Prophecy is defined here in terms of an emanation that is received by 
two human faculties, the rational and imaginative. Though Maimon-
ides subsequently mentions “conjunction” in dealing with prophetic 
visions,8 he does not introduce this notion in his initial description of 
prophecy. In the continuation of the chapter, Maimonides sees the 
emanation from the Active Intellect to these two faculties as resulting 
in the attainment of two types of knowledge: 
Now there is no doubt that whenever, in an individual of this 
description, his imaginative faculty, which is as perfect as possible, 
acts and receives from the intellect an overflow corresponding to his 
speculative perfection, this individual will only apprehend divine 
and most extraordinary matters, will see only God and His angels, 
and will only be aware and achieve knowledge of matters that consti-
tute true opinions and general directives for the well-being of men in 
their relations with one another. (372)
To these two types of knowledge—the apprehension of metaphysics 
and the principles of ideal leadership—one should add also knowledge 
of the future, as is clarified in the following two chapters, as well as 
Maimonides’ other writings.9 The emanation from the Active Intellect 
8 See Guide 2.45; see also Maimonides’ description of conjunction when speaking of 
the ecstatic death of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam at the end of Guide 3.51. Whether 
Maimonides thought that a form of ontological conjunction with the Active Intel-
lect was in fact possible, and with it the attainment of immortality, has been a 
source of disagreement among scholars. For a discussion of this issue, see Howard 
Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought: Studies in Ethics, Law and the Human Ideal 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 136-150.
9 See, for example, Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Principles of the Torah 10.3.
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does not constitute the transmission of actual knowledge in Maimon-
ides’ view, but it refers to a force that strengthens the functioning of 
these two human faculties when they are in a perfect state, thereby 
allowing the individual to attain knowledge in these various areas on 
the basis of the knowledge he already possesses.10 This point is supported 
by the continuation of Maimonides’ discussion, as we shall see below.
In Guide 2.37, Maimonides describes three types of emanation 
that are distinguished solely by the human faculties receiving it and not 
by the nature of the emanation itself:
The case in which the intellectual overflow overflows only toward 
the rational faculty and does not overflow at all toward the imagina-
tive faculty—either because the scantiness of what overflows or 
because of some deficiency existing in the imaginative faculty in its 
natural disposition, a deficiency that makes it impossible for it to 
receive the overflow of the intellect—is characteristic of the class of 
men of science engaged in speculation. If, on the other hand, this 
overflow reaches both faculties—I mean both the rational and the 
imaginative—as we and others among the philosophers have 
explained, and if the imaginative faculty is in a state of ultimate 
perfection owing to its natural disposition, this is characteristic of 
the class of prophets. If again the overflow only reaches the imagina-
tive faculty, the defect in the rational faculty deriving either from its 
original natural disposition or from insufficiency of training, this is 
characteristic of the class of those who govern cities, while being the 
legislators, the soothsayers, the augurs, and the dreamers of veridical 
dreams . . . . (374)
It is clear from Maimonides’ account that the superior rational faculty 
of both the prophet and philosopher is the one responsible for their 
attainment of theoretical knowledge, and the superior imaginative 
faculty is the one primarily responsible for the ability to govern and 
divine. If the prophet is a far better leader than the non-prophet in 
Maimonides’ thought, his advantage is undoubtedly due to his superior 
rational faculty. This enables the prophet to govern with the human 
being’s true perfection and felicity in mind, while non-prophets set as 
their ends false or inferior goals. The prophet’s perfect rational faculty 
10 For more on this point, see Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish 
Philosophy, 239-257.
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also accords him an advantage over non-prophets in the area of divina-
tion.11 Philosophers due to their imperfect imaginative faculty lack 
ability in these two areas. This leaves us with the question of whether 
the prophet is superior to the philosopher in the area of theoretical 
knowledge, and if so, whether his superior imaginative faculty accords 
him this superiority. Complicating the picture is the fact that Moses in 
Maimonides’ thought achieved the highest level of theoretical knowl-
edge, though his imaginative faculty was not involved at all in the 
reception of the prophetic emanation.12
I have argued in previous studies that Maimonides in fact thought 
that prophets were superior to philosophers in the realm of theoretical 
knowledge.13 This superiority is due in large part to a superior rational 
faculty that possesses a greater intuitive ability to quickly frame syllo-
gisms, grasp conclusions, and advance in theoretical knowledge, as 
though one learns these things instantaneously and without effort, just 
as the same ability when applied to particular circumstances allows one 
to divine the future instantaneously. As Maimonides explains in Guide 
2.38 regarding this faculty:
You will find among people a man whose conjecturing and divination 
are very strong and habitually hit the mark. . . . The causes of this 
are many—they are various anterior, posterior, and present circum-
stances. But in virtue of the strength of this divination, the mind 
goes over all these premises and draws from them conclusions in the 
shortest time, so that it is thought to happen in no time at all. In 
virtue of this faculty, certain people give warnings concerning great 
future events. . . . Know that the true prophets indubitably grasp 
speculative matters; by means of his speculation alone, man is unable 
to grasp the causes from which what a prophet has come to know 
necessarily follows. This has a counterpart in their giving informa-
tion regarding matters with respect to which man, using only 
common conjecture and divination, is unable to give information. 
For the very overflow that affects the imaginative faculty—with a 
result of rendering it perfect so that its act brings about its giving 
11 I argue this point in more detail in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 83-87; see also 
below.
12 See Guide 2.45. For more on this issue, see below, chapter 9, 316 n. 2.
13 See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 77-79, 292-293; Prophecy: The History of an Idea 
in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 255-257. 
Chapter Eight276 
information about what will happen and its apprehending those 
future events as if they were things that had been perceived by the 
senses and had reached the imaginative faculty from the senses—is 
also the overflow that renders perfect the act of the rational faculty, 
so that its act brings about its knowing things that are real in their 
existence, and it achieves this apprehension as if it had apprehended 
it by starting from speculative premises. . . . For the overflow of the 
Active Intellect goes in its true reality only to it [that is, the rational 
faculty], causing it to pass from potentiality to actuality. It is from 
the rational faculty that that overflow comes to the imaginative 
faculty. How then can the imaginative faculty be perfected in so 
great a measure as to apprehend what does not come to it from the 
senses, without the rational faculty being affected in a similar way so 
as to apprehend without having apprehended by way of premises, 
inference, and reflection? This is the true reality of the notion of 
prophecy, and these are the opinions that are peculiar to the prophetic 
teaching. (376-377) 
The process of divination Maimonides describes appears to be a rational 
process. Syllogisms are rapidly formed on the basis of the individual’s 
knowledge. Conclusions involving the future are then drawn. Maimon-
ides sees a similar process at work in the attainment of theoretical 
knowledge. The very term that Maimonides uses for “conjecture” and 
“intuition” in the area of divination, al-ḥads, is the term employed by 
Avicenna and other the Islamic philosophers for the ability possessed 
by certain individuals for quickly attaining intelligibles. In the part of 
his encyclopedia Al-Najāt devoted to an exploration of the powers of 
the soul, Avicenna writes regarding the prophetic faculty:
If a person can acquire knowledge from within himself, this strong 
capacity is called “intuition” (al-ḥads). It is so strong in certain people 
that they do not need great effort, or instruction and actualization, 
in order to make contact with the active intelligence. But the primary 
capacity of such a person for this is so powerful that he might also be 
said to possess the second capacity; indeed, it seems as though he 
knows everything from within himself. This is the highest degree of 
this capacity. In this state the material intelligence must be called 
“Divine Spirit.” It belongs to the genus of intellectus in habitu, but is 
so lofty that not all people share it. It is not unlikely, indeed, that 
some of these actions attributed to the “Divine Intelligence” because 
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of their powerful and lofty nature overflow into the imagination 
which symbolizes them in sense-imagery and words in the way which 
we have previously indicated. What proves this is the evident fact 
that the intelligible truths are acquired only when the middle term of 
a syllogism is obtained. This may be done in two ways: sometimes 
through intuition, which is an act of mind by which the mind itself 
immediately perceived the middle term. This power of intuition is 
quickness of apprehension. . . . It is possible that a man may find the 
truth within himself, and that the syllogism may be effected in his 
mind without any teacher. This varies both quantitatively and qual-
itatively. . . . Thus there might be a man whose soul has such an 
intense purity and is so firmly linked to the rational principles that 
he blazes with intuition, i.e. with the receptivity of inspiration 
coming from the active intelligence concerning everything. So the 
forms of all things contained in the active intelligence are imprinted 
on his soul either all at once or nearly so, not that he accepts them 
merely on authority but on account of their logical order which 
encompasses all the middle terms. . . . This is a kind of prophetic 
inspiration, indeed its highest form and the one most fitted to be 
called Divine Power; and it is the highest human faculty.14 
When Maimonides writes that “premises, inference, and reflection” 
are not involved in the apprehension of the prophet, he should not be 
interpreted as maintaining that the prophet knows only conclusions 
without the syllogisms that underlie them, for this is not considered 
true knowledge at all in the philosophic tradition; rather, he has in 
mind Avicenna’s approach that this process happens instantaneously 
in the prophetic intellect.15
14 Fazlur Rahman (trans.), Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 
1952), 35-37. For the Arabic text of the parallel discussion in Avicenna’s encyclo-
pedia Al-Shifā‘, see Fazlur Rahman (ed.), Avicenna’s De Anima (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), 250-252. For a discussion of al-ḥads in Avicenna, see Dmitri 
Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 159-176.
15 Prior to Maimonides, Judah Halevi cites this view of the prophetic intellect in 
Kuzari 5.12. Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera, one of the earliest commentators of Maimon-
ides, indicates the relation between Maimonides’ view and that of Avicenna in his 
commentary on Guide 1.34. See his Moreh ha-Moreh, ed. Yair Shiffman (Jerusalem: 
World Union of Jewish Studies, 2001), 137. Maimonides mentions al-ḥads as a 
virtue of the rational faculty in Eight Chapters 2, indicating that he was well aware 
of the philosophic tradition connecting this power with the attainment of theoret-
ical knowledge. While in the passage from the Guide cited above Maimonides 
clearly implies that a rational process is involved in divination, he may have decided 
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Maimonides’ view of the superiority of the prophet’s rational 
faculty to that of the philosopher emerges from the parable of the light-
ning flashes that he brings at the beginning of the Guide:
We are like someone in a very dark night over whom lightning flashes 
time and time again. Among us there is one for whom the lightning 
flashes time and time again, so that he is always, as it were, in 
unceasing light. Thus night appears to him as day. That is the degree 
of the great one among the prophets. . . . Among them there is one 
to whom the lightning flashes only once in the whole of his night. . . . 
There are others between whose lightning flashes there are greater or 
shorter intervals. Thereafter comes he who does not attain a degree 
in which his darkness is illumined by any lightning flash. It is illu-
mined, however, by a polished body or something of that kind. . . . 
And even this small light that shines over us is not always there, but 
flashes and is hidden again. . . . It is in accord with these states that 
the degrees of the perfect vary. (7-8)
The one who can “see” the truths of metaphysics directly is the prophet. 
Prophecy thus is equated with a special type of intellectual illumina-
tion, by means of which the individual apprehends the highest level of 
reality. Different degrees of prophecy exist in accordance with the 
number of times the intellect experiences this type of illumination. 
Each “lightning flash” brings in its wake a more penetrating grasp of 
metaphysical reality. Moses represents the final point of the continuum 
of perfection. His intellect was in a state of continuous illumination. 
Nevertheless, he remains in some crucial sense a corporeal being. He 
does not see metaphysical reality in the bright light of the sun. 
not to use the term al-ḥads in regard to the attainment of intelligibles as well, in 
order not to make this point too explicit. Instead, he allows his less astute readers 
to draw the conclusion that this power of intuition is tied up only with the imagi-
nation, preventing them from attributing a superior rational faculty to diviners, 
even if only in regard to practical matters, which would blur the distinction between 
the three classes that Maimonides wishes to draw. The difference in his termi-
nology from that of Avicenna thus does not reflect a different attitude; rather, it is 
due to the other issues that inform his discussion. For a different approach to this 
issue, see Amira Eran, “Intuition and Inspiration: The Causes of Jewish Thinkers’ 
Objection to Avicenna’s Intellectual Prophecy (Ḥads),” Jewish Studies Quarterly 14 
(2007): 39-71.
Sage and Prophet  279
The next group Maimonides describes consists of those who see 
metaphysical reality by way of reflection. They are the philosophers. 
Maimonides does not explain the nature of the difference between 
prophets and philosophers. While in his later discussion in the Guide 
the difference between the two lies in how quickly and high one can 
climb in one’s attainment of discursive knowledge, the images he uses 
in this passage suggest that the difference does not lie so much in 
“what” they know, though this too enters into the picture, as in the 
quality or clarity of their apprehension. The prophet is able to under-
stand metaphysical reality in a more profound, holistic manner. This 
point is also suggested by the other famous parable brought by Maimon-
ides in the Guide (3.51), that of the king in his palace. The men of 
science are those who have entered the inner court of the palace, by 
virtue of achieving perfection in the natural things, and understanding 
the divine science, while the prophets are those who, “after having 
attained perfection in the divine science, turn wholly toward God, may 
He be cherished and held sublime, renounce what is other than He, 
and direct all their acts of their intellect toward an examination of the 
beings with a view to drawing from them proof with regard to Him, so 
as to know His governance of them in whatever way it is possible. 
These people are those who are present in the ruler’s council. This is 
the rank of the prophets” (620). The emphasis here too is on the 
completeness of the knowledge one attains in this stage—the ability to 
see the whole picture in all its details of the interrelation of all the 
existents with God.16
These parables and their explanations, as well as Maimonides’ 
approach to Moses’ apprehension in other passages of his writings, read 
16 Compare Maimonides’ description of the knowledge attained by Moses in the 
revelation at Sinai when he was on top of the mountain (in the cleft of the rock), 
depicted in Exodus 33-34: “This dictum—all my goodness—alludes to the display to 
him of all existing things. . . . By their display, I mean that he will apprehend their 
nature and the way they are mutually connected so that he will know how He 
governs them in general and in detail” (Guide 1.54: 124). 
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like a less mystical version of Avicenna’s account in his Remarks and 
Admonitions:17 
Furthermore, if the will and spiritual exercise bring the knower to a 
certain limit, he will encounter pleasurable stolen looks at the light 
of the Truth, as if these looks are lightning that shines over the 
knower and then turns away from him. . . . He is then absorbed in 
those overwhelming moments until they overcome him even while 
not exercising. Thus whenever he catches a glimpse of a thing, he 
returns from that thing to the side of sanctity, remembering some-
thing of the latter. He is then overcome by a fainting spell. Thus he 
sees the Truth in everything. Perhaps on his way to this limit, his 
veils are lifted up from him, and he ceases to be calm. . . . After that, 
spiritual exercise carries him to a point at which his moment is 
converted into tranquility. Thus that which is stolen becomes familiar, 
and the lightning becomes a clear flame. He acquires a stable knowl-
edge of the Truth, as if this knowledge is a continuous accompaniment 
in which he delights in the rapture of the Truth. If he turns away 
from this he will do so with loss and regret. . . . Perhaps up to this 
point, this knowledge is facilitated for him only at times. But then 
he moves gradually until he attains it whenever he wishes. . . . 
Knowledge begins by the truly adept’s separation, detachment, 
abandonment, and rejection—concentrating on a togetherness that 
is the togetherness of the attributes of the Truth, reaching the One, 
and then stopping.18
The focus in both Maimonides’ and Avicenna’s accounts is on the state 
of the intellect, though they resort to figurative language in attempt to 
depict this state. Yet the superiority of the prophet’s intellectual attain-
ment in Maimonides’ view may also be due in part to his superior 
imagination, and not only to his superior rational faculty. The imagina-
tive faculty of the prophet clearly serves as a crucial pedagogical aid in 
17 For Maimonides’ immediate sources for the parable of lightning flashes, see Shlomo 
Pines, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed,” ci, found in his 
translation of the treatise. Pines, however, questions whether Avicenna was 
Maimonides’ immediate source and traces the parable to Ibn Bajja instead, whose 
works were well known to Maimonides; see ibid., civ-cvi. On Ibn Bajja’s approach, 
see Alexander Altmann, “Ibn Bajja on Man’s Ultimate Felicity,” in Studies in Reli-
gious Philosophy and Mysticism (London: Routledge, 1969), 73-107.
18 Shams Inati (trans.), Ibn Sina and Mysticism—Remarks and Admonitions: Part Four 
(London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 86-88.
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teaching others theoretical truths by representing them in images, but 
may also aid the prophet himself to grasp the truths in the realm of 
metaphysics in a more unified manner.19 Only Moses, whose initial 
prophecy also involved the imagination in Maimonides’ view,20 was 
able to reach the level where he could dispense with its services in his 
reception of the prophetic emanation and comprehend metaphysical 
reality as pure intellect, similar to the comprehension of the Active 
Intellect.
The conclusion one apparently draws from this analysis is that in 
any conflict between the prophet and philosopher in theoretical matters 
one should favor the prophet due to his superior knowledge. Yet this 
conclusion is far from certain, insofar as the prophet may often teach 
opinions that are necessary for political reasons, and not because of 
their theoretical truth, as Maimonides indicates in regard to the 
teachings of the Torah itself.21 Moreover, it is not at all clear that Maimon-
ides thought that the prophet is inevitably infallible in his theoretical 
knowledge, a point that emerged from the discussion in the previous 
chapter.22 In short, Maimonides may well have believed that the 
prophet attains greater intellectual perfection than the philosopher, 
and a greater clarity in his understanding of metaphysics, but this does 
not necessitate the view that the opinions the prophet expresses should 
inevitably be accepted as theoretical truth. God’s creation of the world, 
for example, is one of the fundamental opinions that should be accepted 
on the basis of prophetic teachings, according to Maimonides,23 while at 
19 It is interesting to note that Avicenna too, in his Remarks and Admonitions, deals 
with the imaginative aspect of the knowledge attained by the Knower or prophet, 
after dealing with the intellectual aspect. He writes: “Hence, the soul is easily 
pulled to the higher side. If a representation of an invisible thing occurs to the soul, 
the imagination turns toward this representation, and receives it as well. This 
turning is due either to a stimulus given by this occurring thing when the imagina-
tion is quick to discern this stimulus after having rested its movement and relieved 
its weakness, or to the rational soul’s natural employment of the imagination, for 
the imagination assists the soul when such opportunities are presented” (100).
20 See below, chapter 9, 323-324.
21 See Guide 3.28.
22 See above, chapter 7, 249-250.
23 See Guide 2.23. Interestingly, in Guide 2.13, Maimonides indicates that Abraham 
was led to this belief by speculation (and not prophecy). The depiction of Abraham 
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the same time there are good reasons to interpret him as regarding this 
as a necessary belief, rather than a true one, as we have seen above in 
chapter three. Furthermore, given the nature of prophetic speech, the 
views of the philosophers remain the key for understanding the theo-
retical ideas the prophets convey.
The Public Roles of the Prophet and the Sage in 
Maimonides’ Thought and Their Legal Authority
The superiority of the prophet over the philosopher in theoretical 
matters, over the non-prophetic leader in governance, and over the 
diviner in foretelling the future certainly qualifies him as the 
philosopher-king par excellence. The image of the prophet in the Guide 
is in fact that of the ideal leader, though the role of transmitter of a 
divine law is expressly limited to Moses.24 When one turns, however, to 
Maimonides’ legal writings, his position on the public role of the 
prophet is more complex and not without dissonance. In these writ-
ings, the prophet’s role does not appear to be at all commensurate with 
his attainment.
A striking example of this dissonance can be found in Mishneh 
Torah, Laws of the Principles of the Torah. In chapters 7-10, Maimon-
ides deals with the issues of the nature of prophecy, Mosaic prophecy, 
the verification of prophecy, and the authority of the prophet. He 
begins his account by stressing the exceptional wisdom of the prophet, 
his moral traits, his complete knowledge of the natural sciences and 
metaphysics (or pardes in accordance with Maimonides’ definition of 
this term in the first four chapters of this section), and his complete 
single-minded devotion solely to the apprehension of these matters. 
These qualifications result in his conjunction with the Active Intellect 
and becoming in essence a “different person”—a reference to his attain-
ment of the immortal acquired intellect (7.1).25 Maimonides’ depiction 
is an anti-Aristotelian philosopher stands in contrast to Maimonides’ previous 
depiction of Abraham in the Mishneh Torah as a philosopher who proved the exis-
tence of God on the basis of the Aristotelian notion of the eternity of the world.
24 See Guide 2.39-40.
25 See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 137-139. For an analysis of Maimonides’ 
discussion of prophecy in the “Laws of the Principles of the Torah,” see Prophecy: 
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of prophecy in this context is completely in terms of its intellectual 
dimension. He goes on to maintain that there are different levels of 
prophecy, just as in the case of wisdom (7.2), refers to the imaginative 
dimension of prophecy, insofar as it takes place in a vision (7.3), lists 
the differences between normative prophecy and Mosaic prophecy 
(7.6), and indicates that prophecy may be either of a private nature 
(that is, meant only for the recipient), or public (that is, involving a 
mission to others). In the latter case, the task of the prophets are to 
teach others wisdom, inform them what they should do and prevent 
them from practicing evil (7.7)—appropriate tasks, given the prophet’s 
own qualifications and attainment. Maimonides in this manner distin-
guishes between the phenomenon of prophecy and the prophetic 
mission, which is integral to only some prophecies.26
Maimonides’ approach to the verification of prophecy follows from 
the nature of prophecy and the prophet’s qualifications. Individuals 
lacking sterling moral characteristics and perfect wisdom (which primarily 
denotes knowledge of all the natural sciences and metaphysics), cannot 
be prophets. The claim to prophecy on the part of anyone of this 
description thus is automatically dismissed (7.7). It is only at the final 
stage that the prophet is asked to produce a sign—not necessarily a 
miracle, but the accurate foretelling of future events in all their details 
without error (10.1-2). Implicit in this test is the view that since divina-
tion is one of the components of prophecy, the lack of this ability 
indicates that one is not a true prophet.
Till this point, Maimonides’ approach is consistent from a rational 
perspective. Yet the continuation of his discussion is surprising, for 
Maimonides not only sees divination as a component of prophecy; he 
treats it as the primary one, at least of public prophecy: “The prophet 
does not arise for us except to inform us of future events in the world” 
(10.3). One would have expected Maimonides to elaborate upon the 
other tasks that he ascribed to the prophet earlier in his discussion that 
is to say, as a teacher of wisdom and a guide to the proper course of 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 182-201.
26 On Maimonides’ naturalistic approach to the prophetic mission, see Prophecy: The 
History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 251-253.
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public action—which follow from the prophet’s exceptional intellec-
tual accomplishments and leadership abilities.27 Instead, he transforms 
the prophet qua prophet essentially into a glorified diviner.
The aim of Maimonides’ approach appears to be a minimization of 
the public role of the prophet at the same time that he maximizes 
the nature of his attainment. The prophet is the one who achieves ulti-
mate human perfection and an immortal intellect, yet he is not granted 
all the authority that his achievement appears to warrant. Maimonides 
is adamant on the point that prophecy does not involve adding laws to 
the Torah or annulling them, changing their details, or even deciding 
questions of law on the basis of revelation (9.1, 4). In short, the authority 
of the prophet extends only to matters that the Law does not command 
or prohibit, such as waging or not waging war, building or not building 
a wall, etc. (9.2). It is easy to see how these matters are tied up with the 
ability of the prophet to predict the future. The question that this view 
raises is why the prophet does not have authority in the other areas that 
are tied up with his superior intellect, such as determining laws or 
commanding the theoretical truths that are to be held by the nation 
in addition to those decreed by Moses.
The reason Maimonides argues for the eternal uniqueness of Mosaic 
Law, and hence the inability of the prophet to make any changes in it 
whatsoever, can easily be traced in large measure to his desire to erect 
a strong bulwark against the annulment of the Law by those he considers 
to be false prophets, such as the founders of the other religions. Even 
recognizing permanent minor changes in Mosaic Law can open the door 
to its complete abrogation.28 Yet the prophet qua prophet would 
27 Both these roles are stressed in Maimonides’ discussion of prophecy in the Guide, 
though he does not contradict there what he had written in the Mishneh Torah.
28 See, for example, what Maimonides says regarding the issue of changes in the Law 
in Guide 3.34. Not all of Maimonides’ predecessors agreed with the view that 
prophets after Moses lacked all legislative authority. For more on the issues 
discussed here and the relevant bibliography, see Howard Kreisel, “Maimonides’ 
Political Philosophy,” in Cambridge Companion to Moses Maimonides, ed. Kenneth 
Seeskin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193-220; idem, “Prophetic 
Authority in the Philosophy of Spinoza and in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in 
Spiritual Authority: Struggles over Cultural Power in Jewish Thought, ed. Howard 
Kreisel, Boaz Huss, and Uri Ehrlich (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the 
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appear to be the jurist par excellence, so it is perplexing why Maimon-
ides is insistent on barring him even from this role.29 It may be 
countered that he denies him this role as a prophet, but not as a sage, 
for the prophet is also a sage. While this is certainly the case, the 
point remains that Maimonides insists that the prophet has no advan-
tage over non-prophetic sages in deciding laws, despite his evident 
advantages over them. Consider, for example, Maimonides’ extreme 
formulations of this position in the introduction to his Commentary 
on the Mishnah:
Know that prophecy does not apply to speculations concerning the 
[legal] commentary on the Law, and the derivation of “branches” by 
way of the thirteen principles [of legal hermeneutics]. What Joshua 
and Pinchas achieved by way of speculation and [legal] syllogism is 
precisely what Rabina and R. Ashi achieved.30
If a thousand prophets, all like Elijah and Elisha, interpret [the law] 
according to a certain interpretation and a thousand and one sages 
offer an opposing interpretation, ‘one must follow the majority. The 
law is in accordance with the words of the thousand and one sages, 
not the thousand great prophets.31
Given Maimonides’ approach to prophecy, it is hard to argue that he is 
simply favoring intellect over revelation in this case. No one is better 
suited intellectually to decide cases of law than the prophet, so why 
should his prophetic insight of the ideal decision to be made in any 
given matter not be favored over the one who lacks this attainment? 
Why should we only accord the prophet this authority when it comes 
to political decisions, due primarily to his superior divinatory ability, 
Negev Press, 2009), 207-221 (Heb.). See also Gerald Blidstein, “On the Institution-
alization of Prophecy in Maimonidean Halakhah,” Daat 43 (1999): 25-42 (Heb.).
29 It should be noted that the prophet qua prophet shares some of the same areas of 
legal authority as the sages—the ability to institute legal enactments for the public 
as well as to temporarily suspend Mosaic commandments. Maimonides does not 
break with his rabbinic sources on this point, but clearly is more interested in this 
context to stress the limits of prophetic authority rather than its prerogatives.
30 See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Haqdamot HaRambam la-Mishnah (Jeru-
salem: Ma‘aliyot, 1992), 29 (Arabic, 329).
31 Ibid., 36 (Arabic, 335).
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and not accord him a similar authority in purely legal matters due to 
his superior intellectual ability to guide society to the most appropriate 
path? Is not the prophet the individual who best understands the aims 
of the divine Lawgiver and can best determine the most appropriate 
legal rulings in light of the particular historical circumstances of his 
period? This is precisely the model advanced by Alfarabi, which had 
such a strong impact on Maimonides’ thought and to an important 
degree even his own legal activity.32
Moreover, Maimonides appears to maintain the position that just 
as there is an ideal law which finds its expression in the Torah of Moses, 
there are also ideal legal rulings. Evidence for this view can be found in 
his explanation of the reason for the controversies among the Sages, 
which he brings in the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah:
Regarding their saying: “When the students of Shammai and Hillel 
grew more numerous and did not attend to them [their masters] in an 
adequate manner, the controversies in Israel grew more numerous” 
[BT Sanhedrin 88b], this matter is exceptionally clear. When two 
individuals are equal in discernment, speculation, and knowledge of 
the principles from which one deduces [legal opinions], no disagree-
ment at all will arise between them in their logical deductions, and if 
it arises, it will be rare. One finds this in the case of Shammai and 
Hillel, who disagreed only on a few legal rulings. This is due to the 
fact that the logical deductions of each of them in all [legal] matters 
that are attained by logical deduction were close to one another. 
Similarly, the principles that were transmitted to one were the same 
as the principles transmitted to the other. However, when the dili-
gence of their students declined and their [power of] logical deduction 
weakened in comparison to that of Hillel and Shammai, their 
masters, disagreements arose among them in many matters upon 
which they speculated. The logical deductions of each of them were 
commensurate with one’s intellect and the principles one held. One 
should not blame them for this. We do not demand of two sages who 
argue that they argue with the intellect of Joshua and Pinchas. Simi-
larly, we cast no doubts regarding the matter on which they disagreed, 
insofar as they were not like Shammai and Hillel, or those greater 
than them, for God did not command us thus in the service of Him.33 
32 See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 16-27.
33 That is to say, we do not question the final decision of the sages who disagreed with 
one another and who were inferior to their masters, for God did not command us 
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Rather, He obligated us to heed the sages of any given generation, as 
it is said: To the judge that will be in those days and you shall inquire 
etc. [Deuteronomy 17:9]. This is the manner in which controversies 
arose, not that they were mistaken in the traditions they received, 
one receiving a true one and the other a false.34
According to Maimonides’ approach, a less than perfect wisdom is what 
brings to weak logical reasoning and controversies in matters of law. 
From this one can infer that one of perfect wisdom can deduce the ideal 
legal rulings.
While the principles to which Maimonides refers may be thought 
of only as formal legal ones, such as R. Ishmael’s thirteen principles by 
which the Torah is expounded—and hence deriving the ideal ruling is 
based purely on formal legal reasoning—there is good reason to posit 
that Maimonides has additional principles in mind, such as the final 
ends of the Law. In other words, metal-legal principles are crucial in 
deducing the best legal ruling in a given situation. This approach fits 
in nicely with the Platonic model of the philosopher-king who creates 
an ideal society by means of the laws he lays down and the opinions 
that he teaches. Alfarabi, building upon this model, posited successive 
(or simultaneous) ideal legislations laid down on the basis of the revela-
tion (waḥy) attained by different supreme lawgivers, each law framed in 
accordance with the circumstances of one’s period and one’s society. 
Those rulers who were not on the level of the supreme lawgivers, 
insofar as they did not possess all the requisite qualifications to attain 
revelation, were to lead society on the basis of the older ideal 
legislation.35 How they were to do so can be discerned from Alfarabi’s 
discussion of jurisprudence and theology in his Enumeration of the 
Sciences:
Jurisprudence (fiqh) is the art that enables man to infer the determi-
nation of whatever was not explicitly specified by the Lawgiver, on 
the basis of such things as were explicitly specified and determined 
to heed only the decisions of the great sages and not the lesser ones.
34 Haqdamot HaRambam la-Mishnah, 41 (Arabic, 339-340).
35 See Alfarabi, The Political Regime, trans. Fauzi Najjar, in Medieval Political Philosophy, 
ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 37.
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by him; and to strive to infer correctly by taking into account the 
Lawgiver’s purpose with the religion he had legislated for the nation 
to which he gave that religion. Now every religion comprises certain 
opinions and certain actions. Examples of the opinions are those 
legislated about God (praise be to Him) and His attributes, about 
the world, and so forth. Examples of the actions are those by which 
God (the Mighty and Majestic) is magnified, and the actions by 
means of which transactions are conducted in the cities. For this 
reason, the science of jurisprudence has two parts, one part dealing 
with the opinions and another dealing with the actions.
The art of dialectical theology (kalām) is a positive disposition 
that enables man to argue in the defense of the specific opinions and 
actions stated by the founder of the religion, and against everything 
that opposes these opinions and actions. This art is also divided into 
two parts; one part deals with the opinions, and another deals with 
the actions. It is different from jurisprudence. For the jurist takes the 
opinions and the actions stated explicitly by the founder of the reli-
gion and, using them as axioms, he infers the things that follow from 
them as consequences. The dialectical theologian, on the other hand, 
defends the things that the jurist uses as axioms, without inferring 
other things from them. If it should happen that a certain man 
possesses the ability to do both, then he is both a jurist and a dialec-
tical theologian. He defends the axioms in his capacity as a dialectical 
theologian, and he infers from them in his capacity as a jurist.36
According to Alfarabi’s approach, the task of those who are not supreme 
lawgivers is to defend the opinions of the ideal law against those who 
reject them, and to interpret the law in a manner appropriate to situa-
tions not explicitly addressed by it. As in the case of Maimonides, one 
may argue that Alfarabi too sees the jurists as interpreting the ideal law 
solely on the basis of the established formal rules. Yet Alfarabi explic-
itly states that the jurists take “into account the Lawgiver’s purpose 
with the religion he had legislated,” thereby implying that they act also 
in accordance with the spirit of the ideal law in order that it achieves 
the purpose for which it was promulgated.
Maimonides, who rejected the possibility of any ideal legislation 
other than Mosaic Law, regarded the Sages of the Talmud, at least the 
most important of them, as jurists-theologians who were steeped in 
36 Alfarabi, The Enumeration of the Sciences, trans. Fauzi Najjar, in Medieval Political 
Philosophy, 27.
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philosophy. They were able to interpret the Torah, both the actions it 
commands and the opinions it imparts, in accordance with its final 
purpose—the welfare of the soul (that is to say, intellect), and the 
welfare of the body (that is, the body politic)—and in a manner most 
appropriate for the social circumstances of their period. The ideal 
rulings are those that best accomplish this task while still conforming to 
the formal principles of legal reasoning. In essence, ideal legal rulings 
are the ones that the Lawgiver would have ruled if confronted with a 
similar situation. Maimonides appears to have viewed his own task in 
this light, both as a public educator and as a legal authority.37
Hence Maimonides’ preference for the decision of a thousand and 
one non-prophetic sages over that of a thousand prophets is due to the 
importance he attaches to the formal rules of adjudication in cases of 
disagreements, even if the price to be paid is a non-ideal decision. He 
saw it as crucial to keep revelation completely out of the process, and 
insist in no uncertain terms that even those attaining revelation should 
be granted no formal advantage over those who had not, in order to 
prevent those claiming revelation from being in a position to under-
mine the legal process. It would appear that his very real fear of false 
prophets and the havoc they cause played a major consideration in this 
approach. Better to preserve the normative legal process of decision 
making, even if it results in this case in inferior decisions, than to leave 
the process exposed to such a danger. Prophets can still function as 
sages and make their impact on the interpretation of the Law felt in 
that manner. Even in the areas related to determining laws in which 
Maimonides concedes that they enjoy prerogatives as prophets—i.e., 
issuing legal enactments or temporarily suspending commandments—
their prerogatives do not exceed those enjoyed by the rabbinic Sages. 
Maimonides seeks to insure that the Law will not be annulled by any 
authority, whether human or those claiming divine. There was and will 
always be only one inviolable Divine Law, Maimonides insists, and that 
is the Law of Moses.
37 See Warren Z. Harvey, “Political Philosophy and Halakhah in Maimonides,” Iyyun 
29 (1980): 198-212 (Heb.).
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The historical picture that Maimonides paints in support of this 
view is one in which even the classical prophets acted as sages in the 
interpretation of Law. Their exceptional intellectual ability found its 
expression in enabling them to assume the position of heading the high 
rabbinical court. In the introduction to Mishneh Torah Maimonides 
indicates that the biblical prophets received and passed on the Oral 
Law to the next generation not as individuals but as heads of a rabbin-
ical court. Moreover, Maimonides hints that in the Talmudic period 
there were Sages who attained prophetic status but continued to func-
tion as normative rabbinic authorities. The most outstanding example 
of this trend is R. Judah the Prince, the leader of rabbinic Judaism 
toward the end of the second century and the compiler of the Mishnah, 
to whom Maimonides ascribes all the qualifications for prophecy and 
who served as Maimonides’ model for his own activity.38
In my discussion till this point, I have used the term “sage” in what 
appears to be an equivocal manner. The notion of “sage” in reference 
to the interpretation of the Law denotes a person whose expertise is 
Jewish law, whereas the true “sage” in Maimonides’ thought is the one 
who has attained complete knowledge of the sciences culminating in 
metaphysics—that is to say, the true philosopher. The question imme-
diately arises as to the relation he sees between these two kinds of 
sages. Indeed, when Maimonides himself speaks of “sage” (ḥakham) 
and “wisdom” (ḥokhmah), whether he is speaking of the legal sage and 
legal knowledge or the philosophical sage and philosophical knowledge 
must be inferred from the context. At times it appears that he even 
plays on this ambiguity. He certainly depicts as the ideal situation one 
in which the same individual combines both types of knowledge. This 
is true for him of the biblical prophets and the greatest Sages of the 
Talmud. Maimonides even posits that one should only appoint to the 
court jurisprudents who are exceptional not only in their knowledge of 
the Torah but also of “profuse intellect” (ba‘alei de‘ah merubah), and 
who have knowledge of the sciences (Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Sanhe-
drin 2.1). He may be hinting by his use of the term “profuse intellect” 
38 See Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 167, 311.
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that ideally the jurisprudents should also have knowledge of meta-
physics. At any rate, it is clear from the parable of the king in the 
palace in Guide 3.51 that those who enter the palace are not simply 
great jurisprudents but those who have also mastered the sciences, or 
what Maimonides terms in the introduction to his treatise, “the science 
(‘ilm) of the Law in its true sense” (5). Maimonides is well aware of the 
great gap between the ideal he posits and the current situation, as 
attested by his criticism of the philosophic ignorance exhibited by 
most of the rabbinic authorities of his period.39 It is this gap that he 
hopes to at least narrow by way of his compositions.
In the final analysis, the gap between prophet and rabbinic sage in 
the area of legal knowledge does not exist at all for Maimonides, the 
prophet simply being a superior sage, while the gap between the prophet 
and the philosophic sage, which appears to exist, is nevertheless a vague 
one at best. Revelation is not a supernatural phenomenon for Maimon-
ides. Hence even if he thought that there was a categorical difference 
between the type of theoretical knowledge attained by the prophet 
and the discursive knowledge of the philosopher, as I have argued, 
Maimonides still saw this knowledge as one the prophet attained in a 
natural manner by virtue of his qualifications and philosophic studies. 
The prophet is a superior type of philosopher who can glimpse meta-
physical reality in a far more unified and penetrating manner as a result 
of his experience of revelation. It is this attainment more than any 
other that characterizes his perfection. Hence in the Guide the public 
prophet is depicted as serving also as a public philosopher. Yet his audi-
ence does not consist of elite students who can be taught theoretical 
truths in a rigorous philosophic manner. Rather it consists of the entire 
nation, which must be taught by way of images and rhetorical argu-
ments, given the limits of their understanding. For the non-prophet, 
philosophy essentially still remains the only key one possesses to inter-
pret the theoretical views underlying the prophetic images and speech.
39 See for example what Maimonides writes in Guide 2.6 against contemporary 
rabbinic scholars, or the biting criticism in his Treatise on Resurrection of the lack 
of true philosophic knowledge exhibited by the Babylonian Gaon, Samuel ben Ali.
Chapter Eight292 
Sage and Prophet in Provençal Jewish Philosophy
The issue of the legal authority of the prophet was of far less interest to 
the Jewish philosophers of Provence than the issue of the nature of 
prophecy. Maimonides’ approach to prophecy as an emanation from 
the Active Intellect to the perfect rational and imaginative faculties 
was widely accepted by them, and generally served as the starting point 
for their own comments on the subject. For example, Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon in his Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim and Jacob Anatoli in his 
book of philosophical sermons, Malmad ha-Talmidim, assume that their 
readers are familiar with Maimonides’ Guide, and his views on revela-
tion underlie their usage of the term “prophecy” (nevu’ah) without 
further elaboration. Only on occasion do they refer explicitly to 
Maimonides’ discussion.40 Levi ben Avraham’s extensive treatment of 
prophecy in Livyat Ḥen is based primarily on Maimonides’ approach 
and is essentially an elaboration upon it.41 Nissim of Marseille in his 
Ma‘aseh Nissim also deals with this subject in accordance with Maimon-
ides’ thought,42 as does Joseph Ibn Kaspi in a number of his writings.43 
From among the Provençal Jewish philosophers, Gersonides alone 
analyzes prophecy in an independent manner, though he shares with 
Maimonides many of his basic views on the subject.44 As we shall see 
shortly, the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century translations of 
40 See, for example, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, ed. Morde-
chai Bisliches (Pressburg: Anton Edlen v. Schmid, 1837), chap. 19, 119; Jacob 
Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim, ed. L. Silberman (Lyck: Mekize Nirdamim, 
1866), 35b.
41 For a study of this treatise, see above, chapter 5. Levi devotes three chapters to 
discussing this phenomenon, as well as comparing the prophet to the diviner and 
the philosopher. See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and 
the Secrets of the Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of 
the Negev Press, 2007), chaps. 3-5, 115-185 (Heb.). He also has much to say on this 
topic in many other discussions throughout his treatise. 
42 See above, chapter 6, 187-190.
43 For a discussion of Ibn Kaspi’s approach to prophecy, see Barry Mesch, Studies in 
Joseph Ibn Caspi (Leiden: Brill, 1975).
44 For a study of Gersonides’ approach to prophecy, see Prophecy: The History of an 
Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 316-424. For divination and prophecy in 
Gersonides’ thought, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, Without Any Doubt: Gersonides on 
Method and Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 221-323.
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Arabic philosophical treatises into Hebrew played an important role 
in molding the views of the Jewish philosophers on this issue.45
The question upon which I would like to focus here is whether 
these philosophers regarded the prophet as superior to the sage in theo-
retical matters, and if so, what is the nature of his superiority. All 
accorded the prophet the ability to divine the future, an ability the 
philosopher lacked, and saw in this ability an expression of divine provi-
dence. All of them also accepted Maimonides’ position that the 
prophets were outstanding philosophers,46 for complete knowledge of 
the sciences was a necessary condition for attaining prophecy, or in 
light of Avicenna’s approach, they regarded the intuitive ability to 
attain this knowledge instantaneously towards the beginning of one’s 
studies as characterizing the rational faculty of the prophet. Yet when 
it came to the problem of whether prophecy brought with it theoretical 
knowledge that could not be attained by the philosopher, they tended 
to be equivocal in their approaches, even while urging their readers to 
accept the doctrines of the prophets when they run counter to those of 
the philosophers. Their stances on this question are tied to several 
cardinal issues: 1) Is it possible to conjoin with the Active Intellect—an 
issue upon which the philosophers themselves disagreed (both in regard 
to this possibility and just as important, about the nature of conjunc-
tion)—and attain by way of emanation theoretical knowledge that is 
beyond the scope of what can be obtained by normal discursive 
reasoning? 2) Is this state to be regarded as a distinctly prophetic one, 
or can philosophers who are not prophets also attain it? 3) Even if onto-
logical conjunction with the Active Intellect is not conceived as possible, 
is prophecy nevertheless to be characterized by the attainment of a 
level of theoretical knowledge by means of an emanation from the 
Active Intellect that philosophers are incapable of attaining, and if so, 
what is the nature of this knowledge? 4) To what extent did the Jewish 
philosophers commenting on this topic incorporate into their treatises 
esoteric doctrines that run counter to their explicit statements favoring 
45 On these translations, see above, chapter 4, 81, 85-89.
46 Like Maimonides, they also regarded the most important Sages of the Talmud as 
steeped in scientific and philosophic wisdom. 
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prophetic doctrines over philosophic ones? In addition, the leadership 
role of the prophet, which distracted him from contemplation, raised 
the issue of whether this figure should indeed be considered superior 
to the sage who devotes himself entirely to contemplation, given the 
fact that the perfection of the intellect is true human perfection.
The possibility of the human intellect’s conjunction (devequt) with 
the Active Intellect was accepted by Samuel Ibn Tibbon. Ibn Tibbon 
was familiar with Islamic philosophic approaches to this subject, having 
translated into Hebrew three short treatises by Averroes and his son 
‘Abdallāh on conjunction, which he attached to his Commentary on 
Ecclesiastes.47 He refers to this state in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes 
and in his Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, sees in the comprehension of 
all the sciences culminating in knowledge of God a necessary condition 
for its attainment, and connects it with the achievement of immortal-
ity.48 Yet he does not enter into a discussion concerning the precise 
nature of the knowledge attained in this state, nor does he identify it 
with prophecy, but with ultimate wisdom. The latter point suggests 
that non-prophets are also in principle able to attain this state in his 
view, and the distinction between prophecy and philosophy is limited 
to the ability to divine. This point is reinforced by the fact that he 
hints in Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim that the prophet may even err in 
matters pertaining to theoretical wisdom, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter.49 It is true that in a number of passages of his commen-
tary he cautions the reader to favor prophetic tradition over philosophic 
47 These treatises were edited by J. Hercz, Drei Abhandlungen über die Conjunction 
des seperaten Intellects mit dem Menschen von Averroes (Vater und Sohn), aus dem 
Arabischen übersetzt von Samuel Ibn Tibbon (Berlin: H. G. Hermann, 1869). For a 
study of Averroes’ theory of the intellect and conjunction, as well as the theories of 
his predecessors, see in particular Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Aver-
roes on the Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Ibn Tibbon’s 
commentary was edited by James T. Robinson, who also translated much of it into 
English, in his doctoral dissertation, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Eccle-
siastes” (PhD thesis, Harvard University, 2002). The English translation of the 
commentary was subsequently published by him as Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commen-
tary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).
48 See “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes,” on Ecclesiastes 3:19, 
694-695; Ma’amar Yiqqavu ha-Mayyim, chap. 14, 98.
49 See above, chapter 7, 249-250.
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views, but he identifies this tradition with the “good,” that is moral 
virtue, hinting thereby that they should be accepted not because of 
their truth but because of their salubrious influence on the religious 
community.50
Samuel’s son, Moses Ibn Tibbon, in his commentary on Song of 
Songs interprets the entire book as an allegory concerning the state of 
conjunction.51 He also refers to this state in several passages in his Sefer 
Pe’ah.52 Yet like his father, he does not discuss the precise type of 
knowledge attained in this state, nor does he define this state as 
prophecy. He does, however, accord a fundamental advantage to the 
prophet over the philosopher regarding theoretical matters in a different 
passage of the latter treatise. In his explication of a midrash appearing 
in Yalqut Shimoni Exodus, 406, dealing with Moses’ sojourn on top of 
Mount Sinai for forty days and nights, he writes as follows:
In saying: “When He would teach him [Moses] Scripture”—they 
meant that he [Moses] would apprehend by prophecy or by the Holy 
Spirit intelligibles and the knowledge that precedes them that are 
not known by logical reasoning, and this is the divine knowledge 
and spiritual knowledge—”then he would know that it is day.” And 
when he would apprehend something by way of demonstration, and 
draw conclusions by the combination of two premises that are known 
in that they are first intelligibles, or in a different way, or he would 
expound them by one of the thirteen principles by means of which 
the Torah is expounded, and this is human knowledge, “he would 
know that it is night.”53
In his depiction of prophecy in this passage, Moses Ibn Tibbon clearly 
has Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 2.38 in mind. While Maimonides, 
however, may be interpreted as referring to knowledge that in principle 
is attained by way of demonstration and that the prophet attains 
50 See, for example, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiastes 2:13, 626-627 (English, 
348-349). See also Robinson’s comments on this issue on 111.
51 See Moses Ibn Tibbon, Commentary on Song of Songs, ed. L. Silberman (Lyck: 
Mekize Nirdamim, 1874), 8-13 (Heb.).
52 See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and 
Avraham Israel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 
116, 123, 195, 213 (Heb.).
53 Ibid., 103.
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instantaneously, Moses Ibn Tibbon sees this prophetically attained 
knowledge as consisting of matters that are essentially closed to demon-
stration. It is interesting to note how he in this passage also blurs the 
distinction between the rabbinic sage and the philosopher insofar as 
both attain their conclusions by the use of logic, while Moses was able 
to attain the ultimate knowledge in both areas by divine illumination.
Positing the ability of the prophet to attain knowledge not known 
by demonstration appears to entail the view that prophetic doctrines 
should be favored over those of the philosophers when there is a conflict 
between them and the philosophic doctrines lack demonstrative proof. 
Yet as we have already seen in the case of Maimonides in regard to the 
doctrine of creation, while he appears to draw this conclusion, it is far 
from certain that he actually did. The reason for favoring a certain 
view—or the reason ascribed to the prophets themselves for teaching a 
certain view—may be due to political considerations rather than theo-
retical philosophic ones, as Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s comments in his 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes indicate almost explicitly. In the case of 
Moses Ibn Tibbon, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion 
regarding his stance on this issue based on his surviving writings. On 
the surface, he appears to accept the truth of prophetic doctrines over 
philosophic when he writes in Sefer Pe’ah: “The commandment of the 
Sabbath [comes] to verify the creation of the world as received in 
tradition against the view of the philosophers.”54 Yet the very next 
sentence may be interpreted as subtly negating this view: “The masses 
too reject the existence of anything that has no beginning or end.” 
Creation thus may be seen as a crucial doctrine for the limited under-
standing of the masses, and not because it is true.
A similar dilemma confronts the interpreter of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s 
uncle (and brother-in-law),55 Jacob Anatoli (a student of Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon and both his brother-in-law and son-in-law). Anatoli writes in 
Malmad ha-Talmidim:
54 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 118.
55 Anatoli was the brother of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s wife, and he went on to marry his 
niece.
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This part teaches knowledge of the truth, and this is what is intended 
by the term “Torah.” The loftiest of this part is what is taught by 
way of prophetic tradition regarding the existence of the world and 
the manner of its coming into being and the other true stories 
concerning it. Due to the importance of this matter, the Torah began 
with a definitive tradition, not with a philosophic teaching, so that a 
youth belonging to the Torah community attains knowledge based 
on tradition regarding the truth of the existence of the world that an 
old person from among the sages of philosophy cannot attain by way 
of his studies. . . . Consequently, a member of the religious commu-
nity should believe with an enduring faith in everything that comes 
from the Torah, much more than in the things that are known by 
way of logical reasoning. In this way he will stand firm against those 
who dispute him by way of logical reasoning, and he will maintain 
that so it was taught by prophecy. And even though this is not a 
philosophic teaching that one can investigate and refine from it the 
truth, it was refined by prophecy, as the Sage [Solomon] said 
regarding this matter: The word of God is refined, He is a shield to all 
who trust in Him [Proverbs 30:5].56
Despite this position that accords a clear advantage to prophetic tradi-
tion over philosophic investigation, it is not clear that Anatoli actually 
believes that the Torah reveals theoretical truths that are not known by 
way of philosophy. Some of the remarks scattered throughout his trea-
tise can be interpreted as suggesting that he may have held an esoteric 
view on this matter, and that he thought, like Samuel Ibn Tibbon, that 
the Torah taught these doctrines for political reasons.57
The dictum “the sage is superior to the prophet” (BT Baba Batra 
12a) is brought by Anatoli in one of his sermons. Following Maimon-
ides, he does not accord superiority to the sages who are not prophets 
over the prophets who are necessarily also sages. Since this dictum 
appears to imply that there can be prophets who are not also sages, 
he strove to interpret its intent differently in order to avoid this 
conclusion:
56 Malmad ha-Talmidim, 1b. See also 31b, 32b; there too he indicates that some of the 
Torah’s secrets—such as creation, reward and punishment, and the resurrection of 
the dead—cannot be known by way of philosophy.
57 See Israel Ben-Simon, “The Philosophical and Allegorical Teachings of Rabbi Jacob 
Anatoli and His Influence on Jewish Though and Allegory in Provence in the 13th-
14th Centuries” (PhD thesis, University of Haifa, 2012), 4-72 (Heb.).
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Since wisdom is the cause of prophecy, they said: “The sage is supe-
rior to the prophet.” That is to say, wisdom in itself, from the 
perspective of its essence, is greater than prophecy in itself, in accor-
dance with what the sages said that the cause is greater than the 
effect. This is something of which there is no doubt. They did not 
intend [to say] by this dictum that there may be a prophet who is not 
also a sage.58
Anatoli sees wisdom as the main prerequisite for prophecy and superior 
to any other advantage accorded by prophecy. This interpretation, 
however, does not directly address the issue of whether the prophet has 
any advantage over the philosopher in theoretical matters, or if his 
advantage lies solely in the other areas of knowledge that characterize 
prophecy, most notably divination.59 Hence Anatoli’s stance on this 
crucial issue remains an open question dependent upon the problem 
of whether he designed his sermons to contain an esoteric level.
An equivocal attitude on this issue can also be detected in Levi ben 
Avraham’s Livyat Ḥen. Levi too brings the rabbinic dictum of the supe-
riority of the sage over the prophet and offers a variety of interpretations. 
In one of them he treats “prophet” as referring not to the true prophets, 
but to those individuals possessing only a perfect imagination and the 
power of divination. These individuals at times are also loosely termed 
“prophets,” as Maimonides indicates in Guide 2.32. The philosopher is 
clearly superior to such an individual. More important for our discus-
sion are two other interpretations Levi brings:
Insofar as wisdom is the cause of prophecy and prior to it, and is an 
enduring perfection that adheres [in the individual] and grows 
stronger in old age, they said: “The sage is superior to the prophet”—
that is, to the prophet who is not as great a sage as he is, though he 
too is a sage and prophesies due to his preparedness and the excel-
lence of his physical temperament. There is no doubt, as emerges 
from the statements of the Sages, that many of the sages apprehended 
58 Malmad ha-Talmidim, 151a.
59 See also ibid., 77a, where Anatoli sees prophecy as following in the wake of the 
apprehension of the Active Intellect and the attainment of final perfection. He 
does not indicate in this context, however, what prophecy adds to this perfection 
in regard to theoretical knowledge.
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more than many of the prophets did. . . . It is possible that they said: 
“The sage is superior to the prophet,” because the sage-prophet, 
insofar as he leads the nation, must possess a practical intellect and 
must exert himself in the use of the faculty of imagination. More-
over, most of his discourse concerns practical, pedestrian, accidental 
matters, which appear to him by way of the imagination. The perfect 
sage who is not a prophet, however, can deal exclusively with theo-
retical matters, without having to arouse the imagination and involve 
the practical intellect. Furthermore, most of his discourse deals with 
theoretical, necessary, divine matters. It is possible that he could 
become a prophet if he would prepare himself accordingly. Instead, 
he [prefers to] devote his time to perfecting his soul by continuously 
learning the different types of wisdom. This is similar to what is said 
of R. Ḥanina ben Dosa, that his prayers were more readily accepted 
because he put all his efforts in this matter. R. Yoḥanan ben Zakai 
said: “R. Ḥanina is like a slave before the king, while I am like a 
minister before the king” [BT Berakhot 34b].60
In his first interpretation, Levi essentially denies that the prophet has 
any advantage over the sage in theoretical matters, going so far as to 
maintain explicitly that there were sages who in their apprehension of 
theoretical matters were greater than many of the prophets, R. Yoḥanan 
ben Zakai and R. Akiva being two examples that Levi had in mind 
based on the stories the Talmud relates about them in the second 
chapter of BT Ḥagigah. Levi also points out that prophecy is attained 
by the individual intermittently, while wisdom adheres in him perma-
nently, growing even stronger in his old age—a point noted by 
Maimonides in Guide 3.51, where he speaks of conjunction being 
attained precisely in this period of life, when the bodily faculties grow 
weaker.61 Maimonides’ comments imply the view that prophecy, being 
dependent upon one’s bodily faculties, does not appear at all in 
one’s old age, while one can grow even wiser in one’s knowledge of 
the theoretical sciences in this period. Levi himself goes on to note 
this point explicitly in the continuation of his remarks, thereby 
distinguishing the phenomenon of prophecy from the attainment of 
theoretical knowledge.
60 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 120-122.
61 See also Guide 1.54.
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The second interpretation Levi brings is even more noteworthy. It 
not only ascribes to some of the sages greater theoretical knowledge 
than that possessed by some of the prophets, but regards the figure of 
the sage as superior to that of the prophet. The prophet qua prophet 
devotes most of his efforts to political activity (including divination), 
which in Levi’s view acts as a stumbling block to increasing one’s true 
perfection, that of the theoretical intellect. In other words, due to his 
uninterrupted studies, the sage qua sage can go much further in his 
attainment of theoretical knowledge than the prophet, hence it is prefer-
able to remain a sage and not strive for prophecy. On this point, Levi 
calls into question the model of final perfection posited by Maimon-
ides, whose practical component consists of political leadership.62
Levi was hardly the first among the Provençal Jewish philosophers 
to challenge Maimonides on this point. He follows in the footsteps of 
Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who voices a not so subtle criticism of Maimonides’ 
view.63 After apologizing in advance for taking issue with Maimon-
ides, Ibn Tibbon writes as follows in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes on 
the verse I sleep but my heart is awake (Song of Songs 5:2):
Even though he [Maimonides], of blessed memory, said that this 
matter applies only to the Master of the Prophets and to the patri-
archs, peace be upon them, and that none like them can be found, it 
is true that none are like them in being asleep while their hearts are 
awake. For all of them directed their efforts to matters that were not 
necessary in order to sustain their bodies, and by this they compro-
mised the perfection of that union [with God or the Active Intellect] 
mentioned in that chapter [Guide 3.51]. Every effort that results in 
compromising the strength of that union is [termed] “sleep” or some-
thing similar to sleep. Despite this, their hearts were awake—that is 
to say, their thought remained in that union. Was not the Master of 
Prophets absorbed in the toil of leading a nation. . . . This resulted 
in his being distracted in his contemplation, his thoughts disturbed, 
and their clarity sullied.64 The patriarchs too exerted efforts in 
[tending] their flocks, in [attaining] honor and so forth, and in 
62 For a discussion of Maimonides’ model of final perfection and the various scholarly 
approaches to this topic, see Maimonides’ Political Thought, 125-158.
63 See Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Political Role of the Philosopher: Samuel Ibn Tibbon 
Versus Maimonides,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 345-374.
64 Maimonides too suggests this point at the end of Guide 2.36.
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wandering from place to place because of the needs of their flocks. 
Some also had many wives and children. In all of them there is to be 
found a deficiency from this perspective. . . . What could have been 
said of Moses . . . if he had not spent his time in leading a nation 
and adjudicating their disputes, but had isolated himself in contem-
plation and in strengthening the conjunction with the “lover”! The 
same is true of the patriarchs and those who are like them. . . . In 
conclusion, there is a great difference between one who sleeps and 
whose heart is awake and one who is completely awake.65
In a similar manner, Samuel Ibn Tibbon takes issue with Maimonides’ 
interpretation at the very end of the Guide of Jeremiah 9:22-23, in 
which Maimonides indicates that God delights in the exercise of 
loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth, and not solely in 
the knowledge of Him—that is to say, the ultimate perfection of the 
philosopher lies in engaging in political leadership. To Ibn Tibbon, as 
he clarifies in the introduction to his translation of Maimonides’ 
Commentary on Mishnah Avot, God’s delight refers to understanding and 
knowing me, and not to the other three terms, for it is solely theoretical 
knowledge that is the ultimate end of humanity.66 From this perspec-
tive, it is clear that while Ibn Tibbon does not bring the dictum that 
the sage is superior to the prophet, he, like Levi after him, is certainly 
of the opinion that this is the case. Political leadership, rather than 
being viewed as complementing final human perfection—which lies in 
the perfection of the theoretical intellect—and adding to it by serving 
as a form of imitatio Dei, is seen as inevitably detracting from it.67
In his discussion of prophecy, Levi does not deal with the notion 
of conjunction with the Active Intellect. This subject is mentioned in 
passing in several passages of his treatise, and is tied to the attainment 
65 Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 668-669; see Ravitzky, “The Political Role of the 
Philosopher,” 351.
66 See Menachem Kellner, “Maimonides and Samuel Ibn Tibbon on Jeremiah 9:22-23 
and Human Perfection,” in Studies in Halakha and Jewish Thought Presented to 
Rabbi Menachem Emanuel Rackman, ed. Moshe Beer (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 49-57. See also Abraham Melamed, Philosopher-King in Medieval 
and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 53-54; 
Ravitzky, “The Political Role of the Philosopher,” 359-366.
67 For a discussion of this issue in Maimonides’ thought, see Maimonides’ Political 
Thought, 125-158.
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of a perfect intellect—the acquired intellect—and immortality, but not 
with prophecy per se.68 Levi almost definitely dealt with this notion in 
detail in the lost fourth treatise of his encyclopedia—a treatise devoted 
to the natural sciences, including the nature of the human soul and 
intellect. This point can be seen from his encyclopedic poem, Batei 
ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Leḥashim, where he devotes a section of it to the 
human intellect and to conjunction.69 From these sources one sees 
clearly that Levi did not view conjunction as a distinctly prophetic 
attainment. This reinforces the conclusion that he accorded no advan-
tage to the prophet over the sage in theoretical matters.
Yet there is another side to Levi’s thought, which opposes this 
picture. In a chapter devoted to the issue of the difference between 
prophetic and philosophic knowledge, Levi maintains that while most 
of prophecy is concerned with future events, it also deals with theoret-
ical matters. Basing himself on Maimonides, he writes:
At times, prophecy perfects the knowledge of the prophet and 
instructs him in theoretical matters, as the Master (Maimonides) 
indicated, on the condition that he already is a sage, as stated above. 
For he who possesses a pure, refined soul, and whose intellect always 
concentrates on the intelligibles, and who habituates his intellect to 
be in actu—the Separate Intellect will emanate upon him true theo-
retical matters that are more exalted than the matters that are in the 
nature of a person to apprehend. By focusing [his thought] on God 
and conjoining with Him, God will direct him and inform him of 
things related to what he already knows, and more often, that which 
his heart craves to know. It is more probable for this to occur in a 
vision than in a dream. . . .70 There is no doubt that the Torah 
informed us of many things that are at the pinnacle of what the intel-
lects of the most adept philosophers reached at the end of their 
68 See, for example, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 
50; see also Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, ed. 
Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2014), 10, 
46, 137, 144, 148 (Heb.).
69 This section of the poem has been edited by Dov Schwartz, together with the 
commentary of Prat Maimon (Solomon ben Menaḥem), “The Commentary of 
R. Solomon ben Menaḥem to ‘Batei ha-Nephesh ve-ha-Leḥashim’ on the Subject 
of the Intellect,” Kobez al Yad 13[23] (1996): 299-330 (Heb.).
70 See Guide 2.45, where Maimonides writes that visions of prophecy deal only with 
theoretical matters.
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speculation and investigation. Furthermore, some of the secrets 
were made known by way of prophecy to some of the prophets, and 
they attained what was not in the power of the philosophers to attain 
by way of logical reasoning. The Master indicated that prophecy is 
greater than [logical] proof, and the point to which prophecy reaches, 
proof does not reach. . . .71 What is known by prophecy has an utmost 
limit which cannot be surpassed, since the apprehension of the 
human intellect cannot surpass the apprehension of its origin.72 
Moreover, many matters about which the prophet had no previous 
knowledge at all, he would not apprehend by way of prophecy.73
Levi appears to agree that the prophet indeed can attain theoretical 
knowledge that surpasses what can be known by philosophy, though 
not what is beyond the limits of the human intellect as such to appre-
hend. He even agrees that some of this knowledge will appear to the 
prophet in a vision—that is to say, as presented by the imagination as a 
result of the emanation from on high while the prophet is awake. 
Levi’s proviso in this case is similar to the one pertaining to knowl-
edge of the future; the prophet receives knowledge on subjects upon 
which he focuses his attention and about which he has previous knowl-
edge. This serves to “particularize” the emanation from the Active 
Intellect that reaches the rational and imaginative faculties, thereby 
enabling the individual to apprehend new matters—some of which he 
would not have been able to apprehend otherwise—based on the knowl-
edge that was already in his possession and he was thinking about.
In the continuation of his discussion, Levi further elaborates upon 
the distinction between the prophetic and non-prophetic intellect, 
drawing upon sources in Arabic philosophy that existed in Hebrew 
translation:
71 Levi is referring here to what was written in an epistle to Ḥasdai Halevi by a 
student of Maimonides in Maimonides’ name; see Iggerot HaRambam, 678-679. 
The authenticity of this epistle is still being debated by scholars.
72 The origin of the human intellect is the Active Intellect. The sentence can mean 
either that the human intellect cannot know more than what the Active Intellect 
knows, or that it cannot get beyond the level of apprehending the Active Intellect. 
In Aristotelian philosophy, both meanings are similar given the principle of the 
identity between the intellect of the knower and the object of one’s knowledge. 
73 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 168-170.
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Averroes writes in the treatise Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim that the prophet, 
in his being a perfect creation, does not need to attain the intelligi-
bles and sciences by way of logical syllogisms and preliminary 
knowledge, but finds the intelligible matters as though they were 
inscribed in his soul, and a slight allusion and effort is sufficient [to 
attain them], just as the angels do not require them [logical syllo-
gisms and preliminary knowledge]. The explanation of this is that 
the knowledge of the angels is an ordered, natural self-knowledge, in 
which the knowledge of the effects from their causes is apparent 
from the outset, and the effects that are necessitated from their 
effects as well, and everything that is apt to follow from them. This 
is a simple knowledge that includes all that is below it, which is 
always apparent to them [the angels] from the outset, as in the case 
of the first intelligibles by us. They know the last by virtue of the 
first that includes it, not in the inverse manner as is the case by us. 
. . . Let us return to the words of Averroes who said that the perfect 
prophet, like the angels, knows the sciences by way of a few allusions 
without the need for syllogisms. For just as there is found among 
human beings a specimen of the utmost deficiency, close to the 
beasts, so it is necessary that there be found a perfect specimen, 
close to the level of the angels. . . . For the person who attained some 
knowledge and is of refined matter and pure intellect, it is possible 
that he [mentally] isolates himself and extracts himself from his 
matter and receive the emanation of the Separate Intellect. It is said 
in the Book of Circles: “God, may He be blessed, perfected this crea-
ture at the beginning of its creation in order to lead the world by 
means of him, and to perfect deficient human beings by laying down 
religions, laws, admonitions, and promises of reward, and to relate 
matters that the philosophical soul is incapable of knowing. To the 
philosophic soul He granted the investigation of generalities alone. 
For this reason Plato said: ‘We are incapable of understanding what 
was given in the Laws by the prophets; we understand just a little 
and are ignorant of a lot.’”74 For this reason the Torah is called 
“prophetic wisdom” or “divine wisdom,” and theoretical science is 
called “human wisdom.”75
The treatise Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim cited by Levi in this passage is an 
Arabic Neoplatonic treatise that was translated into Hebrew by Jacob 
ben Makhir, a contemporary of Levi and a member of the Tibbonid 
74 Al-Batalyawsi, Ha-‘Agulot Ha-Ra‘ayoniyot, ed. David Kaufmann (Budapest, 1880), 
16-17. The citation from Plato is based on the Apology, 20d-e.
75 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 171-172.
Sage and Prophet  305
family.76 The treatise was generally ascribed either to Al-Ghazali or 
Averroes, though the latter definitely was not the author and it is highly 
doubtful that the former was.77 Levi follows in the footsteps of Moses 
Ibn Tibbon, who had also ascribed the treatise to Averroes.78 This trea-
tise draws heavily from Al-Batalyawsi’s Book of Circles (translated by 
Moses Ibn Tibbon and also cited in this passage by Levi), copying parts 
of it word for word. Al-Batalyawsi’s treatise, in turn, appears to be 
greatly influenced by Avicenna, as well as by other Islamic philosophers 
and by the Brethren of Purity.79 The author of Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim 
repeats the categorical distinction drawn by Al-Batalyawsi between the 
philosophic soul and the prophetic.80 It is not only the ability to lay 
down laws and doctrines for the masses that distinguishes the two 
souls, but also the far greater intuitive ability of the prophet to attain 
intelligibles, reflective of Avicenna’s approach, as well as the ability to 
reach a higher level of theoretical knowledge. Levi points out that in 
the normal discursive manner in which human beings attain knowl-
edge, the causes are known by an investigation of the effects. The 
prophet, however, reaches a level of knowledge similar to that of the 
Active Intellect in which he knows the cause of existence as a simple, 
all-inclusive intelligible, through which all the effects are thereby 
known.81
76 The treatise has survived in manuscript. Chapters 10-12 have been published by 
Leopold Dukes in Otzar Neḥmad 2 (1857): 196-198. Levi’s paraphrase from this 
work appears in chap. 11, 198.
77 For a study of this issue, see Benjamin Abrahamov, “The Sources of Mozné 
Ha-‘Iyyunim,” Daat 34 (1995): 83-86 (Heb.).
78 See Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of 
Providence,” HUCA 11 (1936): 364.
79 For a study of Al-Batalyawsi’s thought, his sources, and his influence on Jewish 
thinkers, see Ayala Eliyahu, “Ibn al-Sid al-Batalyawsi and his Place in Medieval 
Muslim and Jewish Thought” (PhD thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
2010) (Heb.).
80 See Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim, 196-198; Ha-‘Agulot Ha-Ra‘ayoniyot, 12-17. 
81 Ibn Falaquera, a contemporary of Levi who probably was born and lived in Spain 
(though he may have lived in Southern France), adopts a similar approach in his 
commentary on the Guide, Moreh ha-Moreh. He posits the possibility of conjunc-
tion with the Active Intellect and a distinct level of theoretical knowledge attained 
in this state. Moreover, he sees this state as characterizing the prophets, though 
some of the sages also reached it. The prophet learns, by means of the “divine 
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In addition to a higher level of knowledge of existence that 
characterizes the apprehension of the prophets, Levi also posits their 
attainment of doctrines that cannot be attained by the philosopher. 
The creation of the world is a prime example of this category, as 
Levi’s subsequent discussion clarifies.82 In his case too, we are left 
with the dilemma that if he holds an esoteric view on the subject, 
particularly in light of his conflicting stance regarding prophetic 
knowledge versus philosophic knowledge in theoretical matters. The 
issue is not an easy one to decide, since Levi appears to be genuinely 
committed to the truth of the doctrine of creation, and not only its 
necessity for political purposes.
While Levi appears to equivocate on the issue of the superiority of 
the prophet over the philosopher in his theoretical knowledge, Ibn 
Kaspi’s position is less ambiguous. He clearly favors the prophet, 
arguing that his main advantage lies in his knowledge of metaphysics 
that surpasses that of the philosopher, and not in his knowledge of the 
future.83 Following Ibn Falaquera’s commentary on Guide 1.34, 
he approvingly cites Avicenna’s view of the intuitive power of the 
prophetic intellect that allows him to conjoin with the Active Intellect 
and attain all intelligibles without effort and without the years of study 
that Maimonides posits as necessary for perfection.84 Moreover, he sees 
knowledge” attained in this state, the secrets of divine governance in a manner that 
is closed to philosophic speculation. Ibn Falaquera approvingly cites Avicenna’s 
view regarding the prophetic intellect. See Moreh ha-Moreh, introduction, 116-117; 
1.1, 121-122; 1.34, 137; 3.54, 328; appendix, chap. 1, 333-336. Isaac Albalag, another 
contemporary of Levi who probably lived in Spain (Catalonia), also stresses the 
distinct level of theoretical knowledge attained by the prophet. Like Levi, he sees 
discursive knowledge as involving the investigation of the effects in order to appre-
hend the causes, while the prophet, like the Separate Intellects, knows the 
intelligibles in inverse order—i.e., by knowledge of the causes it knows all the 
effects. See Isaac Albalag, Sefer Tiqqun ha-De‘ot, ed. Georges Vajda (Jerusalem: 
Israel Academy of the Sciences, 1973), 67, 82.
82 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 65-79. For a 
discussion of this issue, see my introduction to this volume, 32-37. 
83 See Maskiyyot Kesef, ed. Solomon Werblunger (Frankfurt A.M., 1848), 2.8, 94; 
2.36, 115; ‘Amudei Kesef, ed. Solomon Werblunger (Frankfurt A.M., 1848), 3.51, 
143; Shulḥan Kesef, ed. Hannah Kasher (Jerusalem: Ben-Zevi Institute, 1996), 172; 
Tirat Kesef, in Mishneh Kesef, vol. 1, ed. Isaac Last (Pressburg, 1905), 88. 
84 See ‘Amudei Kesef 1.34, 44; see also Shulḥan Kesef, 172.
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Averroes agreeing to the superiority of prophetic knowledge over phil-
osophic, a point to which I shall return below. Yet on the issue of 
creation, Ibn Kaspi’s position is not without problems. While in a 
number of passages he indicates that this doctrine should be favored 
since prophecy is superior to philosophy,85 he is inclined to interpret 
Maimonides as favoring the eternity of the world and understanding 
the Torah accordingly.86 This does not necessarily entail the conclu-
sion, however, that Ibn Kaspi was not committed to the position of 
the superiority of the theoretical knowledge of the prophet over that 
of the philosopher; he undoubtedly agreed that the prophets made use 
of esotericism in conveying some of their views and this may be the 
case here too. Moreover, he is reluctant to ascribe errors to the prophets 
in theoretical matters, such as in the case of Ezekiel, who apparently 
believed that the heavenly bodies emit sounds—a view based on the 
mistaken belief that the stars are in motion and not the spheres to 
which they are attached87—and he struggles mightily with this issue.88
Nissim of Marseille, a contemporary of Ibn Kaspi, adopts a contrary 
stance on this issue. He accepts the notion that intellectual perfection 
is a necessary condition for prophecy, but does not grant the prophet 
any advantage over the philosopher in theoretical matters. The supe-
riority of the prophet over the philosopher is limited to the ability to 
foretell the future, a view that echoes that of Samuel Ibn Tibbon. 
Nissim is even prepared to argue against Maimonides, who it appears 
to him adopts the opposite conclusion:
Maimonides already wrote in chapter thirty-eight of the second part 
[of the Guide] as follows: “Know that the true prophets indubitably 
grasp speculative matters; by means of his speculation alone, man is 
85 See Maskiyyot Kesef 2.8, 94; 2.12, 99; Shulḥan Kesef, 172.
86 See Maskiyyot Kesef 2.8, 94; 2.12, 99. His position in Gevi‘a Kesef, 6 may also be 
read as favoring the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as one that is necessary for the 
masses but not a true one; see Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Gevi‘a Kesef, ed. and trans. Basil 
Herring (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1982), XIV, 163. 
87 See Guide 2.8.
88 See Maskiyyot Kesef 2.8, 94; Menorat Kesef, in ‘Asarah Kelei Kesef, vol. 2, ed. 
Isaac Last (Pressburg, 1903), 122. For the issue of prophetic error, see above, 
chapter 7, 249-250.
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unable to grasp the causes from which what a prophet has come to 
know necessarily follows.” Thus according to the opinion of the 
Master, the purpose of prophecy is not only to complete the preser-
vation of the body, that is, to preserve it from afflictions, but also to 
complete the theoretical rational part [of the soul] by doctrines 
whose premises necessitating their truth the person has no way of 
acquiring, as though prophecy involves the perfection of the body 
and the soul. Yet in my opinion, the doctrines and knowledge that 
are in the power of a person to grasp by way of speculation and logic 
cannot in anyway reach a person in a vision or a dream of prophecy. 
If there were a way for this to happen, logical investigation and 
knowledge of it would be superfluous. For what can be [attained] 
without toil and investigation and without means, the means and the 
investigation of it would be for naught. The long path would be in 
vain, insofar as there is a different path that is better and shorter 
than it.89
Nissim’s argument regarding the non-superiority of the prophet in 
theoretical matters since it is impossible to attain this type of knowl-
edge without possessing the requisite preliminary knowledge, is similar 
to Averroes’ argument in Epitome of Parva Naturalia (translated by 
Moses Ibn Tibbon in 1254) and even closer to his argument in Long 
Commentary on the Metaphysics (translated by Kalonymos ben Kalon-
ymos ca. 1315).90 In the former work, Averroes writes:
In general, the acquisition of any of the concepts of the theoretical 
sciences in this manner [by way of veridical dreams] would be acci-
dental and rare. It is therefore impossible that a theoretical art be 
fully acquired by a person, by God, unless a person assumes that we 
have here a species of man that can comprehend the theoretical 
sciences without training. Now this species, if it indeed existed, 
would be called “man” only equivocally, but actually it would be 
closer to angels than to man. Now it will be seen from that which I 
shall say below that this is impossible.91
89 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 166.
90 Nissim does not cite explicitly from either commentary but there is reason to 
believe that he was acquainted with both of them.
91 Averroes, Epitome of Parva Naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: 
The Medieval Academy of America, 1961), 52. Moreh ha-Moreh 1.34, 136-137; see 
the references brought by the editor Yair Shiffman in his notes.
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Averroes continues by arguing against the possibility of attaining 
knowledge without training, insofar as training would then not be a 
necessary cause for its acquisition, while in his view it undoubtedly is. 
He further argues that if theoretical knowledge were to come in visions 
to one who had undergone no logical training, such knowledge would 
be superfluous and of inferior nature given their imaginative form. In 
the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, his argument against attaining 
knowledge without training is that if one were able to attain knowledge 
without premises, the premises would be for naught, which is compa-
rable to the case of being able to walk without feet, thereby making the 
feet superfluous, and “nature negates this.” Here too Averroes concludes 
that people who can attain the intelligibles without training are “more 
appropriately considered to be angels rather than men,” a possibility 
that he dismisses.92
Averroes was well aware of Avicenna’s view on the prophetic intel-
lect, and cites it in Incoherence of the Incoherence, but does not critique 
it there.93 Ibn Falaquera, who had a thorough knowledge of Arabic, 
cites Averroes’ view from the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics in 
Moreh ha-Moreh, in which he denies the possibility of attaining all the 
intelligibles at once, and juxtaposes this view with that of Avicenna.94 
Yet even leaving aside Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim, Averroes’s comments 
regarding the existence of an angelic type of person received contradic-
tory interpretations on the part of the Jewish philosophers, not all of 
them seeing him as completely dismissing the possibility of such an 
individual. Ibn Kaspi, for example, draws upon Ibn Falaquera’s 
commentary on Guide 1.34, as I indicated above. He copies Ibn 
Falaquera’s citation from Avicenna, but in the case of Averroes he 
introduces a number of noteworthy changes. He ascribes the view 
regarding an angelic species of human beings to Aristotle, mentions 
92 My summary is based on the citation brought by Ibn Falaquera in Moreh ha-Moreh; 
see the previous note.
93 Averroes in Incoherence of the Incoherence brings Al-Ghazali’s description of this 
view in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, without disagreeing with it; see Aver-
roes, Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut), trans. Simon Van Den 
Bergh (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), Natural Sciences, 313.
94 See Moreh ha-Moreh 1.34, 137. Yair Shiffman cites the references in his notes.
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Parva Naturalia as the source of the view, and presents it as a possibility 
accepted by Averroes (Aristotle) rather than negated by him. He inter-
prets Maimonides accordingly. The necessity of long years of learning 
in order to master metaphysics as posited by Maimonides, Ibn Kaspi 
treats as characterizing all those who do not possess this special type of 
intellect.95 Moreover, even Ibn Falaquera ascribes to Averroes the view 
that the prophet reaches knowledge that completes the knowledge 
attained by the intellect and which cannot be known by it, a view 
based on Averroes’ comments in Incoherence of the Incoherence.96
Nissim was aware of Avicenna’s view regarding the prophetic intel-
lect from Levi’s Livyat Ḥen. He copies from Levi’s paraphrase of Moznei 
ha-‘Iyyunim, and even approvingly brings the quote ascribed to Plato 
regarding human inability to understand what is given in prophetic 
knowledge.97 He sees in this view the key to understanding the unique 
prophecy of Moses. Following Maimonides, he regards Mosaic prophecy 
as purely intellectual, without the mediation of the imagination.98 
Moses alone was able to attain the form of pure intellect and learn the 
intelligibles with little effort. Yet even in this case, Nissim appears to 
regard Moses as receiving prophecy at the culmination of a long process 
of learning, though his superior intellect enabled him to grasp intelli-
gibles with great ease. Moreover, the doctrines taught by Moses and 
whose contraries cannot be demonstrated by the philosophers, such as 
creation, served an important political function in his view, but they 
are not literally true, as we have seen above.99 Moses’ advantage over 
all other prophets and philosophers in regard to theoretical knowledge 
thus does not appear to be a categorical one according to Nissim; his 
advantage lies primarily in his ability to lay down an ideal law.
95 See ‘Amudei Kesef 1.34, 44; see also Menorat Kesef, 93.
96 See Moreh ha-Moreh 2.23, 283; Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, III, 152 
(see also I, 56; XVI, 307). Ibn Kaspi cites Averroes’ comment in ‘Amudei Kesef 
3.13, 125. Averroes also presents in this treatise the view that every prophet is a 
sage (Natural Sciences, IV, 359-360). Yet it appears that Averroes adopts this posi-
tion as a pious fraud. In Incoherence, VI, 218, he essentially rejects the view that the 
inner sense of revealed religion expresses truths barred from speculation.
97 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 175. See also below, chapter 11, 398.
98 For a discussion of Mosaic prophecy, see the next chapter.
99 See chapter 6, 180.
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Gersonides, a contemporary of Nissim, adopts a similar position, 
and goes to great lengths in defending it from a philosophic perspec-
tive. The prophet is an exceptional philosopher in his view. He also 
has an intuitive rational ability to attain intelligibles more quickly than 
the average philosopher and thereby attain prophecy. Thus he may be 
capable of grasping certain intelligibles by way of logical reasoning that 
the philosophers who are not prophets fail to grasp. Yet Avicenna’s 
notion of the special intuitive property of the prophetic intellect that 
enables him to attain all intelligibles instantaneously without effort has 
no place in Gersonides’ thought. Nor is there any categorical difference 
in his view between prophet and philosopher in their theoretical knowl-
edge. Prophecy does not bestow upon the prophet a superior type of 
knowledge of God and the world. Furthermore, in the introduction to 
his treatise The Wars of the Lord, Gersonides defends his tackling of 
very difficult theoretical issues that have not been adequately solved 
philosophically till now, at least not in his eyes, by arguing that a person 
may well be capable of grasping matters that eluded earlier sages, 
clearly implying that they eluded the prophets as well.100
Gersonides denies the possibility for any human being, even a 
prophet, to grasp the Active Intellect. The gap between the knowledge 
possessed by the Active Intellect and the knowledge that it is within 
the ability of even the perfect human being to attain can never be 
bridged. Human knowledge by nature will always be incomplete. No 
one, for example, can grasp all the details of the manner in which the 
heavenly bodies influence the earth—a knowledge that exists in the 
Active Intellect as a complete unity.101 Gersonides does not deny 
the view that a certain level of unity characterizes human apprehension 
too, since the intelligibles exist in a hierarchical order, with the higher 
level ones encompassing the lower. The more profound the intelligible 
that a person apprehends, the broader and more unified the knowledge 
of the intelligibles leading to its apprehension.102 By climbing the ladder 
100 See Levi ben Gershom, The Wars of the Lord, trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadel-
phia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984), vol. 1, 93-97.
101 See The Wars of the Lord 1.6; Commentary to I Kings 8 (lesson 18). 
102 See The Wars of the Lord 1.13.
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of knowledge, the individual continuously comes closer the unity of 
knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect, though he can never reach 
it. Though Gersonides describes the higher levels of human apprehen-
sion by the term “conjunction” (devequt), he does not wish to denote by 
this usage an actual ontological union with the Active Intellect. Rather, 
conjunction signifies the stage at which a person attains a special type 
of providence.103 While even philosophers who accepted the possibility 
of some form of union with the Active Intellect generally did not see 
this union as complete, but with some gap between the two remaining,104 
Gersonides is far more interested in stressing the insurmountability 
of this gap.105
The prophet then is essentially a superior philosopher in Gersonides’ 
thought, with his substantive advantage over the philosopher lying in 
the field of divination. There is, however, one slight advantage that 
Gersonides is prepared to grant the prophet qua prophet that belongs 
to the area of theoretical knowledge. Occasionally the prophet is able 
to attain an intelligible while asleep, which appears to him in imagina-
tive form, due to the power of his rational and imaginative faculties. In 
this way, Gersonides explains the prophetic visions concerning theoret-
ical matters. Yet even in this case the prophet only completes the last 
step in the reasoning process, having possessed beforehand all the 
necessary premises.106 Moreover, if the prophet believes in a false 
premise, as was the case of Ezekiel, then there will be an error in his 
vision as well.107
103 Ibid. 4.6; Commentary on Job 34. See Seymour Feldman, “Gersonides on the Possi-
bility of Conjunction with the Agent Intellect,” AJS Review 3 (1978): 99-120.
104 Ibn Kaspi, for example, maintains that Moses conjoined with the Active Intellect 
but nonetheless was not equal to it in his intellection; see ‘Amudei Kesef 2.4, 91; 
Maskiyyot Kesef 1.36, 50.
105 In the case of Moses, Gersonides posits a level of intellection that comes close to 
that of the Active Intellect, though even in this case he explicitly denies Moses’ 
ability to apprehend the Separate Intellects; see his Commentary on Exodus 33:19-
23; Commentary on Numbers 12:8.
106 See The Wars of the Lord 2.4; 2.6; Commentary on I Kings 11 (lesson 3); Alexander 
Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia,” in 
American Academy for Jewish Research Jubilee Volume, ed. Salo Baron and Isaac 
Barzilay (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1980), 24.
107 See Commentary on Genesis 15:4; Commentary on Job 39.
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After Gersonides, the discussion of this issue continues, mostly on 
the part of Spanish Jewish philosophers; Spain replaced Southern 
France as the center of Jewish philosophy by the middle of the four-
teenth century. Even Moses Narboni, who has much to say regarding 
the relation between prophet and philosopher, and even more on the 
subject of conjunction, wrote all his works in Spain.108 Yet until one 
reaches the great Spanish Jewish philosopher Ḥasdai Crescas toward 
the end of the fourteenth century,109 it is hard to discern any new 
dimensions that are introduced into these discussions. Following 
Maimonides, all the Jewish philosophers discussed in this chapter, as 
well as their Spanish counterparts, viewed normative prophecy as a 
natural phenomenon. Consequently, the questions they addressed 
essentially focus on the types of theoretical knowledge that can be 
attained naturally, the characteristics of the perfect intellect that attains 
them, and whether the intellect undergoes a type of transformation at 
the culmination of the process. For those who posited a higher-level 
knowledge and saw it as characterizing prophecy, this “divine knowl-
edge,” like “human knowledge,” is essentially a different superior 
category of natural knowledge, which is not to be distinguished by its 
agent but by its features, though some of the Jewish philosophers 
sought to obfuscate this point to some degree. While they all counseled 
accepting the views of the prophets over those of the philosophers 
when there was a conflict between them, it appears that many of the 
Jewish philosophers were apt to regard these views as ones that are 
108 Narboni discusses these issues in a number of works, particularly Commentary on 
Averroes’ Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction, ed. and trans. Kalman P. Bland 
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982); Be’ur le-Sefer Moreh 
Nevukhim, ed. Jacob Goldenthal (Vienna: n.p., 1852); Ma’amar bi-Shlemut 
ha-Nefesh, ed. Alfred L. Ivry (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences, 1977); 
Commentary on Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. For studies of Narboni’s approach 
to human perfect and conjunction, see Alfred L. Ivry, “Moses of Narbonne’s 
Treatise on the Perfection of the Soul: A Methodological and Conceptual Anal-
ysis,” Jewish Quarterly Review 57 (1967): 271-297; Gitit Holzman, “Seclusion, 
Knowledge and Conjunction in the Thought of R. Moshe Narboni,” Kabbalah 7 
(2002): 111-173 (Heb.).
109 Crescas completed his magnum opus, The Light of the Lord, at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century, around 1410.
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necessary for political-religious reasons rather than as theoretical 
truths. Hence even those who were convinced of the superiority of 
prophetic knowledge over that of the philosophers did not necessarily 
favor all prophetic doctrines as literally understood. Moreover, some 
even entertained the possibility that the prophets at times err in scien-
tific matters. The approaches of the Jewish philosophers certainly 
varied, as we have seen, yet in the final analysis they shared the same 
basic assumption regarding the origin of prophecy, and they rooted 
their views in the same set of sources. With Crescas, the philosophic 
picture changes dramatically and is rooted more firmly in fundamental 
religious tenets. While he does not entirely abandon the naturalistic 
approach of the philosophers and employs it as the starting point for 
his own thought, he nonetheless sees God as the immediate agent of 
the content of the prophetic message, even though it most often reaches 
the prophet through an intermediary. The superiority of the prophet 
over the philosopher in their knowledge in fact reflects the superiority 
of the knowledge communicated by God to knowledge that is known 
by natural means. This, however, is a different story.110
110 For a discussion of Crescas’ theory of prophecy, see Prophecy: The History of an Idea 
in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 425-485.
Introduction
Maimonides opens chapter thirty-nine of the second part of the Guide 
of the Perplexed with the following assertion:
After we have spoken of the quiddity of prophecy, have made 
known its true reality, and have made it clear that the prophecy of 
Moses our Master is different from that of the others, we shall say 
that the call to the Law followed necessarily from that apprehension 
alone. For nothing similar to the call addressed to us by Moses our 
Master has been made before him by any one of those we know 
who lived in the time between Adam and him; nor was a call similar 
to that one made by one of the prophets after him. Correspondingly 
it is a fundamental principle of our Law that there will never be 
another Law. Hence, according to our opinion, there never has been 
a Law and there never will be a Law except the one that is the Law 
of Moses our Master. (378-379)1
1 All English translations of the Guide are taken from the translation of Shlomo 
Pines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963). All other translations in this 
chapter are my own.
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Maimonides juxtaposes the uniqueness of the Torah with the 
uniqueness of Mosaic prophecy, a point that he had already stressed in 
chapter thirty-five, while adding: “For to my mind the term ‘prophet’ 
used with reference to Moses and to the others is amphibolous” (367). 
That is to say, the essence of the prophecy of Moses in Maimonides’ 
view is different from that of all other prophets and they share only 
some secondary characteristics. Maimonides also reminds his readers of 
the four fundamental differences between Mosaic prophecy and other 
prophecies that he had elaborated upon in his Commentary on the 
Mishnah (the seventh article of faith in the introduction to the tenth 
chapter of tractate Sanhedrin, Pereq Ḥeleq) and in his Mishneh Torah 
(Laws of Principles of the Torah 7.6).2 In addition, in chapter thirty-five 
Maimonides points to a connection between the uniqueness of Moses’ 
prophecy and the uniqueness of the miracles he performed by noting: 
“The same applies, in my opinion, to his miracles and to the miracles of 
2 According to Maimonides, Moses’ intellect became divorced from its dependence 
on his bodily organs (it became a form of Separate Intellect), and he received his 
prophecy without the mediation of the angels. The “angels” in this context may 
allude to the Active Intellect and/or the imaginative faculty. In Guide 2.45, 
Maimonides mentions explicitly that the imagination was not involved in Moses’ 
prophecy, and most, if not all, of the differences between Moses’ prophecy and all 
other prophecies revolve around the activity of the imagination. Yet at least one of 
the differences can also be interpreted as indicating that the Active Intellect was 
not involved in his prophecy. This interpretation is reinforced by the eighth article of 
faith, which states that God communicated the Torah to Moses. There is little 
doubt that Maimonides wished to leave the impression upon his readers that 
Moses’ prophecy was supernatural, and that he received the Law directly from 
God. The question of whether this is Maimonides’ true view is tied to the question 
that stands at the heart of this chapter. See also above, chapter two. For a detailed 
study of Mosaic prophecy in Maimonides’ thought, see Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), s.v. Maimonides on Moses and Mosaic Prophecy. For a study of 
the problem of whether Maimonides regarded prophecy in general as having a 
supernatural dimension, see Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides and Thomas 
Aquinas: Natural or Divine Prophecy,” AJS Review 3 (1978): 1-19. For a survey of 
different approaches to the prophecy of Moses in Jewish philosophy from 
R. Saadiah Gaon to Spinoza, see Howard Kreisel, “The Prophecy of Moses in 
Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in Illuminating Moses: A History of Reception from 
Exodus to the Renaissance, ed. Jane Beal (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 117-141. 
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others, for his miracles do not belong to the class of the miracles of the 
other prophets” (367).
The question that arises in light of Maimonides’ statements is: 
what is the precise relation between Moses’ prophetic apprehension, 
the miracles that he performed, and the Law that he transmitted? Did 
Moses’ special prophetic apprehension enable him to perform the mira-
cles and to legislate the Law—and if so, these phenomena may be 
unique but they still do not deviate from the natural order—or are we 
dealing with three different characteristics associated with his prophecy 
whose common denominator is that they all are outside the boundaries 
of nature? That is to say, Moses perfected himself as far as humanly 
possible in accordance with the natural order, but the special apprehen-
sion he attained, the miracles he performed, and the Law he transmitted 
were all gifts bestowed upon him directly by God. God, and no other, 
should be regarded as the immediate cause of these phenomena. If this 
is the case, the conclusion to which one is drawn is that despite Maimon-
ides’ emphasis on God’s governance of the world by way of the order 
of nature,3 in regard to all the phenomena associated with the prophecy 
of Moses, God suspends this order and establishes an immediate 
connection with an individual human being.
The problem of how to interpret Maimonides on the issue of 
whether God can exercise acts of volition vis-à-vis historical individuals 
arises frequently in the interpretation of the Guide, particularly in the 
modern period. It is well known that Maimonides depicts Moses from 
the perspective of two different viewpoints that merge from time to 
time. On one hand, he sees in Moses the exemplar of human perfec-
tion, the model for all who strive for perfection, whether in the area of 
intellectual apprehension or in the area of governance. In order to 
attain this perfection, Moses had to travel the same path that all others 
have to travel. He also represents the outer limits of human perfection, 
the point from which no human being by nature is capable of further 
advancing. The human dimension of this perfection finds its expression 
in the fact that even after having attained perfection, he was not able 
3 See Guide 2.4-12.
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to overcome entirely the potential to sin. According to Maimonides, 
Moses experienced anger at the waters of Meribah, and according to 
his position in Guide 1.54, every experience of anger stems from a char-
acter defect, whether the anger is justified or not.4 Overall, Moses was 
not able to sever completely his intellect from its ties to matter, in 
order to become a separate intellect already in his lifetime. In accord 
with an image borrowed from Islamic thought that is presented by 
Maimonides in Eight Chapters, 7, there remained a single veil (ḥijāb) 
shrouding Moses’ apprehension of God—namely, the human intellect 
that is not separate from matter.5
On the other hand, Maimonides treats Moses as a completely 
supernatural phenomenon. Moses was able to rent every veil during his 
lifetime and his intellect was transformed into a Separate Intellect. 
Consequent upon attaining this degree he attained a unique prophecy 
that was bestowed upon him directly by God without any intermediary, 
not even the Active Intellect that serves as an intermediary in all other 
instances of prophecy.6 God created the miracles announced by Moses, 
the like of which were never seen before or afterwards. God also 
communicated His messages to Moses via an audible voice, which at 
Sinai was also heard by all of Israel in order to verify his mission. To 
Moses, and to him alone, God, and no other, dictated the divine Law 
word for word. In short, whenever the divinity of the Law is at the 
heart of Maimonides’ discussion, all the phenomena associated with 
Mosaic prophecy are treated as supernatural ones that are outside 
the boundary of human striving. Whenever the focus turns to human 
perfection, Moses is treated as the one who in a natural manner 
attained the limits of this perfection and thus serves as its ultimate 
representative.
4 In Eight Chapters, 1 Maimonides charges Moses with unjustified anger, which clearly 
reflects a character defect. In the Guide, however, he adopts a more extreme posi-
tion. Even when anger is justified, the perfect individual must overcome all internal 
feelings of anger, while pretending to be angry when the situation calls for it.
5 See Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea, 181. On the term ḥijāb in Maimon-
ides’ thought, see ibid., 173-174.
6 See in particular the seventh and eighth principles of faith at the end of the Intro-
duction to Pereq Ḥeleq; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 7.6. 
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There is no reason to doubt the fact that according to Maimonides, 
Moses attained perfection in the area of theoretical knowledge, and 
consequently, perfection in the area of governance, in accordance with 
the Platonic model. This type of governance is patterned after God’s 
governance of the world. On this issue, the controversies among 
Maimonides’ interpreters focus on determining the limits he places on 
human intellectual apprehension, an issue that has important ramifica-
tions for the possibility of human immortality in his thought,7 and the 
relation between a life of theoria and a life of praxis. More fundamental 
to an understanding of Maimonides’ thought is the problem of how to 
interpret the figure of Moses as an individual who merited the occur-
rence of supernatural phenomena on his behalf, which appear to 
indicate God’s personal involvement in history. Was the Deity in fact 
their immediate cause, or did Moses himself work seemingly supernat-
ural activities, as well as legislate the Torah, on the basis of the level of 
intellectual perfection he attained?8
In this chapter I would like to focus on some of the philosophers 
from Southern France who were profoundly influenced by Maimonides 
and how they viewed Moses—his perfection and the supernatural 
phenomena that Maimonides associates with his prophecy. The philos-
ophers are Levi ben Avraham, who lived in the second half of the 
thirteenth century and composed the encyclopedia of the sciences and 
7 This controversy centered primarily on the interpretation of Shlomo Pines’s inter-
pretation of Maimonides’ position in his article, “The Limitations of Human 
Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” in Studies in Medi-
eval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 82-109. Pines’s interpretation was challenged by Herbert 
Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” Maimonidean Studies 3 
(1992-93): 49-103. See also Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and 
the Scope of Metaphysics,” in his Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufk-
laerung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987), 60-129, and Howard Kreisel Maimonides’ 
Political Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 137-147, 311-313.
8 I discussed the central issue of how to interpret the nature of God’s activity in 
Maimonides’ thought, as well as the problem whether Moses was secretly regarded 
by him as the immediate legislator of the Torah, in a number of previous 
studies. See, for example, “Moses Maimonides,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, 
ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1997), 245-280. See 
also Maimonides’ Political Thought, 6-16.
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Judaism entitled Livyat Ḥen;9 and three philosophers who lived in the 
first half of the fourteenth century: Nissim of Marseille, the author of 
a philosophic Torah commentary, Ma‘aseh Nissim;10 Joseph Ibn Kaspi, 
who in several of his exegetical works deals with different aspects of 
the prophecy of Moses, most notably in his Tirat Kesef (Sefer ha-Sod);11 
and Gersonides, who deals with this subject in his philosophic treatise 
The Wars of the Lord, and more extensively in his subsequent Commen-
tary on the Torah. The rejection of the naturalistic approach to Moses’ 
prophecy can be found not only among the opponents of philosophy in 
Provence but also among some of its proponents, as we shall see from 
Kalonymos ben Kalonymos’ critique of Ibn Kaspi’s position. Finally, I 
will turn to the issue of the voice heard at Sinai as well as the one 
heard by Moses in the tabernacle and examine how Maimonides and 
his followers in Provence understood these apparently supernatural 
phenomena, which do not easily lend themselves to naturalistic expla-
nations. In an appendix to the chapter, I will bring some additional 
support to the view that Maimonides viewed Moses, and not God, as 
the immediate agent of the miracles associated with his prophecy.
Levi ben Avraham
A Jewish thinker prior to Maimonides hinted to the integral connection 
between the prophecy of Moses and the miracles he performed in a 
short but highly significant comment. I am referring to the twelfth- 
century biblical exegete Abraham Ibn Ezra, who in his commentary on 
Numbers 20:8—which speaks of God’s command to Moses to talk to 
the rock and bring forth water—writes: “Know that when the part 
(ha-ḥeleq) knows the All (or, everything, ha-kol), he conjoins with the 
All, and creates in everything signs and miracles.” Ibn Ezra’s comment, 
which suggests a naturalistic model for understanding the miracles 
9 For a study of this thinker and his encyclopedia, see above, chapter 5.
10 For a study of this thinker and his treatise, see above, chapter 6.
11 Ibn Kaspi deals also with aspects of this topic in Menorat Kesef, Metsaref la-Kesef, 
and in his two commentaries on the Guide: ‘Amudei Kesef and Maskiyot Kesef. 
For a description of Ibn Kaspi’s treatises, see Hannah Kasher’s introduction to 
her edition of Ibn Kaspi’s Shulḥan Kesef ( Jerusalem: Ben-Zevi Institute, 1996), 
11-53 (Heb.).
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performed by Moses, was well known to the philosophers of Provence.12 
According to this view, God is not the immediate cause of these mirac-
ulous events; Moses himself performed them by virtue of the special 
apprehension he received while in a state of conjunction with God.13 
Ibn Ezra goes on to explain that Moses at first did not succeed in 
drawing water from the rock at Meribah, since “the part (ha-ḥeleq) 
remained a part”—that is to say, because of his quarrel with the Israel-
ites he did not succeed in immediately attaining the state of conjunction 
and “becoming universal (kelali),” which would have enabled him to 
perform the miracle without a flaw. In his initial attempt to bring forth 
water, Moses’ intellect remained incapable of affecting that which is 
outside the body to which it is attached, and did not become a universal 
intellect capable of influencing all entities on earth.
Levi, who was well aware of Ibn Ezra’s approach, deals with Moses 
in a number of chapters belonging to the first treatise (“The Quality of 
Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah”) in the second part of Livyat 
Ḥen.14 In his discussion of miracles in the second treatise, “The Secrets 
of the Faith,” he presents a number of interpretations that shed further 
light on this topic.15 Seldom does Levi content himself with a single 
12 For a study of Ibn Ezra’s approach to miracles and its influence on subsequent 
Jewish thinkers, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in 
Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, 
ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 1984), 231-272. See also 
Howard Kreisel, “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Jewish Quarterly 
Review 75 (1984): 106-114. Ibn Ezra was not the only Jewish thinker prior to 
Maimonides to view the prophet himself as the agent of miracles. Abraham Ibn 
Daud too presents this view based on Avicenna’s approach; See Emunah Ramah, 
ed. Samuel Weil (Frankfurt, 1852), 2.5.1, 73. In his treatise, Ibn Daud deals exten-
sively with the subject of prophecy in general and that of Moses in particular. For 
a study of this topic in his thought, see T. A. M. Fontaine, In Defence of Judaism: 
Abraham Ibn Daud (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1990), 137-166. 
13 I do not think that Ibn Ezra is referring to a state of unification with God, but 
rather a state in which he joins the world of the angels that stands immediately 
below the level of God in the hierarchy of existence. For Ibn Ezra’s description of 
the world of the angels, see in particular his commentary on Exodus 3:15.
14 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the 
Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
Press, 2007), especially chaps. 33-34 (Heb.).
15 See Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and the Gate of the 
Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
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interpretation of the issues he raises; he generally brings a host of inter-
pretations, not all of them in harmony with each other. At times he 
determines which interpretation is the correct one and at times he 
leaves the choice to the reader. Thus one should not expect a consistent 
approach to our subject, but to a variety of possible interpretations. 
What is noteworthy are some of the possibilities that this thir-
teenth-century thinker permits himself to present explicitly to his 
Jewish audience. Levi deals at length with a good number of issues 
related to Moses and his prophecy—e.g., the private revelation to 
Moses at Sinai in the cleft of the rock, the sin of Moses, and Moses’ 
speech impediment. In this chapter, I will focus only upon the question 
of the relation between Moses’ perfection, his prophecy, and the mira-
cles he performed.
Levi agrees with the view that Moses achieved human perfection 
in a naturalistic manner. He was born with a perfect temperament and 
completed his studies of all of the sciences.16 In his interpretation of the 
import of the verse: Moses was eighty years old and Aaron eighty-three 
when they made their demand on Pharaoh (Exodus 7:7), Levi writes: 
“That is to say, they had much time and many years to learn and perfect 
their souls by knowledge of all the sciences. In addition, at this age the 
imaginative faculty is weak in consequence of the weakening of one’s 
physical faculties. This enabled him [Moses] to prophesy without the 
use of the imaginative faculty, between the two cherubs [Exodus 25:22].”17 
Levi interprets between the two cherubs as a metaphor signifying the 
emanation of the Active Intellect directly upon the intellect of Moses 
without the mediation of the imaginative faculty.18 This attainment is 
Press, 2014), especially chaps. 12-13 (Heb.).
16 On the relation of one’s natural temperament and the learning of the sciences, see 
Guide 1.34 (the fourth cause that prevents instruction in the divine science). 
17 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 123, 733.
18 This interpretation is based upon Maimonides’ remarks toward the end of Guide 
2.45. According to Levi, the cherub is a metaphor for the intellect—whether the 
Active Intellect or the human intellect; see Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 
224. He also brings an additional interpretation of this verse: “In order that one 
should not err in thinking that the speech went out from the figure of the cherub, 
and that one should not treat it as a divinity, the story comes to tell us that Moses 
heard the voice between the two cherubs, not from the cherubs themselves” (589); 
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definitely unique in Levi’s view, but not one that breaches the boundary 
of nature, as he writes: “I have already explained that Moses was the 
most exceptional member of the human species and his intellectual 
apprehension was of the utmost level of human apprehension.”19 In 
other words: “Moses apprehended all that is possible for a human being 
to apprehend, and he conjoined with the angels [Active Intellect]. 
Consequently it is said: Moses approached the thick cloud where God 
[Elohim] was [Exodus 20:18], the name Elohim alluding to the angels.”20
According to Levi’s descriptions of the prophecy of Moses, one can 
detect a progression in Moses’ prophetic attainment, insofar as the first 
prophetic experience of his, the vision of the burning bush, was more 
“corporeal” than his prophetic experience at Sinai. Levi writes:
For sixty years, Moses was a corporeal being, as we already saw, for 
it is said: she hid him for three months [Exodus 2:2]. This alludes to 
the three previous periods in a person’s life, for it is said: also from 
yesterday, also from the day before [Exodus 4:10]. In the seventh 
decade [of a person’s life] the darkness of matter departs, as it is 
said: the cloud hid it [the glory of God] for six days and on the seventh 
day it called to Moses from the midst of the cloud [Exodus 24:16]. This 
has the same meaning as: God called to him from the midst of the bush 
[Exodus 3:8], as we shall explain. However, from the midst of the 
bush indicates a more corporeal, unrefined vision than the one indi-
cated by the words from the midst of the cloud, since the vision of the 
bush was the first one that he beheld.21
Levi echoes the view to which Maimonides alludes in Guide 3.45, where 
the latter writes: “Even in the case of Moses our Master, his prophetic 
cf. Guide 3.45. For a study of different interpretations of this verse among Maimon-
ides’ followers, see Esti Eisenmann, “‘From Above the Covering of the Ark, from 
Between the Two Cherubim’: A Study of Jewish Philosophical Interpretation,” in 
Moses the Man: Master of the Prophets, ed. Moshe Hallamish, Hannah Kasher, and 
Hanokh Ben-Pazi (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2010), 101-113 (Heb.).
19 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 743.
20 Ibid., 270. For a discussion of the problem of conjunction of the human intellect 
with the Active Intellect in Maimonides’ thought, see the studies mentioned above 
in note 7. For the Arabic philosophical background of this problem, see Herbert 
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on the Intellect (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1992). 
21 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 733.
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mission is inaugurated through an angel: And there appeared unto him an 
angel of the Lord in the heart of fire [Exodus 3:2]” (576). The “angel” in 
this context appears to represent the imaginative faculty. Only after-
ward did Moses reach the level that he was able to dispense with this 
faculty in the attainment of prophecy.22 Levi, again following Maimon-
ides’ lead, sees in the vexation experienced by Moses as a result of the 
complaints of the Israelites an impairment to the acquisition of prophecy, 
as can be seen from his sin at the waters of Meribah, where he has to 
hit the rock twice in order to bring forth water.23
The depiction of Moses’ prophecy till this point is a unique one 
that nevertheless does not breach the boundaries of the impersonal 
natural order. Moreover, Levi is clear on the point that Moses’ prophecy 
was a result of conjunction with the Active Intellect, as is the case with 
the other prophets. While Maimonides frames his comments in a way 
that can be interpreted that Moses received his prophecy directly from 
God, Levi appears to reject this possibility. The characteristic distin-
guishing Moses’ prophecy from all others is the purely intellectual 
nature of his prophecy, without the involvement of the imagination. 
22 I will return to this passage in the appendix to the chapter. Jacob Levinger was of 
the opinion that Maimonides’ esoteric teaching on this issue is that even at Mount 
Sinai Moses’ prophecy was by way of the imaginative faculty, and hence there was 
no categorical difference between the nature of his prophecy and that of the other 
prophets; see Jacob Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier (Jerusalem: 
Bialik Institute, 1989), 29-38 (Heb.). For a study of fourteenth-century Jewish 
philosophers who also ascribed an imaginative element to Moses’ prophecy, see 
Dov Schwartz, “Mosaic Prophecy in the Writings of a Fourteenth Century Jewish 
Neoplatonist Circle,” Jewish Thought and Philosophy 2 (1992): 97-110. My own view 
is that Maimonides held that Moses’ prophetic experience at Sinai was a purely 
intellectual one focusing on the order of existence, but that his imagination came 
into play in “translating” this knowledge into a perfect legislation; see Prophecy: 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 283-284. 
23 See Levi’s extensive discussion of this story in Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 
744-753. Levi insists that Moses was supposed to hit the rock, and for this reason 
was commanded to take his staff with him, but due to his vexation with the nation 
he was not able to bring forth water immediately by a single stroke. Compare to 
Maimonides’ comment in Guide 2.36, where he maintains that the vexation expe-
rienced by Moses due to the episode of the spies resulted in prophetic revelation 
not coming to him “in the way that revelation used to come before, because—
seeing the enormity of their crime—he suffered greatly because of this matter” 
(372-373).
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Yet Levi also brings a number of interpretations that suggest the 
opposite conclusion, and that he in fact sees God as the immediate 
cause of Moses’ unique prophecy. Moreover, Levi’s interpretations of 
phenomena mentioned in the Torah that appear to be outside the 
boundaries of nature do not always reflect a naturalistic approach. It is 
possible that we are dealing in these cases with an esoteric level to his 
writing, given the religious sensitivity of the issues involved. Levi pres-
ents interpretations that ascribe to God the ability to act directly and 
miraculously in history in order to hide his view that all events should 
be understood in a manner that is in harmony with the workings of the 
natural order. One, however, should not reject the possibility that Levi 
in fact did not reach a definitive conclusion on this issue and leaves the 
matter open. In any case, the fact that he introduced naturalistic expla-
nations in interpreting these events in a treatise intended for a general 
Jewish audience, and it appears that his tendency is to favor these inter-
pretations, is highly significant.
The tendency to understand Moses’ prophecy in accordance with a 
naturalistic model, while not ruling out the alternate possibility, finds 
its expression in other issues associated with this prophecy. In regard to 
the Torah’s statement that Moses neither ate bread nor drank water 
during the forty days he was on Mount Sinai,24 Levi offers two explana-
tions: “Due to the strength of his conjunction with God and his soul’s 
passion for knowledge, a supernal power emanated upon him which 
strengthened his body, fortified his disposition, and preserved him 
without food or drink during this period. An alternate explanation [is 
that] this was by way of a miracle.”25 According to the first explanation, 
the attainment of conjunction naturally resulted in the body being 
preserved without the necessity for the intake of nourishment in order 
to maintain it, and one need not ascribe this phenomenon to the miracle 
working ability of God. Levi’s interpretation suggests that the intellect 
in this state achieves independence from the body and can function 
24 See Exodus 34:28; Deuteronomy 9:9.
25 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 743.
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without being sustained by it,26 while at the same time the body attains 
a static state in which it does not deteriorate. Alternately, the notion 
that this was a miraculous occurrence due to God’s direct involvement 
is also a possible explanation in his view.
As for Moses’ miracles, Levi writes: “God taught the prophet in a 
general way how to change nature and create miracles that He decreed 
should be performed by him [the prophet], as Ibn Ezra maintained: 
‘When the part knows the All, he conjoins with the All, and creates 
signs and miracles’ [Commentary on Numbers 20:8].”27 Levi points to 
the connection between the miracles performed by Moses and his 
knowledge of the Tetragrammaton:
We already explained that the Tetragrammaton refers only to the 
One who is the origin of all existents. . . . Only the Necessary Exis-
tent is capable of changing nature, insofar as it is the first cause of 
nature, as it is said [of Him]: who alone makes miracles [Psalms 
72:18]. Consequently it is said that [this name] refers to His quality 
of mercy, for it is fitting that the shepherd governs, watches over, 
and is compassionate. But Elohim refers to the quality of judgment, 
for the judge must engage in judgment. Consequently it is said: And 
my name the Tetragrammaton I did not inform them [Exodus 6:3], for 
only by this name can one create miracles. . . . Through Moses God 
began to perform miracles in the world, and he was the first of the 
prophets who was sent to the nation with a mission.28
Levi in this passage does not claim that Moses worked the miracles, 
rather God did. Yet one can find an allusion to the idea that Moses was 
their immediate agent in Levi’s subsequent comments:
Some of the signs were performed by Aaron, because he was subtler 
in bringing them about and he understood their natural component. 
In addition, in the change of agents the effects change. Aaron also 
knew how to determine the moment that the plagues will come. 
26 Compare the explanation offered by Moses Ibn Tibbon in his Sefer Pe’ah, 3 (The 
Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and 
Avraham Israel [Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010], 
105-6 [Heb.]).
27 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith, 94.
28 Ibid., 95. As for the notion that Moses was the first to issue a call to others in the 
name of God by virtue of his prophecy, see Guide 2.39.
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Perhaps these things were accomplished with the help of astral 
forces, and Aaron knew how to determine the appropriate times, 
and he would choose them in accordance with the word of God.29
Aaron, in other words, was an adept in astrology and it is precisely the 
knowledge of the effects of the astral forces and how to manipulate 
them that enabled him to bring about some of the plagues at the 
times that he did.30 Similarly, Moses was able to perform miracles as a 
result of his unique knowledge of the order of existence that he attained 
by way of prophecy. This can be inferred from Levi’s treatment of the 
miracle of the “opening up of the mouth of the earth” that swallowed 
up the followers of Koraḥ—one of the miracles God created at the end 
of the sixth day, according to Mishnah Avot 5.6:
“The opening up of the mouth of the earth”—this designates an 
earthquake. The sign lies in God informing Moses the time that it 
was to take place. Each instance of this phenomenon occurred when 
needed. Also belonging to this category is what they [the Sages] said: 
“The wall of Jericho that was swallowed up where it stood” [BT 
Berakhot 54a], similar to what happens in the collapsing of towns 
and the sinking of city-states.31
One may interpret Levi as maintaining that God purposefully implanted 
in the order earthquakes at specific times and places in order to aid 
Israel when the proper time came. Yet he appears to be hinting to the 
fact that earthquakes are natural occurrences. By knowing when and 
where they occur based on a complete knowledge of the natural order, 
the prophet can utilize them for his purposes, as in the case of the 
ground swallowing up Koraḥ or the earthquake that brought down the 
walls of Jericho.32
29 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith, 95.
30 For a study of approaches to astrology among medieval Jewish thinkers, see Dov 
Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan Univer-
sity Press, 1999) (Heb.); see especially his treatment of Levi on pages 245-254.
31 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith, 95.
32 One may further argue that the latter earthquake was hastened by the command to 
march around the city seven times and then sound the trumpets. Levi, however, 
prefers a symbolic reason for this action—namely, to show that Israel is not ruled 
by the seven planets. See ibid., 107.
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As in the case of Aaron, Moses too was an expert in astrology, a 
view that Levi tries to show is attested to also in rabbinic midrash:
Since He saw that the nativity of Moses was weaker than the constel-
lation of Amaleq, and if Moses fought against them he would 
lose—and perhaps this is what is alluded to in saying: the hands of 
Moses were heavy [Exodus 17.12]—and Joshua’s constellation was 
stronger than his, therefore He commanded Joshua to fight Amaleq. 
Moses chose special hours by way of prophecy, and he would raise 
then up his hands by the word of God, as it is indicated in the Chap-
ters of Rabbi Eliezer: “And his hands were steady [ibid.]—Amaleq 
came upon them in accordance with their astrological decree. Moses 
came, halted the sun and the moon and mixed up their hours, as it is 
said: The sun and the moon stood still in their habitation [Habakkuk 
3:11], and it is written: and lifted up his hands on high” [ibid., 10].33 
“Came upon them in accordance with their astrological decree”—
that is to say, they saw that Israel departed [Egypt] under the 
influence of an evil star, thus they came upon them. For if this is not 
the case, what need was there to “mix up the hours”? After all, 
“Israel is not under the influence of the constellations” (BT Shabbat 
156a). Furthermore, what was the purpose of halting the moon?34 
The meaning of: and Aaron and Ḥur supported his hands [Exodus 
17:12], is that they aided him by what they knew of this subject. . . .35 
In the Midrash of Psalms: “Pick some men for us [ibid., 9]—from 
those born on the first [of] Adar.” The reason for this is that the 
moon then enters into the constellation of Aquarius, which is the 
constellation of Israel. It appears that he also desired that the 
ascending constellation be Aquarius at the time of the new moon in 
order that the particular should agree with the generality.36 Even 
though Moses at first experienced difficulties in his study of the 
mathematical sciences due to his natural temperament, God at the 
end enabled him to comprehend them. Or perhaps he was an expert 
only in the area of astrology.37
33 This quotation does not appear in our editions of the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, but 
it appears in Tanḥuma, BeShalaḥ, 28.
34 One may argue that the reason to halt the sun in its orbit was to give the Israelites 
more hours of daylight to fight Amaleq, but Levi shows that astrological consider-
ations were the reason for this action, since Moses halted also the moon.
35 Levi cites a similar midrash found in Tanḥuma, Tetsaveh, 9.
36 That is to say, that the constellation of each of the warriors will be the same as 
the ascending constellation at the time of the new moon, and this would rein-
force their strength.
37 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 771-2. 
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While in this passage Levi speaks at first as though the specific 
commands come directly from God, it is clear from the continuation of 
his remarks that Moses determined what actions were to be taken 
based on his astrological knowledge, and that he conferred with Aaron 
and Ḥur, who were also experts in this field.
There are miracles that Levi apparently rejects any attempt to 
explain in a naturalistic manner, such as the parting of the Sea of Reeds: 
“God chose for the parting of the sea a time of moderate temperature, 
and not a time of great coldness and dreadful frost, in order not to 
give the heretics an opening to claim that this was a natural event, 
since the intensity of the coldness froze the water.”38 Even in this case, 
Levi may have still believed that there was a natural reason for the 
event and Moses was able to predict its occurrence, but he did not want 
to reveal this view given the significance of this miracle. Otherwise, it 
is hard to explain why he is so persistent in presenting naturalistic 
interpretations for many of the other biblical miracles.
The most crucial question that remains is whether Levi held that 
Moses himself was the author of the Torah as a result of the level of 
prophecy that he attained. It is hardly surprising that Levi ascribes the 
Torah to the immediate agency of God in his discussion of the topic. 
Nevertheless, there are passages that may allude to a different view on 
this issue. He writes, for example: “Some of the stories were written by 
Moses in an allegoric manner and he designed them as parables by the 
word of God [literally, the mouth of God,‘al pei HaShem] because of 
necessity.”39 Levi attempts to solve the problem how the Torah can 
contain parables if Moses’ prophecy did not involve the imaginative 
faculty. He does not explain what he means, however, by the phrase 
“by the word of God.” Does he in fact maintain that God commanded 
Moses to write these stories exactly as He dictated them, and hence 
Moses’ imagination was not involved, or is he hinting at the view 
that Moses himself created the parables because he understood the 
need to convey to the nation the truths he received in prophecy in this 
manner, and this understanding is what Levi alludes to when he speaks 
38 Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith, 98.
39 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 224.
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of “the word of God”? As we shall see below, Levi’s approach to the 
“voice” of God may throw some added light on this issue.
Nissim of Marseille
Following the Maimonidean tradition, Nissim treats Moses as an indi-
vidual who attained ultimate human perfection and conjoined with 
the Active Intellect, thereby meriting a prophecy that involved his 
intellect alone without the use of his imagination.40 It is this unique 
attainment that enabled him to govern the Israelites in a perfect 
manner. While Maimonides, followed by Levi ben Avraham, leaves the 
question of the precise relationship between Moses’ perfection and the 
supernatural phenomena associated with his prophecy at least in part 
open, Nissim’s stance on this issue lacks very little if any ambiguity. 
Moses’ perfection enabled him to create the miracles and lay down a 
law that alone may be considered divine.
Nissim describes Moses’ perfection as follows:
Moses, of blessed memory, actualized his intellect, till he was always 
with God. God illuminated him by way of a radiant prism (aspaqlar-
iyah me’irah), till the light of his intellect shone. He commanded 
what he commanded and admonished what he admonished, and he 
gave us a law and commandments by virtue of the good hand of his 
Lord upon him, and in accordance with His command. He induced 
the multitude to follow it by miracles and promises of good fortune, 
awe inspiring miracles and terrible punishments. There remained no 
perfection or what brings it about according to the intellect that he 
had not taught and commanded us. He reached the pinnacle of 
God’s purpose in the creation of humanity. He aspired to every 
perfection that he could determine on the basis of divine science in 
order to perfect the individual and protect him from the evils that 
human beings inflict upon each other, and also those evils that they 
inflict upon themselves as a result of bad choices.41
40 Nissim devotes chapter 12 of his treatise to a discussion of the prophecy of Moses 
in relation to that of all other prophets. He also discusses Moses’ prophecy exten-
sively throughout his work.
41 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 100.
The Prophecy of Moses  331
Nissim shows in this passage the integral relation between intellectual 
perfection, culminating in mastery of the divine science (metaphysics), 
and perfect governance, including the laying down of an ideal law that 
will lead others to perfection and minimize the evils they inflict on each 
other and on themselves. Not only are Maimonides’ views on human 
perfection and the purpose of the divine Law very much evident in this 
passage,42 but just as striking is its similarity to Alfarabi’s description of 
the supreme lawgiver in his The Political Regime,43 which heavily influ-
enced Maimonides’ thought.44 Perhaps most astounding is the fact that 
Nissim in this passage comes close to indicating explicitly that Moses 
himself was the immediate author of the Law, and God only the remote 
cause, a position that is echoed even more explicitly in other passages 
of his work, as we have seen, and moreover, treated as the esoteric view 
of the Sages.45
In keeping with his view that all miracles can be explained in a 
manner that is in harmony with the natural order,46 Nissim explains 
those performed by Moses. All of them consisted either of rare natural 
phenomena that Moses was able to foresee and utilize for his purposes, 
or they were phenomena that do not occur naturally but Moses acquired 
the scientific knowledge that enabled him to bring them about. Many 
of the explanations he borrowed from Levi’s encyclopedia, such as the 
earthquake foreseen by Moses and utilized to destroy the followers of 
Koraḥ, or his striking the rock to release the water which stood under-
neath it.47 All of the plagues occurring in Egypt are given a naturalistic 
42 See, in particular, Maimonides’ description of the purpose of the divine Law in 
Guide 3.27, as well as his discussion of evil in 3.12.
43 See the quote brought above in chapter 2, 25-26.
44 See chapter 2, note 24. Nissim nowhere in his treatise cites explicitly from The 
Political Regime, also known as The Principles of Existents, which was translated into 
Hebrew by Moses Ibn Tibbon and with which he may well have been acquainted. 
He does quote, however, from a different work of Alfarabi, The Classification of the 
Sciences; see Ma‘aseh Nissim, 70-71.
45 See above, chapter 6, 172-173.
46 See above, chapter 6, 190-192. As noted in this chapter, there are passages in 
which Nissim attacks the view that the Torah was not given to Israel by God, but 
this stance does not appear to represent his private view on the subject and is 
presented for religious reasons.
47 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 416-418, 422-423.
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explanation, including the death of the first born,48 and several natural-
istic explanations are proffered for the splitting of the Sea of Reeds.49
No medieval Jewish philosopher who remained faithful to Jewish 
tradition came as close as Nissim in presenting such a radical natural-
istic position in such an open manner. The Torah in Nissim’s view is a 
divine law not because it came directly from God but because it was 
legislated by the individual who attained the highest possible level of 
human perfection, and guided its adherents towards this perfection in 
an optimum manner. Nissim understands the necessity of teaching the 
masses that God is the immediate author of the Torah, and even 
labeling this belief a principle of faith,50 in order to insure their obedi-
ence. Yet he clearly regards this belief as a noble lie, or what was termed 
by Maimonides a “necessary belief,”51 in keeping with the Platonic 
political tradition 
Joseph Ibn Kaspi and the Critique by Kalonymos  
ben Kalonymos
Ibn Kaspi also appears to hold the view that Moses himself brought 
about the miracles and laid down the Law as a result of the perfection 
he attained, though he is careful not to make these points too explicit.52 
Kalonymos, however, discerned from Ibn Kaspi’s remarks in Tirat 
Kesef (Sefer ha-Sod) that this was in fact his view and wrote a scathing 
48 Ibid., 309-317.
49 Ibid., 322. For some of these explanations see chapter 6, 202-203.
50 Ibid., 159-160.
51 See Guide 3.28. Maimonides distinguished these beliefs from “correct beliefs,” for 
they are clearly false when understood literally, such as God is violently angry at 
those who are unjust and He slays them. 
52 For a discussion of the prophecy of Moses in the thought of Ibn Kaspi, see Barry 
Mesch, Studies in Joseph Ibn Caspi (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 61-76. Mesch nicely summa-
rizes Ibn Kaspi’s view of Moses’ perfection and its natural aspects. Moreover, 
Mesch shows that Ibn Kaspi interprets Maimonides as agreeing with Aristotle 
that the world is without beginning and God possesses no personal will (ibid., 
97-100). For a discussion of Ibn Kaspi’s approach to miracles, see Basil Herring’s 
introduction to his edition of Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Gevi‘a Kesef (New York: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1982), 99-122. 
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critique against him.53 One may say that Kalonymos brought to light 
what Ibn Kaspi wanted to leave obscure. In his explanation of Proverbs 
30, Ibn Kaspi writes in the first chapter of his work:
I am more brutish than a man [Proverbs 30:2]. He means to say by 
this—than what is in the nature of the intellect of a person to grasp.54 
We entertain no doubt that Moses our Master reached this final end 
and his actions prove it. Solomon spoke of Moses’ marvelous actions 
and said: Who has ascended up to heaven etc. [ibid., 4]. In general, he 
spoke of the loftiest kinds of marvelous actions Moses performed, 
which included those that were impossible by nature . . . . Undoubt-
edly he acted upon the wind, and in general upon the element of air, 
also upon the element of water, in accordance with his will, most of 
these activities being impossible for us.55
Ibn Kaspi subsequently remarks:
In general, the character of the action teaches the character of the 
agent. Therefore one who understands all of our holy Torah believes 
that Moses our Master, who was the foremost prophet, received it 
from God or from the heavens, both are the same. He undoubtedly 
reached the ultimate point of the perfection of the intellect of the 
human species, and this point is the ultimate final perfection of the 
prophetic perfection. When he reached this point, God, who is 
completely intellect, transmitted to him His holy Torah.56
Kalonymos infers from Ibn Kaspi’s remarks, “that Moses our Master, 
since he apprehended all of the existents completely, worked upon the 
elements as he willed, and therefore his actions were so marvelous. 
This general ability does not exist in the other individuals of the 
53 See Kalonymos ben Kalonymos, Ha-Teshuvah le-Yosef Kaspi (Sendschreiben an 
Joseph Caspi), ed. Joseph Perles (Munich, 1879).
54 In other words, Solomon indicates that he did not realize the full intellectual 
potential of what the ideal human being is capable of realizing, hence he still is 
chracterized by his animal nature.
55 Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Tirat Kesef, in Mishneh Kesef, vol. 1, ed. Isaac Last (Pressburg, 
1905), 3. Compare Ibn Kaspi’s second commentary on Proverbs that appears in 
Joseph Ibn Kaspi, ‘Asarah Kelei Kesef, vol. 1, ed. Isaac Last (Pressburg, 1903), 
126-127.
56 Tirat Kesef, 4.
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species, only in the one who reached the final level possible for the 
species, such as Moses our Master.”57
Kalonymos interprets Ibn Kaspi’s remarks in accordance with 
two different explanations as to how a prophet is capable of working 
miracles. The first he attributes to Avicenna. The soul of the prophet is 
transformed into a type of world soul as a result of his conjunction 
with the Active Intellect, and through his power of representation 
while in this state he can work upon the elements as he wills. Kalon-
ymos identifies this approach also with Ibn Ezra and admits that at one 
point even he and his teachers accepted it.58 The second explanation 
is the one he feels that Ibn Kaspi himself holds. The prophet knows 
how to bring about miracles on the basis of the perfect scientific knowl-
edge he has acquired of the world.
Kalonymos rejects both explanations, the first for reasons that, as 
he indicates, were brought by Averroes in his Incoherence of the Inco-
herence against the notion that the power of representation can bring 
about changes such as an entity being transformed from one species to 
another. There are only two possible ways for existents to change from 
one species to another: either their form emanates from the Active 
Intellect, as was believed by the later philosophers—a reference to 
Alfarabi and Avicenna—or the motion of the heavenly bodies completes 
the process.59 In the latter case, there is no role for representation at all. 
Even if we maintain that the Active Intellect bestows the forms, it is 
only capable of acting when the heavenly motions prepare matter to 
receive a given form. The Active Intellect works only in accordance 
with nature, and God alone can change the heavenly motions.60
57 Ha-Teshuvah le-Yosef Kaspi, 4.
58 Ibid. For a discussion of Avicenna’s theory of miracles and its influence on medi-
eval Jewish philosophy, see Ravitzky, “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in 
Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” 323-361. Avicenna presents this theory in Remarks 
and Admonitions; see Shams Inati (trans.), Ibn Sina and Mysticism—Remarks and 
Admonitions; Part Four (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 105-107. See also 
below in the appendix to this chapter.
59 This is a reference to Aristotle’s notion that human beings are born from the other 
human beings and the sun; see On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 737a.
60 Kalonymos, Ha-Teshuvah, 4. Perles’ edition contains many faulty readings which 
I have emended in my summary and translation. Kalonymos’ argument is in 
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The second explanation, that superior knowledge of the world 
enables one to bring about these changes, is also rejected, again for 
reasons Kalonymos traces to Averroes. He argues that an infinite 
number of preparations are necessary to bring about a small change in 
nature and the human intellect is by nature incapable of discovering all 
of them. Kalonymos concludes in the name of Averroes:
When a prophet presents an activity impossible for man, even if it is 
possible in nature, it is sufficient proof of the divine prophetic spirit 
in him, in that he apprehends activities which speculation cannot 
indicate. When you examine the miracles whose veracity is indicated 
in the Law of Moses, the trustworthy prophet, you find them of this 
kind, as in the transformation of a rod into a serpent, and the split-
ting of the Sea of Reeds. There is no reason to assume that these 
things are conceptually impossible; rather, they are possible in 
nature, but impossible for all men except the prophet, since prophecy 
bears no relation to speculation.61
At first blush, Kalonymos’ position appears similar to the one he is 
attacking, for even those he critiques agree that only in the state of 
conjunction is this special ability or knowledge attained. Yet the differ-
ence between the two positions becomes clearer in the continuation of 
the discussion. According to Kalonymos, God imparted to Moses knowl-
edge of the specific miracles he was to bring about and Moses had 
accordance with the principles of Islamic Aristotelian metaphysics. It does not, 
however, appear in the versions of the Incoherence of the Incoherence that have 
come down to us, neither in the Arabic (Tahafot-at-Tahafot, ed. Maurice Bouyges 
[Beyrouth: Imprimie Catholique, 1930]), nor in the medieval Hebrew translation 
(MS Vatican 520). None contain the argument against the individual performing 
miracles by the power of representation. For Al-Ghazali’s discussion of miracles 
and Averroes’ response, see Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut), 
trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), vol. 1, 316-333.
61 Kalonymos, Ha-Teshuvah, 5. This argument too is not found in our versions of the 
Incoherence of the Incoherence. While Averroes agrees that it is not in the power of 
man or the Active Intellect to transform existents instantaneously, he appears to 
place the limitation on God as well. See Incoherence of the Incoherence, 25ff., 332. 
Averroes, however, condemns the discussion of the principles of religion in order 
not to undermine them, because of the necessity of the virtues that religion incul-
cates for human existence. He concludes: “Of religious principles it must be said 
that they are divine things which surpass human understanding, but must be 
acknowledged although their causes are unknown” (322). 
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no choice in the matter.62 Rather than regard Moses as an active, free-
willing agent, as is the case with his opponents, Kalonymos treats him 
as a passive instrument in carrying out the divine decree.
Kalonymos was inspired to write his response not only due to Ibn 
Kaspi’s remarks in Tirat Kesef but also because of what Ibn Kaspi wrote 
to Kalonymos’ teachers. The fact that Kalonymos at one point was 
attracted to this view also helps explain the fervor he feels in now 
attacking it, lest others succumb to its lure. He summarizes Ibn Kaspi’s 
approach based on these two sources, as well as his critique of it, as 
follows: “I have no doubt that the Torah came from God not in the way 
you maintain, for the prophecy that reached Moses our Master is conse-
quent upon the final perfection, and not that it is the final point of the 
final perfection.”63
There is no disagreement between Kalonymos and Ibn Kaspi 
regarding the fact that Moses attained the final perfection of the human 
species and that there is an integral connection between this unique 
perfection and Moses’ miracles and the reception of the Torah. The 
controversy focuses on the role of God. Ibn Kaspi in Kalonymos’ eyes 
adopts a completely naturalistic position, and leaves no room for any 
voluntary activity on the part of God. To Ibn Kaspi, human perfection 
exists on a continuum, and the one who reaches the final point of this 
continuum naturally attains the ability to perform miracles and lay 
down a perfect legislation. To Kalonymos, God chooses to perform the 
greatest of miracles and transmit the Torah only through the mediation 
of one who has reached the final point of perfection, but in the final 
analysis it is God who determines directly each of the miracles that 
takes place as well as each of the commandments of the divine Law, a 
view that echoes Maimonides’ explicit remarks on the subject, disre-
garding the issue of whether he held an esoteric position.64
62 Kalonymos, Ha-Teshuvah, 5.
63 Ibid., 5
64 See, in particular, Guide 2.25. Moreover, Maimonides treats the belief in God’s 
authorship of every work in the Torah as a principle of faith; see his Introduction to 
Pereq Ḥeleq, eighth principle.
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Kalonymos appears to have discerned correctly Ibn Kaspi’s secret 
position. Though there are passages in which Ibn Kaspi treats some of 
the miracles as supernatural activities performed by God, he nonethe-
less maintains that many of the miracles that are treated as supernatural 
occurrences are characterized so because of our ignorance of the natural 
causes that bring them about. Even Moses’ miracles were possible in 
nature in his view, though he cannot explain how they were performed.65 
It is this radical naturalistic approach that appears to leave no room at 
all for personal divine volition that Kalonymos rejects despite his 
attraction to philosophy.
Ibn Kaspi’s naturalistic approach to the phenomena associated 
with Mosaic prophecy perhaps finds its most explicit expression in his 
treatise Gevi‘a Kesef. There he interprets the voice heard by Moses in 
the Tabernacle as referring to what he attained by way of the emana-
tion to the intellect.
Notice how profusely he spoke with him [Numbers 7:89], which is an 
allusion to Moses himself. For where is God mentioned [in the verse] 
in order that it allude to Him? But Moses spoke with himself and his 
essence, which is his intellect, and the “voice” refers to intellectual 
emanation. All this is clear to the wise.66 
Even the Torah, Ibn Kaspi indicates in several passages in his treatise, 
was written by Moses as a result of his prophetic attainment, with God 
serving as the remote agent.67
Levi Gersonides
While Levi ben Avraham, Nissim of Marseille and Joseph Ibn Kaspi 
view Moses as the perfect individual who by virtue of his intellectual 
attainment was capable of performing miracles, and it appears was 
even capable of legislating a divine law, Gersonides rejects this 
65 See Tirat Kesef, 11ff., 135. In his esoteric commentary on the Guide, Maskiyot Kesef, 
Ibn Kaspi also appears to ascribe to Moses this ability, hence the descent of the 
Glory of God, which refers to the cloud, upon the Tabernacle is treated as a product 
of Moses’ activity; see Maskiyot Kesef, 20-1, 29. 
66 Gevi‘a Kesef, 41.
67 Ibid., 10, 13, 16.
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approach. As in the case of his philosophic predecessors, he agrees 
that Moses in fact reached the highest level of human perfection and 
merited receiving a form of prophecy that involved solely the intellect 
without the mediation of the imagination.68 In general, Gersonides 
accepts Maimonides’ descriptions of Moses’ perfection, with a 
number of changes due to his approach to the manner that prophecy 
is attained.69 Moreover, Gersonides rejects the idea that the human 
being can reach a state of union with the Active Intellect, for he holds 
that it is impossible to attain complete knowledge of the world order 
that characterizes this transcendental intellect and is a condition for 
uniting with it.70 Still, in his commentary on Numbers 12:8 he depicts 
Moses as coming very close to this level:
Due to their conjunction with matter, the other prophets appre-
hended from the order of existents as it exists in God only that part 
to which their thought was inclined. Together with this, Moses 
apprehended all that is possible for a person to apprehend from this 
conceptual order, and by means of this wondrous apprehension he 
conjoined with God and apprehended an aspect of His wondrous 
68 See Gersonides’ discussion of Mosaic prophecy in The Wars of the Lord 2.6 (trans. 
Seymour Feldman [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987], vol. 2, 57-59); 
see also his commentary on Numbers 12:8 (Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, ed. Jacob 
Lev Levy [Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1998], vol. 4, 42-43). For a study of 
Mosaic prophecy in Gersonides’ thought, see Menachem Kellner, “Maimonides 
and Gersonides on Mosaic Prophecy,” Speculum 52 (1977): 62-79; and Kreisel, “The 
Prophecy of Moses in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” 129-133. For a discussion of 
Gersonides’ approach to prophecy in general, see Prophecy: The History of an Idea 
in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 316-424.
69 For example, Gersonides adds the prophet’s ability to “isolate” his intellect 
together with the imaginative faculty from the other faculties of the soul. On the 
idea of “isolation” (hitbodedut) in the philosophy of Gersonides, see Sara Klein-
Braslavy, “Prophecy, Clairvoyance, and Dreams and the Concept of ‘Hitbodedut’ 
in Gersonides’ Thought,” Daat 39 (1997): 23-68 (Heb.). It should be noted that 
Gersonides presents a much more detailed, and it appears different, description 
of the roles of the Active Intellect and the faculties of the soul in the bestowal 
and reception of prophecy than does Maimonides. See Prophecy: The History of 
an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 358-390. 
70 “Conjunction” (devekut) in the writings of Gersonides does not indicate an 
ontological state, but the level of perfection of the intellect by virtue of which 
a person merits prophecy or miracles occurring on his behalf. For a study of this 
topic, see Seymour Feldman, “Gersonides on the Possibility of Conjunction 
with the Agent Intellect,” AJS Review 3 (1978): 99-120.
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figure. This was due to the ease of the isolation of his intellect from 
the other faculties of the soul, till he was always with God and he 
was only able to break away from this conjunction with great diffi-
culty, as we explained at the beginning of Exodus.71
Yet even in this source Gersonides rejects the possibility to grasp the 
Separate Intellects, ipso facto to grasp God, and he limits Moses’ appre-
hension to the entire order of the material world.72
While Gersonides sees an integral connection between Moses’ 
perfection and the miracles that were performed through him, as well 
as his reception of the Torah, he does not view Moses as the agent of 
the miracles or the author of the Torah. In his discussion of miracles at 
the end of The Wars of the Lord, he brings a list of arguments to show 
that the Active Intellect is the immediate agent of the miracles, not 
God or the prophet himself.73 The question of who is the immediate 
source of the Torah is not addressed by Gersonides in his philosophical 
treatise. In his Commentary on the Torah, he attributes the Torah and 
the miracles to God, but in keeping with his position in The Wars of the 
Lord, one should interpret him as viewing God as their remote cause, 
just as God is the remote cause of all that occurs in the world, and not 
their immediate cause. Should one then also attribute the legislation of 
the Torah to the Active Intellect? It would appear that this is the 
conclusion to which Gersonides’ approach leads, with all the problems 
that attach to this position from both a religious and a philosophical 
71 Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 4, 42-43. Compare his commentary on Exodus 
33:30: “. . . Till Moses became like a simple intellect and did not sense physical 
things” (Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 2, 432). See also his commentary on 
Exodus 4:10. As opposed to Maimonides, though similar to the interpretation 
Maimonides attributes to Onqelos, Gersonides interprets the “face” of God as 
referring to the Separate Intellects; cf. Guide 1.37; 1.54.
72 Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 2, 434 (commentary on Exodus 33:20).
73 The Wars of the Lord 6.2.10 (vol. 3, 474-486).
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perspective.74 Gersonides, however, is very careful to hide this conclu-
sion from the readers of his Torah commentary.75
Gersonides’ approach to miracles, comparable to his approach to 
prophecy, is integrally related to his theory of divine providence. 
Prophecy and miracles result from the impersonal activity of the Active 
Intellect. Prophecy, which is one of the expressions of divine provi-
dence, reaches the one who has completed all the necessary preparations 
in order to attain this emanation from the Active Intellect, without the 
Active Intellect being cognizant of the recipient. Similarly, the miracle 
is performed on behalf of one who has reached the level of perfection 
that renders them worthy of this phenomenon, without the Active 
Intellect being cognizant of the one whose perfection sets off the prov-
idential order to the extent that miracles occur for the benefit of this 
individual. This order is different than the natural order and neutral-
izes it, though it too is impersonal. Therefore Gersonides, as distinct 
from his predecessors, does not attempt to explain miracles in terms of 
the workings of the natural order, such as by ascribing to the prophet a 
natural ability to bring about the miracle in one way or another. Rather, 
he thinks that the miracle results from a type of activity that has no 
naturalistic explanation yet at the same time it is not the effect of a 
personal act of volition, neither of the Active Intellect nor of God. His 
approach to divine providence in general and to miracles in particular 
74 Ḥasdai Crescas pointed out the philosophical problems in Gersonides’ approach in 
his effort to show these actions must be ascribed to the personal activity of God, 
who knows individuals qua individuals. According to Crescas, Gersonides has no 
coherent explanation for how the Active Intellect, which does not know individ-
uals qua individuals, can perform specific miracles for a specific person or group. 
See Or HaShem 2.2.1-3; 3.1.5. For a discussion of this point, see Prophecy: The 
History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 439-443. Crescas devotes the sixth 
part of the third section of his treatise to a detailed discussion of the prophecy of 
Moses; see ibid., 431-435, 471-477.
75 Several scholars have explored Gersonides’ Commentary on the Torah and the rela-
tion between the views he presents there and those found in his philosophical 
treatise, The Wars of the Lord. See the bibliography compiled by Menachem 
Kellner, “Bibliographia Gersonideana,” in Studies on Gersonides—A Four-
teenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Leiden: Brill, 
1992), 367-414. See also my Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish 
Philosophy, 399-418.
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enables him to accept in a literal manner the occurrence of most of the 
miracles depicted in the Bible, and furthermore, to view them as 
“supernatural” phenomena.
In his Commentary on the Torah, Gersonides treats the prophecy of 
Moses as miraculous. For example, he writes in his commentary on 
Deuteronomy, chapter 4 (the eighth lesson):
This comes to inform us that Moses did not merit this highest level 
of prophecy due to the advantage of his natural preparedness to 
attain the emanation of prophecy . . . since others may also come to 
possess this [level of] preparedness. For this is possible in the species, 
as has been explained in the natural sciences. The holy Torah clari-
fied that there never will be a prophet who transmits a Torah aside 
from Moses, of blessed memory. Therefore it is clear that God by 
way of a miracle was responsible for the magnitude of the level of 
prophecy of Moses, in order that the Torah be transmitted by him, 
just as the matter of the Gathering at Sinai was by way of a miracle. 
. . . For this reason, it is fitting that you know that when we said in 
the portion of Balaq that another prophet like Moses will arise in 
Israel and in the rest of the nations, and he is the king messiah for 
whom we hope, we did not mean to say that he will be a prophet 
transmitting a Torah, for this is impossible. It is not by way of 
prophecy qua prophecy to proclaim a divine Law, except in a mirac-
ulous way as in the case of the prophecy of Moses. Rather, what we 
meant to say is that he will be similar to him, or even superior, in the 
matters that are mentioned there—namely, the creation of signs and 
miracles and the rest of the matters that ensue, as it is stated: There 
did not arise in Israel another prophet like Moses [Deuteronomy 34:10].76
Gersonides expands upon this point at the end of his Commentary on 
the Torah (Deuteronomy, chapter 34, the fifteenth lesson):
Perhaps one will raise an objection and say: Why is it not possible 
that a different prophet will transmit a Torah as did Moses? How 
could the Torah have decreed that this Torah will never change and 
that nothing will be added to it or deleted from it? For if this is the 
case, the capacity he possesses [the prophet who is as perfect as 
Moses] to be a prophet who transmits a Torah is in vain. The answer 
to this is that no one will be equal to Moses in this matter. For his 
76 Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 5, 27-28; cf. vol. 4, 136-137 (Numbers, chap. 25, 
the second lesson). 
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prophecy to transmit the Torah is miraculous, and does not belong to 
the capacity of a prophet qua prophet, if it was not by way of a 
miracle. God clarified that it is not His will to create a different 
Torah, or to add to it or delete from it a permanent addition or dele-
tion. In this manner the objection is removed.77
According to Gersonides, the prophet for whom miracles like those of 
Moses will be performed is the king messiah. It is with a description of 
the messiah and his miracles that Gersonides chooses to conclude his 
commentary,78 a subject that is intended to instill hope in his reader. 
One should not conclude from what he writes concerning the Torah 
and miracles in his Commentary on the Torah that Gersonides rejected 
the approach he presented earlier in The Wars of the Lord regarding 
God’s impersonal activity. These miracles took place due to not only 
the perfection of the prophet, whether Moses or the king messiah, but 
also the providence the nation as a whole deserved to receive, or the 
merits of their forefathers.79 Gersonides was of the opinion that this 
explanation was adequate from a philosophical perspective to accept 
the occurrence of all the miracles mentioned in the Torah, the miracles 
that according to tradition were to take place at the time of the final 
redemption, as well as the Torah itself as a law that was bestowed upon 
Moses from on high. It follows from Gersonides’ analysis that the prov-
idential order, though it is an impersonal one, for both God and the 
Active Intellect do not know individuals qua individuals, still operates 
in a personal manner. The most manifest expression of this can be 
discerned in all the phenomena that are connected with the prophecy 
of Moses.
The Voice of God80
Perhaps no supernatural phenomenon mentioned in the Torah better 
illustrates God’s ability to act directly in history than the heavenly 
77 Ibid., vol. 5, 351.
78 Ibid., 352 (the nineteenth lesson). See Menachem Kellner, “Gersonides on Mira-
cles, the Messiah, and Resurrection,” Daat 4 (1980): 5-34.
79 See The Wars of the Lord 4.6 (vol. 2, 200); 6.2.14 (vol. 3, 504).
80 Much of this section is based on my article, “The Voice of God in Medieval Jewish 
Philosophic Exegesis,” Daat 16 (1986): 29-38 (Heb.). It should be noted that my 
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voice heard by Israel at Sinai. Given the fact that all the medieval 
Jewish philosophers accepted the view that God was incorporeal and 
hence possessed no physical organs, God could not be conceived as 
actually speaking. R. Saadiah’s solution to this difficulty was to treat 
the speech as audible sounds that were created by God in the air, a 
solution that has its roots in the Aramaic translation of Onqelos to the 
Torah.81 R. Saadiah does not confine this phenomenon to the revelation 
at Sinai and to the private revelations to Moses. He treats the speech 
heard by prophets in general as created speech, often accompanied 
by the appearance of the Created Glory.82 The notions of created 
speech and the Created Glory not only serve to solve the problem of 
anthropomorphism, but they also provide an empirical means for the 
prophet to verify that he is fact receiving a communication from God—
the five senses in R. Saadiah’s view being a source of reliable knowledge.83 
The implication of this approach is that God is personally involved in 
every transmission of prophecy—God chooses each prophet individu-
ally, and creates the actual words heard by him.
In regard to normative prophecy, Maimonides rejects this approach, 
considering instead the sights and sounds experienced by the prophet 
as resulting from an emanation to the imaginative faculty.84 Thus they 
have no reality outside the prophet’s soul. As for the revelation at Sinai 
and the speech of God to Moses, however, he appears to accept the 
view of audible created speech, which in turn entails that the imme-
diate agent of every word of the Torah is in fact God. This is precisely 
interpretation of Maimonides was later advanced independently by Jacob Levinger 
in Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier, 39-48.
81 For a study of R. Saadiah’s theory of the created voice, see Alexander Altmann, 
“Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: its Origin and Background,” in Saadya Studies, ed. 
E. I. J. Rosenthal (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1943), 4-25; Harry 
Wolfson, Repercussions of the Kalām in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), 87-93. See also Prophecy: The History of an Idea in 
Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 56-85.
82 Book of Beliefs and Opinions 2.12. R. Saadiah, however, also maintains that in many 
instances the angels transmitted the divine communication to the prophets; see 
ibid. 2.10.
83 Ibid. Introduction.5.
84 See Guide 2.36-38, 41-45. For an analysis of these chapters, see Prophecy: The 
History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 239-257, 263-284.
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the view that Maimonides posits as the eighth principle of the faith in 
his Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq, though there he leaves open the ques-
tion of the manner by which the words reached Moses. It is also the 
view that he presents in Mishneh Torah., Laws of Principles of the 
Torah 8.1 in reference to the revelation at Sinai. The necessity of this 
view for upholding the Israelites’ belief in the Torah as a divine law is 
clear. The question remains whether this is also Maimonides’ personal 
view on the matter.
In several passages in the Guide Maimonides refers to the divine 
voice, treating it as audible, and at times referring to it as created. For 
the most part he utilizes this notion to negate corporeality from God. 
For example, in his discussion of the verb ‘abor (to pass) in Guide 1.21 
he presents Onqelos’ interpretation of Exodus 34:6, And God passed by 
before his face and called—that God caused His Indwelling to pass 
before Moses. Maimonides then adds:
You are free to believe whatever belief you wish. You may believe 
that the great station attained by [Moses] was indubitably, in its 
entirety, a vision of prophecy and that he solely desired intellectual 
apprehensions—everything, namely, that which he had demanded, 
that which was denied to him, and that which he apprehended, 
being intellectual and admitting of no recourse to the senses, as we 
interpreted in the first place. Or you may believe that there was, in 
addition to this intellectual apprehension, an apprehension due to 
the sense of sight, which, however, had for its object a created thing, 
through seeing which the perfection of intellectual perfection may 
be achieved. . . . Or again you may believe that there was in addition 
an apprehension due to the sense of hearing; that which passed by 
before his face being the voice, which is likewise indubitably a created 
thing. Choose whatever opinion you wish, inasmuch as our only 
purpose is that you should not believe that when Scripture says, in 
the verse we are discussing, He “passed by,” the phrase is analogous 
to: Pass before the people [Exodus 17:5]. For God, may He be honored 
and magnified, is not a body, and it is not permitted to ascribe 
motion to Him. (50-51)
Maimonides clearly prefers the first opinion, that the senses of sight 
and hearing were not involved at all in Moses’ prophecy, but the other 
interpretations at least negate from God corporeality and thus provide 
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legitimate alternatives. One should note that in addition to Exodus 
34:6, Maimonides also cites in this chapter Numbers 7:89: And he 
heard the voice speaking to him, referring to the voice Moses heard in 
the Tabernacle between the two cherubs. This suggests that both verses 
are to be interpreted in a similar manner. Moreover, in the same 
context he brings a further example of a divine voice calling to a 
prophet, Isaiah 40:6. Subsequently in his discussion of prophecy he 
clarifies that Isaiah’s prophetic visions resulted from an emanation to 
the imagination,85 hence no audible voice was heard by Isaiah at all. 
This supports the conclusion that Maimonides did not think that an 
audible created voice was involved even in the case of Moses. In other 
passages too, in which he cites verses depicting a voice addressing 
Moses, his concern is to negate the interpretation of God as corpo-
real.86 The notion of an audible voice created by God thus is of great 
benefit to the belief of the masses in Maimonides’ view, even if he 
himself does not accept it and hints that Moses’ prophecy consisted 
solely of intellectual apprehensions.87
85 Guide 2.44-45.
86 Ibid., 1.37, 65.
87 In a letter to Ḥasdai Halevi, written in Hebrew, purportedly by a disciple of 
Maimonides in Maimonides’ name, there is a discussion of the voice heard by 
Moses. Maimonides labels it a “created voice” that issued forth from the cloud. 
Yet he also brings the interpretation in the name of “many others” that the voice 
was not a sensible one, but “the soul of Moses our Master grasped the supernal 
theoretical intelligibles and understood and ‘heard’ in the true manner the meaning 
of the divine intelligibles.” Maimonides indicates that if Scripture had not explic-
itly taught: And he heard the voice speaking to him (Numbers 7:89), he would have 
agreed with this interpretation. See Isaac Shailat (ed. and Heb. trans.), Iggerot 
HaRambam (Jerusalem: Ma‘aliyot, 1987), 680. The argument that the literal 
meaning of Scripture compelled Maimonides to reject the interpretation that the 
“voice” was not a sensible one is certainly problematic. Maimonides after all 
refrains from interpreting the voice heard by the other prophets as an audible 
created one. It would appear that the opinion Maimonides mentions and rejects is 
in fact his esoteric opinion, as can be seen by the questionable reason he gives 
for dismissing it. It should be noted that a number of scholars question the authen-
ticity of this letter. Shailat too views it as a fake, though he does not rule out the 
possibility that parts of it are based on authentic responses by Maimonides; see 
ibid., 675. 
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The voice heard by Israel at Sinai poses a greater difficulty, for in 
this case an entire nation was reported to have heard the voice, and on 
the basis of this event they accepted the Torah. It is significant that in 
the first part of the Guide Maimonides brings the verse regarding the 
Gathering at Sinai: And all the people saw the sounds (Exodus 20:15) to 
illustrate the notion that, “although this station constituted a vision of 
prophecy, as is well known and universally admitted in our commu-
nity, action and speech are ascribed to God so that an overflow 
proceeding from Him should thereby be indicated” (Guide 1.46: 100). 
The labeling of the Gathering at Sinai as “a vision of prophecy” hints 
at the manner in which Maimonides understands this event, though it 
remains unclear how an entire nation can collectively experience a 
vision that does not involve one’s external senses. One, however, may 
counter this interpretation by arguing that Maimonides is using the 
notion of “vision” here in a loose manner, not in its precise sense, and 
he certainly does not wish to deny the literal truth of the Torah’s 
description of this event. 
Maimonides’ comments concerning the Gathering at Sinai in the 
context of his discussion of prophecy throw some further light on this 
issue. In Guide 2.32, Maimonides distinguishes between the reception 
of prophecy at Sinai, which was solely in accordance with the prepared-
ness of each individual, and the great fire and terrifying sounds that 
everyone there witnessed. Only the latter phenomena are labeled by 
Maimonides as miraculous, suggesting that they did in fact occur in 
reality. In the following chapter he distinguishes the sounds and light-
ning from the voice of God, “I mean the created voice from which the 
speech [of God] was understood” (Guide 2.33: 365). The use of the 
term “created voice” certainly implies an audible voice, but Maimon-
ides had already shown his inclination to understand God’s “voice” as 
signifying an emanation from God. In an attempt to uphold the prin-
ciple that all individuals receive from the emanation what they are 
prepared to receive, Maimonides brings two different interpretations 
of what the people heard from the divine voice at Sinai. According to 
the first interpretation, they heard a great sound but no articulated 
words at all, indicating that none of them received prophecy but they 
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all relied completely on the prophecy of Moses. According to the 
rabbinic view, however, the people heard the actual words of the first 
two Commandments. This interpretation is not favored by Maimon-
ides, but he nonetheless points out that even according to this view 
the people heard what they were prepared to hear, for the first two 
Commandments could be known by demonstration, and “everything 
that can be known by demonstration, the status of the prophet and that 
of everyone else who knows it are equal” (364). In this manner he shows 
that according to the view of the Sages the Israelites were prepared to 
receive/apprehend the existence of the one God independent of Moses’ 
prophecy. Maimonides’ discussion at least suggests the possibility that 
while one should interpret the Israelites’ gathering around Mount Sinai 
literally, their hearing of divine speech is a parable signifying an expe-
rience of collective enlightenment, rather than the actual hearing of an 
audible heavenly voice. This unique gathering resulted in the accep-
tance of the Ten Commandments and the law transmitted by Moses on 
the basis of what the Israelites witnessed and apprehended there.
As for the miraculous phenomena that took place during this gath-
ering, Maimonides, in the course of a later discussion regarding the 
difficulty of grasping that which is separate from matter, brings a report 
 on the weather conditions at Sinai at the time the Ten Commandments 
were received: “It is, moreover, well known and generally accepted in 
the religious community that the day of the Gathering at Mount Sinai 
was a day of clouds, of mist, and of a light rain” (Guide 3.9: 437). 
Maimonides interprets this description as a parable signifying “that the 
apprehension of His true reality is impossible for us because of the dark 
matter that encompasses us and not Him.” In this context he treats the 
Gathering at Sinai as “greater than any vision of prophecy and 
beyond any analogy.” While Maimonides’ stance serves to highlight 
the uniqueness of the event, more importantly it comes to preempt the 
interpretation that denies the veracity of the event by treating it solely 
as a parable, similar to all other prophetic visions, insofar as “every-
thing that is apprehended in a vision of prophecy is only a parable for 
some notion.” One may conclude that Maimonides intimates here that 
the miraculous fires and terrifying sounds witnessed at Sinai in truth 
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resulted from the highly unusual weather conditions at the time. The 
story of the Gathering at Sinai thus is literally true, as opposed to 
prophetic visions in general, but the miracles accompanying this gath-
ering were in fact rare natural events. This leaves open the possibility 
that the supernatural heavenly voice, on the other hand, should be 
interpreted in Maimonides’ view solely as a parable, similar to the 
notion of hearing a divine voice or divine speech in other prophetic 
visions, signifying what transpired in the souls of each Israelite in the 
course of this collective experience.
The problem of the voice heard by Moses and the one heard by all 
of Israel at Sinai occupied Maimonides’ followers in Provence, whom 
we have explored in this chapter. Levi ben Avraham relies on Maimon-
ides’ analysis of the term “face” in Guide 1.37 to explain that God’s 
speech to Moses “face to face” signifies that the revelation came to him 
without the intermediary of an angel, clarifying what Maimonides 
leaves veiled. He writes:
Moses would grasp the Intellects and hear the pure speech from the 
emanation of the last of the angels—namely, the Active Intellect—
without the mediation of an angel, that is to say, without the use of 
the imagination, as it is stated: And the figure of God he looks upon 
[Numbers 12:8], and it is stated: God spoke to Moses face to face 
[Exodus 33:11], and it is stated: mouth to mouth [Numbers 12:8]. 
This indicates conjunction with the Active Intellect.88
By regarding the speech Moses heard as pure speech that is the 
product of his conjunction with the Active Intellect, Levi rejects 
the notion that Moses heard an audible voice.
The more difficult problem of the voice heard by the nation is 
addressed by Levi in the course of his discussion of the Giving of 
the Torah. He commences by presenting the classic view of the 
voice—namely, that it was a created audible voice. Maimonides had 
brought this view in the name of Onqelos, but R. Saadiah is the one 
who presents it most explicitly as we have seen. Drawing upon 
88 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 138. 
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Maimonides’ discussion in Guide 2.33, but with R. Saadiah’s 
approach in mind, Levi writes:
The voice that Moses heard was a created voice that God created 
from the air, hence Onqelos translated, and God answered him with 
a voice [Exodus 19:19]: “On the part of God he was answered by a 
voice.” He translated, but let not the Lord speak with us [Exodus 
20:16]: “[Speech] should not be spoken on the part of God.” Israel 
also understood that the speech of God was by a created voice 
without a body, as it is stated: And a figure you do not see, only a voice 
[Deuteronomy 4:12].89
Yet side by side with this interpretation Levi brings an exceptionally 
radical interpretation, though not in his own name:
There was one who interpreted that God aided and gave power to 
Moses to make his voice heard to the people, as in the literary usage 
[of the term “answer”]: money answers every need [Ecclesiastes 10:19]. 
This is the reason it is written: He heard the voice speaking (middaber) 
with him [Numbers 7:89], and it does not say: “speaking (meddaber) 
to him,” from the intensive form of the word, but middaber from the 
reflexive. . . . It is possible that the [voice] came forth from the cloud. 
This is seen from the fact that via a cloud the revelation came to him, 
as Scripture clarifies by indicating: And when Moses entered the Tent 
the pillar of cloud descended and stood at the door of the Tent and spoke 
with Moses [Exodus 33:9], and indicating: Behold I come to you in a 
thick cloud [ibid., 9].
According to this interpretation, an audible voice was in fact heard at 
Sinai by the people, but the voice belonged to Moses when he was on 
top of the mountain. This phenomenon is tied up with the thick cloud, 
which apparently, in the mind of the interpreter, served to amplify 
Moses’ voice.
Levi brings yet another interpretation, reiterating the one he had 
already brought regarding the voice heard by Moses, but this time not 
as his own view:
There was one who understood God’s speech with Moses as being 
without sounds at all, as is the case with the other prophets, but 
89 Ibid., 199.
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his intellect grasped the [Separate] Intellects, received emanation, 
and apprehended knowledge of the Supernal, in accordance with 
what is possible for one at the highest level of humanity. This 
[internal] intellectual speech and conception of the intelligibles is 
what Scripture terms “voice.” For this reason, He heard the voice 
speaking (middaber) with him [Numbers 7:89], is in the reflexive 
conjugation . . . .90
Levi indicates that he favors the interpretation that Scripture refers to 
a created audible voice by means of which God spoke to Moses, but he 
goes on to indicate that the speech (dibbur) heard by Moses alone signi-
fies conjunction.91 He thus leaves it an open question how he understood 
the voice heard by Moses, let alone the one heard by all of Israel.
It is precisely the radical interpretation of the voice of God 
presented by Levi in the name of others that Nissim of Marseille adopts 
and presents as his own, and moreover as the esoteric view of the 
greatest of the Sages:
“Why then does it say: Moses spoke [and God answered him by a 
voice] [Exodus 19:19]? It merely teaches that Moses was endowed 
with strength and force, and that God helped him with a voice, so 
that Moses could let Israel hear the same tone which he himself 
heard [Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Tractate Baḥodesh, 4].”92 This 
shows that Rabbi Akiva understood the term “answered him” 
(ya‘anenu) as in: The Lord shall answer (ya‘aneh) the wellbeing of 
Pharaoh [Genesis 41:16], which signifies—will agree to and assist in 
his wellbeing.93 Thus by the power of God issued forth a created 
thing that speaks, which assisted Moses’ voice from on top of the 
mountain, so that it was heard by Israel on the bottom of the moun-
tain as a mighty sound, as a voice created in the air of the heavenly 
90 Ibid., 202.
91 Ibid., 202-203. It should be noted that a similar ambiguity characterizes Levi’s 
treatment of the tablets upon which were engraved the Ten Commandments. 
Though he appears to favor the supernatural interpretation that God engraved the 
first set of tablets, it is not entirely clear from his discussion whether this is his 
actual view. See ibid., 252, 257-258. Compare to Maimonides’ treatment of this 
topic in Guide 1.66.
92 Jacob Z. Lauterbach (trans.), Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael (Philadelphia: Jewish Publi-
cation Society, 1933), vol. 2, 223.
93 Compare to David Kimchi’s interpretation of the verse in his Commentary on the 
Torah.
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firmament. And the “tone” Moses would hear, that is to say, by way 
of prophecy and the intellect that emanated upon him, he would let 
Israel hear with the aid of an object of God that would amplify his 
voice and strengthen it with a created voice that would reach the 
ears of the people.94
While Nissim frames his comments in a somewhat ambiguous manner, 
there can be little doubt that he is alluding here to the view that the 
voice heard by the people was in fact Moses’ own voice. Moses received 
his prophecy on top of the mountain solely by his intellect in the form 
of internal speech, and he was able to convey the contents of his 
prophecy to the Israelites below by way of a “created voice”—namely, 
a natural object that he discovered on the top of the mountain that he 
was able to use in order to amplify his voice and make it sound like a 
created voice descending from heaven upon the people below.95 Nissim 
in this manner attempts to buttress the interpretation he found in 
Livyat Ḥen by introducing an object that enabled Moses to make his 
voice heard to the nation. He undoubtedly felt that this subterfuge 
was necessary in order to instill in the hearts of the masses obedience 
to the laws Moses laid down as a result of the pure illumination of the 
intellect that he attained.
In his various treatises, Ibn Kaspi devotes very little attention to 
the problem of the voice heard by Moses or that by all of Israel. In a 
brief remark in Tirat Kesef, he indicates that the sounds and fire actu-
ally occurred during the Gathering at Sinai by the will of God, but does 
not enter into more detail.96 His esoteric commentary on the Guide, 
Maskiyot Kesef, provides a few hints to his view on this issue. In his 
commentary on Guide 1.5, he reiterates the notion that the phenomena 
depicted as occurring at Sinai were in fact experienced by the senses, 
and hints that they were the product of Moses’ activity.97 His juxtapo-
sition of the Created Light or Glory, which he treats as natural 
94 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 333.
95 Nissim may be thinking of some large horn-like object. 
96 Tirat Kesef, 140-1.
97 Maskiyot Kesef, 20-21.
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phenomena, such as the cloud descending upon the Tabernacle,98 with 
the Created Voice suggests that he views the voice heard at Sinai by the 
nation as an audible one that was also brought about by Moses, though 
he does not state so explicitly. In his commentary on Guide 2.33, he 
elaborates upon Maimonides’ interpretation of Onqelos, that what 
was heard by the nation was an entity that spoke, not God, but adds 
nothing to the nature of this existent and how it came about.99
Gersonides also views the voice heard by the nation at Sinai as an 
audible one, which he treats as a miracle. In his commentary on Exodus 
19:19 he writes:
The sound of the trumpet became increasingly stronger, and this 
phenomenon was a supreme miracle. Still another miracle was 
created there. Moses spoke with God, and when God answered him 
by way of prophecy, there was created an audible sound of speech, 
which Israel heard, and it became clear to them that God spoke with 
Moses. The creation of a sound of speech without the organ of 
speech is similar to the creation of a serpent from a rod. That is to 
say, the existence of a sound of speech is not impossible in itself, but 
it is impossible in nature for it to be created without an organ. Thus 
its creation was by way of a miracle.100
Gersonides had already explained at the end of The Wars of the Lord 
that the immediate agent of miracles is the Active Intellect, which are 
performed by it as result of the level of perfection attained by the 
prophet.101
 98 Not in all cases does Ibn Kaspi treat the Created Glory as a substance existing 
outside the soul of the prophet. Often it is beheld by the prophet in a vision, hence 
it is the product of his imagination. Ibn Kaspi prefers the former explanation when 
others also witness the Glory.
 99 Ibid., 114. In Tirat Kesef, 140-141, Ibn Kaspi treats the voices and fires at Sinai as 
phenomena created by God and perceived by the senses, suggesting that this is 
also the case with the voice decreeing the Ten Commandments. His discussion in 
Gevi‘a Kesef, 148, on the other hand, suggests that the speech of God at Sinai does 
not refer to an audible voice, but to the emanation from the Active Intellect. As for 
the private prophecy to Moses, Ibn Kaspi’s comments in this case too suggest that 
no audible voice was heard, but he does not state so explicitly.
100 Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 2, 142.
101 The voice Moses alone heard at Sinai in the cleft of the rock (Exodus 34:6), on the 
other hand, is treated as one heard in a vision—that is to say, it was not an audible 
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Conclusion
The question that challenged the Jewish philosophers that I dealt with 
in this chapter is whether miracles and the Torah can be explained in a 
manner that is in harmony with Aristotle’s naturalistic approach to the 
world order. Some of the Provençal philosophers thought that the Aris-
totelian approach could be broadened to provide an explanation for the 
occurrence of miracles, a task that was already accomplished by the 
Islamic philosopher Avicenna. One should view the prophet himself as 
the immediate agent of the miracles by virtue of the level of speculative 
knowledge he attained and perhaps also by virtue of a special power of 
the soul to affect matter that is outside his own body The legislation of 
the Torah one can ascribe to Moses by virtue of the complete knowl-
edge of the world order that he attained, and his ability to employ this 
knowledge in order to legislate a perfect law that directs the nation 
toward human perfection. While Levi, Nissim, and Ibn Kaspi appear to 
favor this approach, Nissim less ambiguously than the other two 
thinkers, both Kalonymos and Gersonides reject it for different reasons. 
The philosophic reasons Kalonymos advances against this approach 
ultimately serve to bolster the traditional view that attributes miracles 
and the Torah to the personal volition of God. For Gersonides, the 
philosophical inadequacy of the approach that views Moses as the 
immediate agent of these phenomena calls for the development of a 
different philosophical approach. He posits a providential order beyond 
the natural order. In this order, the Active Intellect is the immediate 
agent of acts of providence, such as miracles. These acts are not 
regarded by Gersonides as natural ones. From this standpoint, Moses’ 
perfection belongs to the natural order, while his prophecy belongs to 
the order of divine providence. Nevertheless, he sees the providential 
activity of the Active Intellect, as is true of all of its other activities, as 
impersonal, lacking all cognizance of the recipients of its activity. The 
perfection attained by an individual or a collective is responsible for 
activating its providential activity. We thus may label this order as a 
verse. See Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, vol. 2, 435.
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mechanistic one, even if it is not considered natural according to the 
Aristotelian model. From a modern perspective, one can say that 
despite the significant difference between Gersonides’ approach and 
that of other philosophers discussed in this chapter, a difference that 
allows Gersonides to consider the phenomena that are tied to Moses’ 
prophecy to be “supernatural,” the aim of his approach is the same—to 
distance from God all personal activities, that is to say, activities that 
God directs to an individual qua individual, and yet sill propose an 
explanation that allows the acceptance of Moses’ miracles, the creation 
of a heavenly voice and the Giving of the Torah.
Appendix: Some Comments on Maimonides’ 
Approach to Miracles
In the Guide, Maimonides does not devote a detailed discussion to the 
topic of miracles but reveals his opinion in a number of comments, 
most of them found in the context of his discussion of creation and his 
discussion of the differences between the miracles of Moses and 
those of the other prophets.102 On one hand he maintains: “Know that 
with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all the miracles become 
possible” (Guide 2.25: 329). On the other hand he praises the Sages who 
were of the opinion:
Miracles too are something that is, in a certain respect, in nature. 
They say that when God created that which exists and stamped 
102 Maimonides’ most detailed discussion of miracles is at the end of his Treatise on 
Resurrection and at the end of his Medical Aphorisms in his short Treatise Contra 
Galen. Both these treatise were written after the Guide and both of them contain 
an apologetic component, with the view of defending God’s ability to work mira-
cles against the naturalistic approach of the philosophers. Maimonides’ basic 
argument is that a deity who created the world certainly has the ability to change 
the nature of every creature in it. Only the conceptually impossible cannot be 
performed by God. Maimonides also has some important comments on this 
subject in his earlier legal works, most notably in his commentary on Mishnah 
Avot 5.6 and in Eight Chapters, 8. In the present context, I confine myself to his 
remarks in the Guide. For some other studies of Maimonides’ view of miracles, see 
Hannah Kasher, “Biblical Miracles and the Universality of Natural Law: Maimon-
ides’ Three Methods of Harmonization,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 
8 (1998): 25-52; and Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Maimonides and Miracles: The Growth 
of a (Dis)belief,” Jewish History 18 (2004): 147-172.
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upon it the existing nature, He put it into these natures that all the 
miracles that occurred would be produced in them at the time when 
they occurred. According to this opinion, the sign of a prophet 
consists in God’s making known to him the time when he must make 
his proclamation, and thereupon a certain thing is effected according 
to what was put into its nature when first it received its particular 
impress. If this statement is as you will see it, it indicates the superi-
ority of the man who made it and the fact that he found it extremely 
difficult to admit that a nature may change after the Work of the 
Beginning, or that another volition may supervene after that nature 
has been established in a definite way. For instance, he seems to 
consider that it was put into the nature of water to be continuous 
and always flow downwards except at the time of the drowning of 
the Egyptians; it was the particularity of that water to become 
divided. I have drawn your attention to the spirit of that passage and 
to the fact that all this serves to avoid having to admit the coming 
into being of something new. (Guide 2.29: 345)103
In this manner, Maimonides indicates that even if one accepts the view 
that the world is created by showing that this view does not entail 
belief in a change in God’s will or wisdom—such a change being 
impossible to ascribe to God according to the Aristotelian philosophers 
and Maimonides in their wake—there still remains a problem regarding 
miracles. At first glance, the miracle necessitates a change in the divine 
will, if not also a change in God’s knowledge and wisdom. For this 
reason Maimonides praises the sage who tries to show that there is no 
change of will after creation, since the miracles were implanted in 
nature at the time of creation.
Despite his praise, Maimonides does not state explicitly that he 
agrees with this view. Moreover, he presents a different view in his own 
name immediately prior to passage cited above, in which he argues:
I have said that a thing does not change its nature in such a way that 
the change is permanent merely in order to be cautious with regard 
103 Maimonides bases his comments on Genesis Rabbah 5.4. He opens his discussion 
with the remark: “The Sages, may their memory be blessed, have made a very 
strange (gharīb) statement about miracles.” On the positive usage of the term gharīb 
in Maimonides’ writings, see Avraham Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval 
Jewish Philosophy (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 158-164 (Heb.).
Chapter Nine356 
to the miracles. For although the rod was turned into a serpent, the 
water into blood, and the pure and noble hand became without a 
natural cause that necessitated this, these and similar things were 
not permanent and did not become another nature. But as they, may 
their memory be blessed, say: “The world goes its customary way” 
[BT ‘Avodah Zarah 54b]. This is my opinion, and this is what ought 
to be believed. (ibid.)
Maimonides does not enter into a detailed analysis of these two 
views, nor does he indicate what the difference is between the Sages’ 
view and his own, if in fact he regards them as two different views. 
It should be noted that the examples of miracles he brings in the 
presentation of his own view and in the presentation of that of the 
Sages are different. He may have been of the opinion that the Sages’ 
explanation is not appropriate for those miracles in which an entity is 
transformed into a different one, such as the rod that was transformed 
into a serpent, for it is difficult to consider them exceptional events 
that were implanted in nature. They do not lend themselves to any 
naturalistic explanation, and it appears that they can only occur as a 
result of an act of volition on the part of an agent who is capable of 
bringing about such a transformation.
In any case, despite his distinct tendency to defend the natural 
order as it is, and to regard it as the primary expression of God’s 
wisdom and ability, Maimonides accepts the belief that miracles 
reveal God’s ability to act outside the workings of nature and even 
counter to it, and that this belief is essential to Judaism. Belief in the 
creation of the world is the basis for belief in miracles and that the 
Torah is from heaven, as Maimonides argues in Guide 2.25:
The belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees it—that is, the belief 
according to which the world exists in virtue of necessity, that no 
nature changes at all, and that the customary course of events cannot 
be modified with regard to anything—destroy the Law in its prin-
ciple, necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity 
all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out. (328-329)
Yet if Maimonides’ true view is that the world is without beginning, as 
I argued in chapter 3, it is clear that he did not agree with the belief 
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that God is the immediate agent of the miracles and immediate author 
of the Torah, or that particular miracles were implanted in nature at 
the time of creation. The question immediately arises whether amidst 
Maimonides’ various comments on miracles one can discern hints to an 
esoteric approach that explains their occurrence in a manner that is in 
harmony with Aristotelian thought. As we have already seen, Avicenna 
developed an approach that posited that the prophet himself was the 
agent of miracles. Al-Ghazali presents Avicenna’s approach in his 
Incoherence of the Philosophers.104 In the Jewish world prior to Maimon-
ides, both Ibn Ezra and Abraham Ibn Daud followed in Avicenna’s 
footsteps.105 There is little doubt that Maimonides was acquainted with 
some if not all of these sources.
In an article on miracles I wrote that perhaps a veiled allusion to 
the idea that the prophet is the agent of miracles can be detected in 
Guide 1.61, where Maimonides polemicizes against the writers of 
amulets in the course of his discussion of the names of God:
Do not let occur to your mind the vain imaginings of the writers of 
charms or what names you may hear from them or may find in their 
stupid books, names that they have invented, which are not indica-
tive of any notion whatsoever, but which they call “the names” and 
of which they think that they necessitate holiness and purity and 
work miracles. All these are stories that it is not seemly for a perfect 
man to listen to, much less to believe. None is called “the articulated 
name” except the name having four letters that is written but not 
read in accordance with the sounds written down. (149)106
I wrote in reference to this passage:
It is noteworthy that Maimonides does not negate the view that one 
can perform miracles through knowledge of the “articulated Name.” 
104 Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, 
UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), Discussion 17, 172-173.
105 See above, n. 12.
106 See Aviezer Ravitzky, “Maimonides and his Disciples on Linguistic Magic and ‘the 
Vain Imaginings of the Writers of Charms’,” in Jewish Culture in the Eye of the 
Storm: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Yosef Aḥituv, ed. Avi Sagi and Naḥem Ilan (‘Ein 
Tsurim: HaKibbutz HaMe’uḥad, 2002), 431-458 (Heb.).
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To Maimonides, knowledge of the Name is not similar to that of 
some magical formula. Rather, it indicates notions with respect to 
the divine essence. Moses, in Maimonides’ view, possessed the 
highest level of knowledge of God, and of how the world is governed 
by Him possible for man. On the basis of this knowledge, he may 
have been able to produce exceptional events. This conclusion would 
explain Maimonides’ position that just as Moses’ apprehension and 
prophecy were superior to those of all others, so were his miracles.107 
I would like to take this opportunity to substantiate this hypothesis 
further.
Maimonides continues to explain the meaning of the articulated 
Name in the following chapter when discussing the priestly benediction:
I believe that the dictum: “The Sages transmit the the name having 
four letters once a week to their sons and their pupil [BT Qiddushin 
71a],” refers not only to their teaching the mode of pronouncing this 
name but also to their making known the notion because of which 
this name has been originated without any derivation. Accordingly, 
there also would be in this notion a divine secret. (Guide 1.62: 150)
That is to say, knowledge of the Name is primarily metaphysical knowl-
edge and not the manner in which the letters are articulated. The other 
special divine names too, according to Maimonides, indicate metaphys-
ical notions regarding the Deity.108
In chapter 63, Maimonides turns to the story of the burning bush 
and the significance of the divine names that Moses learned in his 
vision. In this context, Maimonides also notes that Moses was the first 
prophet who received a prophetic mission to others,109 whereas the 
patriarchs received prophetic communications pertaining to their 
personal affairs alone. In the same vision, Moses also learned the philo-
sophic proofs that he was to teach the Israelite sages in order to 
demonstrate that God is the necessary existent, and not the soul of the 
107 “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” 114
108 Several times in the chapter Maimonides repeats the view that what was taught 
regarding all the special names of God were the notions they indicate and not 
simply how they were to be pronounced. Compare to the approach of Nissim of 
Marseille, Ma‘aseh Nissim, 404-407.
109 On the nature of prophetic missions in general in the philosophy of Maimonides, 
see Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 252-253.
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sphere—the belief that characterized the idolatrous religions of old. 
Maimonides continues:
[Moses], peace be on him, posed another question saying: once they 
have accepted by means of these intellectual demonstrations the 
view that there is an existent deity, what shall be my proof that 
the existent deity has sent me? Thereupon he was granted the 
miracle. (155)
Maimonides does not explain here the true nature of the vision that 
Moses beheld. When Maimonides deals with the subject of prophecy in 
the second part, he treats all prophetic visions as the product of the 
imaginative faculty, but he is careful to exclude Moses from the 
description of this phenomenon that he brings there. Maimonides, 
however, does not deny that other prophets also performed miracles—
the opposite is the case110—only that one should regard Moses’ miracles 
as superior to all others. The question arises how they succeeded in this 
matter. The answer appears to be straightforward: they learned which 
miracle was about to take place by means of their prophetic vision, 
which resulted from an emanation upon their intellect and their imagi-
native faculty. Yet as I attempted to show in my book on prophecy, 
one should not interpret Maimonides as maintaining that the emana-
tion that reaches the prophet contains specific knowledge that is 
directed to him personally. Rather, the emanation strengthens the 
faculties of the soul of the prophet, enabling him to arrive at conclu-
sions regarding conceptual matters or in the field of divination based on 
the knowledge that he previously acquired.111 If this is the case, the 
prophet apparently learns of exceptional occurrences or anomalies in 
nature that are about to take place, or how to act upon different bodies 
to bring about changes in them, pertaining to those matters upon which 
he concentrated his thought when the prophetic emanation reached him.
Maimonides hints in Guide 3.45 that Moses too received his 
prophecy by means of the imaginative faculty in his vision of the 
burning bush: “Even in the case of Moses our Master his prophetic 
110 See, for example, Guide 2.35.
111 See Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 243-245.
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mission is inaugurated through an angel: And there appeared unto him an 
angel of the Lord in the heart of fire (Exodus 3:2)” (576). It appears that 
this side remark, which touches only indirectly upon the subject of the 
chapter, is a good example of Maimonides’ esoteric writing, in which 
“nothing has been mentioned out of its place, save with a view to 
explaining some matter in its proper place” (Guide 1.introduction: 15). 
There are different possibilities for interpreting the secret Maimonides 
wishes to hide, and it is not my intent to deal with them here.112 One 
thing is certain. The miracles that Moses saw at the burning bush 
were in a vision that was created by his imaginative faculty as a result 
of the emanation that reached him from the Active Intellect. This 
signifies that the miracles beheld by Moses at the burning bush did not 
happen in reality. When they did happen later on, for the transforma-
tion of a rod into a serpent subsequently took place publicly in Pharaoh’s 
court, they apparently were performed on the basis of knowledge 
acquired by Moses during his initial vision. Moses then was the agent 
of these miracles as a result of the emanation that descended upon his 
intellect and imaginative faculty. It seems to me that the interpretation 
of the vision of the burning bush that Nissim explicitly presents in 
Ma‘aseh Nissim is in fact the esoteric view of Maimonides. Nissim writes:
If you are not pleased with the view that what happened between 
God and Moses regarding the two miracles mentioned there occurred 
in his internal senses [i.e., the imagination], but you believe that 
they occurred in reality—there is no harm in this. Furthermore, if 
you find this view harmful [that the miracles did not occur in reality], 
I will retract it and say that God showed him and taught him 
privately how to bring them about, till he knew how to perform them 
before the community of Israel and before Pharaoh. Congruous with 
this view is His saying: See all the miracles that I have put into your 
hand [Exodus 4:21]—until he knows how to do them as he knows 
them in his mind, till he can do them accurately without mishap. For 
by demonstration and experience he will fulfill his objective.113
112 Ibid., 297-301.
113 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 202. Compare Moses Narboni’s commentary on Guide 2.29 (Jacob 
Goldenthal [ed.], Be’ur Narboni le-Sefer Moreh Nevukhim [Vienna, 1852], 38b).
Introduction
In the introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides sets 
forth the purpose of his treatise and adds the following remark:
I do not think that anyone possessing an unimpaired capacity imag-
ines that the words of the Torah referred to here that one contrives 
to understand through understanding the meaning of parables, are 
ordinances concerning the building of Tabernacle, the lulab, and the 
law of four trustees. Rather what this text has in view here is, 
without any doubt, the understanding of obscure matters. (11)1
The “obscure matters” mentioned by Maimonides apparently refer to 
the “secrets of the Torah,” which he equates with the natural and 
metaphysical sciences.2 He thereby clarifies from the outset of his 
1 All English translations of the Guide are taken from the translation of Shlomo 
Pines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963). All other translations in this 
chapter are my own.
2 Maimonides identifies these sciences with the “work of creation” and “work of the 
chariot”; see Guide, introduction; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah, 
chapters 1-4. See above, chapter 7, 229.
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treatise that he does not regard the commandments as allegories 
belonging to these secrets. They are to be understood in a literal 
manner. The most detailed listing of the secrets of the Torah is 
presented by Maimonides in Guide 1.35. They include a discussion of 
the divine attributes and the way they should be negated as pertaining 
to God, the meaning of the attributes that may be ascribed to God, a 
discussion of the creation of what God has created, the character of 
divine governance of the world, the manner of divine providence, the 
notions of divine will and divine knowledge, the notion of prophecy 
and its various degrees, and the meaning of the divine names. In the 
course of the Guide, Maimonides deals with all these topics. The 
esotericists among his interpreters have looked for his hidden views 
specifically in his discussions of these topics, attempting to show that 
his true position in these matters essentially conforms to that of the 
Aristotelian philosophers.3 On some of these issues, Maimonides 
expresses his agreement with the philosophers’ world view explicitly. 
Divine governance of the world is one prominent example.4 More 
important for our purpose are those topics that are treated promi-
nently in the Guide that are not on Maimonides’ list, particularly the 
two topics that conclude the Guide—the reasons for the command-
ments and human perfection.5 Maimonides devotes well over half of 
the third part of the Guide to these two topics. Why so much attention 
3 The topics of creation, prophecy, and providence in particular have been the focus 
of attempts to show that Maimonides hints to his essential agreement with the 
Aristotelian view. For a summary of the divergent interpretations of Maimonides 
on these issues, see Howard Kreisel, “Moses Maimonides,” in History of Jewish 
Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1997), 
256-272. For a survey of the esoteric interpretations of Maimonides’ philosophy, 
see Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed: Between the 
Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries,” in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore 
Twersky (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 159-207. See also 
above, chapter 3.
4 Maimonides writes in Guide 2.6: 265: “There is then nothing in what Aristotle for 
his part has said about this subject that is not in agreement with the Law.”
5 These topics are not the only ones treated by Maimonides that are not on his list of 
the “secrets of the Torah.” Maimonides also devotes a detailed discussion in the 
Guide to the proofs for the existence of God and the problem of evil. It may be 
argued, however, that these topics are subsumed into other ones that are mentioned, 
namely divine attributes and divine providence.
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is paid to topics whose discussion is apparently not part of the explicit 
purpose of the treatise invites further investigation.
While Maimonides indicates that the commandments are not 
“obscure matters” that should be understood allegorically, thus 
suggesting the view that no esoteric doctrines are involved in his 
presentation of them,6 his approach to the commandments in Guide 
3.25-49 has been the cause of more than a little perplexity. On some 
points Maimonides appears to present contradictory positions and even 
allusions to an esoteric doctrine, as shown by his medieval commenta-
tors as well as his modern ones. For example, Maimonides argues in 
Guide 3:26 that the particulars of the commandments may not always 
have a specific reason but may be arbitrary, one of his examples being 
the specific type of animal chosen for a particular sacrifice, while in 
3.46 he offers explanations why particular animals were chosen for 
certain sacrifices.7 Another example is Maimonides’ apparently esoteric 
view on the nature of Oral Law, which emerges from a close reading of 
3.41.8 To these two examples we may add positions presented in the 
Guide that appear to contradict his position in earlier works, such as his 
positive evaluation of asceticism in 3.48 and his treatment there of the 
Nazarite as a holy individual due to his abstinence, while regarding the 
Nazarite as a sinner in Eight Chapters, 4 for abstaining from permitted 
6 See, however, Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 397-400. Twersky argues that this topic belongs 
to the secrets of the Torah in Maimonides’ thought, but he provides only indirect 
evidence in support of this conclusion. It should be noted that this topic is essen-
tially different than the ones mentioned explicitly by Maimonides. They deal with 
being and with the foundations of nature, thus corresponding to the subject matter 
of the theoretical sciences in Aristotelian philosophy. The reasons for the command-
ments belong more to the domain of political philosophy, which is a practical 
science.
7 See Josef Stern, Problems and Parables of Law (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1998), 30-31.
8 Maimonides’ discussion suggests that the Oral Law was not received by Moses 
together with the Written Law but developed later. For a discussion of this issue, 
see Jacob Levinger, “On the Oral Law in Maimonides’ Thought,” Tarbiz 37 (1968): 
282-293 (Heb.) [reprinted in his Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier (Jerusalem: 
Bialik Institute, 1989), 100-111].
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pleasures.9 Further examples may also be adduced.10 These problematic 
issues notwithstanding, there appears to be nothing esoteric about the 
gist of Maimonides’ approach. All commandments have a purpose or 
telos. They are designed to promote either true beliefs or the social 
welfare of the body politic, what Maimonides terms “the welfare of the 
soul” and “the welfare of the body.”11 In this manner they create an 
ideal environment for the pursuit of individual perfection, what 
Maimonides labels the “perfection of the soul,” which is essentially the 
perfection of the intellect in its apprehension of all truths that the 
human intellect is capable of grasping regarding being.12 Performance of 
the commandments accrues no benefit to God or to any of the existents 
above humanity in the hierarchy of being. Nor do the commandments 
have any magical-mystical effects on the soul that are closed to the 
discernment of human reason. The manner they mold a person’s char-
acter traits can be grasped by a close examination of the activities they 
command or prohibit in conjunction with knowledge of Aristotelian 
ethics. In this chapter I would like to make a number of observations 
regarding Maimonides’ approach to the reasons for the command-
ments, then turn to the treatment of this topic among some of his 
followers in Provence, particularly Levi ben Avraham, and conclude by 
returning to the place of this topic in the Guide.
Characteristics of Maimonides’ Approach to the 
Reasons for the Commandments
The fundamental premise upon which Maimonides bases his discus-
sion of the reasons for the commandments is that they all were 
legislated for a good reason, for God does nothing in vain.13 Their 
 9 I have dealt with this issue in “Asceticism in the Thought of R. Baḥya Ibn Paquda 
and Maimonides,” Daat 21 (1988): 5-22.
10 Maimonides apparently contradictory positions regarding commandments that 
appear to involve cruelty to animals, such as sending away the mother bird before 
taking her young, has also been discussed by scholars; see for example Stern, Prob-
lems and Parables of Law, 49-55, 63-66.
11 See Guide 3.27.
12 For a discussion of this issue, see Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 166-170, 189-193.
13 Guide 3.25.
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ultimate purpose is to promote human perfection, which consists of 
the perfection of the intellect, which in turn requires living in a well 
ordered society. The latter goal is achieved by legislating laws that 
prevent the inhabitants of society from wronging each other and more 
importantly, that inculcate moral virtues which contribute to social 
harmony or the wellbeing of the body politic (as well as to the well-
being of the body and soul of the individual). The former goal is 
advanced by inculcating true beliefs as well as actions that reinforce 
them or are designed to counter false beliefs.14 One of the most well 
known characteristics of Maimonides’ approach is the historical-an-
thropological reasons he presents for many of the commandments. 
According to his reading of history, the idolatrous religions of old 
posed the greatest obstacle to the welfare of the soul and its perfec-
tion, as well as to the welfare of the body, that is to say, social morality. 
It is for this reason that the Torah’s first goal is to eradicate idolatry, 
both its beliefs and the ritual practices that reinforce these beliefs.15 
Many of the commandments are the immediate product of the Torah’s 
campaign to put an end to these beliefs and practices. Ironically, the 
very success of the Torah in this area is why we no longer understand 
the reasons for many of the commandments. The books purportedly 
describing the ancient religion of the Sabians, foremost among them 
the Nabatean Agriculture, provide Maimonides with his critical 
insights into some of the Torah’s more esoteric commandments, 




16 Worthy of note is Maimonides’ concluding remarks to his discussion of the reasons 
for the commandments in ibid. 3.49: 612:
 In the case of most of the statutes whose reason is hidden from us, everything 
serves to keep people away from idolatry. The fact that there are particulars the 
reason for which is hidden from me and the utility of which I do not understand, 
is due to the circumstance that things known by hearsay are not like things that one 
has seen. Hence the extent of my knowledge of the ways of the Sabians drawn from 
books is not comparable to the knowledge of one who saw their practices with his 
eyes. . . . If we knew the particulars of those practices and heard details concerning 
those opinions, we would become clear regarding the wisdom manifested in the 
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A corollary of Maimonides’ historical-anthropological approach is 
his view that many of the commandments reflect a form of historical 
compromise. The order of sacrifice in its entirety is the result of such a 
compromise, since it allows the Israelites to continue to practice the 
form of worship to which they were accustomed. At the same time it 
weans them away from idolatrous beliefs and practices by changing the 
details of the practice and directing all sacrifices to the true deity 
instead of false gods. In Guide 3.32, Maimonides categorizes the 
commandments involving the sacrifices as belonging to the “second 
intention” of the Torah, namely commandments not laid down for 
their own sake since they do not contribute directly to a person’s 
perfection. Sacrifices do not constitute the ideal form of worship that 
lead most directly to a true apprehension of God, at least on the level 
appropriate for society as a whole. In promulgating the Law, God takes 
under consideration the fact that it is harder to uproot ritual practices 
than the beliefs they are designed to support. The basic practices must 
be maintained while attaching them to new beliefs. Otherwise the 
people will continue to hold on to the old practices, the promulgation 
of newer forms of worship by the Law notwithstanding, together with 
the idolatrous beliefs associated with them. While sacrifices are coun-
tenanced for this reason, God at the same time limits their practice in 
time and place and attempts to accustom the Israelites to the more 
superior form of worship, prayer, upon which the Law does not place 
the same limitations.17 As is the case with all legislations, the Law 
addresses a certain social reality and is framed from the standpoint of 
what is possible to achieve in a given situation.
details of the practices prescribed in the commandments concerning the sacrifices 
and the forms of uncleanness and other matters whose reason cannot, to my mind, 
be easily grasped.
17 Ibid. 3.32. It is important to note that Maimonides regards prayer as a Torah 
commandment and not a rabbinic ordinance. This view not only is in harmony 
with his philosophical approach but also reflects the dominant view of the Geonim. 
For a study of this issue, see in particular Gerald Blidstein, Prayer in Maimonidean 
Halakha (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1994), 23-68 (Heb.). On prayer in Maimon-
ides’ thought and how it contrasts to sacrifices see below, chapter 11, 403-406.
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The notion of viewing many commandments as a result of histor-
ical compromise is certainly problematic from a religious standpoint. 
Gershom Scholem goes directly to the heart of the issue in the intro-
ductory essay to Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism:
For a purely historical understanding of religion, Maimonides’ anal-
ysis of the origin of the mitzvot, the religious commandments, is of 
great importance, but he would be a bold man who would maintain 
that his theory of the mitzvot was likely to increase the enthusiasm 
of the faithful for their actual practice, likely to augment their imme-
diate appeal to religious feeling. If the prohibition against seething a 
kid in its mother’s milk and many similar irrational commandments 
are explicable as polemics against long-forgotten pagan rites, if the 
offering of sacrifice is a concession to the primitive mind, if other 
mitzvot carry with them antiquated moral and philosophical ideas—
how can one expect the community to remain faithful to practices of 
which the antecedents have long since disappeared or of which the 
aims can be attained directly through philosophical reasoning? To 
the philosopher, the Halakah either had no significance at all, or one 
that was calculated to diminish rather than to enhance its prestige in 
his eyes.18
It would also be a bold individual who would argue that there is 
no truth in Scholem’s critique of Maimonides’ approach. Scholem 
employs his critique to explain the more attractive solution offered by 
the kabbalists in winning hearts and minds in the battle to uphold 
Jewish law and lore. It is not incidental that Scholem bases this 
critique on Maimonides’ approach in the Guide. As already been 
noted by scholars such as Isadore Twersky, Maimonides’ approach to 
the reasons for the commandments in the Guide differs from the 
approach that may be gleamed from the Mishneh Torah.19 In the Guide, 
the question that Maimonides seeks to answer is: why did God 
command these particular commandments, what is the divine motive? 
In the Mishneh Torah, on the other hand, Maimonides is more 
concerned with providing reasons that would add to one’s devotion. 
18 See Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken 
Publishing House, 1941), 29.
19 Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 430-439.
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The question he answers in those passages in the Mishneh Torah in 
which he provides reasons for the commandments is how one 
observing the commandments should view them. A religious existen-
tial perspective is adopted in this work.20 These two perspectives— 
that which views the commandments from the standpoint of the 
reason God commands them and that which focuses on how one 
should regard the commandments while observing them—often 
overlap and there is no inherent contradiction between them. 
Maimonides himself adopts an existential approach to the command-
ments in Guide 3.51 while dealing with the form of worship appropriate 
to those striving for intellectual perfection. Nevertheless, these two 
approaches create different impressions on the mind of the reader, as 
is Maimonides’ intent.
Even in confining oneself to Maimonides’ approach in the Guide to 
commandments belonging to the “second intention,” one discerns that 
his approach is not as one-dimensional as the critique of it suggests. 
The novelty and radical nature of his historical-anthropological 
approach to sacrifices has overshadowed the other dimensions of 
Maimonides’ approach to this topic. As we have seen above, according 
to Maimonides’ discussion of the “second intention” of the Law, the 
reason for the limitations in time and place governing the offering of 
sacrifices is due to the inferior nature of this type of worship. Yet in 
Maimonides’ subsequent discussion one finds a positive value placed 
upon some of these limitations. Consider what Maimonides writes, for 
example, in 3.47, while discussing the stringent limitations placed 
upon the entry to the Sanctuary:
We have already explained that the whole intention with regard to 
the Sanctuary was to affect those that came to it with a feeling of awe 
and of fear, as it says: Ye shall fear My Sanctuary [Leviticus 19:30]. 
Now if one is continually in contact with a venerable object, the 
impression received from it in the soul diminishes and the feeling it 
provokes becomes slight. (593)
20 See in particular the example of Maimonides’ different treatments of the laws of 
impurity brought by Twersky, ibid., 435.
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If familiarity breeds contempt, as Maimonides appears to argue, 
severely limiting certain practices insures that they remain awe-in-
spiring. Here too there is no inherent contradiction between Maimonides’ 
different positions on this issue. The limitations on sacrifice may serve a 
twofold purpose: they are designed to create the feeling of awe while at 
the same time encourage the individual to become accustomed to the 
more frequent and superior form of worship, namely prayer. Yet 
Maimonides’ discussion of the Sanctuary in Guide 3.47 reveals a far 
more nuanced approach to sacrifices as a mode of worship than the 
general view he expresses in 3.32. This is further underlined by the 
allegorical explanation he offers for aspects of the service in the Sanc-
tuary as well as for some of the sacrifices in his discussion in Guide 
3.46, as we shall see below.
Reasons for the Commandments in Provençal 
Jewish Philosophy
Given the dominant influence Maimonides’ approach in the Guide exer-
cised on most of the subsequent medieval Jewish philosophers, it is not 
without justification that Scholem views it as the medieval Jewish philo-
sophical approach. This enables Scholem to treat Maimonides’ view of 
the reasons for the commandments, particularly what must be regarded 
from many perspectives as its most problematic aspect, as reflecting the 
view of the medieval Jewish philosophers in general. Yet historical reality 
never fits neatly into the categories we create to describe it. It is not only 
Scholem who finds Maimonides’ approach wanting on this issue; the 
same is true of many of Maimonides’ most avid followers, particularly 
those who lived in Provence for the century and a half following his 
death. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of the Guide, started exploring 
the problem of the reasons for the commandments by focusing on some 
whose reason Maimonides did not adequately address in his view.21 
21 Samuel Ibn Tibbon wrote a short treatise on the reason for the table with the 
loaves of bread that are placed in the Sanctuary, as well as for the candlestick. The 
motivation for writing this treatise is Maimonides’ admission that he does not 
know the reason for this commandment; see Guide 3.45. Ibn Tibbon explains how 
both commandments are designed to combat the notion that God is corporeal. See 
MS Oxford 1252, 335a-337b.
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His son-in-law, Jacob Anatoli, delves into the topic of the reasons for the 
commandments in more detail in his book of sermons, Malmad ha-Talmi-
dim.22 Some of the later thirteenth-century and early fourteenth-century 
thinkers, such as Levi ben Avraham,23 David ben Samuel HaKokhavi,24 
22 Ed. L. Silberman (Lyck: Mekize Nirdamim, 1866).
23 For a discussion of Levi and his encyclopedia Livyat Ḥen, see above, chapter 5.
24 See Sefer ha-Batim, vol. 2 (Sefer Mizvah), Moshe Hershler (ed.) (Jerusalem: Makhon 
Shalem, 1983). 
 Sefer ha-Batim, or Kiryat Sefer as the treatise was called by the author, is for the 
most part a legal work, in fact one of the most ambitious legal works ever written. 
Like Maimonides’ code, and in fact building upon it, HaKokhavi deals with all 
topics of Jewish law, whether relevant to his own period or not, but unlike the 
Mishneh Torah, HaKokhavi cites his medieval sources, brings divergent opinions, 
and introduces a different method of organization. Most of this early four-
teenth-century treatise is lost, while the few surviving parts have been published. 
Prior to writing his legal compendium, HaKokhavi wrote a different treatise enti-
tled Migdal David (The Tower of David), which he then appended to the beginning 
of his legal compendium. This treatise consists of two parts, the first devoted to 
a detailed discussion of the principles of Judaism—HaKokhavi brings seven such 
principles: creation, free will, providence, Torah from heaven, reward and 
punishment, the coming of the messiah, and resurrection of the dead. The second 
part is an in-depth discussion of the rationale underlying each of the 613 
commandments. The core of the treatise, the legal section, is divided into three 
parts, with each part subdivided into “houses” (batim), consisting of different 
categories of commandments (in total, 12 categories). In the introduction to 
Kiryat Sefer, HaKokhavi describes the mutual relation between the two sections 
of his combined treatise. The tower—knowledge of the principles of Judaism—
defends the city, that is, the religion, against all its enemies who wish to destroy 
it, while the residents of the city supply the defenders of the tower with their 
nourishment, that is, knowledge of all the commandments. For an outline of the 
sections of the treatise, see Adolf Neubauer, “Documents inédits,” Revue des 
études juives 9 (1884): 218. For a discussion of HaKokhavi’s thought, see Moshe 
Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 181-216 
(Heb.); see also Howard Kreisel, “Between Faith and Reason: Three Medieval 
Hebrew Encyclopedias,” in Jewish Thought and Jewish Belief, ed. Daniel J. Lasker 
(Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2012), 82-85 (Heb.). For a 
discussion of his legal approach, see Pinchas Roth, “Later Provençal Sages—
Jewish Law (Halakhah) and Rabbis in Southern France, 1215-1348” (PhD thesis, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2012), 142-149 (Heb.). See, most recently, 
Gavriel Hanuka, “The Philosophy and Halakhic Theory of R. David d’Estelle” 
(PhD thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2014) (Heb.).
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Nissim of Marseille,25 and Gersonides,26 among others,27 explore this 
topic in depth. 
Maimonides’ approach disturbed these thinkers not only for exis-
tential-spiritual reasons, but also for theological ones. Why would God 
promulgate eternal commandments whose rationale was not eternal? 
True, they remain much more modest in their approach than the 
kabbalists who begin to flourish in the same period. They do not create 
narratives that place the commandments in the context of a cosmic 
struggle in which God’s power could be augmented by their practice.28 
For them, as for Maimonides, God is the Unmoved Mover. God does 
not become emotional, let alone stronger or weaker, by what a person 
puts in his mouth, for example, or by what comes out of it. Humanity, 
both as individuals and as a collective, is the realm to which an under-
25 For a discussion of Nissim and his treatise Ma‘aseh Nissim, see above, chapter 6.
26 This topic is almost, though not quite, completely absent from Gersonides’ philo-
sophic magnum opus, The Wars of the Lord, but as is only fitting occupies much of 
his attention throughout his Torah commentary. For a discussion of Gersonides’ 
approach to the commandments, see Isaac Heinemann, The Reasons for the 
Commandments in Jewish Literature (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency Press, 1966), 
97-102 (Heb.); Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide 
(Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973), 492-505.
27 Mention should also be made of the Torah commentary of the late-thirteenth-cen-
tury Spanish kabbalist, Baḥya ben Asher. Baḥya’s commentary is replete with 
philosophical explanations of many of the commandments, many of whose sources 
have not been identified. It is clear that Baḥya had at his disposal philosophical 
sources that are no longer available to us. Some may have been the product of the 
Jewish philosophers of Provence. There is evidence, for example, that some of the 
writings of Moses Ibn Tibbon, the son of Samuel Ibn Tibbon, have not survived 
and that they dealt in part with the subject of the commandments. This evidence 
is based on references by Moses Ibn Tibbon in his Sefer ha-Pe’ah to these works, as 
well as references by Levi in his Livyat Ḥen. A number of the references allude to 
matters pertaining to the commandments; see my introduction to The Writings of 
R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and Avraham Israel (Beer-
Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 9-35 (Heb.); see also 
above, chapter 4, 93, 111.
28 For a study of kabbalistic approaches to the commandments see Daniel Matt, “The 
Mystic and the Mizwot,” in Jewish Spirituality, I, ed. Arthur Green (New York: 
Crossroad Press, 1986), 367-404. Frank Talmage contrasts philosophic and kabbal-
istic approaches along different lines, focusing on the allegorical interpretation of 
the commandments employed by the philosophers as against the symbolic interpre-
tation of the kabbalists; see Frank Talmage, Apples of Gold in Settings of Silver, ed. 
Barry Walfish (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), 132-139.
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standing of the reasons for the commandments is to be limited. They 
also share with Maimonides his fundamental belief that all command-
ments are essentially rational, that is understandable, from a human 
perspective, with the Aristotelian world view in its medieval form lying 
at the heart of their approaches. While Maimonides’ historical-anthro-
pological approach is not ignored by them or even dismissed, one can 
detect a recurring attempt to supplement this approach with reasons 
that are divorced from the vicissitudes of history and would not lose 
their luster over time.
Naturalistic reasons figure prominently in the Provençal Jewish 
philosophers’ approaches to the commandments just as they do in Maimon-
ides’ approach. Maimonides explains certain prohibitions, such as 
forbidden foods, as being laid down in order to prevent harm to one’s 
body. Blood for example is forbidden because of the damage it causes 
to the digestive system. He also regards pork as harmful despite the fact 
that he knows that not all medical authorities share this opinion.29 
While Maimonides does not view circumcision as being commanded 
for physical health reasons,30 but to serve as a physical sign uniting all 
those committed to the monotheistic idea, he also regards it as 
decreasing sexual desires. This plays a crucial role in the pursuit of 
moral and intellectual perfection.31
Yet Maimonides at times breaks with a naturalistic framework for 
understanding the commandments. He suggests miraculous explana-
tions for some of them. In Guide 3.47, for example, he writes:
As for the uncleanness of leprosy, we have already explained its 
meaning. The Sages, may their memory be blessed, have also 
29 See Guide 3.48. For a discussion of this issue, see Levinger, Maimonides as Philoso-
pher and Codifier, 112-124.
30 Such a reason would suggest that there is a lack of physical perfection in God’s 
creation, since man is born with a superfluous part. Thus God’s creation could not 
be regarded as the most perfect one possible. The same theological problem does 
not hold true with regard to moral defects, for the nature of the human being 
requires the striving for moral and intellectual perfection and not its possession 
from the outset.
31 Guide 3.49. For a discussion of Maimonides’ approach to the commandment of 
circumcision, see Stern, Problems and Parables of Law, 87-107.
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explained it. They have made known to us that the established prin-
ciple in regard to it is that it is a punishment for slander and that at 
first this change appears in the walls. If the man repents, the purpose 
has been achieved. . . . If he still persists in his disobedience, it 
passes over to his clothing, then to his body. This is a miracle that 
was perpetuated in the religious community like that of the waters of 
the woman suspected of adultery. (597)
How committed is Maimonides to an understanding of the leprosy 
mentioned in the Torah as a miraculous phenomenon, or to the mirac-
ulous effectiveness of the water administered to a woman suspected of 
adultery in establishing her guilt, is an open question.32 In the continu-
ation of his remarks in 3.48, he notes that leprosy is a contagious 
disease, a fact that suggests the tie drawn between leprosy and slander 
as not literal but metaphoric. In 3.49, he presents sociological and 
psychological reasons in reference to most of the other details of the 
ceremony of the woman accused of adultery. It is noteworthy that he 
posits an ongoing miracle in reference to the salient feature of this 
commandment. In this manner, Maimonides’ approach to the command-
ments mirrors his approach to the divine governance of the world in 
general.33 While the object of Maimonides’ discussion is to instill in his 
readers a greater appreciation of God’s governance of the world through 
the order of nature, and to limit the importance and extent of the 
miraculous, he nevertheless understands the theological importance of 
allowing for the occurrence of miracles. Similarly, his discussion of the 
commandments is designed to show how they further the natural ends 
of humanity in a manner that conforms to the order of nature, but at 
the same time reflect some of the supernaturalistic aspects of divine 
activity.
32 This problem belongs to the more general one of Maimonides’ approach to mira-
cles, specifically whether he accepts the view of God’s direct intervention in events 
of the world or is secretly committed to a completely naturalistic understanding of 
all phenomena. For a discussion of this issue, see my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish 
Philosophy,” JQR 75 (1984): 101-114; see also above, chapter 9, 354-360.
33 On the similarity that Maimonides draws between Law and nature, see Guide 3.34, 
49.
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The Provençal Jewish philosophers tend to expand upon the natu-
ralistic approach in understanding the reasons for the commandments, 
such as in the case of forbidden foods. They see all these foods as 
harmful to one’s health and bring scientific explanations in support of 
this position.34 They also extend the naturalistic approach to command-
ments that Maimonides sees primarily in terms of a reaction to Sabian 
practices. While Maimonides, for example, sees the commandment 
prohibiting the mingling of crops (kil’ayim) as combating idolatrous 
rites, the Jewish philosophers of Provence supplement this reason with 
theological and naturalistic ones. HaKokhavi, after agreeing with 
Maimonides’ view, adds:
The words of our Sages suggest a different reason for the prohibition 
to mingle crops. They said: “You shall observe my decrees [Leviticus 
19:19]—the decrees that I decreed in my world—you shall not let 
your cattle mate with a different kind” [BT Sanhedrin 60a]. It appears 
to me that the intent of this statement is to prohibit us, in accor-
dance with the decree of divine wisdom in His world, from creating 
a species that is not found in nature, for this would lead to the denial 
that all existence is under God’s providence. This denial would also 
lead to the corruption of the existents. One who tries by means of 
stratagems to create something that is not found in accordance with 
the nature of existence in its entirety will think that the world did 
not come into existence in accordance to the purpose of one who acts 
with intent. I say “the corruption of the existents,” for the conjoining 
of one species with another in vegetation or in animals will lead to 
the corruption of that species. It will no longer continue to exist and 
no longer breed its kind.35
34 See, for example, Malmad ha-Talmidim, 98a-b; Sefer ha-Batim, 379-388; Ma‘aseh 
Nissim, 370-372, 378-379; Gersonides’ commentary to Leviticus 11:1-46 (Perushei 
Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, volume 3, ed. Jacob Lev Levy [Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav 
Kook, 1997], 127-155).
35 Sefer ha-Batim, 402. See also his explanation for the prohibition against wearing 
kil’ayim (ibid., 320-321). Among subsequent Jewish philosophers a similar explana-
tion appears in Nissim’s Ma‘aseh Nissim, 384, and Gersonides’ commentary to 
Leviticus 19:19 (Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, volume 3, 302-303). HaKokhavi’s 
explanation appears earlier in Nahmanides’ commentary to Leviticus 19:19, which 
may have served as HaKokhavi’s source. Nahmanides too employs naturalistic 
reasons where he feels that they are in harmony with the notion of the eternal 
validity of the Torah and serve to strengthen one’s commitment to observance. For 
a comparison between Maimonides and Nahmanides on their approaches to the 
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The eating of fruits of the tree in its first three years (‘orlah) is yet 
another example where Maimonides looks to Sabian practices to 
provide an explanation for the prohibition,36 while subsequent Jewish 
philosophers look also to nature. Nissim argues that the fruit in its first 
three years is bad for one’s health. He also presents a good agricultural 
reason for this prohibition, based on the fact that most people think 
more in terms of short term gains than the long term consequences. As 
a result of the commandment, the individual rather than immediately 
attempting to multiply the fruits of the true, as would be one’s tendency 
and would lead to the tree’s destruction, concentrates instead on 
strengthening the tree.37
Health reasons, in addition to the other reasons presented by 
Maimonides, are also found among the explanations given by these 
philosophers for the commandment of circumcision.38 HaKokhavi 
writes: “Circumcision is also a safeguard against some diseases. It is 
known by the science of medicine that many diseases occur in those 
possessing foreskins that do not occur in those who are circumcised.”39 
A similar explanation is presented by Nissim.40
Two other types of explanation, one Maimonides only occasionally 
employs and the other he does not present at all, tend to play a promi-
nent role in Provençal approaches to this subject. Both these types of 
explanation can be traced to a different Spanish Jewish thinker who had 
a strong impact on Provençal Jewish philosophy, Abraham Ibn Ezra. The 
first type of explanation is the allegoric one. Certain commandments 
commandments labeled divine decrees (ḥuqqim), see Stern, Problems and Parables 
of Law, 109-160.
36 See Guide 3.37.
37 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 385-386. Nissim cites Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Leviticus 
19:23 as the source of the first reason. Gersonides expands upon this reason in his 
commentary to Leviticus 19:23 (Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, volume 3, 304).
38 See Avraham Gross, “Reasons for Circumcision: Trends and Historical Influ-
ences,” Daat 21 (1988): 25-46 (Heb.). The philosophers presenting this explanation 
ignore the reason for Maimonides’ refusal to introduce the physical health factor in 
regard to circumcision. As noted above, this reason suggests a lack of physical 
perfection in God’s creation of man, since he is born with a superfluous part that 
is a physical liability in addition to being a moral one.
39 Sefer ha-Batim, 72.
40 Ma‘aseh Nissim, 373.
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were promulgated with the intention of spurring our thought to focus 
on eternal scientific-theological truths or moral ones. In a famous 
passage toward the beginning of his commentary on Leviticus, a 
passage that appears also in his Yesod Mora, Ibn Ezra explains the 
sacrifice of ‘olah (that which goes up), a sacrifice that is burnt 
completely, as one that is offered to atone for ha-‘olah ‘al ha-ruaḥ, that 
is to say, sinful thoughts.41 Both the name of the sacrifice and the 
details concerning it serve to stimulate the person to ponder the indi-
vidual’s more noble part and attempt to burn out completely any evil 
inclinations. Ibn Ezra’s older contemporary, R. Judah Halevi, is 
another Spanish Jewish philosopher whose philosophical treatise was 
known to the Jewish philosophers of Provence and who made use of 
allegoric explanations in his approach to the commandments. In Kuzari 
2.26, he presents an allegoric understanding of the Sanctuary, treating 
it as a macro-anthropos.42
Maimonides tends to treat allegoric explanations as nice homilies 
rather than part of the original intent of the commandments.43 This 
serves to safeguard the commandments themselves from being treated 
as allegories rather than actions that one is obligated to perform. Yet it 
is not the case that Maimonides denies all allegoric explanations of the 
commandments. His explanation of the sin-offering in Guide 3.46, for 
example, is primarily of an allegorical nature:
As for the burning of the sin-offerings, its purpose was to signify that 
the trace of the sin in question was wiped out and had disappeared, 
and that no trace remained of that action just as no trace remained 
of the sin-offering which was destroyed by having been burnt. 
41 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Leviticus 1:4, and his Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, ed. 
Joseph Cohen (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), 140.
42 The idea of the Sanctuary as a macro-anthropos is found in Midrash Tanḥuma, 
Pequdei 3. While Halevi presents an allegorical interpretation, it appears that he 
thinks that the arrangement of the Sanctuary as a macro-anthropos has a theurgic 
function—it serves to bring down the spiritual forces from the divine world. The 
allegorical explanations of some of the commandments on the part of the Provençal 
philosophers, on the other hand, are based on the notion that the commandments 
are designed to serve as a prod to contemplate scientific and philosophic truths.
43 This is true for example of the rabbinic explanation for the four species on the 
Festival of Tabernacles; see Guide 3.43.
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Consequently, its burning would not offer a sweet odor unto the 
Lord. (591)
Even more allegorical in nature is Maimonides’ explanation of the 
scapegoat in the passage that immediately follows. Maimonides concludes 
his explanation with the following remark:
No one has any doubt that sins are not bodies that may be trans-
ported from the back of one individual to that of another. But all 
these actions are parables serving to bring forth a form in the soul so 
that a passion toward repentance should result: We have freed 
ourselves from all our previous actions, cast them behind our backs, 
and removed them to an extreme difference. (Ibid.)
The primary reason that Maimonides resorts to allegorical explanation 
in these instances in all probability is to avoid the most evident and far 
more problematic alternative: namely, magical explanations.44 These 
have no place at all in Maimonides’ thought.
Maimonides’ ambivalence regarding allegorical explanations can 
be detected in the qualified manner he presents the final explanation 
of this kind in the chapter:
As for the offering of wine, I am up to now perplexed with regard to 
it: How could He have commanded to offer it, since the idolaters 
offered it? No reason for this has occurred to me. Someone else gave 
the following reason: For the desire, which is located in the liver, the 
most excellent thing is meat; for the animal faculty, which is located 
in the heart, the most excellent thing is wine; similarly the faculty 
located in the brain—that is, the psychic faculty—takes pleasure in 
songs accompanied by instruments. Therefore every faculty offers to 
44 Even more problematic is the explanation that regards the scapegoat as a sacrifice 
to the fallen angel Azazel or Azael. This explanation would certainly transform the 
commandment into an idolatrous act in Maimonides’ view, though he makes no 
allusion to it. The notion that the scapegoat is dedicated to a fallen angel is 
preserved in Pirqei de-Rabbi Eliezer, 46, and in Yalqut Shimoni to Genesis 6, no. 44, 
a midrash that is known to the Jewish philosophers of Provence; see for example 
my edition of Livyat Ḥen: The Work of Creation (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish 
Studies, 2004), 341 (Heb.). The Zohar too builds upon this midrash in explaining 
the scapegoat ritual; see Zohar, II, 184b. See also BT Yoma 67b, which transforms 
the scapegoat into a form of atonement for the sins of the fallen angels.
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God the thing most cherished by it. Accordingly offerings consist in 
meat, wine and sound—I mean song. (591-592)
This explanation is offered not in Maimonides’ own name and only 
because his own most likely explanation for practices concerning sacri-
fices fails him in this instance. Why Maimonides offers an explanation 
at all in this case is not too difficult to discern. The practices involved 
evoke the conception that God enjoys corporeal pleasures. An appro-
priate counter-explanation had to be adduced to put the focus of the 
commandment back on humanity.45
The allegorical approach to the structure of the Sanctuary and its 
service exerted an important influence on the thought of the Jewish 
philosophers of Provence. Gersonides, for example, devotes a lengthy 
excursus on this subject in his commentary to Exodus 25-27, Lesson 3.46 
Building upon Halevi’s approach, Gersonides treats the Sanctuary 
both as a macro-anthropos as well as a micro-cosmos. The latter allegor-
ical understanding of the Sanctuary figures prominently also in the 
commentary of Nissim.47 HaKokhavi expands upon Halevi’s allegorical 
explanation of the order of sacrifices and points out the limitations of 
Maimonides’ approach in his own discourse on the subject.48 The phys-
ical and metaphysical ideas conveyed by the structure of the Sanctuary 
and its utensils as depicted by these thinkers are based on Aristotelian 
science. While they would seem antiquated to the modern reader, they 
represent scientific truths to the rational medieval one. Moreover, many 
45 For the same reason, Maimonides repeats in Guide 3.43 the allegoric reason for the 
commandment to sound the shofar on the New Year presented in Mishneh Torah, 
Laws of Repentance, 3.4. The shofar is designed to awaken us from our spiritu-
al-moral slumber and call upon us to examine our deeds and repent. The popular 
alternative in this case would be to regard the sounding of the shofar as a way of 
awakening the Deity, based on an anthropomorphic conception of God, or as a 
means of chasing away Satan and the demons. Maimonides’ explanation provides 
a much better alternative to these views from the perspective of his theology.
46 Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, volume 2, ed. Jacob Lev Levy (Jerusalem: Mossad 
HaRav Kook, 1997), 361-372. 
47 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 355-358.
48 Sefer ha-Batim, 119-133. HaKokhavi follows Halevi in stressing also the hidden 
affects of the order of sacrifice on the soul of the individual.
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of these thinkers were convinced that the basic structure of the world 
as conceived by Aristotle came close to being demonstrative. Hence the 
truths conveyed by the Sanctuary in their view were eternal ones. 
While progress would continue to be made in many important details 
of the various sciences, none of these thinkers entertained the notion 
that Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics would one day be rejected on 
rational grounds.49
The second type of explanation taken from Ibn Ezra, which plays 
a prominent role in the approach to the commandments among many of 
the Jewish philosophers of Provence, is one that is not advanced at all 
by Maimonides. This type of explanation is anchored in what today we 
would call the “occult sciences,” but Ibn Ezra would consider them to 
be practical sciences—astrology and sciences dealing with the special 
properties of objects.50 Ibn Ezra’s treatment of the breastplate (ḥoshen) 
worn by the high priest that was employed to answer questions about 
whether a certain course of action should be undertaken suggests that 
he viewed it as an astrolabe.51 The stones in the breastplate were chosen 
for their special properties, for example crystal (aḥlama) for its ability 
to induce dreams.52 His understanding of some of the laws of incest is 
49 When Scholem criticizes the philosophers’ approach by pointing out that their 
explanations of some of the mitzvot “carry with them antiquated moral and 
philosophical ideas,” he is guilty of an anachronism. It is of considerable historical 
irony that many of the kabbalistic explanations are the product of an imaginative 
reworking of many of the same philosophical and ethical views maintained by the 
medieval Aristotelian philosophers. The fact that these explanations continue to be 
regarded by so many as timeless appears to reflect the victory of imagination over 
intellect.
50 For the most in-depth treatment of the place of astrology in Ibn Ezra’s thought, see 
Shlomo Sela, Astrology and Biblical Exegesis in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Thought 
(Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1999) (Heb.); see also Y. Tzvi Langermann, 
“Some Astrological Themes in the Thought of Abraham Ibn Ezra,” in Rabbi 
Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. 
Isadore Twersky and Jay Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
28-85. For a study of astrology in medieval Jewish thought, see Dov Schwartz, 
Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 
1999) (Heb.). 
51 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Exodus 28:7-8. For a discussion of this issue see 
Sela, Astrology and Biblical Exegesis in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Thought, 287-299.
52 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Exodus 28:9.
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rooted in the special properties of the land of Israel.53 One of the 
reasons he gives for the rest imposed on us on the Sabbath and the 
prohibition against travel is because of the rule of the evil planets on 
this day, Mars at night and Saturn during the day. Avoiding activity 
during this period is a way to protect us from the negative effects of 
these planets.54 Other examples can be brought along these lines.
Many Provençal Jewish philosophers, if not most, were more 
inclined to take their cue from Ibn Ezra on these matters than from 
Maimonides. The astrological significance some of the command-
ments—e.g., the Sabbath being ruled by two evil planets, making a 
cessation from work highly advisable,55 identifying the breastplate 
worn by the High Priest as an astrolabe—is a theme that recurs in the 
writings of a number of thinkers. They viewed these explanations as 
naturalistic ones, while conceding that the scientific reasons for the 
efficacy of certain practices and objects are not always understood. 
Often they can to be discerned only by experience. This is not unlike 
the practical science of medicine, particularly regarding the efficacy of 
many drugs.56 Halevi had already employed the medical analogy, God 
being the expert physician, to explain the beneficial effects of the 
Divine Law in contrast to other legislations.57 He appears to have in 
mind the direct influence of the commandments on the soul in a manner 
indiscernible by human reason. This is seen in his description of the 
salutary effects sacrifices have on the soul, often in complete opposition 
to the expectations of reason.58 The explanations offered by some of the 
Provençal Jewish philosophers are less mystical and more scientific in 
nature. Many of the commandments whose reasons are not easily 
understood are seen as affecting one’s physical disposition, which in 
53 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Leviticus 18:26; Deuteronomy 31:16.
54 See Howard Kreisel, “The Sabbath in Medieval Jewish Philosophy: From the 
Supernatural to the Natural,” in Sabbath: Idea History Reality, ed. Gerald Blidstein 
(Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2004), 69-75 (Heb.).
55 See ibid., 75-79.
56 See, for example, Nissim’s explanation of the reason for the law of the red heifer 
brought above, chapter 6, 197-198.
57 See Kuzari 1.79.
58 Kuzari 4.15; see also 3.23.
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turn affects the powers of the soul. The incense burnt in the Sanc-
tuary, for example, is seen as purifying the vapors that enter the body, 
helping to sharpen one’s intellect and induce prophecy. Music too helps 
to create the proper balance between the humors necessary for receiving 
this emanation. In general, the offering of sacrifice in connected with 
the praxis of attaining prophecy.59
Even commandments that suggest supernatural divine interven-
tion are given naturalistic explanations by at least some of the Provençal 
philosophers. Nissim, the most radical naturalist among this group, 
offers a naturalistic explanation to explain the efficacy of the unusual 
ceremony to which a woman suspected of adultery is subjected in order 
to reveal whether she in fact is guilty of the crime, as well as how the 
adulterer also suffers his just punishment.60 Moreover, no allusion is 
made to leprosy as a supernatural disease for slander but rather as a 
physically contagious one.61 In explaining leprosy appearing on the 
walls of a house, Nissim treats it as a form of mould that results from 
rancid air and adversely affects the occupants of the dwelling. This 
phenomenon he notes can still be found in Arab lands.62 Gersonides 
offers a similar explanation in his commentary to Leviticus 13:47. In 
general, many of the laws of impurity and of purification are seen as 
related to combating physical contagion, impurity not being simply a 
“fancied notion” referring to touching things held as unpleasant or 
disgusting, as Maimonides describes it.63 Dead bodies actually physi-
cally contaminate things with which they are in contact and many of 
59 See Sefer ha-Batim, 130-131; Ma‘aseh Nissim, 347; Gersonides’ commentary to 
Genesis 6-9, Lesson 10 (Perushei Ralbag ‘al HaTorah, volume 1, ed. Jacob Lev Levy 
[Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook 1992], 92-3). Gersonides shows also how the 
contemplation of the allegoric significance of sacrifice stimulates the intellect and 
prepares it for prophecy. 
60 See Ma‘aseh Nissim, 399-400.
61 Ibid., 374-375.
62 Ibid., 378. As for the ceremony of one who is purified from leprosy, he offers 
primarily an allegorical explanation.
63 Guide 3.47.
Chapter Ten382 
the commandments are designed to protect from this contamination or 
to cleanse it.64
Levi ben Avraham
I would like to focus now on the Provençal thinker who presents one of 
the most extensive discussions of the reasons for the commandments, 
Levi ben Avraham. In the section titled “The Quality of Prophecy and 
the Secrets of the Torah,” in the second part of his monumental ency-
clopedia Livyat Ḥen,65 Levi devotes fourteen chapters to this subject 
(chapters 13-26).66 He is of the opinion that this topic in fact belongs to 
the secrets of the Torah. As is the case with other secrets, the time is 
now ripe to reveal this one. In his view, in order to achieve the goals for 
which the commandments were intended, one must observe them with 
the proper intent, which requires knowing their reasons.
Levi opens his discussion by presenting the Maimonidean idea of 
the equibalance of the commandments, in which there is no deficiency 
or excess, and which guide the individual in accordance with the just 
middle path while avoiding the opposing extremes of laxity and overly 
burdensome restrictions. Insofar as the Torah is perfect, and within 
each species what is perfect is unique, the Torah will never undergo any 
abrogation or change, and no divine law will ever replace it.67 Levi goes 
so far as to liken the immutability and uniqueness of the Torah to that 
of God.
In the following chapter, the commandments are divided by him in 
different ways, many of the divisions revolving around the Maimoni-
dean notion that the purpose of the Torah is to promote the welfare of 
64 See, for example, Sefer ha-Batim, 176. Allegoric reasons are also adduced for 
understanding the laws of purity and purification. See in particular Gersonides’ 
discussion of these laws immediately following his commentary to Leviticus 11:46.
65 For a discussion of Levi and his encyclopedia see above, chapter 5.
66 Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, 
ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 
2007), 304-622 (Heb.).
67 Ibid., 305; cf. Guide 2.39. While Maimonides’ discussion suggests that the perfect 
specimen must be unique, since there cannot be two completely identical yet 
distinct members of a species, this argument in reference to the Torah is made 
explicit by Anatoli in Malmad ha-Talmidim, 191a-b.
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the body and the welfare of the soul.68 For example, one of the divi-
sions is between mishpatim, which come to promote peace and justice in 
the world, and the “commandments of the heart,” which come to 
perfect the soul. Levi is of the opinion that the individual who lives in 
isolation does not require the first category of commandments, nor do 
the pure individuals who have no desire to harm others. He brings as 
an example the inhabitants of India who, according to one of the tales 
told about them, live together in perfect harmony without any legal 
code, courts, or police—a tale whose apparent origin is one of the 
versions of The Gests of Alexander of Macedon, which was very popular 
in the Middle Ages.69 This natural trait, however, does not pertain to 
the Israelites, hence their need for such laws. Another division, which 
he attributes to Maimonides, involves three main categories: those 
involving moral virtues, those involving beliefs, and those involving 
actions. Among the actions, some come to preserve a true belief (e.g., 
the Sabbath) or to eliminate a false one (e.g., sacrifices), and some come 
as symbolic actions pointing to moral lessons (e.g., the red heifer), or to 
theoretical truths involving God and the world (e.g., the menorah in 
the Sanctuary). Others come to leave a positive impress on the soul of 
the individual (e.g., awe of the Sanctuary).70
Levi then devotes twelve chapters to different commandments or 
groups of commandments. The topics alone indicate where his major 
concerns lie. The order is as follows: 1) commandments whose purpose 
is to inculcate noble moral traits (in which he deals with forbidden 
foods and laws of purification as well as charitable gifts); 2) command-
ments concerning incest, circumcision, and vows; 3) the sale of houses 
in walled cities, the red heifer, and cities of refuge; 4) commandments 
whose purpose is to eradicate idolatry; 5) commandments whose 
68 Guide 3.27.
69 Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 324-342. Moses Ibn 
Tibbon brings this tale in his Ma’amar ha-Taninim, which probably served as Levi’s 
immediate source. See The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 239. For a discussion 
of this tale and the sources in which it appears, see ibid., note 54. It should be 
noted that a version of the Gests was translated into Hebrew as early as the begin-
ning of the thirteenth century.
70 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 354.
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purpose is to honor the Holy Sanctuary; 6) commandments whose 
purpose is to strengthen the faith; 7) Sabbath and Festivals; 8) command-
ments whose purpose is to hint at matters of wisdom or to stimulate us 
to learn; 9) the Tabernacle and its Utensils 10) the altar 11) the structure 
of the Sanctuary 12) the Vestments of the High Priest.71 Levi’s discus-
sion of the commandments is designed more as a supplement to 
Maimonides’ discussion than an alternative to it. While he does not 
attempt to deal with the reasons for each of the commandments or to 
organize them systematically, his encyclopedic tendency finds its 
expression in the multiple reasons he presents for the various command-
ments and their details with which he deals. Moreover, much of his 
discussion is devoted to the citation and explication of rabbinic 
midrashim pertaining to the commandments, in an attempt to under-
stand them along philosophic-scientific lines. As in the case of 
Maimonides, he distinguishes between homiletic explanations and 
those that he feels uncover the true intent of the commandment.72
Naturalistic and allegorical reasons dominate Levi’s approach. As 
is the case with many of his contemporaries in Provence, Levi views 
astrology as a practical science, hence he sees astrologic reasons 
underlying a number of the commandments, such as the Sabbath, the 
breastplate of the High Priest, and even the reason for the date of the 
High Holidays.73 On this point he too is far more influenced by 
the approach of Ibn Ezra than that of Maimonides.74 While he does not 
reject Maimonides’ historical-anthropological explanation of many of 
the commandments, he supplements them with explanations that are 
ahistorical. In this manner he underscores the trans-historical value of 
each of the commandments.
We have already seen that Maimonides treats the laws of purity 
and impurity as based for the most part on a “fancied notion”75—an 
71 In chapter 27, Levi deals with the significance of numbers—those that characterize 
some of the commandments, as well as other matters found in the Torah.
72 See above, note 44.
73 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 522-523, 534-535, 556-557, 615-616; see also 
below.
74 See above, note 51. 
75 See above, note 63.
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idea based not on reality but on vain imaginings. Maimonides traces 
many of these imaginings to the Sabians, and argues that the Torah 
attempts to limit the severity of these laws by confining them primarily 
to ritual matters and not to everyday life.76 In essence, he treats the 
approach of the Torah to these matters as similar to that of sacrifices. 
The Torah compromises with the existing situation by legislating laws 
in harmony with the prevalent views and practices, at the same time 
that it limits the scope of the practice of these laws. This is also true of 
laws that do touch upon daily matters, such as the laws concerning 
menstruating women, which were legislated because of the widely held 
negative attitude toward menstruation, and in Maimonides’ view were 
much less restrictive than the laws of the Sabians.77 Levi, on the other 
hand, is more interested in downplaying this historical approach. The 
laws of menstruation, for example, also limit the desire for sexual inter-
course.78 In addition, menstrual blood is viewed by Levi as poisonous 
coarse matter, and not simply as something that was deemed unclean in 
popular imagination. Any newborn that is formed from it will have a 
bad temperament and be infected, hence the reason for prohibiting 
intercourse with menstruating women. Levi cites not only a midrash in 
support of this view,79 but also medical scholars.80
Levi traces the impurity of dead bodies to their poisonous effect on 
the surrounding air, which also explains the rabbinic injunction to 
distance dead carcasses and cemeteries from the city, as well as the 
biblical prohibition against leaving the body of an executed criminal 
hanging overnight, in order not to defile your land (Deuteronomy 21:23). 
The air of the Land of Israel in Levi’s view is much purer than that of 
Egypt. For those growing up in Israel, any pollution to its air will result 
in far greater injury to them than in the case of those who grew up 
76 Guide 3.47.
77 Ibid.
78 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 379-381.
79 Tanḥuma (Buber), Metzora‘, 3.
80 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 388-389. Maimonides himself notes the 
unhealthy nature of menstrual blood in his Medical Aphorisms, Heb. trans. Nathan 
Hameathi, ed. Suessmann Muntner (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1982), 341.
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accustomed to breathe polluted air.81 Many of the details of the laws of 
concerning corpses and the utensils that are impurified by them also 
have a naturalistic explanation that is based on the contamination of 
the surrounding air. Human corpses produce much more contamina-
tion than the dead of other species in his view, hence the more severe 
restrictions regarding contact with them and the utensils in their 
vicinity. Levi explains the reason why the same restrictions do not 
apply to the corpses of Gentiles (or beasts) from two different (and 
somewhat conflicting) sociological perspectives. On one hand, Jews 
naturally shy away from the dead bodies of Gentiles as well as beasts, 
hence there is no need to legislate in this matter; on the other hand, the 
Gentile dead are buried all over the place, within the city as well as by 
the side of thoroughfares, making such restrictions impossible to 
uphold.82
Levi regards leprosy as a highly contagious disease, and not as a 
supernatural punishment. This is the reason that no exceptions are 
made in the law to isolate the leper from the community, no matter how 
noble is the afflicted individual. The notion that leprosy comes to those 
speaking evil of others is nothing more than a rabbinic homily in his 
view. The reason for the initial seven days of isolation he traces to the 
fact that this is the natural length of time for the course of many 
diseases. The fact that leprosy may be found in the walls of houses is 
explained by the possibility that the air may transfer the characteristics 
of this pestilence to them.83
Allegorical reasons are more readily employed to explain the 
process of purification. Levi adduces explanations of this sort for the 
purification ceremony of the leper.84 Similarly, allegorical explanations 
are offered for all the details of the law of the red heifer.85
81 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 393-394.




The Reasons for the Commandments  387
Many of the explanations for the commandments already encoun-
tered among other Provençal thinkers are contained in Levi’s treatise,86 
from the allegorical understanding of the structure of the Temple and 
its vessels to the practical effects of aspects of the Temple service in 
bringing about a purification of the brain, and even prophecy. A natu-
ralistic approach is also presented for the prohibitions concerning 
agriculture and forbidden foods.
Influences of Levi’s Christian milieu at times can also be detected 
in his discussion of the commandments.87 In discussing circumcision, 
for example, Levi offers the reasons brought by Maimonides: to dampen 
the sexual drive, and to serve as sign of unity. As opposed to some of 
the other Provençal philosophers, he does not talk of the diseases asso-
ciated with the foreskin, perhaps because he, like Maimonides, sensed 
that such an explanation suggests a defect in God’s creation.88 There 
remains, nonetheless, a subtle but significant difference between their 
approaches. Maimonides writes in an Islamic environment in which 
Moslems also practice circumcision. Thus for Maimonides circumcision 
is a sign uniting all those who believe in the unity of God, and he 
formulates his position accordingly.89 Levi, writing in a Christian envi-
ronment, sees circumcision as a sign uniting Jews and preserving them 
in their far-flung Diaspora while other nations disappeared, a theme 
that will reemerge in Spinoza’s thought.90
Levi’s Christian milieu also has an impact on another significant 
point in his discussion. He attempts to show the superiority of circum-
cision over baptism in that the former is a permanent signed impressed 
upon the flesh. The Christians, however, argue the shortcoming of 
86 In some cases, Levi’s treatise may well have been their source. Nissim was 
definitely acquainted with Levi’s treatise, though he never mentions the author by 
name. It appears that the same is true of HaKokhavi.
87 Levi devotes chapter 12 to a polemic against Christianity, showing his awareness of 
Christian views. For Levi’s acquaintance with Christians and Christianity, see 
Howard Kreisel, “Christian Influences on Levi ben Avraham’s Livyat Ḥen,” Studia 
Hebraica 6 (2006): 45-53.
88 See above, notes 31, 38-40.
89 Guide 3.29. See Stern, Problems and Parables of Law, 95-97.
90 See Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 100.
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circumcision in that it excludes women.91 Levi, who was sensitive to 
this charge, attempts to show the ways in which this commandment 
has also the woman in mind:
One of the reasons for circumcision is to decrease the [sexual] appe-
tite and weaken the [evil] inclination by diminishing the elemental 
moisture in the organ, and to sanctify [God] by means of the vessel 
through which the species endures. This will lead also to the perfec-
tion of the woman, for her enjoyment of sex will lessen because of 
this, as they say: “One having sex with an uncircumcised male finds 
it difficult to refrain” (Genesis Rabbah 80.11). In addition, the 
woman is part of the creation of man, a rib of his ribs. She is under 
his service and dominion, Follows him and is included in his 
commandments. In man’s removal of what is superfluous, the woman 
removes it too. Moreover, the woman’s observance and care taken 
during the days of her menstruation, her cleansing and purification, 
take the place of this intent. It is known that the heart is the fore-
most minister for the power of giving birth. For this reason, diminishing 
the moisture of the man from the outset purifies his blood, cools 
down and diminishes his [evil] inclination, calms his nature, refines 
the power of his intellect, and [leads him to] attain a good tempera-
ment. The offspring will then be born with this characteristic, and 
this nature will be strengthened in his sons and daughters. This 
commandment thus includes men and women.92
Levi’s acquaintance with Christian practices, which he observes from 
his neighbors, finds its expression in other discussions of the reasons 
for the commandments. He even sees the Christians as having intro-
duced new holidays in imitation of Jewish ones. For example, in his 
discussion of the ten days of repentance between the New Year and the 
Day of Atonement, Levi sees an astrological basis for the idea found in 
rabbinic literature that this is a period of divine judgment, inasmuch as 
this is the period of the Fall equinox in which the sun enters into the 
constellation of Libra, represented by scales of judgment (hence in 
Hebrew the constellation is termed moznayim, meaning scales). In 
Levi’s view, the Christians, seeing that the Jews observed a holiday 
in this period revolving around God’s judgment of the world, decided 
91 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 417.
92 Ibid., 416.
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to adopt this practice: “And in imitation of us, the gentiles made a 
holiday in this period for Michael, and they said that he examines souls 
and weighs their actions.”93 Levi refers here to Michaelmas, named 
after the archangel Michael, which in the West is celebrated on 
September 29. Michael is normally depicted as holding scales, and 
according to Christian belief will blow the great horn on the Day of 
Judgment and will accompany the souls to the presence of God.
I would like to conclude this section with a lengthy example of 
Levi’s allegoric understanding of the reasons for one matter pertaining 
to a number of commandments, which will help to convey a deeper 
appreciation of his approach. The example is taken from chapter 18, 
dealing with the commandments whose purpose is to eradicate idolatry. 
After a lengthy exposition of the reason for sacrifices that basically 
follows the lines of Maimonides’ approach, Levi turns to the reason 
for the prohibition of offering leaven and honey in a burnt offering 
(Leviticus 2:11). He first ties the reason for this prohibition with 
ancient idolatrous practices, as does Maimonides in Guide 3.46, and 
then continues:
We have already hinted at another reason in the first part of Batei 
ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Leḥashim,94 namely that the leaven is sour, cold, and 
dry, the opposite of honey. Matzah (unleavened bread) too is dry by 
nature and signifies a lack of appetite for physical pleasures. Leaven 
alludes to an evil appetite and the strengthening of matter, as it is 
said: “Who detains us [from performing God’s will]? The leaven in 
the dough and the subjugation by the nations” [BT Berakhot 17a]. It 
is also said: Knead the dough until it is leavened [Hosea 7:4], that is, 
until they put into action their evil intentions.95
In the case of the first proof text, one may understand by the context 
that the leaven refers to the evil inclination. The latter proof text, on 
the other hand, can only be understood by a thorough knowledge of 
Levi’s source. This is characteristic of his entire composition and cannot 
simply be explained by the copyist shortening the quotes found in 
93 Ibid., 541.
94 For a description of this poem see above, chapter 5, 120-121.
95 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 453-454.
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the original version of the treatise, as is often the case. Levi assumes 
that his readers know the Bible and rabbinic literature by heart and 
that they can complete the text to which he alludes and thereby under-
stand the point he is making. The beginning of the verse in Hosea 7:4, 
which he does not explicitly quote, reads as follows: They are all adul-
terers, like an oven heated by the baker. He rests from stoking the fire from 
the time of the kneading of the dough until it is leavened. With the knowl-
edge of the complete verse, the reference is clear.
Levi next takes up the problem of why leaven is required in the 
offering of the first fruits, goes on to deal with the reason why leaven is 
forbidden on Passover, and enters into a brief legal discussion on how 
the command: Eliminate the leaven (tashbitu se’or) (Exodus 12:15) is to 
be fulfilled, whether by burning or by annulment. He shows that the 
leaven that one knows about is burnt, while that which remains 
unknown to the person is annulled. He then adduces the symbolic 
meaning of both these activities. He concludes this part of his discus-
sion with the following comment:
We find that the prohibition of leaven on Passover alludes to 
two good intentions: remembering the miracle and removing the 
superfluous physical desires. The honey hints at overspeculation 
(hitḥakhmut), studying those matters that do not enter the province 
of the hylic intellect96 and looking for demonstrative proof where 
none is to be found.97
Levi goes on to cite a number of verses, most prominently Proverbs 
25:16: Have you found honey? Eat as much as is sufficient for you, lest you 
be sated and vomit it out. This verse appears in the story in Tractate 
Ḥagigah of the four who entered pardes and is also analyzed by Maimon-
ides in Guide 1.32. In short, the intake of honey—that is to say, engaging 
in speculation—by one who does not have the proper constitution for 
it may lead to heresy, while the right amount of honey that is suitable 
for one’s digestion is good.
96 In other words, studying matters the human intellect is incapable of understanding. 
The hylic intellect refers to the human potential for grasping the intelligibles.
97 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 455; cf. Guide 1.32.
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Levi continues this line of thought by remarking: “It is the obliga-
tion of the individual to investigate the reasons for the Torah and its 
secrets. For this reason the Torah commanded not to eliminate salt 
from the sacrifice. It is said:98 ‘Can one give it taste as understanding?99 
Scripture says: You should salt it [Leviticus 2:13]’ [BT Menaḥot 21a].”100 
While the exact meaning of this text has been subject to conflicting 
interpretations,101 Levi cites it to show that one should pursue the 
secrets contained in the Torah by means of one’s understanding, which 
is symbolized by the salt that is applied to the sacrifice. Salt, Levi also 
points out, is a symbol for the covenant. What follows is a discourse on 
the need to pursue wisdom.
In this manner, the discussion continues moving between details 
of the commandments and the moral and theoretical lessons they are 
designed to stimulate in those who ponder them. Numerous discussions 
regarding different commandments follow this pattern in Levi’s trea-
tise. The reader of Livyat Ḥen may be tempted to conclude that what 
we are dealing with here is simply homilies on homilies, that is to say, 
Levi’s homilies on rabbinic homilies. This misses the point. Levi feels 
that his expositions capture an important dimension of the biblical 
texts themselves, texts that the Sages only partially illuminated by 
their expositions, and which Levi is further illuminating by his. All 
these expositions are part of the original intent of the text. I would say 
that his approach has an element that anticipates the approach of 
Samson Raphael Hirsch in modern times.102 Yet it should be noted that 
98 The discussion there deals with the salt that is to be applied to the sacrifice, in the 
course of which the Sages define tevunehu, a term appearing in a baraitha that is 
used in reference to the manner salt should not be applied
99 In Hebrew: יכול יתן בו טעם כבינה.
100 Livyat Ḥen: The Quality of Prophecy, 455.
101 Rashi explains the question: Can you give it taste just as understanding gives a 
person distinction? This apparently means to immerse it in salt. According to the 
Arukh by Nathan ben Yeḥiel: Can you give it a taste of discernment (reading 
tevunah rather than ke-binah)—that is, just enough so that the taste of salt can be 
discerned? Both these sources were known to Levi.
102 See in particular Hirsch’s discussion of symbolism in his essay Grundlinien einer 
juedischen Symbolik published in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Naphtali Hirsch (Frank-
furt, 1908-1912), vol. 3, 211-447 (partially translated into English in Timeless Torah, 
ed. Jacob Breuer [New York: Feldheim, 1957], 303-420).
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Levi is totally familiar with the standard scientific Hebrew lexico-
graphic works of his period, Yonah Ibn Ghanaḥ’s Book of Roots, David 
Kimḥi’s treatise by the same name, and Nathan ben Yeḥiel’s Arukh. 
He thereby bases his etymological discussions on what would be consid-
ered in the Middle Ages a solid linguistic footing. Perhaps more 
interesting, there are elements in Levi’s approach that are reminiscent 
of some of the kabbalistic approaches to the commandments, at least in 
form if not in content. This topic deserves further investigation.
While Levi may have gone down in history as a heretical thinker 
whose treatise was banned by the Rashba, from his discussion we can 
discern that he was looking for ways to maintain and enhance the value 
of the commandments. Many of the commandments were converted 
into symbolic acts, though not theurgic ones,103 the appreciation of 
which required both philosophic study and the study of the entire 
rabbinic tradition. Whatever one may think of this endeavor, one that 
weds the prophets and the rabbinic sages to Aristotelian philosophers 
and occult scientists, at least one thing clearly emerges from the reading 
of this passage from Levi’s treatise. Only one with a profound knowl-
edge and commitment to Jewish law and lore could have written it.104
Conclusion
Let us return to Maimonides. I began this chapter by asking why he 
includes a discussion of the reasons of the commandments as part of the 
Guide, when the purpose of his treatise as he presents it is to offer an 
explanation of the secrets of the Torah that are presented in Scripture 
103 Some of his naturalistic explanations, on the other hand, would strike today’s 
reader as being essentially magical, since they are predicated on astrological beliefs. 
On the distinction between natural and magical, see Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: 
The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), 618-622.
104 One reading the polemical literature against the philosophic camp in the controver-
sies of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries may come away with the impression 
that the more radical members of this camp were not well versed in rabbinic tradi-
tion. In the case of Levi at least, as well as Nissim, who could be considered even a 
more radical rationalist, this was definitely not the case. The immersion of these 
thinkers in rabbinic tradition, and not just those who were known as “moderate” 
Maimonideans, such as Menaḥem HaMeiri, deserves a separate study.
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in parable form. The reasons for the commandments are not listed by 
him among the secrets of the Torah, and he explicitly indicates that the 
commandments are not to be treated as parables. Herbert Davidson 
has adduced textual evidence in support of his conclusion that Maimon-
ides did not have most of the Guide written when he wrote the 
introduction.105 If Davidson is correct, the Guide may in fact have 
really been a work in progress, with its final shape taking place in the 
course of the writing. It follows from this view that Maimonides’ 
lengthy discussion of the commandments may not have been part of his 
original plan for the treatise. Rather it was the result of a decision in 
the midst of the work to write a broader theological work and to include 
additional topics that are crucial for an understanding of the rela-
tion between Judaism and Aristotelian philosophy. He felt the need 
to complete the picture, as it were. What is the overall purpose of 
the Torah and the reason for its specific commandments, particularly 
those that appear to have no discernible reason, is certainly a cause for 
perplexity for one grounded in both traditions, one that calls for an 
explanation.
One can only hypothesize why Maimonides was boldly willing to 
offer a historical relativistic view for so many of the commandments in 
the course of discussing this topic. It should be noted that most, though 
certainly not all, of the commandments to which his historical explana-
tion applies were not being practiced in Maimonides’ time, most 
notably all the commandments involving the Sanctuary. His explana-
tion suggests that Jews are not worse off for it, though they are certainly 
worse off in his view for not living in a sovereign Jewish state ruled by 
Jewish Law.106 Moreover, his approach to the commandments suggests 
105 See Herbert Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 327-334. In Davidson’s view, this point helps 
explain the absence of instances of discernable contradictions in the Guide, and the 
overall absence of any esoteric teachings. As Maimonides continued to write the 
Guide, he changed his mind about introducing contradictions as a writing tech-
nique or introducing esoteric teachings. I do not think that Davidson is right 
concerning the issue of Maimonides’ esotericisim, but further evidence can be 
adduced for his basic position that the introduction was written prior to the actual 
writing of much of the treatise.
106 See, for example, his remarks on living in exile in Guide 2.36.
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a historic dynamism in which progress could be made in creating a more 
perfect religion within the framework of Mosaic Law.107 His repeated 
insistence that the law is immutable108 comes to address Maimonides’ 
contemporary concerns. It does not negate the view that he regards 
these commandments as far from ideal in his own time, let alone in the 
messianic future.109 This is not to question his belief in the view that in 
the time of the messiah all the commandments will again be practiced.110 
It is to argue that Maimonides’ focus is on the present. He develops a 
view of the messianic future that best supports what he is trying to 
accomplish in the here and now amidst the multiple challenges that 
confront Judaism from within and without.111 In regard to the command-
ments whose rationale is a historical relativistic one and that continued 
to be practiced in Maimonides’ time, religious existential reasons could 
be substituted for historical ones, as he at times does in the Mishneh 
Torah, in order to maintain their relevance.
It is not without much irony that one of the main charges against 
the medieval Provençal Jewish philosophers in the controversies that 
erupted in the first half of the thirteenth century and then at the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century is that they allegorize the Torah and its 
commandments. In other words they follow the same route taken by 
the Christians.112 Yet it was not for the purpose of throwing off the yoke 
107 One should note also Maimonides’ attempts to limit the scope of the Oral Law, 
which from a legal perspective broadened the scope of laws that could be changed 
with the reconvening of the Sanhedrin in the messianic period. See Kreisel, 
Maimonides’ Political Thought, 21-22.
108 See particularly the ninth principle of faith in his Commentary on the Mishnah: 
Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq.
109 Maimonides alludes to this point when he subtly suggests that were a prophet to 
come in his own period, he would not command sacrifices; see Guide 3.32.
110 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and their Wars 11.1.
111 See above, chapter 2, 38-39.
112 This point emerges clearly from the letters accompanying R. Solomon Ibn Adret’s 
ban against the allegorical preachers, signaling out Levi; see Abba Mari of Lunel, 
Sefer Minḥat Qena’ot, ed. Haim Z. Dimitrovsky (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 
1990), 726-737. For a study of the conflict over philosophical allegorization in 
Provence in its social context see Ram Ben-Shalom, “Communication and Propa-
ganda between Provence and Spain: The Controversy over Extreme Allegorization 
(1303-1306),” in Communication in the Jewish Diaspora, ed. Sophia Menache 
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 171-177.
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of the Law that they bring allegorical explanations or that they contin-
uously strive to look for naturalistic ones, but in order to underscore 
the eternal relevance of each of the commandments as against Maimon-
ides’ historical relativism. It is Maimonides in this area who was in 
reality the most radical of Maimonideans.
Introduction
In an exceptional treatise written in Provence at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, Ma‘aseh Nissim by Nissim of Marseille, its author 
devotes part of his discussion of providence to an explanation of the 
significance of prayer.1 He writes as follows:
I heard of one who included another form of providence and safe-
guarding to those we mentioned—the attainment of foreknowledge, 
which enables one to plan how to save oneself from fortuitous occur-
rences. Indeed, to my way of thinking this is not very far from 
common sense. Namely, they say that when the soul of a person 
conjoins with God by way of prayer and by fully concentrating on 
wisdom [or science], the spirit of understanding comes about [in 
him]. Due to this faculty, which leads the body and the faculties of 
the soul as a whole, the person will endeavor [to save himself]. Even 
when he falls ill and is at the threshold of death, he will arouse 
himself to pray to God and conjoin with Him, and depict [in his 
mind] the intelligibles and recall the wonders of the Creator and His 
actions. By transforming his potential intellect to an actual one, he 
1 On the author and his treatise, see above, chapter 6.
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strengthens his natural power and may be saved. Potentiality is 
incomplete existence and actuality is complete existence. An intel-
lect in actuality comes about in one who meditates, which [in turn] 
disseminates in his soul a lofty power. He receives a new emanation 
that he did not possess from the outset when his intellect was in 
potentia. Therefore, it is not implausible that his soul as a whole will 
be strengthened. For the human soul is a single soul possessing many 
activities.2 It—that is to say, the human soul—emanates from the 
Active Intellect. Therefore, when there comes about an increment in 
the emanation from it to the human soul, the power of the soul as a 
whole is strengthened in all of its activities. . . . 
If you should say: it follows from this that the human being will 
have a greater lifespan and fewer diseases than any other living 
species, yet we see that the opposite is true. Namely, there are species 
that have a greater lifespan, and on the whole, they all have fewer 
diseases than human beings. Moreover, sometimes we find a 
simpleton who is always healthy and a wise person in poor health. 
We will answer you: there are diverse reasons for this, such as the 
difference in temperaments as well as physical makeups that vary in 
strength and weakness. There are those easily affected [by external 
matters], and others [affected] with difficulty. But if one posits two 
individuals with identical temperaments who are stricken by the 
same illness of equal severity at the same time, and they arrive at the 
threshold of death, and one represents to himself and mulls over 
the vanities of the world, its illusions and things that pollute the 
intellect and darken its light, and the other represents in his heart 
the wonders of the Creator and abandons all other thoughts, and he 
prays to Him, and transforms his intellect from a potential one to an 
actual one, and is strengthened by what he grasps of the intelligi-
bles—it is not implausible to claim that the one on whose soul 
emanates a divine emanation, and the spirit of understanding comes 
about in him, and his intellect becomes actual after being a potential 
one, that the power of his soul as a whole will strengthen more than 
that of the person who is of the opposite description. Maimonides 
wrote in the second part [of the Guide of the Perplexed], chapter 
thirty-eight, regarding the faculty of divination and the faculty of 
courage as follows: “When the intellect emanates upon these two 
faculties they become greatly strengthened,” in addition to the 
imagination. For the traits [of the soul] and the imagination leave 
a recognizable impress upon natural things. The individual’s 
confidence by virtue of his prayer will help him. So the first indi-
vidual will die, while the power of the second will be strengthened 
2 This is the view of Aristotle. See Maimonides, Eight Chapters, chapter 1.
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and he will be saved and return to his well-ordered affairs and live 
a long life.
According to this view, it is fitting for our entire nation to pray 
constantly in times of crisis more than other nations, even though 
they [the other nations] ridicule us for this, considering it the way of 
women, and of no value. You know that it is a positive command-
ment to pray at a time of crisis.3 It is possible, as we have indicated, 
that by strengthening the faculty of the intellect, all the faculties of 
the soul will be strengthened, and that what was at first hidden will 
be revealed to them, as well as the way of being saved. Moreover, it 
is possible that someone will receive something akin to the power of 
prophecy, enabling him to know what will happen. In addition, their 
power will be strengthened by their confidence and the hope instilled 
by their prayer, and they will fight mightily with [all] their heart and 
soul against the enemy that oppresses them. Everything that the 
Torah commanded is for our benefit. As Plato noted: “We are inca-
pable of understanding, and our intellects fall short [in grasping] 
what the [divine] laws convey to us.”4
Our Sages said in the chapter “When the Trial has Ended”: “He 
below who devotes his strength to prayer has no enemies on high . . . 
and all who are on high augment his strength” [BT Sanhedrin 44b]. 
It is possible that they hinted by this to what we have already indi-
cated—that [when he prays] he then strives with all the power of his 
soul to attain the emanation from on high. For this reason [the words 
for] prayer (tefillah) and supplication (taḥanun) are in the reflexive 
form. One says: mitpallel, and it is written: va-etḥannan to God 
[Deuteronomy 3:23]. Our Sages said: “Va-etḥannan. It should be 
[written] va-eḥannan [intensive form of the verb]! This teaches us 
that Moses made himself into supplications to God.”5 It is possible 
that for this reason it is written: In all places where I cause my name 
3 See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed 1.36; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Fasting 
1.1. Maimonides subsumes this obligation under the Torah commandment to sound 
the trumpets in the Temple during the offering of sacrifices, as well as when evils 
befall us; see Book of Commandments, positive commandment 59. For a discussion 
of this obligation, see below.
4 This dictum, based on Plato’s Apology 20d-e, was popular in medieval Arabic and 
Hebrew literature. Halevi brings a variation of it in Kuzari 4.13 and 5.14. Nissim’s 
formulation is closest to the one found in the Hebrew translation of the Arabic 
philosophical treatise, Moznei ha-‘Iyyunim, chapter 11, with which he was 
acquainted, and which he (wrongly) ascribes to Averroes based on Levi ben Avra-
ham’s Livyat Ḥen; see above, chapter 8, 304-305.
5 I was not able to locate the rabbinic source of this citation. Nissim apparently 
borrowed this citation from Levi ben Avraham; see below. For a similar midrash 
see BT Sanhedrin 44a; Deuteronomy Rabbah 2.4.
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to be pronounced, I will come to you and bless you [Exodus 20:21]. 
Our Sages said regarding David: “The entire time that his mouth did 
not cease from learning, the Angel of Death had no dominion over 
him.”6 Our Sages also said: “Prayers were instituted in place of the 
daily sacrifices” [BT Berakhot 26b]. The sacrifices came to arouse 
and awaken the power of prophecy, and to strengthen the faculty of 
the intellect and the faculties of imagination and divination. Simi-
larly, prayer comes to strengthen the power of the soul: either in the 
manner that they [the sacrifices] did, or by strengthening his natural 
power in order to save him from illness, or by strengthening his 
[faculty of] divination and imagination by turning his thought to the 
matter [at hand] and pondering it constantly. The perfect good imag-
ination will move a person to choose the good path in all matters to 
which the representation of the intellect does not extend. For this 
reason, one who prays with the proper intent does not fail for the 
most part. The essence of prayer is the intent, not the movement of 
the lips while the heart is not at one with them, troubled instead by 
illusory matters and the vanities of the world, for then there will not 
come to him an emanation and supernal power. For this reason 
David said: and renew a steadfast spirit in me [Psalms 51:12], since a 
new power and a steadfast spirit will come about in one who prays 
with intent.
Because of all these ways [regarding the efficacy of prayer] that 
complement the intellect, how much injustice to his soul and body is 
inflicted by one who is negligent and lenient concerning prayer! In 
addition—that is to say, regarding prayer—his heart will then not 
become haughty. This will inhibit his appetitive soul, and he will 
remember all of God’s acts of loving-kindness in all the goods 
bestowed upon him.7
The connection between one’s character traits, prayer and foretelling 
the future was presented by Nissim also earlier in his treatise, in the 
context of dealing with the rewards promised by the Torah for observing 
its commandments:
6 Nissim paraphrases from the story found in BT Shabbat 30b. 
7 Nissim of Marseille, Ma‘aseh Nissim, ed. Howard Kreisel (Jerusalem: Mekize 
Nirdamim, 2000), chapter 13, 196-199 (Heb.). All translations in this chapter are 
my own, except for those from the Guide of the Perplexed, which are taken from the 
translation of Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). For 
further statements of Nissim on prayer, see Ma‘aseh Nissim, 290, 292. 
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There is a person who is better prepared for this than others—either 
by nature or by his traits and behavior—and is aided in this by his 
abandonment of the affairs of the lower world and its pleasures and 
imaginary honor. He is forbearing and does not disturb his senses 
and his imagination with the vanities of the world. As a result, it is 
possible that a power reaches him akin to the power of prophecy 
regarding some occurrence soon to take place, so he can seek mercy 
concerning it, as though the future occurrence arouses him to this. 
The person in question will not strive for that which cannot be 
attained by him, because his imagination will not arouse him to it. 
His imagination will arouse him to strive only for that which can be 
attained by him. So it may occur that when he prays the heavens will 
give rain and a cure will soon come to the sick, and if this worshipper 
is a prophet, he will learn and divine the future concerning these 
matters.8
As can be seen from his discussion, Nissim draws an integral connec-
tion between prayer and the contemplation of the intelligibles—the 
eternal truths regarding God and the structure of the world—which 
characterizes human perfection. Furthermore, he suggests three reasons 
for the efficacy of prayer in attaining what is beseeched. 1) Prayer 
results in the reception of an emanation from the Active Intellect that 
strengthens the intellect of the worshipper together with other faculties 
of his soul, such as imagination and courage. As a result, the worshipper 
by his own enhanced powers may overcome illness, defeat his enemies, 
etc. 2) Conjunction with the supernal world (i.e., the Active Intellect) 
may come about as a result of prayer, which in turn leads to prophecy, 
or to a similar phenomenon, enabling the person to divine the future 
and take the necessary steps to attain his objective—conjunction, 
prophecy, and the ability to foretell the future being regarded by Nissim 
as natural phenomena.9 3) Prayer humbles the spirit of the worshipper 
by reminding him of his nature and the superiority of the Creator. It 
thereby brings about in him extreme humility, which is critical for the 
welfare of his soul and body, by curbing his physical inclinations.
8 Ma‘aseh Nissim, chapter 10, 121-122.
9 For a discussion of this issue, see above, chapter 6, 185-190.
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In Nissim’s discussions of the reasons for prayer, God’s direct 
activity is conspicuous by its absence. There is no mention of God 
hearing the worshipper and granting him his request, or taking delight 
in the praises uttered by the worshipper and rewarding him accord-
ingly. Despite the fact that prayer is addressed to God, God plays no 
active role vis-à-vis the worshipper aside from being the object of 
contemplation and the ultimate source of the constant emanation that 
the worshipper in a naturalistic manner prepares himself to receive. 
Completely missing here is any allusion to the traditional conception of 
the nature of prayer.
We can succinctly summarize the primarily reason that Nissim 
presents an approach that is far different than that of the Sages—the 
penetration of Aristotelian-Neoplatonic philosophy in its Arabic form 
into medieval Jewish thought. Nissim, as is the case with an entire 
circle of Western European Jewish intellectuals in the Middle Ages, 
accepted the Aristotelian view of God as a completely unchanging 
deity, who is not cognizant of individuals as they exist in history and is 
not effected by any external factors, and consequently the world 
behaves solely in accordance with natural law. God is the First Cause 
of all that occurs in the world, but not the immediate one. According to 
the Aristotelian worldview, a deity who is cognizant of individuals, 
hears their prayers and answers them, is inevitably a deity whose 
essence is composed of different thoughts, whose knowledge and will 
continuously change, and who acts in accordance with external influ-
ences—in short, a deity who is not the absolute One and the unchanging 
First Cause as proven by the philosophers. For the Jewish thinker who 
sought to remain loyal to the Torah and its commandments while 
accepting the Aristotelian view of God, a different significance to 
prayer had to be found to replace the one rooted in the notion of a 
personal deity.
Even medieval Jewish thinkers who did not adopt such an extreme 
position negating any connection between God and human beings in 
history were often influenced by philosophic ideas, which led them to 
grasp prayer in a different manner than in earlier periods. Special atten-
tion was paid to the idea of an ontological conjunction between the 
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human soul and the higher realm, and the need for a process of purifi-
cation of the soul in order to reach this supreme state. No less important 
was the idea of an impersonal constant emanation of forces from the 
supernal world upon everything in the sublunar world that is prepared 
to receive them. According to this view, the types of reward depicted in 
biblical and rabbinic literature held little value in comparison to the 
pleasure experienced by the soul in its union with the supernal world. 
Any reason given to the commandments in general and to prayer in 
particular is secondary to their function in purifying the soul in order 
to attain this state.
This approach can be readily discerned in the thought of Judah 
Halevi, despite his rejection of the approach of the Aristotelian philos-
ophers.10 In the third part of Kuzari, he presents an extensive discussion 
of the nature and significance of prayer in the life of the pious indi-
vidual. He depicts prayer as a summoning by the faculty of intellect 
belonging to the pious individual of all the senses and other faculties of 
the soul, after providing each of them with its needs, in order that they 
should “aid him to conjoin with the level above it, namely the divine 
level, which is above the level of the intellect.”11 Halevi describes this 
level as one of conjunction with al-Amr al-Ilāhī (the Divine Matter), 
and goes on to elaborate upon the manner in which prayer leads to it.12 
Halevi’s description of the activity of al-Amr al-Ilāhī is reminiscent of 
the philosophers’ description of the activity of the Active Intellect. 
Halevi himself points out the similarity between them: “Al-Amr al-Ilāhī 
awaits one who is worthy to conjoin with it, and to be for him a lord, as 
in the case of the prophets and pious, just as the Intellect awaits all 
those whose natures are perfected and whose soul and character traits 
10 On Halevi’s dialectical relationship with Aristotelian philosophy, see Howard 
Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Kuzari: Between the God of Abraham and the God of 
Aristotle,” in Joodse filosofie tussen rede en traditie, ed. Reinier Munk and F. J. 
Hoogewould (Kampen: Kok, 1993), 24-34.
11 Kuzari 3.5.
12 Ibid. 3.11-17. Halevi’s conception of al-Amr al-Ilāhī has been the source of 
conflicting scholarly interpretations. For a discussion of this issue, see Howard 
Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2001), 136-140.
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are well balanced, in order that it will alight upon them in a perfect 
manner, as in the case of the philosophers.”13
If many of the thinkers who maintained the view of a personal 
deity who intervenes in nature approached prayer primarily as an 
activity of contemplation and preparation for conjunction, and not 
one which primarily consists of talking to God, all the more so is this 
the case with those thinkers who did not think that God was at all 
capable of listening to the speech of human beings. Yet even among the 
circle of Jewish intellectuals that adopted the Aristotelian worldview 
and hinted at this conclusion, Nissim’s discussion of prayer remains 
exceptional in the explicitness of its philosophical approach.
Maimonides
As is true of all the Jewish philosophers of Provence, the most forma-
tive influence on Nissim’s thought was exercised by Maimonides. 
Maimonides deals with the meaning of prayer in several passages in the 
Guide of the Perplexed, and his approach to this topic has drawn the 
attention of a number of scholars.14 The interpretations of Maimon-
ides’ approach in large measure are dependent upon the question of the 
extent to which he accepted the Aristotelian worldview regarding all 
that pertains to the relationship between God and the world. As we 
have seen in several of the previous chapters, differences of opinion 
regarding the answer to this question characterize the history of the 
interpretation of Maimonides’ thought from the very beginning of the 
dissemination of his writings, and these differences are conspicuous 
13 Kuzari 2.14.
14 See in particular Ehud Benor, Worship of the Heart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). 
Benor deals also with the interpretations of earlier scholars such as Marvin Fox and 
Oliver Leaman. See also Isadore Twersky,”’And One Should Regard Oneself as if 
Facing the Lord’: Intention in Prayer according to Maimonides,” in Knesset Ezra: 
Literature and Life in the Synagogue, ed. Shulamit Elizur, M. D. Herr, Gershon 
Shaked, and Avigdor Shinan (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute. 1994), 47-67 (Heb.); 
Gerald Blidstein, Prayer in Maimonidean Halakha (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 
1994), 77-122 (Heb.). Maimonides’ description in Guide 3.51 of the prayer of one 
aspiring to the perfection of the intellect has served as a focal point for much of the 
scholarly analysis of his approach; for a further discussion of this issue, see below.
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even among the medieval disciples of Maimonides in Provence.15 It 
appears to me that a careful reading of Maimonides’ writings strengthens 
the hypothesis that at the foundation of his teachings stands the Aris-
totelian philosophic view of the Deity,16 and his approach to prayer 
stems from this view. Maimonides sees in prayer primarily a stimulus to 
contemplation and the attainment of the supreme truths on the part of 
the intellectual elite. As for the masses, it serves to strengthen their 
belief in God. The view that God listens to prayers and answers them, 
when interpreted literally, is essentially a myth intended for the masses, 
though it is a philosophic myth that is true in a non-literal sense. In the 
present context I will bring only a general outline of this interpretation 
of Maimonides’ understanding of prayer.
The most famous and controversial passage regarding prayer is 
Maimonides’ comment on this subject in Guide 3.32, mentioned in the 
course of his discussion of sacrifices.17 He regards sacrifices as a form of 
historical compromise reflecting God’s “gracious ruse” in devising a 
way to wean the Israelites away from false beliefs and the practices that 
reinforce them to true beliefs and superior practices. At the time of the 
Giving of the Torah, sacrifices were the universal means of worship-
ping the stars, who were considered to be gods by all the nations of the 
world. God did not demand of Israel to abandon completely the modes 
of worship to which they were accustomed, “for a sudden transition 
from one opposite to another is impossible. And therefore man, 
according to his nature, is not capable of abandoning suddenly all to 
which he was accustomed” (526). Maimonides goes on to explain:
15 For studies dealing with this issue see, for example, Aviezer Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn 
Tibbon and the Esoteric Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 6 
(1981): 87-123; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 2000), 50-79 (Heb.). For a discussion of the esoteric interpretation of 
Maimonides through the ages, see in particular Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of 
the Guide of the Perplexed: Between the Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries,” 
in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1990), 159-207.
16 This is the basic position that I have argued throughout this volume. For a summary 
of my position, see Maimonides’ Political Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 
1-23. 
17 See above, chapter 10, 366.
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His wisdom, may He be exalted, and His gracious ruse, which is 
manifest in regard to all His creatures, did not require that He give 
us a Law prescribing the rejection, abandonment, and abolition of all 
these kinds of worship. For one could not then conceive the accep-
tance of [such a Law], considering the nature of man, which always 
likes that to which it is accustomed. At that time this would have 
been similar to the appearance of a prophet in these times who, 
calling upon the people to worship God, would say: “God has given 
you a Law forbidding you to pray to Him, to fast, to call upon Him 
for help in misfortune. Your worship should consist solely in medita-
tion without any works at all.” (Ibid.)
According to Maimonides, God does not tamper with human nature to 
prepare humanity to reach the desired state immediately. Rather, He 
commands them in conformity with their nature, taking under consid-
eration their long held beliefs and ingrained practices. The implication 
of Maimonides’ comment is that prayer in its legal form and content 
is also a form of “gracious ruse”—not one that is historically relative, 
as are sacrifices, but one that still takes under consideration the beliefs 
of the masses. There is an ideal form to worship God, which consists 
of the pure contemplation of Him and His acts—i.e., the structure of 
the world. 
The first intention of the Law, according to Maimonides, is “the 
apprehension of God and the rejection of idolatry” (527). Sacrifices 
pertain to the “second intention”—that is to say, acts that are crucial in 
light of historical circumstances for removing the obstacles to attain the 
first intention, though they are not desirable in themselves. If God had 
not enjoined sacrifice, the nation would continue to sacrifice to other 
god because of their being accustomed to this form of worship. Instead, 
the Torah commands this mode of worship but transfers it from the 
planets to God. Maimonides implies that if it were not for this histor-
ical circumstance, one that is no longer relevant to his own period, God 
would not have commanded sacrifices at all.18 The evidence that 
Maimonides brings to show that they belong to the second intention, 
18 This is not to imply that Maimonides secretly advocates the abolition of sacrifices 
in the messianic period, as some of the German Jewish Reformers sought to inter-
pret him; see George Y. Kohler, Reading Maimonides’ Philosophy in 19th Century 
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and not the first, is the fact that the Torah restricts sacrifices to a single 
place, only in the period in which there is a Temple, and allows only the 
priests to perform this activity. This shows that the Torah seeks to make 
the people less dependent upon sacrifices as a mode of worship in their 
daily lives. “Invocation, prayer, and similar practices and modes of 
worship,” on the other hand, “come closer to the first intention and are 
necessary for its achievement” (527). Therefore, Maimonides argues, 
prayer is permitted everywhere and enjoined upon everyone.19
Maimonides is very careful in his formulation. Prayer comes “closer” 
to the first intention and is in fact necessary for its attainment on the part 
of the masses, presumably throughout history, but it is not the first inten-
tion itself. The continuous contemplation of God on the basis of true 
opinions is the final purpose of the Torah, and also that of human beings 
qua human beings. This notion is presented in many passages in Maimon-
ides’ writings and not only in the Guide of the Perplexed.20
The notion that prayer is close to the first intention but far from 
the ideal emerges from yet another passage in which this subject is 
mentioned. In Maimonides’ discussion of divine attributes in chapter 
fifty-nine of the first part of his treatise, he insists that one must not 
ascribe to God any positive attributes. God can only be described by 
negative attributes or by attributes of action. In light of this position, 
he writes:
The most apt phrase concerning this subject is the dictum occurring 
in the Psalms: Silence is praise to You [Psalms 65:2], which inter-
preted signifies: silence with regard to You is praise. This is a most 
perfectly put phrase regarding this matter. For of whatever we say 
intending to magnify and exalt, on the one hand we find that it can 
have some application to Him, may He be exalted, and on the 
other we perceive in it some deficiency. Accordingly, silence and 
limiting oneself to the apprehensions of the intellects are more 
Germany: The Guide to Religious Reform (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), index: sacri-
fices. I discuss the reason why this is not the case in chapter 2, 26-29.
19 Prayer is considered by Maimonides to be a commandment of the Torah and not 
simply a rabbinic injunction. For a discussion of this issue, see Blidstein, Prayer in 
Maimonidean Halakha, 23-68.
20 See, for example, Guide 1.1; 3.8: 27, 51, 54; Introduction to the Commentary on the 
Mishneh; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 4.8-13.
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appropriate—just as the perfect ones have enjoined when they said: 
Commune with your own heart upon your bed, and be still. Selah. You 
also know their famous dictum—would that all dicta were like it. I 
shall quote it to you textually, even though it is well remembered, so 
as to draw your attention to the various significations it expresses. 
They have said: “Someone who came into the presence of Rabbi 
Ḥaninah said [in prayer]: God the Great, the Valiant, the Terrible, 
the Mighty, the Strong, the Tremendous, the Powerful. Thereupon 
[Rabbi Ḥaninah] said to him: Have you finished all the praises of 
your Master? Even as regards the first three epithets [used by you], 
we could not have uttered them if Moses our Master had not 
pronounced them in the Law and if the men of the Great Synagogue 
had not [subsequently] come and established [their use] in prayer. 
And you come and say all this. What does this resemble? It is as if a 
mortal king who had millions of gold pieces were praised for 
possessing silver. Would this not be an offense to him” [BT Berakhot 
33b]? Here ends the dictum of the perfect one. Consider in the first 
place his reluctance and unwillingness to multiply the affirmative 
attributes. Consider also that he has stated clearly that if we were left 
only to our intellects we should never have mentioned these attri-
butes or stated a thing appertaining to them. Yet the necessity to 
address men in such terms as would make them achieve some repre-
sentation—in accordance with the dictum of the Sages: “The Torah 
speaks in the language of the sons of man” [BT Yevamot 71a]—
obliged resort to predicating of God their own perfections when 
speaking to them. It must then be our purpose to draw a line at using 
these expressions and not to apply them to Him except only in 
reading the Torah. However, as the men of the Great Synagogue, 
who were prophets, appeared in their turn and inserted the mention 
of these attributes in the prayer, it is our purpose to pronounce only 
these attributes when saying our prayers. According to the spirit, this 
dictum makes it clear that, as it happened, two necessary obligations 
determined our naming these attributes in our prayers: one of them 
is that they occur in the Torah, and the other is that the prophets in 
question used them in the prayer they composed. Accordingly, we 
should not have mentioned these attributes at all but for the first 
necessary obligation; and but for the second necessity, we should not 
have taken them out of their context and should not have had 
recourse to them in our prayers, while you continue to use [in prayer 
additional] attributes. (139-141)
This passage nicely reflects the position that Maimonides later brings in 
Guide 3.32. The contemplation of God’s negative attributes and 
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attributes of action—i.e., the structure of the world and the intercon-
nection of all its parts—is the true praise of God and the profoundest 
“prayer.” Nevertheless, there is a necessity to compromise with the 
intellectual capacities of the masses. The descriptions of God in Scrip-
ture and in the fixed formula of prayer established by the Sages are the 
result of this compromise. Those leading the prayer service should rest 
satisfied with this compromise and not multiply God’s attributes, for 
otherwise they contribute to the erroneous inclination of the masses 
to ascribe to God positive attributes. Against this inclination of the 
masses Maimonides fought his entire life, even with legal instruments 
that he had at his disposal as a rabbinic authority.21
Maimonides continues his discussion by presenting a biting critique 
of a prominent trend that he discerns in his own period, which further 
supports this false conception of God—namely, the sermons and reli-
gious poems that entered into the prayer service:
Thus what we do is not like what is done by the truly ignorant who 
spoke at great length and spent great efforts on prayers that they 
composed and on sermons that they compiled and through which 
they, in their opinion, came nearer to God. In these prayers and 
sermons they predicate of God qualificative attributions that, if 
predicated of a human individual, would designate a deficiency in 
him. For they do not understand those sublime notions that are too 
strange for the intellects of the vulgar, and accordingly took God, 
may He be magnified and glorified, for an object of study for their 
tongues; they predicated attributes of Him and addressed Him in all 
the terms that they thought permitted and expatiated at such length 
in this way that in their thoughts they made Him move on account 
of an affection. They did this especially when they found the text of 
a prophet’s speech regarding these terms. Thereupon they had full 
license to bring forward texts that ought to be interpreted in every 
respect, and to take them according to their external meaning, to 
derive from them inferences and secondary conclusions, and to 
found upon them various kinds of discourses. This kind of license is 
frequently taken by poets and preachers or such as think that what 
they speak is poetry, so that the utterances of some of them consti-
tute an absolute denial of faith, while other utterances contain such 
rubbish and such perverse imaginings as to make men laugh when 
21 See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 196-200.
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they hear them, on account of the nature of these utterances, and to 
make them weep when they consider that these utterances are 
applied to God, may He be magnified and glorified. (141)22
In the following chapter, Maimonides explains the philosophical implica-
tion of the view that God possesses positive attributes: “I shall not say 
that he who affirms that God, may He be exalted, has positive attri-
butes either falls short of apprehending Him or is an associator or has 
an apprehension of Him that is different from what He really is, but I 
shall say that he has abolished his belief in the existence of the Deity 
without being aware of it” (Guide 1.60: 145). Maimonides’ reasoning is 
straightforward. Any being who possesses positive attributes cannot be 
the Deity, so to imagine that the Deity possesses positive attributes is 
to imagine a non-existent being as the Deity. On the other hand, the 
true Deity, the absolute One, is not accepted by this person at all. In 
light of this far-reaching conclusion, one can appreciate Maimonides’ 
biting critique in chapter fifty-nine of all those who contribute to this 
false conception.
In his categorization of the commandments in Guide 3.35, Maimon-
ides includes the commandment to pray in the ninth class, together 
with the other commandments that he brings in Mishneh Torah: Book 
of Love. He writes: “The utility of this class is manifest, for it is wholly 
composed of works that fortify opinions concerning the love of the 
Deity and what ought to be believed about Him and ascribed to Him” 
(537). He reiterates this view in his discussion of this class in chapter 
forty-four. Thus prayer was not established in order to talk to God, 
according to Maimonides, but rather to think about Him in a certain 
manner. True love of God, as Maimonides describes it in the Guide as 
well as in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah, results only 
from the proper philosophical understanding of God and the world.23 
In general, Maimonides offers a startling definition of the category of 
commandments that are treated by the Sages as being between human 
22 On Maimonides’ exceptionally negative attitude toward liturgical poetry, and his 
willingness to make some compromises on this issue, see Blidstein, Prayer in 
Maimonidean Halakha, 123-149.
23 For a study of this issue, see Maimonides’ Political Thought, 225-266.
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beings and God: “For every commandment, whether it be a prescrip-
tion or a prohibition, whose purpose it is to bring about the achievement 
of certain moral quality or of an opinion or the rightness of actions, 
which only concerns the individual himself and his becoming more 
perfect, is call by them [a commandment dealing with the relation] 
between man and God” (Guide 3.35: 538). In this case, too, Maimon-
ides removes the dimension of “relationship” that is seemingly involved 
in the fulfillment of these commandments, because there cannot be any 
immediate relationship between God and human beings.
It is true that Maimonides does not appear to negate completely 
the view of God acting in history, and one may justly claim that many 
of the prayers are based on this view. Moreover, it appears that 
Maimonides views prayer not only as a medium to engage in medita-
tion but also as a way to attain God’s help. In chapter thirty-six of the 
third part of the Guide, Maimonides deals with the first class of 
commandments, which include those that he brings in Laws of Princi-
ples of the Torah. These are commandments involving “fundamental 
opinions,” as Maimonides labels them in chapter thirty-five. To this 
class of commandments Maimonides attaches the commandment to 
pray and fast in times of crisis, which is found in an entirely different 
section of the Mishneh Torah—the Book of Times, Laws of Fasts. 
Maimonides explains why in the Guide he includes this commandment 
with those involving fundamental opinions:
In the same way the commandment given to us to call upon Him, 
may He be exalted, in every calamity—I mean its dictum: Then you 
shall sound an alarm with the trumpets [Numbers 10:9]—likewise 
belongs to this class. For it is an action through which the correct 
opinion is firmly established that He, may He be exalted, appre-
hends our situations and that it depends upon Him to improve them, 
if we obey, and to make them ruinous, if we disobey; we should not 
believe that such things are fortuitous and happen by chance. This is 
the meaning of its dictum: And if you walk with Me in the way of 
chance [Leviticus 26:21], by which it means: if you consider that the 
calamities with which I cause you to be stricken are to be borne as a 
mere chance, I shall add for you unto this supposed chance its most 
grievous and cruel portion. This is the meaning of its dictum: [And if 
you] walk with Me in the way of chance, then I will walk with you in 
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the way of a furious chance [Leviticus 26:27-28]. For the belief that 
this is chance contributes to necessitating their persistence in their 
corrupt opinions and unrighteous actions, so that they do not turn 
away from them; thus it says: Thou has stricken them, but they were 
not affected [Jeremiah 5:3]. For this reason we have been commanded 
to invoke Him, may He be exalted, and to turn rapidly toward Him 
and call out to Him in every misfortune. (Guide 3.36: 539-540)
It is important to stress that Maimonides describes the opinion that 
God apprehends the circumstances of the individuals and can mend 
them a “correct” or “true” opinion.24 This point contradicts the inter-
pretation I have been advancing till now in regard to Maimonides’ 
conception of God, as well as his approach to the significance of prayer. 
Still other opinions voiced by Maimonides in his discussion of indi-
vidual providence and of God’s knowledge of particulars support the 
interpretation that Maimonides views God as being personally involved 
in dispensing rewards and punishments. Nonetheless, there are also 
opinions that he presents that are not in harmony with the view that 
God is directly involved in what happens to the individual. For example, 
he opens his discussion of the Torah’s approach to individual provi-
dence with the far-reaching claim:
It is likewise one of the fundamental principles of the Law of Moses 
our Master that it is in no way possible that He, may He be exalted 
should be unjust, and that all the calamities that befall men and the 
food things that come to men, be it a single individual or a group, are 
all of them determined according to the deserts of the men concerned 
through equitable judgment in which there is no injustice whatso-
ever. Thus if some individual were wounded in the hand by a thorn, 
which he would take out immediately, this would be a punishment 
for him, and if he received the slightest pleasure, this would be a 
reward for him—all this being according to his deserts. Thus He, 
may He be exalted, says: For all His ways are judgment, and so on 
[Deuteronomy 32:4]. But we are ignorant of the various modes of 
deserts. (Guide 3.17: 469)
24 Compare Maimonides’ distinction between true opinions and (politically) neces-
sary ones in Guide 3.28.
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While his remarks suggest that God is personally involved in all the 
goods and evils that befall every individual, he continues his discussion 
by arguing the view that individual providence is earned only by the 
righteous in accordance with their intellectual attainment:
It follows necessarily according to what I have mentioned in the 
preceding chapter that when any human individual has obtained, 
because of the disposition of his matter and his training, a greater 
portion of this overflow than others, providence will of necessity 
watch more carefully over him than over others—if, that is to say, 
providence is, as I have mentioned, consequent upon the intellect. 
Accordingly divine providence does not watch in an equal manner 
over all the individuals of the human species, but providence is 
graded as their human perfection is graded. In accordance with this 
speculation it follows necessarily that His providence, may He be 
exalted, that watches over the prophets is very great and propor-
tionate to their degree in prophecy and that His providence that 
watches over excellent and righteous men is proportionate to their 
excellence and righteousness. For it is this measure of the overflow 
of the divine intellect that makes the prophets speak, guides the 
actions of righteous men, and perfects the knowledge of excellent 
men with regard to what they know. As for the ignorant and disobe-
dient, their state is despicable proportionately to their lack of this 
overflow, and they have been relegated to the rank of the individuals 
of all the other species of animals: He is like the beasts that speak not 
[Psalms 49:13]. (Guide 3.18: 475)
According to this passage, ignorant-evil individuals do not merit indi-
vidual providence at all, and from this perspective they are similar to 
animals. In the previous chapter, Maimonides did not leave even a 
shadow of doubt regarding his position concerning animals—God does 
not direct toward them the evils each one individually suffers or the 
goods each one enjoys, but they occur fortuitously. Each individual 
benefits solely from the general providence that belongs to it as a 
member of its species—that is, the means by which it can preserve its 
life for a period of time and propagate its species.
Maimonides essentially presents two different approaches to indi-
vidual providence: 1) individual providence extends to all members of 
the human race equally, and it includes rewards and punishments in 
this world in accordance with a person’s just deserts; 2) individual 
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providence is in accordance with the intellectual attainment of the indi-
vidual and involves only the safeguarding of the righteous from evils. 
One who does not merit individual providence is exposed to all the 
evils that occur by chance. Even according to the second approach, 
Maimonides’ position is open to two conflicting interpretations: A) 
God watches over the wise and righteous person directly, so individual 
providence is both personal and miraculous. B) Individual providence, 
like general providence, is naturalistic. The one who perfects his intel-
lect and his character traits does not suffer from most of the evils that 
afflict those who pursue vain goals, such as the attainment of wealth, 
luxuries, and power. Moreover, the perfect individual attaches no 
importance to the physical evils that at times befall him. In his eyes 
they have no connection to final perfection, which is the perfection of 
the intellect. Finally, the essence of the person who attains ultimate 
perfection is that of pure intellect detached from the body, and is there-
fore unaffected by what happens to the bodily limbs. According to this 
interpretation, the physical evils that occur to human beings are not 
really fortuitous from the perspective of the one who is afflicted, insofar 
as they befall him because he had not attained perfection—and many 
could have been avoided if he had at least striven to attain it—even 
though they were not directed to him personally by the world order or 
by divine action. This interpretation is in harmony with Maimonides’ 
exegesis of the story of Job, which he treats as a philosophical parallel.25 
It also holds the key to understanding Maimonides’ perplexing remarks 
concerning providence in Guide 3.51, where he writes:
A most extraordinary speculation has occurred to me just now 
through which doubts may be dispelled and divine secrets revealed. 
We have already explained in the chapters concerning providence 
that providence watches over everyone endowed with intellect 
proportionately to the measure of his intellect. Thus providence 
always watches over an individual endowed with perfect apprehen-
sion, whose intellect never ceases from being occupied with God. 
25 Guide 3.23-24. For a study of Maimonides’ interpretation of the story of Job, see 
Robert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 43-77.
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On the other hand, an individual endowed with perfect apprehen-
sion, whose thought sometimes for a certain time is emptied of God, 
is watched over by providence only during the time when he thinks 
of God; providence withdraws from him during the time when he is 
occupied with something else. . . . On the other hand, he who has no 
intellectual cognition at all of God is like one who is in darkness and 
has never seen light. . . . Hence it seems to me that all prophets or 
excellent and perfect men whom one of the evils of this world befell, 
had this evil happen to them during such a time of distraction, the 
greatness of the calamity being proportionate to the period of 
distraction or to the vileness of the matter with which he was occu-
pied. . . . The providence of God, may He be exalted, is constantly 
watching over those who have obtained this overflow, which is 
permitted to everyone who makes efforts with a view to obtaining it. 
If a man’s thought is free from distraction, if he apprehend Him, 
may He be exalted, in the right way and rejoices in what he appre-
hends, that individual can never be afflicted with evil of any kind, 
For he is with God and God is with him. When, however, he aban-
dons Him, may He be exalted, and is thus separated from God and 
God separated from him, he becomes in consequence of this a target 
for every evil that may happen to befall him. For the thing that 
necessarily brings about providence and deliverance from the sea of 
chance consists in that intellectual overflow. Yet an impediment may 
prevent for some time its reaching the excellent and good man in 
question, or again it was not obtained at all by such and such imper-
fect and wicked man, and therefore the chance occurrences that 
befell them happened. To my mind this belief is also shown as true 
by a text of the Torah; He, may He be exalted, says: And I will hide 
My face from them and they shall be devoured . . . [Deuteronomy 
31:17]. It is clear that we are the cause of this hiding of the face, and 
we are the agents who produce this separation. . . . Everyone who 
has rendered himself so worthy that the intellect in question over-
flows toward him, has providence attached to him, while all evils are 
prevented from befall him. (625-626)
Maimonides elaborates on the last point, interpreting Psalms 91 (Song 
on Mishaps) in accordance with this view:
He [David] then goes on to describe the protection against the plot-
ting of men, saying: If you should happen to pass on your way a 
widely extended field of battle and even if one thousand were killed 
to your left and ten thousand to your right, no evil at all would befall 
you. . . . It is as if he said that this individual is protected because he 
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has known Me and passionately loved Me. You know the difference 
between the terms “one who loves” (oheb) and “one who loves 
passionately” (ḥosheq); an excess of love (mahabbah), so that no 
thought remains that is directed toward a thing other than the 
Beloved, is passionate love (‘ishq). (626-627).26
While Maimonides’ remarks may be interpreted as indicating God’s 
miraculous protection of the individual in question, they are best 
understood in accordance with the interpretation presented above. 
Individual providence is completely naturalistic, with the human intel-
lect being the instrument of its expression and not only the reason for 
meriting it. God does not directly watch over the one who perfects his 
intellect; rather the perfection of the intellect allows the individual to 
avert many physical evils, and protects him from suffering physical evils 
even in instances when those evils affect his bodily state. This interpre-
tation was suggested by some of Maimonides’ medieval interpreters 
and echoed by some of his modern ones.27 To reinforce this point, 
Maimonides concludes the chapter with a description of ecstatic death 
due to the strength of one’s apprehension and passionate love of God, 
which he notes “in true reality is salvation from death.” In this manner, 
he indicates that the essence of this individual is that of pure intellect, 
unaffected by what happens to his bodily state, and he continues to 
persist in this state through eternity.
26 In regard to passionate love, compare Maimonides’ remarks in Mishneh Torah, 
Laws of Repentance 10.3. For a discussion of this issue, see Adiel Kadari, Studies in 
Repentance: Law, Philosophy and Educational Thought in Maimonides' Hilkhot 
Teshuvah, (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 245-252 
(Heb.). For a discussion of the terms for love in Maimonides, see Steven Harvey, 
“The Meaning of Terms Designating Love in Judaeo-Arabic Thought and Some 
Remarks on the Judaeo-Arabic Interpretation of Maimonides,” in Judaeo-Arabic 
Studies, ed. Norman Golb (Amsterdam: Psychology Press, 1997), 175-196.
27 Samuel Ibn Tibbon suggests this interpretation in his letter to Maimonides; see 
Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of 
Providence,” HUCA 11 (1936): 341-366. For modern interpreters who argue this 
view, see in particular Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concepts of Providence and 
Theodicy,” HUCA 43 (1972): 169-206; Charles Touati, “Les deux théories de 
Maïmonide sur la providence,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual 
History, ed. Siegfried Stein and Raphael Loewe (Alabama: Alabama University 
Press, 1979), 331-344. 
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Returning to Maimonides’ comments on prayer in Guide 3.36, we 
may conclude that he purposefully formulates his position in a manner 
that will be interpreted by the ordinary reader as maintaining that God 
personally punishes those who turn away from Him and will cease these 
punishments if they return to Him. This is what prompts the individual 
to pray to God and to reform his ways. Yet in light of Maimonides’ 
approach to providence, we can appreciate the true purport of his 
remarks. Repenting from sins and embarking upon the path of righ-
teousness are what prevents many of the same evils from afflicting the 
individual in the future, while obstinacy to continue in one’s evil ways 
only brings in its wake more evils because of the lifestyle one leads. It 
is for this reason that Maimonides includes the commandment to repent 
in the class of commandments involving “fundamental principles,” 
mentioning it immediately after the commandment to call upon God in 
times of crisis. It is clear according to his position that prayer alone will 
not help the individual if it is unaccompanied by a change of behavior. 
As opposed to the common believer, the non-perfect philosopher does 
not see the hand of God behind the evils befalling the individual, but 
regards them as fortuitous occurrences. This leads him to the completely 
erroneous conclusion that there is no connection between these evils 
and the behavior of the individual. In light of this conclusion he may 
see no reason to reform his ways, and, in turn, he will inevitably be 
afflicted by more evils. Only the true philosopher understands that 
there is an integral connection between the evils afflicting an individual 
and his behavior and the state of his intellect, even if the evils that 
befall an individual are not directed to him personally by the Deity. 
Thus Maimonides can label as a correct opinion the view that evils that 
befall us are not “fortuitous.” Rather they are all tied to our failure to 
achieve perfection.
The special form of worship of those aspiring to perfection, 
described by Maimonides in Guide 3.51, adds yet a further perspective 
to the significance he attaches to prayer. Maimonides stresses the 
importance of contemplation during prayer rather than its formal 
aspect. His aim is to bring the Jew who observes the commandments to 
a state in which he continuously contemplates God even when he is 
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engaged in daily mundane tasks. Prayer serves as a crucial intermediate 
step in this process. Maimonides describes the process as follows:
Know that all the practices of the worship, such as reading the Torah, 
prayer, and the performance of the other commandments, have only 
the end of training you to occupy yourself with His commandments, 
may He be exalted, rather than with matters pertaining to this 
world; you should act as if you were occupied with Him, may He be 
exalted, and not with that which is other than He. If, however, you 
pray merely by moving your lips while facing a wall, and at the same 
time think about your buying and selling; or if you read the Torah 
with your tongue while your heart is set upon the building of your 
habitation and does not consider what you read; and similarly in all 
cases in which you perform a commandment merely with your 
limbs—as if you were digging a hole in the ground or hewing wood 
in the forest—without reflecting either upon the meaning of that 
action or upon Him from whom the commandment proceeds or upon 
the end of the action, you should not think that you have achieved 
the end. Rather you will then be similar to those of whom it is said: 
You are near in their mouth, and far from their reins [Jeremiah 12:2]. 
From here on I will begin to give you guidance with regard to the 
form of this training so that you should achieve this great end. 
The first thing that you should cause your soul to hold fast onto is 
that, while reciting the Shema‘ prayer, you should empty your mind 
of everything and pray thus. You should not content yourself with 
being intent while reciting the first verse of Shema‘ and saying the 
first benediction. When this has been carried out correctly and has 
been practiced consistently for years, cause your soul, whenever you 
read or listen to the Torah, to be constantly directed—the whole of 
you and your thought—toward reflection on what you are listening 
or reading. When this too has been practiced consistently for a 
certain time, cause your soul to be in such a way that your thought is 
always quite free of distraction and gives heed to all that you are 
reading of the other discourses of the prophets and even when you 
read all the benedictions, so that you aim at meditating on what you 
are uttering and at considering its meaning. If, however, while 
performing these acts of worship, you are free from distraction and 
not engaged in thinking upon any of the things pertain to this world, 
cause your soul—after this has been achieved—to occupy your 
thought with things necessary for you or superfluous in your life, and 
in general with worldly things, while you eat or drink or bathe or 
talk with your wife and your small children, or while you talk with 
the common run of people. . . . When, however, you are alone with 
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yourself and no one else is there and while you lie awake upon your 
bed, you should take great care during these precious times not to set 
your thought to work on anything other than that intellectual 
worship consisting in nearness to God and being in His presence in 
that true reality that I have made known to you and not by way of 
affections of the imagination. In my opinion this end can be achieved 
by those of the men of knowledge who have rendered their souls 
worthy of it by training of this kind. And there may be a human 
individual who, through his apprehension of the true realities and 
his joy in what he has apprehended, achieves a state in which he 
talks with people and is occupied with his bodily necessities while 
his intellect is wholly turned toward Him, may He be exalted, so 
that in his heart he is always in His presence, may He be exalted, 
while outwardly he is with people. (622-623)
Prayer, according to this approach, is primarily an important means to 
the contemplation of God, by setting aside fixed periods of time for 
this purpose. Maimonides does not indicate in detail what should be 
the content of this contemplation, but he ties it to the true apprehen-
sion of God, in opposition to thoughts that are the product of one’s 
imagination. He thereby alludes to contemplation of the truths of the 
natural sciences and metaphysics, or the divine science, which he 
describes at the beginning of the chapter when he speaks of the knowl-
edge of the perfect ones who enter the palace of the king.
It appears that on this point one can discern a continuity between 
Maimonides’ discussion of prayer in Mishneh Torah and his position in 
the Guide. At first glance it is surprising that he does not elaborate 
upon the notion of intent (kavvanah) in his presentation of the laws 
regarding prayer in the Mishneh Torah. Even when he deals with the 
laws pertaining to praying with intent, he does not elaborate upon this 
notion. He devotes only one clause or halakhah to define what type of 
intent is necessary:
What is the [proper] intent? He should empty his heart of all 
thoughts and view himself as though standing in the presence of 
God (Shekhinah). Therefore, one must sit awhile before prayer in 
order to focus one’s heart, and afterwards pray in tranquility and 
with [feelings of] supplication. He should not pray as if bearing a 
burden that he discards and then departs. (Laws of Prayer 4.16)
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Maimonides’ formulation here is meant to be reminiscent of the 
description of the attainment of prophecy that he brings earlier in 
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 7.1.28 There he speaks 
of the individual’s philosophic apprehension of all that exists. It appears 
that Maimonides did not wish to enter into detail concerning the 
contents of the proper intent, in order to enable each one to fulfill the 
command to pray in accordance with the level of his intellectual attain-
ment. He does not eliminate the aspect of prayer as speaking to God 
or requesting one’s needs. The implicit message he wishes to convey, 
however, is clear. Contemplation on the basis of true notions of God 
and His connection to the world is the primary purpose of prayer.
According to my interpretation of Maimonides’ approach, the value 
of prayer for the masses is mainly pedagogical. The belief that God 
listens to prayers and answers them is, when understood literally, a 
necessary one for the masses in order to fortify their belief in God and 
their commitment to the Torah and its commandments. For those 
aspiring to true perfection, the commandment to pray mandates fixed 
times to be set aside for contemplation and encourages this activity. 
The question remains whether we can ascribe to prayer any additional 
value in an Aristotelian universe, either for the masses or for the intel-
lectual elite. The tendency among the Jewish philosophers of Provence 
was to answer this question in the affirmative. As we have seen, Nissim 
shows how the demand to pray not only has educational value, but also 
brings in its wake practical benefits to the worshipper in this world as 
well as aiding him in his preparations to merit the next. Prayers are 
often answered, and not only those of the intellectually perfect, despite 
the fact that God is not cognizant of the individual and his prayers. 
Nissim presents the boldest expression of this approach, but he is not 
alone in holding it. He belongs to a Jewish philosophical school of 
thought in Provence that originated with Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who not 
only translated the Guide into Hebrew but was also the father of the 
esoteric philosophical approach to understanding Maimonides, as well 
28 For a discussion of this point, see Maimonides’ Political Thought, 245-252. See also 
Blidstein, Prayer in Maimonidean Halakha, 23-33.
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as the Bible and rabbinic midrash.29 Ibn Tibbon’s family continued to 
develop this philosophical approach, and other Jewish philosophers in 
Provence followed in their footsteps, some of them who also touched 
upon the issue of prayer.
The Jewish Philosophers of Provence
One of the early Jewish philosophers who understood the significance 
of prayer in light of a naturalistic theory regarding divine providence is 
Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s son, Moses.30 In response to his father’s query to 
Maimonides concerning the latter’s theory of providence, Moses Ibn 
Tibbon argues that Maimonides’ naturalistic view is close to trans-
parent. Furthermore, he sees an affinity between Maimonides’ approach 
and that of Ibn Ezra. Moses Ibn Tibbon divides providence into two 
types, both of them operating in a naturalistic manner, and he describes 
them as follows:
Verily the degree of God’s providence and the saving of the wise 
from temporal calamities is proportionate to the degree of their 
wisdom and their intellect, since their heart and intellect more fully 
protect them from all that is in the province of intellect to guard 
against. It [the intellect] is the interceding angel,31 which is found in 
one among a thousand human beings, as it is written: one man from 
a thousand I found [Ecclesiastes 7:28]. But God’s providence for His 
servants and righteous ones lies in His emanating upon them the 
divine prophetic wisdom after their attainment of the truths of 
the intellect. This is the superior form of providence, for in accor-
dance to what reached their intellect from the perfect intellect, till 
they are in constant conjunction with Him, they are saved from all 
fortuitous events and mishaps. For they are constantly conjoined 
with God and the eye of God is upon them, so they will not suffer 
from any iniquity and crime. Abraham Ibn Ezra already said: “When 
the part [the individual] knows everything (ha-kol), it conjoins with 
29 See, in particular, Ravitzky, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric Character of the 
Guide of the Perplexed,” 87-123. See also Carlos Fraenkel, From Maimonides to 
Samuel Ibn Tibbon: The Transformation of Dalālat al-Hā’irīm into the Moreh 
Nevukhim, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007) (Heb.).
30 On this thinker and his works see above, chapter 4.
31 See Job 33:23; cf. Guide 3.23.
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the All (ha-kol), and it creates in everything signs and wonders.”32 
Insofar as the heart of the individual who has attained this level is 
with God, there will be revealed to him the things that will occur 
and all their contingent characteristics, and he will then escape them 
and counter them by prayer and divine service and by his knowledge 
of the decrees of the heavenly rulers of the earth [that is to say, of 
the stars], and by his change of name and location, and he will avoid 
the astrological decree destined for him and annul the effects of the 
constellations.33
For Moses Ibn Tibbon, prophecy is the primary expression of the 
higher form of providence, for through it one learns of future evils to 
be avoided and one may even attain the ability to perform miracles.34 
While Maimonides does not mention foreknowledge explicitly as an 
expression of providence, it certainly is implicit in his approach.35 
However, Ibn Tibbon, taking his cue from Ibn Ezra rather than 
Maimonides, ties foreknowledge not only with prophecy but also with 
knowledge of astrology—a view that comes to dominate Jewish philos-
ophy in Provence despite Maimonides’ polemical stance against it.36 
It is clear from the passage just cited that Ibn Tibbon sees prayer as 
one of the measures that help counter the evils destined to befall the 
individual, but he does not elaborate on why this is so. As we have 
seen above, it is precisely this problem that Nissim addresses in his 
comments on the efficacy of prayer.
In his Sefer Pe’ah, Ibn Tibbon devotes a chapter to a discussion 
of the commandment to pray. In this context, he essentially follows 
32 See Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Numbers 20:8.
33 Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of Provi-
dence,” 363-364.
34 On the prophet as miracle worker in Ibn Ezra’s thought, see Aviezer Ravitzky, 
“The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in 
Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University, 1984), 231-272. See also above, chapter 9, 321.
35 In Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 10.3, Maimonides goes so far as 
to view divination as the main public function of prophecy.
36 For a study of astrology in medieval Jewish thought see Dov Schwartz, Astral Magic 
in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1999) (Heb.). 
For Maimonides’ critique of astrology, see, for example, Y. Tzvi Langermann, 
“Maimonides’ Repudiation of Astrology,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 123-158.
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Maimonides’ pedagogical approach. One of the questions he addresses 
is why the Sages chose the word tefillah for prayer, which comes from 
the root meaning to pass judgment, and not the word meaning thanks 
(hoda’ah) or supplication (teḥinnah). He answers as follows:
Perhaps because the nature of the human being is for each indi-
vidual to request help from his Lord, and to implore Him to grant 
him all his needs, and to thank him for all the goodness [He bestowed 
upon him]—it was called tefillah in order to awaken him to the fact 
that all of God’s actions are righteous and just, and his own deeds 
will bring him closer [to God] or distance him. In accordance with 
his conjunction with God will be the providence he attains and his 
being safeguarded. He should justify God for both the good and the 
evil . . . .37
In this passage we see that prayer for Ibn Tibbon is essentially a call to 
introspection rather than a call to God.
In his encyclopedia Livyat Ḥen,38 Levi ben Avraham, a younger 
contemporary of Moses Ibn Tibbon,39 also devotes a chapter to a discus-
sion of prayer.40 As in the case of Maimonides, he does not explicitly 
negate the idea that God listens to the prayers of human beings, and he 
even opens the chapter with the statement: “We are obligated to believe 
that God accepts the prayer of one who prays before Him with a 
pure heart.”41 Yet from the continuation of the chapter, one can clearly 
discern that God in Levi’s view does not act in a direct and personal 
manner toward the worshipper. Like his philosophical predecessors, 
37 The Writings of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and 
Avraham Israel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 
143 (Heb.).
38 On this encyclopedia and its author, see above, chapter 5.
39 As pointed out in chapter 5, Levi was in close contact with Ibn Tibbon in the 
period when they both lived in Montpellier, and he borrows heavily from his 
writings.
40 Unfortunately, this chapter has survived only in the shorter version of the encyclo-
pedia and it appears in Levi ben Avraham, Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of the Faith and 
the Gate of the Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University 
of the Negev Press, 2014), 21-27 (Heb.). For an English translation of this chapter, 
see the appendix below.
41 Ibid., 21.
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Levi stresses the importance of praying with the proper thoughts. 
Prayer should be said aloud in other to strengthen one’s intent and 
concentration. The purpose of prayer is to attain conjunction with God 
and the world of the Separate Intellects. Levi is very critical of the 
masses, who are more concerned with the outer trappings of the prayer 
service, and by way of his criticism one can learn of some of the customs 
involving prayer in Provence in the second half of the thirteenth 
century. Levi’s mastery of Jewish legal and homiletic literature finds 
its expression throughout the chapter. Legal discourses and midrashic 
opinions are all interpreted in light of his philosophic approach. 
Levi distinguishes between two forms of prayer: praise and 
requests. Praise is the primary form in his view, and it essentially takes 
the form of contemplating God and His acts. Levi notes that it is 
regarding this form of prayer that the Talmud remarks: “Would that he 
prays the entire day.”42 This form of prayer also results in foreknowl-
edge enabling the worshipper to save himself from impending evils. In 
this manner, Levi notes, God heeds the prayer of the worshipper 
without experiencing any change thereby.43
Even the more moderate Maimonideans in Provence were influ-
enced by this philosophic approach to prayer, as we can see in the case 
of the early fourteenth-century thinker David ben Samuel HaKokhavi:44
One of my colleagues engaged in speculation asked me: insofar as it 
is within the person’s choice to choose the path of goodness and 
truth, why pray to God to guide us in His commandments and show 
us His path and return us to Him when the matter is dependent upon 
our choice? I responded to him that according to our belief, when we 
42 Ibid., 23.
43 Ibid., 26.
44 For a brief description of HaKokhavi’s composition Sefer ha-Batim, or Kiryat Sefer 
as the treatise was called by the author, see above, chapter 10, note 23. HaKokhavi 
was almost certainly acquainted with Levi’s encyclopedia and draws numerous 
interpretations from it; see Gavriel Hanuka, “The Philosophy and Halakhic 
Theory of R. David d’Estelle” (PhD thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2014) (Heb.), who 
points out many parallels between the two thinkers. Levi is never mentioned by 
name, but numerous opinions brought by HaKokhavi in the name of “one of the 
men of speculation,” including in his discussion of prayer, can be found in Levi’s 
encyclopedia.
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pray to Him with intent, He hears our prayers and will remove from 
us the obstacles to knowing His path and the truth. The prophets 
and those speaking by means of the Holy Spirit already spoke of this 
in several places, together with the fact that the purpose of prayer 
is to serve as a reminder to the intelligent to transform their poten-
tial intellect into an actual one, and then they will speak by means of 
the Active Intellect and unite with it.45
While HaKokhavi appears to be of the opinion that God personally 
aids the worshipper to achieve the desired end, though this point 
requires further investigation, the end itself that he posits is identical 
to that posited by the Aristotelian philosophers, with prayer serving as 
an important pedagogical aid in achieving it. Throughout his discus-
sion, HaKokhavi reiterates the point that the proper intent in prayer is 
to comprehend God in accordance with human ability.46 At the founda-
tion of prayer are not the various requests on the part of the worshipper 
or even his praises of God, but the contemplation of God and attain-
ment of the truths grasped by the intellect.
The final thinker I wish to explore is Gersonides, who composed 
his works in the first half of the fourteenth century.47 Unfortunately, in 
his philosophic magnum opus, The Wars of the Lord, Gersonides does 
not deal with prayer. He mentions it only in passing in the context of 
his discussion of miracles, the topic with which he closes his treatise. 
He points out the fact that often miracles occurred as a result of the 
prayer of the prophet,48 and goes on to analyze the connection between 
miracles and prophecy. He views both phenomena as expressions of 
individual providence. According to Gersonides, miracles result from 
the activity of the Active Intellect in response to the level of perfection 
45 Sefer ha-Batim, vol. 2 (Sefer Mizvah), ed. Moshe Hershler (Jerusalem: Makhon 
Shalem, 1983), 87; See Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom, 205.
46 Sefer ha-Batim, vol. 2, 82, 86, 88-90.
47 For a study of Gersonides and his thought, see Charles Touati, La pensée 
philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973). See 
also Seymour Feldman, Gersonides: Judaism within the Limits of Reason (Oxford: 
Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010).
48 The Wars of the Lord 6.2.9, trans. Seymour Feldman, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1999), 471.
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attained by the prophet and his achievement of “conjunction,”49 without 
the Active Intellect being aware of those who merit this special type of 
providence. Gersonides essentially posits two types of order operating 
in the world. The first is the natural order of the stars and the powers 
emanating from them upon the earth. This order not only determines 
all changes in sublunar matter, but even influences the individual’s 
thoughts and choices. Human beings, however, have the power to 
choose to act in a manner that is contrary to these influences, in accor-
dance with the directives of the intellect. The second order is that of 
the impersonal activity of the Active Intellect vis-à-vis those who reach 
the level of perfection, which enables them to receive from it a special 
emanation. This emanation assumes the form of prophetic divination, 
or similar phenomena, which enables the individual to foresee the evils 
that are to occur as a result of the influence of the stars and escape 
them. This special emanation from the Active Intellect at times even 
results in the neutralization of the negative influences from the stars on 
this individual, as well as others with whom he is in contact. Gerson-
ides apparently sees prayer as helping the prophet prepare himself 
to achieve the state in which he merits this special emanation that 
results in the occurrence of miracles on his behalf.50
In his commentaries on the Bible, Gersonides deals with prayer in 
several passages. It should be noted that he does not adopt a different 
philosophical approach in his commentaries from the one he presents in 
the The Wars of the Lord.51 Moreover, he often refers the reader to the 
49 “Conjunction” (devekut) in the writings of Gersonides does not indicate an onto-
logical state, but the level of perfection of the intellect by virtue of which a person 
merits prophecy or miracles occurring on his behalf. For a study of this topic, see 
Seymour Feldman, “Gersonides on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Agent 
Intellect,” AJS Review 3 (1978): 99-120.
50 I touched upon Gersonides’ view of miracles and providence above, chapter 9, 
337-342. For a further study of this issue see Prophecy: The History of an Idea in 
Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 392-396. 
51 For a study of philosophic ideas in Gersonides’ biblical commentaries, see, for 
example, Seymour Feldman, “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis,” in his translation 
of The Wars of the Lord, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1987), 
213-247. See also Charles Touati, “Les idées philosophiques et théologiques de 
Gersonide dans ses commentaires bibliques,” Revue des sciences religieuses, 28 
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relevant section in his philosophic treatise where he deals in depth with 
a notion that he mentions in his commentary. Nevertheless, insofar as 
the commentaries were intended for a more general Jewish audience 
than the one for which his philosophic treatise was intended, he pres-
ents his views in them in a manner more appropriate for a traditional 
audience. In general, he avoids mentioning the activity of the Active 
Intellect, ascribing its activity directly to God instead, particularly 
those actions that result from the attainment of individual providence. 
The impression many of his comments leave on the average reader is 
that God is in fact capable of acting in a personal manner.
For example, commenting on Genesis 25:21—And Isaac entreated 
God for his wife because she was barren—he writes: “When it became 
clear to Isaac that the failure to give birth was due to his wife and not 
to him, he prayed to God, may He be exalted, on behalf of his wife that 
He mend her ability to give birth by way of a miracle, so that she could 
give birth for him. God, may He be exalted, heard his prayer and she 
became pregnant.”52 At the end of the section, in the second lesson he 
brings regarding this story, Gersonides elaborates on this view: 
“Concerning opinions, it informs us that God, may He be exalted, 
watches over those conjoining with Him, to grant them the benefits 
they request, not only for themselves but also for their loved ones. The 
reason for this is that they are distressed when benefits are denied their 
loved ones. As a consequence, God, may He be exalted, brings the 
benefits to their loved ones in order to alleviate the distress, which is a 
type of evil, from those who conjoin with Him. Thus you find that 
Isaac’s prayer to have sons by Rebecca is granted him.”53 The reader who 
is not acquainted with Gersonides’ philosophic approach will not find 
in his comments any idea that is problematic from a traditional perspec-
tive, nor will he be sensitive enough to the problem that Gersonides 
(1954): 335-367; Robert Eisen, Gersonides on Providence, Covenant, and the Chosen 
People (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). 
52 Ralbag, Commentary on Genesis, ed. Baruch Braner and Eli Freiman (Jerusalem: 
Maaliyot, 1993), 333 (Heb.).
53 Ibid., 336.
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wishes to solve—namely, if individual providence is attained by a person 
as a result of the perfection he achieved without God being cognizant 
of him, how can those who did not achieve this perfection (in this case, 
Rebecca) still merit individual providence? His answer is that the prov-
idence in this case is really attained by Isaac and not Rebecca. One may 
claim with a great deal of justice that Gersonides does not present a 
cogent explanation for how God can “answer” Isaac’s prayer without 
being acquainted either with him, his prayer, or Rebecca—a problem 
I have discussed in a different context.54 It is important to stress, 
however, that Gersonides thought that his approach to individual prov-
idence did in fact supply a cogent explanation for these miraculous 
events, and in the context of this approach he understands the efficacy 
of prayer.
The connection between prayer, perfection, and conjunction 
emerges from other passages in his commentaries. For example, in his 
commentary on Exodus 9:29, he mentions the importance of location 
and mental “isolation” (hitboddedut) in Moses’ preparations, in order 
that his prayer be heeded. In his commentary to Deuteronomy 4, lesson 
1, he ties the praise of God at the beginning of Moses’ prayer to his 
apprehension of God, which prepares him for individual providence 
and enables his subsequent entreaty to be granted. These ideas are 
reiterated in his commentaries on other biblical books as well.55 At 
times Gersonides does not limit the possibility of conjunction to the 
intellectually perfect, but sees others having attained this state as a 
result of prayer.56 What is critical is that the individual pray with the 
proper intent; Gersonides does not attach any particular significance to 
the specific words that are uttered. He also discusses the limits of what 
can be accomplished by means of prayer. He explains that it is forbidden 
to pray for that which is conceptually impossible—for example, that 
54 See Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 440-444.
55 See, for example, his commentary to I Samuel 1:3; II Samuel 22:4; II Samuel 24, 
lesson 3; I Kings 8:39-52; I Kings 11, lessons 24, 28, 29; Job 33:33.
56 See, for example, his commentary to I Samuel 7, lessons 7 and 12.
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God change the past—but one can pray for other types of miracles.57 
Despite the fact that Gersonides formulates his exegetical comments in 
a manner that suggests that the heeding of the worshipper’s prayer is 
due to God’s miraculous intercession, it is clear that one must under-
stand them in accordance with the approach to providence he presents 
in his philosophical treatise. The order of the world, particularly the 
emanation flowing from the Active Intellect, is designed to answer the 
prayers of those attaining the level of conjunction, without God being 
acquainted with the worshipper or his prayers.
In conclusion, the approach to prayer on the part of the more 
radical Jewish philosophers in Provence, who remained committed to 
the Torah and its commandments, and even of Maimonides himself, 
reflects a sharp break from the traditional conception of God being 
personally aware of the individual’s prayers and who has the power to 
grant the worshipper’s requests. No room was now left for any imme-
diate connection between God and the worshipper. The significance of 
prayer was understood in light of the impersonal workings of the world 
order, with the stress placed on the salutary effects of the act of prayer 
on the worshipper himself. Contemplation of philosophical truths was 
viewed as the ultimate form of prayer, and conjunction with the Active 
Intellect its ultimate goal. Even those not attaining this goal were 
shown to benefit from prayer in a variety of ways. These philosophers 
attempted to guide their readers to an appreciation of this view, 
which at the same time would lead to a purer form of worship. This 
approach was certainly not the only one to be found among the followers 
of Maimonides in Provence, though even the more moderate camp was 
strongly influenced by it. Much of subsequent Jewish philosophy, 
particularly in Spain, attempted to present an alternative approach to 
God’s relationship with the world, one in which God was cognizant of 
the individual’s prayers and could heed them, while showing that this 
relationship did not negate His being the absolute, unchanging One. 
This, however, is another story.
57 See his commentary to II Samuel 21, lesson 45.
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Appendix: Livyat Ḥen: On the Explanation of the 
Secret of Prayer58
We are obligated to believe that God accepts the prayer of one who 
prays to Him with a pure heart and refined and unpolluted thought, 
and clings to Him with the appropriate intent—or the hearer has intent 
when the speaker has intent59—since it is known that prayer is ineffec-
tive without intent, as they said: “The worshipper must focus his heart” 
[BT Berakhot 31a], and they also said: “A person must always gauge 
himself; if he can focus—he should pray” [BT Berakhot 30b]. If he 
prays without intent, his prayer is not a prayer, and he should go back 
and pray with intent.60 They said: “According to the intent of the heart 
are the words” [BT Megillah 20b]. Therefore the men of antiquity 
would tarry for an hour and then pray.61 For this reason it [prayer] is 
called “service of the heart,” in order that one remove from one’s 
heart the vanities of the world. They commanded to stand in prayer 
after engaging in words of Torah,62 since the intent and [mental] 
representation is the principal thing that Scripture commands, as it 
is stated: Ponder it on your bed and sigh [Psalms 4:5].63 He censured 
the one who utters the name of God with his mouth and lips, but his 
heart is far from Him.64 The law is in accordance with Rabbi Judah, 
who says that if he did not utter it [the Shema‘] while hearing it with 
his ears, he fulfills his obligation.65 Nevertheless, one must do so de 
jure, as we learnt in a baraitha: “A person should not say the blessing 
after meals in his heart, but if he does, he fulfills his obligation” 
58 The translation of this chapter is based on my edition, Livyat Ḥen: The Secrets of 
the Faith and the Gate of the Haggadah, 21-27.
59 In the case when one does not pray oneself but hears the prayer of another. The 
person fulfills his obligation if he so intended while listening and the reciter also 
intended that the hearer fulfill his obligation.
60 See BT Berakhot 30b; Mishneh Torah, Laws of Prayer 4.15.
61 Mishnah Berakhot 5.1.
62 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Prayer 4.18.
63 See BT Berakhot 4b.
64 See Isaiah 29:13.
65 BT Berakhot 15a.
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[BT Berakhot 15a]. Verily, by the utterance with the lips the intent 
adheres and is strengthened.
It is stated: “Rabba did not decree a fast on a cloudy day” [BT 
Berakhot 32b]. The reason for this is that the intellect is turbid on a 
day of clouds, because the power of the soul is pure when the air is 
pure. It is a separating partition,66 [preventing] one from focusing in a 
suitable manner.67 It is stated: You have screened yourself off with a 
cloud, that no prayer may pass through [Lamentations 3:44], for iniquities 
are an obstructing cloud, as it is stated: Your iniquities have separated 
[you from your Lord] [Isaiah 59:2].68
Chapter “From When does One Mention”: “The prayer of a 
person is not heard unless he places his soul in his hand, as it is stated: 
Let us lift up our hearts to our hands to the Lord in the heavens [Lamenta-
tions 3:41]” etc. [BT Ta‘anit 8a]. But due to our worries and discords in 
exile, our intent is not pure.69 We learnt in Tractate ‘Eruvin [65a]: 
“R. Eliezer said: I could have exonerated the entire world from the 
[failure to fulfill properly the] law of prayer, as it is stated: Hear now 
this, those who are afflicted and drunken but not from wine [Isaiah 51:21].” 
They also said: “One who prays must set his eyes to what is below and 
his heart to what is above” [BT Yevamot 105b]. They commanded to 
prolong the saying of [the word] “one” [in the first verse of the Shema‘], 
in order to anoint Him as king in all six directions,70 but one need not 
sway one’s head in the manner that the masses do. The person should 
awaken and accustom his intellect to be in actu by means of prayer, as 
66 This idea is taken from the Guide 3.9 and 3.51, though Levi interprets it in a more 
literal manner. The notion that weather conditions influence one’s ability to think 
is tied to the doctrine of climatology, which underlies the talmudic dictum in BT 
Baba Batra 158b: “The air of the Land of Israel makes one wise.” For a study of this 
doctrine in medieval Jewish philosophy see Alexander Altmann, “The Climatolog-
ical Factor in Judah Halevi’s Theory of Prophecy,” Melilah 1 (1944): 1-16 (Heb.); 
Abraham Melamed, “The Land of Israel and Climatology in Jewish Thought,” in 
The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed. Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer 
Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zevi, 1991), 52-78 (Heb.).
67 Cf. Moses Ibn Tibbon’s explanation in Sefer Pe’ah, 31 (The Writings of Moshe Ibn 
Tibbon, 145-147). 
68 See BT Sanhedrin 65b; Maimonides, Eight Chapters, chapter 7.
69 Cf. Guide 2.36.
70 See BT Berakhot 13b.
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signified [by the verse]: Be close to Him and wholehearted [Job 22:21]. 
He should prepare his heart to unite with his Creator and to merge 
(tit‘arev) with the Pure Forms.71 He will be aroused to believe in God 
and His might, and that everything originates from Him, and that He 
is the foundation of everything, the absolute One without beginning, 
the true One.72
Know that there are two categories of prayer. The first category, 
which is the more worthy, is to unify God and to mention His praises 
and His acts, as they said: “One should always arrange His praises” etc. 
[BT Rosh HaShanah 35a]. This is called “service of the heart.” They 
also said: “One who says: A psalm of David [Psalms 145:1] three times a 
day [is guaranteed a place in the World to Come]” [BT Berakhot 4b]. 
They interpret these words to refer to verses requesting mercy, but 
“one who completes the hallel every day is a curser and blasphemer” 
[BT Shabbat 118b]. They said this, however, in order that one should 
not emulate the heretics who recite it every day, since it states: I am 
your servant the son of your maidservant [amah] [Psalms 116:16].73 Our 
master Solomon [Rashi] interpreted the son of your maidservant as indi-
cating that the [more exalted] servant is the one born of a domestic 
maidservant.74 It appears that he [David] exalted in the fact that he 
found a woman of valor who craved her husband and was observant of 
the service of God.75 Regarding this type of thanksgiving and praise, 
71 That is to say, the Separate Intellects, or more specifically, the Active Intellect. See 
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 7.1. Maimonides not only uses the 
term “Pure Forms” to designate the Separate Intellects but also the word tit‘arev to 
signify conjunction, and not the Hebrew word tidbaq. Both these terms are a trans-
lation of the Arabic word yittiṣal, which Maimonides employs in the sixth principle 
of faith in his Introduction to Pereq Ḥeleq.
72 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Principles of the Torah 1.1-7.
73 It appears that Levi is referring here to a Christian custom, based on the view that 
these psalms contain allusions to Jesus and the Virgin Birth (amah being translated 
by Christians as a young virgin). I did not find, however, any source for this custom 
in the Christian orders of prayers in the Middle Ages.
74 As opposed to one who was purchased in the market.
75 That is to say, his soul was in a body that faithfully served it in its striving for 
perfection, which is the true service of God. This metaphorical allusion, based on 
Ecclesiastes, is found in Guide, introduction and 3.8. Maimonides contrasts the 
faithful supportive wife with the one who is a harlot, that is to say, the body that 
seduces the soul to pursue corporeal pleasures. 
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they said: “Would that a person pray the entire day” [BT Berakhot 
21a]. Only he should not elaborate upon the divine attributes, in order 
not to belong to the group of whom it is said: They lied to Him with their 
tongues [Psalms 78:36]. We learnt: “Someone who came into the pres-
ence of Rabbi Ḥaninah said [in prayer]: God the Great, the Valiant, the 
Terrible, the Mighty, the Powerful, the Courageous and the Tremen-
dous. Thereupon [Rabbi Ḥaninah] said to him: Have you finished all 
the praises of your Master?” [BT Berakhot 33b].76 We learnt in the 
chapter “One who Recites”: “R. Eliezer said: One who speaks too 
much in the praise of God is uprooted from the world, as it is stated: Is 
anything conveyed to Him when I speak [Job 37:20]” [BT Megillah 18a]. 
Chapter “One who Sees”: “Let the words of a person be few before 
the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is stated: Keep your mouth from 
being rash and let not your throat be quick to bring forth speech before the 
Lord [Ecclesiastes 5:1]” [BT Berakhot 61a]. Yet one should elaborate 
upon the greatness, goodness, and righteous kindness of His acts, 
which are innumerable. No one can discern most of the types of perfec-
tion and equibalance that are found in all the existents, and their 
nature and power and special qualities. The forms, figures, and charac-
teristics, and the types of appearance, colors, and sounds generated and 
produced by nature are endless.
It is a matter of custom to praise God in song and to raise a shout to 
Him with psalms [Psalms 95:2], for by means of [song] a person will 
improve and his thought will be aroused and his soul will be joyous and 
the conjunction will be strengthened. Yet even regarding this type [of 
prayer] it is said that one for whom Torah is his craft is exempt from 
prayer.77 This is due to its fundamental superiority, for there is nothing 
more honorable than it. Furthermore, one who is engaged in the fulfill-
ment of a commandment is exempt from prayer78—for this is superior 
to Torah—unless one can fulfill both at one time. What is stated in the 
76 See Guide 1.59, cited above, 406-407.
77 See BT Shabbat 11a. This refers to a person who devotes himself entirely to the 
study of Torah.
78 See BT Succah 26a.
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Tosefta: “One who engages in Torah is exempt from phylacteries,”79 is 
due to the fact that the phylacteries require guarding and one should 
not let one’s thought wander from them, and also because the phylac-
teries are meant to serve as a reminder and an allusion, and for 
safeguarding. It was expounded: “A prayer to Habakkuk [Habakkuk 
1:1]. It should have stated: A psalm (tehilla). This comes to teach: 
Everyone who engages with the Account of the Chariot for one hour is 
treated by Scripture as though he prayed the entire day” [Bahir, 65].
The second category [of prayer] is the request of material needs. 
Of this category they said: “Can a person pray the entire day? [It was 
already explained by Daniel: And three times a day etc. [Daniel 6:11]” 
[BT Berakhot 31a]. For it is not good to add to this, as we find: “Rabba 
came upon R. Hamnuna, who was multiplying his prayers. He said to 
him: They abandon eternal life and engage in temporal life” [BT 
Shabbbat 10a]. The Sages said: “The Holy One, blessed be He, loves 
meeting places that are distinguished by [the study of] law more than 
all the synagogues” etc. [BT Berakhot 8a]. Torah and wisdom are 
“eternal life”; “more than all the synagogues,” which are “temporal 
life.” This is what they intended when they said: “One should not 
request his needs in Aramaic, for the ministering angels will not heed 
him for they are not acquainted with Aramaic” [BT Shabbat 12b]. That 
is to say, one should not overly elaborate upon requests for the needs of 
this world, and this is what he [the Sage] referred to as “Aramaic.” This 
is similar to what they meant when they said: “One should not sit on a 
bed of an Aramaean woman” [BT Berakhot 8b].80
We learnt in the chapter “They Brought out to him the Ladle”: 
“They said in the name of Shemayah: He should pronounce ‘peace’ [at 
the end of the ‘Amidah prayer] towards the right and then towards his 
left, as it is stated: At His right hand was a fiery law unto them [Deuter-
onomy 33:2], and it is stated: A thousand may fall at your side and ten 
thousand at your right hand [Psalms 91:7]. . . . Rabba saw that he [Abaye] 
pronounced ‘peace’ first towards the right. He said to him: Why do you 
79 This ruling is brought in the Mekhilta, tractate Pisḥa, 17. 
80 Levi interprets “an Aramaean woman” as a reference to sexual craving. Cf. The 
Writings of Moshe Ibn Tibbon, 144-145.
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suppose that your right hand is meant? Your left is the right of the 
Holy One, blessed be He” [BT Yoma 53b]. The interpretation of what 
was said in the name of Shemaya is: “He should pronounce ‘peace’ 
towards the right,” means towards the right of the Holy One, blessed 
be He, which is the left of the person, because the heart is there, which 
is the organ of the intellect, and there the Torah is found, which is to 
the right of the Holy One, blessed be He. Afterwards he should 
pronounce “peace” towards his right, which is the left of the Holy One, 
blessed be He. The reason for this is that the liver is mostly on the right 
side, which is the fountain of corporeal desire, and from it comes rebel-
lion and sin. For this reason he cited: A thousand may fall at your side 
and ten thousand at your right hand [Psalms 91:7], that is to say, he further 
asks of God to grant him peace from the numerous desires that are 
found on the right side, and He should make peace between the hosts 
on high and the hosts below.81 This is how it appears to me to interpret 
[the talmudic dictum]. He understood this by way of analogy to standing 
in front of a king of flesh and blood, with his left side being opposite 
the right side of the king and his right opposite [the king’s] left, as our 
Master Moses [Maimonides] wrote in chapter five of the Laws of 
Prayer.82 This is similar to: I have set God always before me; surely He is 
at my right hand [Psalms 16:8].
[Maimonides], may his memory be blessed, also said: “There is 
no doubt that what is true of one is true of the community” [Guide 
3.51].83 It appears to me that for this reason the prayer of the commu-
nity is the chosen one, for there generally will be found one or two 
select individuals. Moreover, the more select individuals there are, 
the more the emanation and the greater the good.84 God causes [His 
81 See BT Berakhot 16b-17a. Levi interprets the “hosts on high” as referring to the 
powers of the intellect and the “hosts below” to the powers of the body.
82 See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Prayer 5.11.
83 Levi employs this dictum in a different manner than does Maimonides. Maimon-
ides uses it to signify that what is true of the community—the absence of providence 
because of the community breaking their connection to God—is true also in 
the case of the individual. Levi wishes to signify that the fate of the individual and 
the fate of the community are interdependent. The blessing that falls upon the 
community includes also the individuals not worthy of it, and vice versa.
84 Cf. Kuzari 3.19.
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Indwelling to] dwell upon the notables of Israel who extoll Him in 
truth, that He sits . . . .
Know that by way of true prayer which is said with intent a person 
conjoins with the Active Intellect and reaches its level, hence [it is 
said]: [God] acquiesced to his entreaty [Genesis 25:21]. The Sages said: “I 
Supplicated [va-etḥannan – reflexive form of the verb] to God [Deuter-
onomy 3:23]. It should be: va-eḥannan [intensive form]! This teaches us 
that Moses made himself into supplications.”85 This is also the meaning 
[of their dictum]: “How do we know that the Holy One, blessed be He, 
prays [BT Berakhot 7a].”86
When God hears the prayer of His servants and righteous ones 
and guards them, no change of will and alteration in Him ensues 
thereby. By virtue of prayer and conjunction with God, a power 
emanates [upon them], which preserves them and informs them by 
way of dreams, or in a different manner, of future calamities and what 
troubles are about to occur. It teaches them the way to protect them-
selves from what is fated by the constellations, without any change in 
the will of the higher beings and suspension of their power.87 For 
example, the sage by knowing the evil that is destined to befall a 
city—by war, pestilence, or an earthquake that overturns cities and 
destroys nations—can leave the city together with his progeny and be 
saved. Or he planned to take an ocean voyage and God preserved him 
and prevented him from embarking.88 This is similar to the parable 
presented by Ibn Ezra of a horse running on a track. The wise turn to 
the sides of the road while the blind and foolish stand in the middle 
of the road and walk along the thoroughfare of the city and are tram-
pled by the feet of the horse,89 in the manner that Solomon said: 
85 I was not able to locate the source of this citation. For a similar midrash, see BT 
Sanhedrin 44a; Deuteronomy Rabbah 2.4.
86 That is to say, God’s “prayer” is His Self-Contemplation.
87 In accordance with the medieval Aristotelian view that the spheres possess a 
rational soul and the will to imitate God by their perfect motion and the forces that 
flow from them that sustain everything on earth; see Guide 2.4, 7. 
88 And the ship subsequently capsizes; see Guide 3.17.
89 See Abraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary to Exodus 33:21. The constellations are 
likened to a galloping horse.
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A prudent man foresees evil and hides; the foolish continue on and are 
punished [Proverbs 22:3].
I [now] see fit to explain a certain prayer that concerns the matter 
with which we are dealing, and many have fallen short in grasping its 
meaning. It is as follows: We learnt in the chapter “The Morning 
Prayer”: “One who travels in a place of danger should pray a short 
prayer. What is ‘a short prayer?’ R. Eliezer says: ‘May You do Your 
will in Heaven, and grant satisfaction to those who fear you below, and 
do what is good in Your eyes. Blessed be the One who hears prayer’” 
[BT Berakhot 29b]. In my opinion, the gist of the matter is: “Even 
though You fulfill Your desires and decrees in heaven and the powers of 
the stars do not change, grant satisfaction to those who fear you to 
accept willingly those decrees, or grant them a way to avoid harm from 
the constellations, and preserve them from [evil] incidents. We know 
that You undergo no change or affectation in this matter, for this is 
always Your will that has no beginning, and You forever do what is 
good in Your eyes.” We may also interpret “and do what is good in 
Your eyes”: on many occasions we cannot discern what is truly good for 
us, so You should choose and not I. In this manner we should interpret 
our saying in the blessing after meals on the Sabbath: “Grant us in 
accordance with Your wish,” that is to say, grant us repose that is in 
accordance with Your wish. This is similar to what we say in the formu-
lation [of the prayer] “You are One”:90 “A complete repose that You 
wish.” Or the meaning of “in accordance with Your wish” is: as You 
designated for us by Your prophet.
90 In the afternoon service of the Sabbath.
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